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The major powers' approaches to international intervention: an automated text analysis of the United Nations Security Council debates

Antonio Henrique Pires dos Santos

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Thesis submitted to the Postgraduate Programme in Political Science at the Federal University of Pernambuco, as a partial requirement for obtaining the title of Doctor of Political Science.

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Abstract

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), one of the six principal organs of the United Nations (UN), is primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It convenes public meetings where members discuss potential threats to international peace and share perspectives on various international conflicts. During these debates, members may highlight different facets of a situation and suggest varied courses of action to achieve conflict settlement. This thesis seeks to answer the following question: What are the differences and similarities between the UNSC permanent members' approaches to international intervention? To answer this question, this work introduces a typology of approaches to international intervention, encompassing the principal tools and themes in UNSC practices, informed by key UN documents and the literature on international conflicts. Utilising this typology, the study conducts an automated text analysis of 14,170 speeches by the UNSC permanent members from January 1992 to December 2023, employing an updated version of the UN Security Council Debates Dataset. Through the dictionary's categories, this research examines each permanent member's most emphasised approaches in their speeches. The dictionary effectively identifies each member's position in the Council, corroborating prior studies and contributing new insights. The study reveals that all permanent members display high and similar mentions of peacemaking, humanitarian assistance, and counter-terrorism. The categories of sanctions, peacekeeping, and non-proliferation are also commonly mentioned, albeit less frequently. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France strongly align their approach to international intervention, reflecting literature on the Western coalition within the Council. Concerning the main differences between the permanent members, the P3's focus is on humanitarian assistance, state responsibility, and international justice. China prioritises peacemaking, sovereignty, and peacebuilding, while Russia often emphasises counter-terrorism, particularly in relation to drug trafficking. This research develops and validates a dictionary for analysing approaches to international intervention, offering a comprehensive view of 32 years of post-Cold War UNSC debates. It highlights overarching trends and specific emphases of individual members in particular meetings. Thus, it contributes to international relations literature by providing a tool for future research, aiding in causal research designs and exploratory studies that mobilise and look at other actors and situations.

Keywords: United Nations, Security Council, text-as-data, international intervention.

Resumo

O Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas (CSNU), um dos seis principais órgãos das Nações Unidas (ONU), é primordialmente responsável por manter a paz e a segurança internacionais. Ele convoca reuniões públicas onde os membros discutem potenciais ameaças à paz internacional e compartilham perspectivas sobre vários conflitos internacionais. Durante esses debates, os membros podem destacar diferentes facetas de uma situação e sugerir variados cursos de ação para alcançar a resolução de conflitos. Esta tese busca responder à seguinte pergunta: Quais são as diferenças e semelhanças nas abordagens dos membros permanentes do CSNU sobre intervenção internacional? Para responder a esta pergunta, este trabalho introduz uma tipologia de abordagens para a intervenção internacional, abrangendo as principais ferramentas e temas nas práticas do CSNU, informadas por documentos-chave da ONU e pela literatura sobre conflitos internacionais. Utilizando essa tipologia, o estudo conduz uma análise de texto automatizada de 14.170 discursos dos membros permanentes do CSNU de janeiro de 1992 a dezembro de 2023, empregando uma versão atualizada da base de dados UN Security Council Debates. Através das categorias do dicionário, esta pesquisa examina as abordagens mais enfatizadas nos discursos de cada membro permanente. O dicionário identifica eficazmente a posição de cada membro no Conselho, corroborando estudos anteriores e contribuindo com novos insights. O estudo revela que todos os membros permanentes demonstram altas e semelhantes menções à peacemaking, assistência humanitária e contra-terrorismo. As categorias de sanções, manutenção da paz e não-proliferação também são comumente mencionadas, embora menos frequentemente. Os Estados Unidos, o Reino Unido e a França alinham fortemente suas abordagens à intervenção internacional, refletindo a literatura sobre a coalizão ocidental dentro do Conselho. Quanto às principais diferenças entre os membros permanentes, o P3 foca em assistência humanitária, responsabilidade do Estado e justiça internacional. A China prioriza peacemaking, soberania e peacebuilding, enquanto a Rússia frequentemente enfatiza o contra-terrorismo, particularmente em relação ao tráfico de drogas. Esta pesquisa desenvolve e valida um dicionário para analisar abordagens sobre intervenção internacional, oferecendo uma visão abrangente de 32 anos de debates do CSNU no pós-Guerra Fria. Ela destaca tendências abrangentes e ênfases específicas de membros individuais em reuniões particulares. Assim, contribui para a literatura de relações internacionais ao fornecer uma ferramenta para pesquisas futuras, auxiliando em desenhos de pesquisa causal e estudos exploratórios que mobilizam e observam outros atores e situações.

Palavras-chave: Nações Unidas, Conselho de Segurança, texto-como-dado, intervenção internacional.

List of Figures

List of tables

List of abbreviations

APRP	Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program
AQAP	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Committee
CTED	Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration
GNA	Government of National Accord
GNU	Government of National Unity
HIPPO	High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
HNP	Haitian National Police
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
IR	International Relations
MICAH	International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti

MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-proliferation Treaty
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
RwP	Responsibility while Protecting
SSR	Security-sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNMEER	United Nations Mission for Ebola and Emergency Response
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Summary

1. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), one of the United Nations' (UN) six main organs, holds the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This forum is the central point for discussing major international conflicts and has the power to make decisions that are legally binding on all UN member states. It has the authority to determine the existence of threats to the peace and can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorise the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The UNSC was designed to function continuously. It convenes meetings to address the most relevant global events that impact international security. Paralysed during the Cold War, the Council became much more active since the end of the superpower rivalry. Many of the UNSC's meetings are public, providing an opportunity to access the countries' perspectives on key international security issues.

International conflicts have become increasingly more complex. The notion of security has evolved to cover aspects of human security. Each situation raises different challenges and is permeated by varied geopolitical interests. Since the end of the Cold War, the international arena has been marked by a growing sense of divergence among global powers, contrasting with the brief period of unity in the early 1990s. This shift, culminating in heightened tensions such as the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, underscores the need to understand the practices of the United Nations Security Council, particularly the approaches of its permanent members toward international intervention.

The UNSC public meetings provide an opportunity not only to how states assess the reality of conflicts but, most importantly, how they interact with each other, converging and diverging. There are many ways to frame a situation and many tools available to achieve conflict settlement. It is not unusual for countries to disagree about how to act and hold totally contrasting views about the facts on the ground.

Considering this context, the main challenge of this thesis is to process the content of public meeting transcripts, structure a dataset with extracted metadata, and develop a tool that captures qualitative features of permanent members' speeches to evaluate their approaches to international intervention. By integrating insights from United Nations literature with automated text analysis, this thesis aims to generate significant insights into the Security Council's practices over the past 32 years. This objective is encapsulated in the following

research question: What are the differences and similarities between the UNSC permanent members' approaches to international intervention?

Considering the United Nations framework and 14,170 speeches from 1992 to 2023, this thesis presents how permanent members emphasise different approaches to international intervention according to factors such as diplomatic tradition, specificities of the situation, and political interests. Text as data techniques applied to the transcripts allow us to quantify and measure when differences and similarities among Council members take place, opening new paths for research questions.

To analyse the differences and similarities among the permanent members, this thesis developed a dictionary of ideal types of approaches to international intervention. This study will focus on the UNSC permanent members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States), known as the P5. The UNSC convenes meetings on interstate and intrastate conflicts to produce multilateral responses to solve them. The P5 represents the major powers, and due to their permanent seat, it is possible to track their approaches in every meeting, facilitating investigation across time and different conflicts.

This thesis is structured as follows: i) Chapters 2, 3, and 4 focus on a literature review of what has been produced about the UNSC practice and its members; ii) Chapter 5 presents the dataset of UNSC debates and how we are applying automated text analysis; iii) Chapter 6 provides the results that answer this work's research question; and iv) the Conclusion summarises the results, put them in perspective with what was outlined in the literature review and indicates ways to advance in the research agenda on the UNSC. Each chapter covers a specific part of our research question: What are the differences and similarities of the UNSC permanent members' approaches to international intervention?

Chapter 2 is focused on the UNSC. It explains what the Security Council is and how it works and offers an overview of its structure, who its members are, its historical background, how it acts, and its main limitations. The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce this important international body and familiarise the reader with its practice, with a special focus on how it conducts meetings and what it can do to maintain international peace and security.

Chapter 3 outlines what it understands as "approaches to international intervention". It proposes a typology that covers all tools and subjects that are relevant to the Council's practice, its challenge to maintain international peace and security, and its debates.

The typology contains ten ideal types, each representing one approach to international intervention: sovereignty, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, sanctions, international justice, counter-terrorism, state responsibility, and non-proliferation. It was built based on key UN documents about the role of this organisation in international security, the literature about international conflicts, and the UNSC debates. This typology reflects both the UN framework related to international security and what is discussed in UNSC meetings. It represents the theoretical contribution of this thesis.

Chapter 4 presents the main findings of previous studies about the five permanent members. This thesis is part of this research agenda. It describes what is known about the differences and similarities between the views of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China on international security more broadly and the role of the Security Council more specifically. Based on what was uncovered by previous research, this work can delineate expectations about what it can find after analysing the UNSC debates. This literature provides three main expectations that will receive greater attention during the presentation of the results:

1) The alignment between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and their focus on humanitarian concerns and the need to hold states accountable for human rights violations.

2) The Chinese emphasis on the principle of sovereignty, the support of peaceful means, and the relevance of economic development.

3) Russia's emphasis on sovereignty or intervention according to the situation under discussion and concerns over terrorism, particularly drug trafficking in Afghanistan.

This research does not conduct a deep investigation to test if these statements accurately reflect the dynamics of the UNSC. They serve as a guide for the presentation of the results, highlighting points that deserve more attention. Additionally, since this knowledge is well established in the literature, the detection of these elements in the UNSC debates by the dictionary points to its robustness and face validity.

Chapters 5 and 6 cover the issue of differences and similarities. Chapter 5 explains how we are going to detect differences and similarities by presenting materials and methods. The basic material of this thesis is the UNSC meeting transcripts, which were processed and split into speeches that form the UN Security Council Debates Dataset. This thesis uses an adapted

version of the dataset, expanding its period to cover UNSC debates from 1992 to 2023 but focusing on the speeches delivered by the five permanent members. The result is a dataset with 14,170 speeches covering the last 32 years of UNSC activity, enriched with metadata about speakers, dates, agenda items, and meeting symbols.

Concerning the methodology, Chapter 5 explains how this thesis adopts a text-as-data approach to analyse the UNSC debates. It explains how the typology proposed in Chapter 3 is used to inform the categories of a dictionary, each representing one approach to international intervention. It further describes in detail how the dictionary was built and how it will be applied to perform text analysis of the permanent members' speeches, providing examples of the form of measuring the presence of the categories.

The Chapter also highlights the limitations of the dictionary and delineates exactly what it is capable of detecting in speeches. The main observation concerning this point is that the dictionary does not capture the preferences or choices of the permanent members to follow a given course of action. Emphasis on a category does not necessarily imply support for that category. The dictionary can capture specifically what themes and tools are deemed relevant to the debates. Only a close reading of the speeches and comprehension of the context can elucidate what are the preferred courses of action and the nuances of the permanent members' points of view about reality. The dictionary provides a way to represent text through frequencies of categories and offers a useful point of departure for more in-depth analyses. This is the methodological contribution of this thesis.

Chapter 6 answers the research question of this thesis, providing in-depth analyses of the five permanent members based on the results provided by the application of the dictionary. It highlights the differences and similarities of the permanent members' approaches to intervention through four subsections: i) an overview of the permanent members' speeches considering the last 32 years of UNSC debates; ii) an analysis of the positions of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in the cases of Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Iraq/Kuwait; iii) an investigation of the Chinese stance in the cases of Iraq/Kuwait, Lebanon, Venezuela, and Haiti; iv) a description of Russia's positions in the cases of Afghanistan and Ukraine.

Each subsection gave more attention to specific members, but all cases were analysed, taking into consideration all five members. In this part, the main purpose was not to conduct a deep investigation of the cases to provide insights about specific situations or about how a given member acted. Instead, the idea was to demonstrate that the dictionary is able to detect

meaningful variation in the permanent members' speeches and work as a useful tool to navigate through the enormous amount of text produced by the UNSC debates. That is why this chapter relies less on what the literature has produced about the situations analysed and more on the content of the UNSC meeting transcripts. In other words, Chapter 6 describes the differences and similarities of the permanent members' approaches to international intervention as told by their speeches.

The five members are similar in the sense that all of them put great emphasis on peacemaking and humanitarian assistance, which is illustrative of the purpose enshrined in the UN Charter to pursue peaceful means and of the importance of human security in international affairs. The differences arise when we look at how members mobilise these approaches in connection with the other categories.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and France demonstrated a strong alignment in emphasis on approaches to international intervention, being characterised by a greater emphasis on humanitarian assistance, state responsibility, international justice, and non-proliferation. China expressed the most different position, with a great emphasis on peacemaking, sovereignty, and peacebuilding. Russia displayed a higher emphasis on counter-terrorism, especially due to its concern over drug trafficking in Afghanistan. Also, it was possible to detail how Russia can move from the defence of non-interference to a more aggressive and interventionist stance.

The analyses in Chapter 6 focused on a small subset of cases. However, the dictionary can be applied to a wide range of other cases, encompassing various time periods and agenda items. To enable readers to explore additional cases, this study provides an interactive dashboard, available at https://antonio-pires.shinyapps.io/dash_thesis_unsc/, allowing users to engage with the data and replicate the analyses presented in this thesis.

Finally, the Conclusion links the key findings to the expectations set out in Chapter 4. It summarises the dictionary's efficacy in identifying rhetorical variations previously analysed in numerous studies on the UNSC, showcasing its robustness. This closing chapter underscores the strengths of the dictionary of approaches to international intervention proposed by this thesis, opening avenues for future studies.

2. THE UNSC AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the United Nations Security Council. It will delve into the Council's structure, outline its members, and explain how it convenes meetings and makes decisions. The chapter will also trace the evolution of the Council's practices over time, detailing its main tools and discussing its primary limitations in its actions.

The structure of this Chapter will follow the main provisions of the UNSC present in the UN Charter. In this sense, three chapters of the Charter are essential to understand more about the Security Council. Chapter V relates to its composition, functions, powers, and procedure; Chapter VI is devoted to the pacific settlement of disputes; and Chapter VII focuses on threats to the peace, breaches of the pace, and acts of aggression. This exploration will offer a clear understanding of the Council's role and functioning within the broader context of international relations and global governance.

2.1. Structure

The Security Council is the central body on international security issues in the United Nations. Following Article 24 (1) of the Charter, the Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It combines international legal and political authority that comes to life when the Permanent Members decide to use it and lies dormant when they do not (HURD, 2018).

One of its specificities among the UN organs is that it must always be able to function, according to Article 28 (1) of the Charter. Additionally, Articles 34 and 35 state that any UN member can bring any situation to the attention of the Security Council, which will decide if the case is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Unlike the other bodies in the UN, the Council has the authority to make legally binding decisions. The UN Charter gives this authority based on two provisions. Article 25 of the Charter states that UN members "agree to accept and carry out the decision of the Security Council". According to Article 103, obligations imposed by the Council, being obligations under the Charter, have priority over all other international obligations of states. These two

articles empower the Security Council with the authority to make legally binding decisions (WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022).

Three points must be considered to understand what it means for a Council decision to be legally binding. First, not all resolutions adopted under Chapter VII are legally binding since the Council's powers include making recommendations. Second, actions under this chapter are not limited to the use of military force, this being only one of a range of measures that may be taken, such as economic sanctions. Third, a resolution may not be binding in its entirety but only in specific provisions (WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022).

These considerations are important because they are part of the dynamics of the Council, where consensus may be achieved through ambiguity about which provisions of a resolution are legally binding or not. In this context, three elements are viewed as signals of a legally binding decision: i) the determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression under Article 39; ii) evidence that the Council is acting under Chapter VII; iii) and when the Council takes decisions within the meaning of Article 25, mentioning this article or using operative words such as "decides", "authorises", and "empowers" (WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022).

Decision-making in the Council, therefore, is directed at determining which situations endanger international peace, what to do about them, and which decisions or parts of its decisions will be legally binding. This process is deeply affected by the Council's membership.

2.2. Membership

Chapters V and VII of the UN Charter establish the Security Council's authority. These chapters set out the Council's structure, membership, and capacities. They list its five permanent members (the United Kingdom, the United States, France, China, and Russia) and the rules for selecting the ten non-permanent members (chosen for two-year terms by regionally defined voting groups), known as the E-10 (HURD, 2018).

In 1965, the number of elected members in the UN Security Council was increased from six to ten. This change was implemented through an amendment to the UN Charter and was influenced mainly by the significant growth in the UN's membership following the period of decolonisation. This expansion was intended to represent better the diverse and growing number of countries within the United Nations (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018).

The permanent members, often called P5, have the most significant influence on Council activities due to their size and capacity, familiarity with the United Nations system and veto power (LOWE *et al.*, 2010). This power is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter but derives from the provisions about voting in the UNSC.

Voting in the Security Council is based on Article 27 of the Charter, according to which each Council member has one vote. Decisions on substantive matters require at least nine affirmative votes, including the concurring votes of all permanent members. The meaning of "concurring votes" was meant to imply that the permanent members should vote in favour of a decision for it to pass, but this understanding changed in 1946 to cover the possibility of abstentions as "concurring" (HURD, 2018).

The consequence of the requirement of concurring votes by the permanent members to approve decisions is known as the veto power, which ensures that no Council decision can be taken if it is against the interests of any of them (HURD, 2018). The veto does not apply to procedural matters, for example, including an item on the agenda. However, the decision on whether a question is procedural or not is itself non-procedural and thus subject to the veto (WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022).

The granting of a permanent status to five members derives from the historical moment when the UN was created. During discussions in 1943-1944, the United States, the UK, and the Soviet Union conceived the idea of major powers assuming global leadership. Referred to as the "Big Three", they perceived themselves as natural leaders and, with the inclusion of China for regional representativeness and France to renew its historical global position, formed the eventual Permanent Five. This concept, solidified within the Charter, has endured over time, granting these nations increased influence in world politics (HURD, 2018).

The privileges of the permanent members were designed to ensure their engagement with the organisation, something that the League of Nations failed to accomplish (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018). The P5 even presented the veto power as a necessary condition for the institution's existence (KRISCH, 2010). Because of the veto power, the Security Council assumes the form of an organisation with endless legal authority but with a practical power entirely dependent on the P5 (HURD, 2018).

2.3. Meetings

Article 28 of the Charter provides that the Council shall be organised to function continuously and hold periodic meetings. The UNSC usually holds meetings at the UN Headquarters in New York, but it may reunite away from the Headquarters if this facilitates its work.

The Provisional Rules of Procedure set out guidelines for conducting Security Council meetings in its Chapter IX. Rule 48 specifies that the Council shall meet in public unless stated otherwise. Public meetings are transcribed into verbatim records, while private meetings issue *communiqués*.

When meeting in public, the Council may invite non-members to participate without the right to vote, under Rule 37, when it considers that the interests of that member are significantly affected by the content of the discussion or when a member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council following Article 35 (1) of the Charter. The same may apply to members of the Secretariat or other persons, under Rule 39, whom the Council considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

The Council may also hold meetings informally, under formats such as “informal consultations of the whole” and the “Arria-formula”. Since this research is limited to analysing public meetings, the following paragraphs describe their procedures. The document Note 507 (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2017) offers a guide for the Council’s working methods, detailing how it convenes and conducts public meetings.

As seen above, the Security Council comprises five permanent members and ten elected ones. To understand the different roles within the Council’s dynamics, it is essential to explain the Presidency of the Security Council. The President represents the Council, takes steps to implement Council decisions, and conducts diplomacy on the Council’s behalf (SIEVERS; DAWS, 2014). Under Rule 18, the presidency rotates monthly, according to the English alphabetical listing of its members.

In the context of the meetings, the President coordinates the Council’s work and, among other things, shall call a meeting at any time necessary, approve the provisional agenda for each meeting, and call the representatives to deliver their statements. The President also has a preparatory role in connection with formal meetings, discussing with members which topics

must be addressed, dates, and invitations, and monitoring the readiness of draft resolutions and presidential statements (SIEVERS; DAWS, 2014).

The discussion on meeting topics occurs through informal consultations and leads to the approval of the provisional agenda for formal meetings, using descriptive formulations of agenda items. Each session addresses one agenda item. For example, the first public meeting of 2023 (S/PV.9235) addressed the item "The situation in the Middle East". More about this subject will be discussed in Chapter 4 because agenda items are an essential source of information for this research.

Following Rule 11 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure, the Secretary-General shall communicate each week to the representatives of the Council a summary statement of matters of which the Security Council is seized. This list is reviewed at the beginning of each year to determine if the Council has concluded its consideration of any of the listed items and whether they should be deleted. Further, items not considered during the preceding three calendar years also must be deleted.

The most recent list, containing items considered at a formal meeting from 1 January 2020 to 2 December 2023, comprises 52 agenda items. The oldest agenda item of the list is "Consideration of the draft report of the Security Council to the General Assembly", adopted since 6 September 1946. The most recent one is "Letter dated 13 September 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/688)", adopted first on 15 September 2022.

Each meeting addresses one specific issue and is convened under a particular format. Formal public meetings may have different formats according to the outcome and number of participants. Note 507 (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2017) lists four basic types of formal public meetings:

i) Open Debate, the most inclusive format, where non-Council members may participate upon their request,

ii) Debate, the most common format, where briefings may be conducted, and Council members may deliver statements. Rules 37 and 39 can be invoked to invite participants to the discussions,

iii) Briefing is the most restrictive format, where individuals provide briefings and only Council members may deliver statements. Other participants may be invited under Rules 37 and 39 as “briefers”,

iv) Adoption is the format designed for adopting resolutions and presidential statements, where members may deliver statements before and/or after voting and non-Council members may be invited to participate based on Rules 37 and 39.

For the sake of time, all participants are encouraged to keep their statements to 5 minutes and express agreement without repeating the content of a previous speech. Typically, the speaking order is established through a draw, but in some cases, it can be based on a sign-up sheet. Presidents of the Security Council usually make their national statement last, although they may provide introductory remarks and their national statement earlier with prior notice.

The President can also adjust the list of speakers to accommodate delegations involved in drafting processes or during unscheduled or emergency meetings. Chairs of subsidiary bodies may be placed first when presenting their work or reporting on issues within their mandate. The same is valid for non-Council members who have a direct interest in the outcome of the matter under consideration.

Members can exchange speaking slots, and any changes should promptly be communicated to the Secretariat. High-level officials representing Council members follow a protocol-based order, and adjustments can be made if necessary. In certain circumstances, visiting higher-level officials may be allowed to speak ahead of permanent representatives with the Council's consent, especially in non-high-level meetings.

All open formal meetings are accorded verbatim meeting records, a detailed, first-person record of statements made. Meeting records of the Security Council receive a symbol following this pattern: “S/PV.” plus the meeting number. Members and non-members are encouraged to provide the texts of their statements to the Secretariat because they are valuable tools for the preparation of the verbatim records of the Council.

These textual records of the UNSC practice are the primary source of this research. They are valuable sources of information about how the Council acted on different occasions and how its members interacted with each other. Let us continue discussing the UNSC, delving into its historical background, considering the end of the Cold War as the main turning point for its activity.

2.4. History

2.4.1. Cold War

The division of the world into two blocs during the Cold War, an American and a Soviet, caused the paralysis of the Council, which reduced its ability to respond to threats and breaches of peace (GRAHAM, 1992; WILSON, 2014). The source of much of the disagreement among the permanent members was inherently political and stemmed mainly from the Soviet desire to restrain Western domination in the UN (WILSON, 2014).

Paralysis of the Council usually means that the veto is being used constantly and preventing action to deal with grave situations. Between 1946 and 1986, the veto was used 121 times by the Soviet Union and 57 times by the United States. Although there were almost 200 armed conflicts in the first 40 years of the UN, the Council responded only two times (WILSON, 2014). Military action was authorised to reverse a North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 and to deploy a robust peacekeeping mission to the Congo in the 1960s (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018).

The relations between states have limited the impact of multilateral organisations. When the Council was unable to take action, political manoeuvring took place outside the UN, which then became only a forum for the rhetorical echoes of these struggles (KEOHANE, 2007). During the Cold War, the Council's role was limited to a third-party observer of conflicts. This gave rise to the notion of peacekeeping, with missions authorised through negotiation between the UN and the parties rather than outright coercion. Since these operations are based on the parties' consent, they respect Article 2 (7) of the Charter on non-interference in domestic affairs (HURD, 2018).

2.4.2. Post-Cold War

The late 1980s brought a change in the Council's dynamics, with increased cooperation among the P5, which allowed for five peacekeeping and observer forces to be deployed in the cases of the Iran-Iraq war, Afghanistan, Angola, and Namibia and to deal with conflicts within Central America. The major turning point towards increased cooperation in the Council was the response to the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait in 1990 through resolution 678, which authorised a US-led coalition to halt and reverse the invasion. In this period, the UN Security Council

adopted a more interventionist stance, redefining its international peace and security approach. The Council deployed successful peace operations with broader mandates and large civil components in countries like El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018).

The post-Cold War period raised an important debate between theorists of IR about the future of realist theories, strongly marked by the context of bipolarity and the idea of a balance of power (DUNNE; KURKI; SMITH, 2013; VIOTTI; KAUPPI, 2012). Against the optimism of the time, some feared that the new order would tend to conflict, either because of the realist idea that the new configuration of the international system was less stable than the bipolar balance of the Cold War (MEARSHEIMER, 2014), or because new kinds of conflicts would arise (HUNTINGTON, 2011).

Other theories followed the path of optimism, betting on the universalisation of liberal democracy and a consequent increase in practices of cooperation (FUKUYAMA, 1989; KEGLEY, 1993). Constructivism gained momentum with the end of the Cold War, stating that the meaning of international anarchy is derived from international actors' agency, opening space for understanding forms of interaction that could range from the Hobbesian eternal conflict to cooperation and mutual understanding (DUNNE; KURKI; SMITH, 2013; VIOTTI; KAUPPI, 2012; WENDT, 1992, 1999).

The optimism of this period diminished after the peacekeeping disasters in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, “which cast lasting shame on the UN and a sudden end to the first boom period of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era” (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018, p. 144). The failures in Bosnia and Rwanda and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 without a Security Council authorisation led the international community to discuss its obligations in the face of mass atrocities, paving the way to the development of the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks temporarily restored unity within the Council, which allowed for US military action in Afghanistan, the strengthening of a sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and the imposition of binding counter-terrorist obligations on all member states through resolution 1373. This moment of unity was broken after the 2003 US-UK invasion of Iraq without Council authorisation (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018).

The Council’s agenda during the 21st century was concentrated on civil war management, especially in Africa and the Middle East. This focus can be explained by the high

number of civil wars in these two regions, permissive African attitudes toward UN interventions, and greater ease of agreement among the P5 in Africa, which does not fall into the exclusive zone of influence of any of the great powers (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018).

In this setting, the Council initiated significant operations in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This revival of peacekeeping activities is linked to its usefulness for the P5, as it establishes stability in conflict zones while sharing costs and risks.

This moment found its limits, especially after the 2011 NATO campaign against the Gaddafi regime in Libya, the first time the Security Council had mandated the use of force against the de jure government of a UN member state to protect civilians. Russia, China, and countries of the Global South criticised the action, arguing that it was over the limits of the mandate and pursuing regime change. This episode led Russia and, to a lesser degree, China to paralyse the Council during the Syrian crisis through the use of veto. Additionally, the Global South's negative assessment of NATO intervention in Libya was reflected in Brazil's proposal of the concept of Responsibility While Protecting (RwP), which addresses the practical implications of R2P emphasising the cautious and judicious use of military force in humanitarian interventions, underscoring the principles of prevention, proportionality, and last resort (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018; RIBEIRO, 2020; STUENKEL, 2016).

The end of the Cold War paved the way for the UNSC to be more active and created the conditions for more consensus between the great powers. This new period in international affairs saw the establishment of numerous international interventions with different characteristics: with and without Council authorisation, under peacekeeping missions or unilateral action, resulting in successes and big failures. Behind these events lies an ongoing discussion about the notion of security and the issues that fall under the mandate of the Security Council.

2.5. UNSC and security

The conclusion of the Cold War marked a significant shift in the conceptualisation of security. The Council broadened its definition of threats to international peace and security and

reevaluated the limits of state sovereignty in the face of more complex global challenges (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018).

The United Nations was designed primarily to prevent conflicts between states. Previously, the traditional notion of security was predominantly anchored in state security, focusing on defence against external threats and preserving national sovereignty (FREDERKING, 2007). Especially after the end of the Cold War, globalisation, technology, and terrorism changed the dynamics of conflicts, blurring the line between the local and the global, inter-state and intra-state.

There has been a transition towards a more expansive understanding of security, encapsulating the concept of human security, which extends beyond the mere protection of states from external aggression, emphasising the safeguarding of individuals from a broad array of threats. This broader perspective includes concerns related to internal crises, terrorism, protection of civilians, weapons of mass destruction, piracy, health, environmental challenges, economic stability, and crime in a broader sense, among others (FREDERKING, 2007; WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022).

In this context, the responsibility of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security requires not only mediation between states but also the devising of multiple tools to address human security and cover all elements of modern hybrid conflicts. The question becomes whether to intervene in a conflict, how to intervene, and what is the best approach to address the complexity of each situation.

Moreover, the expansion of issues falling under the UNSC's responsibility to maintain international peace and security has made it increasingly challenging to balance the principles of sovereignty and non-interference with the imperative to act in resolving international conflicts. This enlargement means that interventions in conflicts often involve navigating complex situations where the traditional norms of state sovereignty and non-interference might be at odds with the emerging global consensus on the need for proactive measures in conflict resolution and humanitarian interventions.

In this context, the relationship between the prohibition of the use of force, rooted in the principle of sovereignty, and the tools of peace and security available for UN action was discussed within the organisation over the years. Many UN documents, starting from the 1992 Agenda for Peace, delved into how the UN and its Security Council should act in the face of threats to international peace and security.

2.6. The UNSC in action

The Council has exclusive authority to decide what threatens international peace and determine the appropriate response. While expanding the spectrum of situations that could endanger international peace, the UNSC had to adapt and develop ways to act in the face of such situations, always with attention to how Council action impacts the principle of sovereignty. The Council may choose to act through diplomacy but also impose economic sanctions and military enforcement.

2.6.1. Peace operations

Following the evolution of the UN's role in international conflicts, the first document to consider is An Agenda for Peace (UNITED NATIONS, 1992), which presents four basic instruments for peace and security activities: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. The Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was requested to address the first three, and peacebuilding was added to the list. The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (UNITED NATIONS, 1995) collapses preventive diplomacy and peacemaking into one instrument and devotes additional attention to disarmament, sanctions, and peace enforcement.

According to Fung (2019), the 2000 Brahimi Report, the 2003 Peacekeeping Handbook, and the 2008 Capstone Doctrine represented significant shifts in the approach to UN peacekeeping operations. They moved away from the earlier requirement that peacekeepers must always assume the continuous consent of all parties involved as a precondition for their actions. Additionally, these frameworks relaxed the strict adherence to impartiality when peacekeepers are in action.

The Brahimi Report (UNITED NATIONS, 2000) defines the elements of peace operations by focusing on conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The Capstone Doctrine (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a) reiterates this list of instruments and advances describing the concept of multidimensional peacekeeping operations and its role in human security and peacebuilding.

The report “A More Secure World” (UNITED NATIONS, 2005) reflects the evolving threats to international peace and security and makes recommendations to strengthen the

international framework of collective security. On the issue of the role of the available tools to address these challenges, it speaks of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding together as the operational face of the United Nations.

Finally, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report examined how peace operations can adapt to new challenges in maintaining global stability. It covered the UN's involvement in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement (UNITED NATIONS, 2015). This report recognised that modern peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions were often conducted in more complex contexts than traditional inter-state conflicts. Key among these challenges were issues related to stabilisation efforts in post-conflict zones, dealing with insurgencies, and responding to asymmetric threats (FUNG, 2019).

All these documents explicitly mention the tools available for the United Nations act to address international conflicts: peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding. Even though not cited as a specific tool, humanitarian assistance has been mentioned as a crucial task since the 1992 Agenda for Peace. These tools are deeply linked to UN peace operations and the work of UN agencies. They are not only commonly performed under the UN flag but also need to be developed in accordance with the principle of sovereignty and consent of the parties. The situation is different when it comes to the use of force.

2.6.2. Peace enforcement

If peaceful means fail, coercive measures, including military force, may be authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. The Security Council can identify aggressors (Articles 39, 40), determine enforcement measures (Articles 41, 42, 48, 49), and request members to provide military forces based on special agreements (Articles 43–45).

Concerning this last point, UN members did not reach agreements under Article 43 to make armed forces and facilities available to the Security Council (SIEVERS; DAWS, 2014). The 1992 Agenda for Peace recommends that the Council consider utilising peace enforcement units formed by troops made available by UN members. These units were never created.

Chapter VII delineates the framework of collective security under the UN, which is based on the conviction that peace is indivisible, that all States share an interest in countering aggression whenever and wherever it may occur, and that the united threat of counterforce has a deterrent effect on potential aggressors (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022). Its use does not imply that the UN can wage war, and its practice has been that when enforcement action is required, it is entrusted to a coalition of willing States with the authorisation of the Security Council (UNITED NATIONS, 2000).

Article 39 of the Charter is the opening provision of Chapter VII and gives authority to the Council to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. This determination can apply to specific and general threats (WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022). Enforcement measures under Chapter VII require the implicit or explicit determination of any of those three situations (SIEVERS; DAWS, 2014).

Article 2 (7) prohibits intervention in matters that are essentially under the jurisdiction of any State, often referred to as internal affairs. These include cases in which a conflict is essentially confined to a national territory and is not properly a threat to international peace and security. However, as mentioned before, state responsibility has expanded over time to protect individuals and their rights, creating new possibilities for intervention (JACKSON, R., 2007).

From the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, states have agreed that genocide, committed in times of peace or war, is a crime under international law and therefore, the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs cannot be used to protect genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing, which can properly be considered a threat to international security and as such provoke action by the UNSC.

The controversial NATO intervention in Kosovo 1999 led Secretary-General Kofi Annan to call for a new international consensus on humanitarian intervention. In response, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was created and elaborated a report presenting the concept of Responsibility to Protect, later endorsed by the 2005 World Summit (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022). The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect demands coordination between sovereignty and human rights, justifying interventions when a state refuses to protect its population or fails to do so (GLANVILLE, 2011).

The situations that would give rise to a military intervention are two: i) loss of life on a large scale, present or occurred, with or without genocidal intent, whether as a result of deliberate state action, state negligence, inability to act or a failed state situation; and ii) large-scale ethnic cleansing, present or occurring, committed through murder, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape (INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 2001). There was a growing acceptance that the issue was not the right to intervene but the state's responsibility to protect when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophes – mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing through forced expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease (UNITED NATIONS, 2005).

It is in this context that the UNSC has become more active in humanitarian crises, reformed its approach to collective security, and assumed democratisation as a creed, responding to situations that previously would have been considered issues of domestic jurisdiction (CRONIN; HURD, 2008; KEOHANE, 2007; SIEVERS; DAWS, 2014; WILSON, 2014). The UNSC adopted 725 resolutions between 1946 and 1991 and 608 between 1992 and 2000. Resolutions from the 1990s onwards stand out from previous ones for their constant references to international law, including human rights and refugee law (DEPLANO, 2015).

Following the notions of interstate security and human security, it is possible to summarise the multiple situations considered threats to international peace and security and the different coercive measures that the Council can use to fulfil its primary responsibility. First, peace enforcement may involve non-military sanctions. Second, the Council must act to prevent or halt crimes against humanity and promote international justice. Because threats to international peace and security may derive from interstate and intrastate conflicts, Council action may be directed at non-state and state actors who commit violations of international law. Finally, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is still a vital issue in international security, with additional risks in the post-Cold War of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups.

2.7. UNSC limitations

The Council has the liberty to define what constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Since the end of the Cold War, it has become increasingly engaged in developing complex responses to global challenges. But what can we say about the limits of Council action?

The first limitation that deserves to be mentioned is that the Council should act within its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Even though the concepts of peace and security have expanded over the years, this remains a divisive issue between members. For example, it is not consensual that human rights situations fall under the Council's mandate (WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022).

On more than one occasion, China has explicitly stated that "human rights issues should be discussed in specialised bodies, such as the Human Rights Council" (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2019a, p. 3). In another meeting, the Chinese representative opposed to the Security Council hearing a briefing from an independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar established by the Human Rights Council, arguing that this would "encroach on the mandates of the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, violate provisions of the Charter and weaken the responsibilities and roles of various United Nations bodies, thereby leading to grave negative consequences" (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2018a, p. 23). In 2014, it opposed the addition of the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Council's agenda based on large-scale violations of human rights (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2014).

Another limitation of the Council is that obligations under the Charter cannot prevail over peremptory norms of general international law (*jus cogens*). The International Law Commission elaborated a non-exhaustive list of peremptory norms, which includes the prohibition of aggression, genocide, slavery, torture, racial discrimination and apartheid, crimes against humanity, the right of self-determination, and basic rules of international humanitarian law. In other words, the Council could not oppose these norms. These constraints, however, work better in theory than in practice because it is difficult to ascertain and judge that a given action taken by the Council is contrary to these norms (WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022).

Finally, there has been a movement more recently calling for the non-use of the veto power when it blocks action against mass atrocities. However, the notion of an unreasonable veto or the responsibility not to cast a veto in certain situations has no legal basis (WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022).

Ultimately, these constraints on the Council's actions can only be a function of the interaction between the members of the UNSC. The Council is not subject to any effective procedures by which the legality of its acts can be tested. What is also lacking is any procedure to ensure the implementation of the Council's international responsibility and state responsibility (WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022).

The UN Charter delegates significant authority to the Council to decide about the use of force without binding it by requirements in terms of case selection, timing, and appropriate tools. Additionally, there is no automatic obligation to intervene militarily on behalf of another state (HURD, 2018; LUCK, 2006; VOETEN, 2005).

According to Wood, UN members do not have a right to assess the legality of Council decisions and ignore them when they consider them illegal. However, as a matter of policy, they can disregard binding obligations imposed by the Council, with all the political and legal consequences that might flow from such a course. This is why the author argues that self-restraint and using power only where it is necessary to maintain international peace and security are the most effective checks on the Council's power (WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022).

Considering the liberty that the Council has to make decisions and the lack of enforceable legal constraints, it is necessary to assess the checks and balances in the Security Council through its internal dynamics. For instance, the proposal of a specific course of action must take into account how many votes it has on its side, the possibility of a member casting a veto, if the action sets an unfortunate precedent, if it triggers retaliation if it affects the Council credibility and legitimacy if it can be effective (WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022).

Ultimately, the Council's action can be interpreted as being shaped not by objective criteria but rather by the "interplay of interest-based calculations of its members, their allies, countries potentially contributing troops to peacekeeping operations, and often the states involved in armed conflict themselves" (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018, p. 146). Hence, it is essential to investigate how each member positions itself in the Council, especially the permanent members, and understand their differences and similarities towards the UNSC's responsibility to maintain international peace and security.

2.8. Summary

In this Chapter, we first looked at the United Nations Security Council to understand its structure, membership, meeting formats, historical background, and how it addresses the challenges to international peace and security. With no legal constraints and an ever-expanding notion of security, the Council can decide when and how to fulfil its responsibilities, limited only by the interaction between its members, especially the permanent ones. The next Chapter introduces a typology of "approaches to international intervention" designed to capture the most

relevant themes present in the permanent members' dynamic in the Council when discussing international peace and security.

3. APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

This chapter explores the United Nations Security Council's role in international conflict resolution. Its main contribution is the proposal of a typology encompassing the principal tools and themes in UNSC practice towards global challenges, labelled here as "approaches to international intervention". It clarifies the meaning of this term in the context of this research and introduces ten ideal types based on key UN documents, the literature on international conflicts, and the UNSC debates.

3.1. A typology of approaches to international intervention

Given the growing complexity of international conflicts and the diverse tools the UN framework offers to address them, this thesis develops a typology of "approaches to international intervention". Drawing on the UN's fundamental documents, the specialised literature on UN practices, the tools for maintaining international peace and security, and a manual analysis of UNSC debates to decipher diplomatic language around these tools, this typology aims to capture all relevant themes discussed in the UNSC.

The typology supports building a dictionary that can be used for text analysis. It consists of ten categories or ideal approaches to international intervention. Section 5.2.2 displays the main keywords associated with each category. In this section, for its turn, provides a brief description for each category and delves into their theoretical reasoning. The table below displays the overview of the typology:

Table 1: Typology of approaches to international intervention

Broad Category	Category	Description
Non-Intervention	Sovereignty	Mentions of the principle of sovereignty and non-interference, and references to violations of sovereignty, such as aggression and acquisition of territory by force.
UN Peace Operations	Peacemaking	Mentions of peaceful means, dialogue, negotiation, and neutral ways of referring to actors involved in the conflict.
	Peacekeeping	Mentions of UN presence in the field and UN missions' traditional activities such as demilitarisation, inspection, and verification.
	Peacebuilding	Mentions of peacebuilding measures in post-conflict situations, such as reintegration, economic and social development, state reform, political transitions, and elections.
	Humanitarian Assistance	Mentions of humanitarian assistance and civilian victims of conflict (displaced persons, refugees, asylum-seekers)
Peace Enforcement	International Justice	Mentions of judicial measures, international courts and tribunals, and crimes against humanity
	Non-proliferation	Mentions of non-proliferation, including international commitments and weapons of mass destruction.
	Sanctions	Mentions of sanctions, including specific measures.
	State Responsibility	Negative ways of referring to state actors and mentions of state abuse against civilians.
	Counter-Terrorism	Negative ways of referring to non-state actors and mentions of criminal activity typically committed by non-state actors.

Source: elaborated by the author.

The basic assumption behind this typology is that, when discussing a given conflict, the permanent members of the Security Council have multiple approaches to adopt, and they may diverge about the most relevant one. On the most basic level, some members may focus their speeches on the principle of sovereignty and non-interference, while others may bring the use of coercive measures to the discussion.

Additionally, when discussing the gravity of the situation, members may emphasise different aspects of the conflict (terrorism, state responsibility, sexual and gender violence, protection of civilians, etc.) and different tools available in the UN framework for conflict resolution (peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, international courts, etc.).

However, it is necessary to highlight that instruments for peace and security rarely occur linearly and were thought to be adopted in an integrated manner (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a). Therefore, even though the categories will be analysed based on their emphasis in speeches, it is also important to pay attention to categories' overlaps and how the permanent members connect them with each other.

To understand the purposes of this typology, it is also necessary to break down the three words that compose the notion of "approaches to international intervention". First, this study used "approach" because it assumes an agnostic position towards the speakers' intentions. This assumption is connected to the use of the typology in a dictionary for text analysis and reflects a methodological limitation, explained in more detail in Chapter 5.

For this research, it is assumed that when a member emphasises a particular approach, it indicates solely that it considers the theme connected to the strategy relevant to the debate. For example, when mentioning the issue of sanctions, a participant in the debate may support the imposition, argue in favour of lifting imposed sanctions, or describe the work of a sanctions committee. Emphasis on an approach solely implies that it is deemed relevant for the debate. Secondly, it mentions "international" intervention to indicate that it refers to situations brought to the attention of the global agenda, specifically the UNSC.

Finally, conceptually, the notion of intervention is at the limit between peace and war and is directly linked to the concept of sovereignty (FINNEMORE, 2004; WEBER, 1994). For example, Christian Reus-Smit (REUS-SMIT, 2013) understands international intervention as the transgression of the jurisdiction of one unit by another unit or group of units. For this work, a definition of intervention must include interventionist practices that occur without violating State sovereignty.

UN peace operations can be understood as intervention practices because they involve "meddling" in the internal affairs of a given State in conflict, sometimes assuming State functions to ensure the maintenance of peace and prevent escalation of the conflict. The Supplement for An Agenda for Peace even speaks of the UN's role in terms of "international intervention" (UNITED NATIONS, 1995, para. 13). These operations occur not in violation of State sovereignty but with the host state's consent.

Therefore, to cover more possibilities of intervention and align it with the UN framework of collective security and the practices of the post-Cold War period, this research understands intervention in a broader sense, as a practice that projects international actors not directly involved in a conflict as participants in the process of achieving peace, with or without the consent of the host and with different degrees of use of force.

The following sections describe each of these basic approaches in detail and how they are linked to the practice of the Security Council. Since these ten categories will be part of a dictionary applied to the speeches delivered at the Council, by the end of each category's description, this study presents five sentences in the permanent members' speeches that illustrate how these approaches are emphasised in the UNSC debates.

3.2. Sovereignty

The principle of sovereignty is enshrined in the UN Charter in Article 2, especially paragraphs 4 and 7, respectively, on the prohibition of the use of force and interference in domestic jurisdiction. They function as limits to the actions of states and the United Nations but are understood in a political sense, not legal (WOOD; STHOEGER, 2022). These provisions do not affect Chapter VII enforcement measures or define parameters for Security Council decisions on conflict interventions. The decision on the legitimacy, limits, scope, and extent of international intervention remains political, requiring Member States to deliberate and decide for each case.

3.2.1. Different aspects of the concept

Sovereignty can be understood as a principle that organises authority within and between states and has multiple facets. Internally, sovereignty means that a state has supreme political authority in each society. This authority requires material capabilities to be exercised,

referred to as empirical sovereignty. Externally, sovereignty denotes a position of independence and the absence of any external authority. This independence is also reflected in the right of a state to be recognised by the others, a feature that can be labelled as legal sovereignty (BARNETT, 2010; JACKSON, R., 2007; JACKSON, R. H.; ROSBERG, 1982; LAKE, 2013; WENDT, 1992).

The principle of sovereignty is also a social concept since it serves as a basis for interaction in an international society of States. Mutual recognition of sovereignty is part of the construction of states and establishes sovereignty as an institution. Recognition is not merely a formal and diplomatic act but an effect of the refusal to violate a State's exclusivity over its territory (BIERSTEKER; WEBER, 1996; WENDT; FRIEDHEIM, 1996). It is a practical attitude repeated every time the opportunity for intervention arises but is rejected. It is possible to affirm that the current international order is based on the differentiation between political units based on sovereignty (REUS-SMIT, 2013).

If we treat sovereignty as a socially constructed concept, different points of view are possible, and it is necessary to consider how asymmetric power relations impact views on sovereignty and intervention. Developing nations, for example, may have more reservations about the relativisation of sovereignty, which would cover up the great powers' domination (LYONS; MASTANDUNO, 1995). Countries may disagree not only about the role of sovereignty in the international system but also about whether a specific state, at a particular time, violated rules of international law and what are the implications of such an act to its sovereignty rights.

3.2.2. Sovereignty and R2P

The end of the Cold War amplifies this discussion. It marks a moment of contestation of the strict observance of state sovereignty and the right to non-intervention, connected with the development of the human rights agenda (SEAMAN, 2014). The Agenda for Peace recognises the sovereign state as the fundamental entity of the international community but also states that the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed. Indeed, one of the starting points of the text is the rejection of an absolute notion of sovereignty and the need for State leaders to find a balance between good internal governance and the requirements of an increasingly interdependent world (UNITED NATIONS, 1992).

Subsequent publications highlighted the tension between sovereignty rights and the deployment of UN presence through fact-finding missions, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, the former being at times an impediment to the latter, with the report "A More Secure World" emphasising the relationship between sovereignty and responsibility (UNITED NATIONS, 1995, 2005, 2008a, 2015).

The report "A More Secure World" is the follow-up to the outcome of the 2005 Millennium Summit, which endorses the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), presented in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001, which marks another point of inflexion around the notion of sovereignty. This report was elaborated to build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty through the concept of R2P (INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 2001).

According to R2P, the non-intervention norm would be the starting point, the rule, and intervention would be the exception for cases of violence that genuinely "shock the conscience of humanity" or that represent a clear and present danger to international security, requiring coercive military intervention (INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 2001, p. 31). This moment can be understood as the emergence of a tension between a more conventional concept of sovereignty and the idea of shared sovereignty to enable the practice of intervention where and when sovereignty fails (KRASNER, 2004).

3.2.3. Sovereignty in the dictionary

To sum up, state sovereignty is a fundamental concept in the international system and expresses the right of States to exercise authority over their territories without external interference. In the dictionary, the category "Sovereignty" includes keywords that cover all mentions of i) sovereignty principles, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, and ii) violations, such as aggression, annexation, and occupation. The following are five sentences representative of this category:

1) "We have noted that the mandate of the commission whose establishment is about to be authorised is rather extensive, touching in certain aspects upon Burundi's **sovereignty** and **internal affairs**." (Representative of China, 3571st meeting, 28 August 1995).

2) “Our message is clear: there can be no calling into question of Bosnia and Herzegovina's **territorial integrity**”. (Representative of France, 7308th meeting, 11 November 2014).
3) “At the same time, we note the inadmissibility of the Israeli practice of targeted eliminations, the **construction of settlements** and the continuation of the Wall”. (Representative of Russia, 5736th meeting, 29 August 2007).
4) “So once again I hope we can all urge Israel to cease its systematic policy of **settlement expansion**, demolition of Palestinian structures and limits on Palestinian development”. (Representative of the United Kingdom, 7772nd meeting, 15 September 2016).
5) “Russia champions the **sovereignty** of nations and then acts as if its neighbour borders do not exist”. (Representative of the United States, 7384th meeting, 17 February 2015).

3.3. Peacemaking

The Charter of the United Nations, in its Article 2, obligates all members to settle disputes by peaceful means, to refrain from the threat or use of force, and to cooperate with UN-sponsored actions. Chapter VI of the Charter specifies the mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes and was particularly important during the Cold War years (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022). Article 33 (1) of Chapter VI requires that States seek solutions through traditional forms of peaceful settlement: negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or resort to regional organisations. The Security Council must call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means (WHITE, 2021).

Also present in the discussion on peacemaking is the concept of conflict prevention, referred to in An Agenda for Peace as preventive diplomacy: “an action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (UNITED NATIONS, 1992, para. 20). Building trust is the goal of preventive diplomacy, which would depend on measures such as fact-finding missions to gather information about social and economic trends that can cause conflict, which would serve to provide early warning of threats to peace.

The concept of peacemaking, in turn, is associated with bringing the conflicting parties together to reach an agreement by peaceful means, as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter. Mediation and negotiation play a central role in this process and can be carried out by individuals appointed by the Security Council, the General Assembly or the Secretary-General

(UNITED NATIONS, 1992, 2000). Additionally, peaceful settlement of disputes may involve adjudication and arbitration through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022; UNITED NATIONS, 1992). Peacemaking activities are designed to occur at the beginning of a conflict but are also crucial in post-conflict.

In the early years of the UN, the debates in the UNSC around peacemaking focused on whether a situation could be classified as "likely to endanger international peace and security" (Articles 33 and 34) and so appropriate for Chapter VI recommendations, or as a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" (Article 39) requiring the activation of Chapter VII. The “Spanish Question” in 1946, for example, related to the activities of the Franco regime, was considered an “international concern” and a “potential menace to international peace” but not a “threat to the peace” (WHITE, 2021).

Peacemaking went through changes over time: consisting of Chapter VI functions formally applied during the immediate post-1945 period, absence of normative development during the Cold War, being limited to a reiteration of the core obligations of states and the powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and reflecting the ideological changes of the post-Cold War in terms of an expansion of the purposes of peacemaking to include democracy and the liberal State in peace agreements and address inequalities and other post-conflict injustices (WHITE, 2021). With the conflicts becoming more complex over time, the activities of mediation and negotiation also became more challenging and, at times, deemed inadequate in contexts involving multiple actors, among them extremist groups that scorn compromise solutions (UNITED NATIONS, 2015).

3.3.1. The notion of “good offices”

The notion of “good offices” reflects the idea of a third party attempting to bring actors involved in a conflict to the negotiating table. This term has evolved to encompass various diplomatic actions to prevent, manage, or resolve conflicts (RAMCHARAN, 2001). It can range from simple communications by the Secretary-General to full-scale mediation efforts and is applicable in pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict situations.

The UN Charter does not explicitly mention “good offices” but implies such a role for the Secretary-General through Articles 98 and 99. The former specifies that the Secretary-

General shall perform functions entrusted by the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council. These functions would include those in the field of the prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes[1].

On the other hand, Article 99 empowers the Secretary-General to bring any matter to the Security Council's attention that may threaten international peace and security. Rarely used in the history of the United Nations, despite some implicit mentions, this article was explicitly invoked for the first time in the post-Cold War period by Secretary-General António Guterres on 6 December 2023. The SG urged the Security Council to press to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, appealing for a humanitarian ceasefire to be declared.

3.3.2. Peacemaking in the dictionary

In summary, peacemaking involves the use of negotiation tools, mediation, diplomacy, early warning, good offices, and confidence-building to prevent conflicts from arising and, once they have started, to bring the parties together to build a peaceful solution. Notably, there may be an affinity between peacemaking and the principle of sovereignty since the former, different from peacekeeping and peacebuilding, seems rooted in sovereign equality, consent and agreement (WHITE, 2021).

In the dictionary, the category "Peacemaking" will cover mentions of i) peaceful means, such as dialogue, negotiation, and mediation; ii) peaceful solutions, such as dispute settlement, agreement, and ceasefire; and iii) ways of referring to actors involved in a conflict that is more likely to be neutral and connected to processes of negotiation, mainly references to "parties". This category's presence in the speeches emphasises peaceful and negotiated solutions between the parties. The following are five sentences representative of this category:

1) "In recent days, the overall situation in eastern Ukraine has been stable, and the ceasefire has largely been maintained". (Representative of China, 7400th meeting, 6 March 2015).
2) "We hope that it will bring about the awaited leap forward by those who hold the key to move Mali and the region towards lasting peace and stability". (Representative of France, 8229th meeting, 11 April 2018).
3) "There are many sides to the complex and deep-seated problems in Rakhine state, which can be resolved only through exclusively peaceful political and diplomatic

[1] Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/peacemaking-mandate/secretary-general. Access on: 26 January 2024.

means, by establishing a dialogue between the Naypyidaw and Dhaka authorities and involving representatives of every faith and nationality". (Representative of Russia, 8255th meeting, 14 May 2018).

4) "As the Boundary Commission decision grows nearer, we believe it is important for the international community to engage more deeply in the peace process, particularly the guarantors of the peace process and regional organisations, including the Organization of African Unity". (Representative of the United Kingdom, 4485th meeting, 6 March 2002).
5) "Russia must stop destabilising Ukraine and allow all the people of Ukraine to decide their country's future through a democratic political process". (Representative of the United States, 7219th meeting, 18 July 2014).

3.4. Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. The establishment of peacekeeping operations has its legal basis in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. Traditionally associated with Chapter VI on Pacific Settlement of Disputes, the Security Council adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII when authorising deployment into volatile post-conflict settings (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a).

3.4.1. Principles of peacekeeping

The principles of peacekeeping are consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence. The attainment of these principles is what helps us distinguish between peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement measures.

Parties' consent is based on the idea that peace operations require their commitment to a political process and acceptance of a peacekeeping operation to assist in that process. Consent can be withdrawn and is, in practice, withdrawn when a party seeks to restrict the operation's freedom of action (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a).

Impartiality means that the implementation of the mandate cannot favour any party. Impartiality is not neutrality or inactivity. Peacekeepers must be impartial when dealing with conflicting parties but not neutral regarding the execution of their mandates and violations of

the peace process or international norms and principles. In complex operations involving the management of consent with several parties, impartiality means adherence to the principles of the Charter and the mandate and not neutrality towards violations of the peace process or international norms and principles that a UN operation upholds because, in some cases, local parties are not moral equals, but aggressors and victims (UNITED NATIONS, 2000, 2008a).

Lastly, non-use of force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate involves resisting attempts to prevent peacekeeping operations from fulfilling their duties. In situations where militias, criminal gangs and other spoilers threaten the peace process and the civilian population, the UNSC often provides a "robust" mandate authorising operations to use "all necessary means" to deter attempts to dismantle the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist national authorities in maintaining law and order (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a).

3.4.2. Evolution of the concept

The concept of peacekeeping evolved over the years and can be understood through two basic approaches: traditional and multidimensional. The first relates to those operations typical of the Cold War period, involving military personnel to observe ceasefire agreements such as the ones deployed in Kashmir and Palestine in the late 1940s. The traditional peacekeeping model fits this chronology: 1) war (typically interstate); 2) ceasefire; 3) invitation to monitor the ceasefire, and 4) sending of military observers for monitoring (posts, patrols, overflights) and, at the same time, drafting a political agreement. The operation would be a way to build trust between the parties, ensuring that neither side would violate the agreement.

The end of the Cold War and the complexities of the internal conflicts demanded a new way of thinking about peace operations. The Agenda for Peace mentioned the necessity of peacekeeping operations moving beyond the strictly military character and integrating civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists, and police (UNITED NATIONS, 1992). The Supplement highlighted the challenge of peacekeeping operations protecting humanitarian operations and civilian populations and pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation while maintaining the principles of consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence (UNITED NATIONS, 1995).

The concern about the new and complex conflict dynamics has been a constant for the United Nations since the end of the Cold War. The challenges are related to aspects such as low State capacity to provide security to the population and maintain public order, damaged basic infrastructure, displaced population, ethnic, religious or regional divisions and human rights abuses (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a).

The HIPPO report (UNITED NATIONS, 2015) reiterates this concern, adding the question of whether changes in conflict may be outpacing peace operations' ability to respond. It also asserts that many peace operations are deployed in an environment with little or no peace to keep, a context far from the traditional model.

To address these challenges, the United Nations developed a novel way of conceiving peace operations under the notion of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. They are typical of the post-Cold War period and assume the most varied tasks to create a safe and stable environment while strengthening State capacity, facilitating the political process, and ensuring the activities of other UN and international actors. These operations, in short, fill the vacuum of public order in countries in conflict.

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations employ a set of military, civil and police components to assist in the implementation of an agreement, which can be very specific regarding the phases of the peace process or more comprehensive, leaving details for future negotiations (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a). The activities performed by these operations cover the observation of ceasefires just like traditional peacekeeping but also address issues related to humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, and state-building.

The principle of non-use of force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate was reshaped due to new challenges in the environment of conflicts, such as described in the HIPPO report:

> (a) ceasefire monitoring is taking place in more hostile settings;
>
> (b) peace implementation is being undertaken in more challenging operating environments, often with political processes susceptible to collapse and
>
> (c) in situations that the Panel here terms "conflict management", missions are being deployed into more violent settings without the enabling frameworks that have previously driven success (UNITED NATIONS, 2015).

In some cases, the environments into which UN peacekeeping operations are deployed are characterised by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers. In the face of

such situations, the Security Council has given robust mandates authorising the use of all necessary means to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a).

Operations with robust mandates may blur the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, encompassing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022). However, the use of force in peacekeeping operations with a robust mandate is placed at the tactical level, rooted in consent, and with the clear objective of deterring spoilers. On the other hand, peace enforcement involves the use of force at the strategic or international level, seeking the military defeat of the spoilers and those in violation of international law (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a). Additionally, it is essential to highlight that counter-terrorism activities are explicitly placed outside the limits of UN peacekeeping operations in the HIPPO report (UNITED NATIONS, 2015).

3.4.3. Peacekeeping in the dictionary

UN peace operations evolved over time, dealing with the challenge of meeting fast-paced, changing conflict dynamics by adding new tools and instruments to their repertoire. With so many areas of concern, different parties, and courses of action, UNSC members face increased difficulty in building consensus around the best and most suited response to a given situation.

To summarise, peacekeeping operations are commonly deployed during a conflict to maintain peace and security. In a multidimensional approach, peacekeeping operations help implement agreements reached through peacemaking, pave the way for early peacebuilding measures, and support the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

To distinct it from peacemaking, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance, the peacekeeping category in the dictionary contains keywords more related to a restricted notion of peacekeeping, covering mentions of i) UN presence, such as blue helmets, peace initiative, and interim force, and ii) traditional peacekeeping activities, such as inspection, demilitarisation, disengagement, and verification. For simplification, the category does not contain the acronyms of UN peacekeeping missions, such as MINUSMA, MONUSCO, MINUSTAH, etc. The following are five sentences representative of this category:

1) “I wish to pay tribute to all the Force Commanders and chief military observers, and, through them, to all United Nations peacekeepers around the world.” (Representative of China, 6789th meeting, 20 June 2012).
2) “That peace operation - the first sent by the African Union - deserves the international community’s support.” (Representative of France, 4775th meeting, 18 June 2003).
3) “We thank Assistant Secretary-General Alexander Zouev for presenting the final progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (S/2018/344).” (Representative of Russia, 8239th meeting, 19 April 2018).
4) “However, no United Nations peacekeeping mandate should be regarded as open-ended.” (Representative of the United Kingdom, 5560th meeting, 31 October 2006).
5) “So improvement begins with clear, credible and achievable mandates for all United Nations missions - and, of course, that starts right here.” (Representative of the United States, 6389th meeting, 23 September 2010).

3.5. Peacebuilding

The concept of peacebuilding is the counterpart of preventive diplomacy. It aims to identify and support structures that will strengthen and solidify peace, reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, and provide an exit for peacekeepers (UNITED NATIONS, 1992, 2000, 2008a). Several of these activities take place within the scope of the UN system's various programs, funds, offices, and agencies, focusing on creating structures for the institutionalisation of peace and strengthening state capacity.

Peacebuilding may occur after an agreement with long-term provisions to deal with the structural causes of the conflict (political, economic and social) or in relation to a potential or past conflict without any previous peacekeeping operation. The activities are undertaken to achieve peace not only as the absence of war but also as sustainable peace through addressing the root causes of conflict and strengthening national capacity (UNITED NATIONS, 2000, 2008a). Military and technical engagements may accomplish the cease of hostilities, but lasting and sustainable peace relies on political solutions.

3.5.1. Core peacebuilding activities

To achieve sustainable peace, peacebuilding measures focus on at least four critical areas: restoring the State's ability to provide security and maintain public order, strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights, supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes, and promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees uprooted by conflict (UNITED NATIONS, 2008b).

Addressing the root causes of conflict and achieving a durable and sustainable peace is a very complex task involving many areas. Therefore, peacebuilding missions must integrate military, police, and civilian components to address political, social, and economic issues. Condensing the content of the primary UN documents on peace operations and the literature (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022; UNITED NATIONS, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008a, 2015; WHITE, 2021), this research considers the following tasks as the core of peacebuilding activities:

1) Reintegration aims to enable former combatants to return to society and create a safe environment for the development of social and economic life. The central concept for this area is disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), which is related to technical advice, disarmament and cantonment sites, collection and destruction of weapons, ammunition and other materials, and reintegration. Associated activities involve demilitarisation, control of small arms, demining, and repatriating refugees.

2) Reforms in the State structure and capacity-building, involving security sector reform (SSR), with advisory and training support for security personnel, the restructuring, reform and training of the national police and/or armed forces, strengthening of national judiciary and corrections systems, legal and judicial reform, strengthening the rule of law, electoral reform, technical assistance for democratic development, fight against corruption, improvement of respect for human rights, defence sector reform, and civil administration. Strengthening the rule of law in connection with human rights protections includes addressing impunity through transitional justice mechanisms.

3) Monitor elections and support the processes of popular consultation and polls.

4) Promoting social development through supporting formal and informal processes of political participation, free and fair elections, peace processes, and national reconciliation. A

particular focus is directed at the participation of women in all decision-making mechanisms, peace processes and at all levels of conflict resolution, as urged by Resolution 1325 (2000).

5) Advancing economic development through addressing issues such as unemployment, economic governance, financial aid, and economic recovery.

As aforementioned, peacebuilding involves the joint efforts of different actors, so peace operations usually have a more supporting role, for example, when addressing humanitarian assistance and socioeconomic recovery and development (UNITED NATIONS, 2008b).

These operations may address the needs of the local population by implementing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), which may include infrastructure assistance and short-term employment generation activities (UNITED NATIONS, 2008b). For example, the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is working with a local organisation specialised in providing adult literacy education in Gao, northern Mali. MINUSMA helped refurbish three classrooms where more than a hundred men and women attend classes in their local languages[2].

3.5.2. Relationship with the state administration and the local population

In certain situations, peace operations may be required to operate as a substitute for the state administration, filling the vacuum of political order. Until mid-1999, a minor part of peacebuilding activities was devoted to civil administration conduct or oversight. However, in June 1999, the UN engaged in developing a transitional civil administration for Kosovo and three months later for East Timor (UNITED NATIONS, 2000). Also, the Capstone Doctrine (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a) describes how some operations acted under the authorisation of the Security Council to assume the legislative and administrative functions of the State temporarily.

When considering all the peacebuilding tasks, from the most supportive to the ones that assume parts of the State, it is worth mentioning the great relevance of the relationship with the local population. The Brahimi Report highlights that effective peacebuilding requires active and multidimensional engagement with the local parties (UNITED NATIONS, 2000).

Promoting national and local ownership, awareness of emerging local capacities, and sensitivity to the effect of the mission upon the population are ways of increasing the

[2] Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/quick-impact-projects-communities. Access on: 26 January 2024.

operation's legitimacy and ensuring the sustainability of any national capacity once the operation has been withdrawn (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a). The HIPPO report highlights that countries and their people must be viewed as agents of peace, not "projects" (UNITED NATIONS, 2015).

3.5.3. Peacebuilding in the dictionary

Peacebuilding is probably the most challenging concept to include as a dictionary category since it encompasses diverse activities. To condense them into a few areas of activity described earlier, the category "Peacebuilding" in the dictionary will cover all mentions of root causes of conflict, reintegration, state reform, electoral processes, social development, and economic development. Below is a list of five sentences that fall under this category:

1) "Eliminating poverty is a requirement for international peace, development and stability." (Representative of China, 5220th meeting, 30 June 2005).
2) "A second point concerns the elections, which will be an important test on 26 October." (Representative of France, 4605th meeting, 5 September 2002).
3) "Externally imposed solutions are not capable of dealing with the unique and complex nature of the underlying causes of Haiti's crisis." (Representative of Russia, 9066th meeting, 16 June 2022).
4) "Fourthly, we must tackle the problem of small arms, since if former combatants still have access to personal weapons once the fighting is over, they are at great risk of being drawn back into violent ways of life." (Representative of the United Kingdom, 3977th meeting, 12 February 1999).
5) "But the international community needs to go one step further and consider how demobilised soldiers and other citizens can be put back to work rebuilding their country's infrastructure, which, to put it bluntly, is trashed." (Representative of the United States, 3621st meeting, 24 January 1996).

3.6. Humanitarian Assistance

One of the main changes in the Security Council after the end of the Cold War was the embracing of the responsibility to address humanitarian issues, referring to humanitarian crises as threats to international peace and security, while not one resolution had mentioned humanitarian intervention during the Cold War (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022). Humanitarian assistance is facilitated by peacekeeping operations because of their potential to

improve the situation on the ground for a peaceful resolution, but it is not strictly part of the list of peacekeeping activities (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a).

3.6.1. Evolution of the concept

Humanitarian assistance is cited in An Agenda for Peace as a form of action that requires the consent of the affected country (UNITED NATIONS, 1992). In 1995, the use of UN forces to protect humanitarian operations was mentioned as a new fact (UNITED NATIONS, 1995). According to the Capstone Doctrine (UNITED NATIONS, 2008a), peacekeeping's task is more related to assisting humanitarian assistance, providing a safe environment for its delivery, and, depending on the situation, escorting convoys or transporting humanitarian aid. There are also small-scale quick-impact projects for more direct benefit to the population.

The protection of civilians, a core principle of international humanitarian law and a moral responsibility of the United Nations, is deeply connected to humanitarian assistance (UNITED NATIONS, 2015). This specific task is frequently mentioned in peace operations mandates, including activities such as monitoring and advocacy for human rights, supporting the development of the rule of law, and physical presence, deterrence, and protective action in the face of imminent threats against civilians, with particular focus on child and women protection.

3.6.2. Health and environmental issues

The broadening of the notion of human security in the Security Council to address the evolving challenges of international conflicts is connected to the inclusion of two areas of concern to its agenda: health and the environment. Concerning the first, the issue of infectious diseases in the context of conflicts led the UN Security Council, in 2000, to take into consideration HIV/AIDS as a critical security concern in Africa, primarily focusing on the health impact on UN peacekeepers. In another situation, in 2014, the Council adopted resolution 2177 under Chapter VII to respond to the Ebola crisis, acknowledging the epidemic as a global threat and establishing the UN's first medical mission, the UN Mission for Ebola and Emergency Response (UNMEER) (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018).

More recently, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the UN Security Council adopted resolutions calling for ceasefires in conflict zones to facilitate humanitarian aid and

vaccine distribution. The first resolution, adopted in July 2020, called for a minimum 90-day ceasefire after delays due to disputes between the US and China over how the resolution text should refer to the World Health Organization (WHO). A second resolution, adopted in February 2021, reinforced the need for global cooperation on vaccine distribution (RUSHTON; VOSS, 2022).

The inclusion of environmental issues in this broadening concept of security is a sign of recognition of the significant impact of environmental degradation and climate change on global peace. The UN Security Council remains divided over climate change and security, with a minority opposing its integration into the Council's agenda. This was the case in 2021, when Russia vetoed draft resolution S/2021/990.

Climate security first entered UN Security Council discussions in 2007, driven by the UK and aligned with a resurgence of interest in scientific literature and major policy reports. Germany renewed focus on the topic in 2011, resulting in a presidential statement expressing concern over climate change's potential to worsen threats to international peace and security. Subsequently, climate security received less formal attention, discussed mainly in Arria-Formula meetings on issues like sea level rise, rising temperatures, and opportunities for cooperative responses (HARDT *et al*., 2023).

The main approach of the UNSC towards climate security, therefore, is on how extreme events impact crisis development. Environmental disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, and droughts, are part of the UNSC debates since they pose significant challenges to international security and may lead to large-scale displacement, disrupt key infrastructure, and exacerbate existing tensions. Several UNSC resolutions and field missions, particularly in Africa, have incorporated climate security considerations. For example, resolution 2429 (2018), which extended the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), mentioned the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, and natural disasters including drought and desertification on the situation in Darfur.

3.6.3. Humanitarian assistance in the dictionary

There are many ways the UN can advance with the promotion of human rights, among them the support to humanitarian assistance, the inclusion of human rights provisions in peace agreements and diverse participation in peace processes, protection of civilians in peacekeeping mandates, and bringing perpetrators of human rights violations to justice. This spectrum of

activities covers more than one area of UN action; therefore, we need to split it among the categories of this research's dictionary.

Themes related to social development, such as participation and representation, are present in the "Peacebuilding" category since they are part of laying the foundations for a more diverse and democratic society, mainly in the aftermath of conflict situations. Concerning issues related to human rights violations and crimes against humanity, they will be included in the "International Justice" category because of their link with violations of international law more broadly and the establishment of international tribunals and courts to prosecute those who commit these crimes. Additionally, human rights violations are part of the atrocities committed during conflicts that raise the question about the use of force.

The category "Humanitarian Assistance" in the dictionary is limited to those mentions about sending aid and basic supplies to alleviate the suffering of victims of conflict and groups of people typically affected by conflicts, such as refugees, internally displaced people, children, the elderly, civilian people, and civilian infrastructure. Additionally, to account for the broad concept of human security in the UNSC, the category also covers mentions of health crises and environmental disasters. The following are five sentences representative of this category:

1) "Millions of children have taken refuge in neighbouring countries." (Representative of China, 9032nd meeting, 12 May 2022).
2) "We call for the protection of, and respect for, all civilians, especially the vulnerable – women, children and humanitarian personnel." (Representative of France, 8974th meeting, 23 February 2022).
3) "As part of the Flu Fly Away project, the Kharkiv Institute of Veterinary Medicine carried out research on wild birds as a vector for the transmission of avian influenza." (Representative of Russia, 8999th meeting, 18 March 2022).
4) "The United Kingdom expresses its solidarity with the Serbian people, and indeed all those in the region who are suffering as a result of this natural disaster." (Representative of the United Kingdom, 7183rd meeting, 27 May 2014).
5) "The result is that polio has re-emerged as a threat to Nigerian children, with two cases discovered last month." (Representative of the United States, 7779th meeting, 28 September 2016)".

3.7. Sanctions

The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, may apply measures not involving the use of armed force to modify the behaviour of a party that is threatening

international peace and security, as defined under Article 39 (WILSON, 2014). These measures are commonly referred to as sanctions and occupy a medium place between peacemaking and peace enforcement, or between words and war. Also, they are among the few instruments to induce compliance with Security Council decisions (CHESTERMAN; JOHNSTONE; MALONE, And D. M., 2016).

Article 41 of the Charter states that sanctions measures include "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations". This non-exhaustive list is designed to be non-military and aims to change the behaviour of a target considered to be acting unlawfully. Concerning UN practice, sanctions often involve arms embargoes, freezes of assets, bans on investment, limits on banking services, travel bans, export or import limits, denial of visas, and cancellation of air links (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022).

Sanctions were used by the United Nations on two occasions until 1990: Southern Rhodesia in 1965 and South Africa in 1977. Since the end of the Cold War, sanctions have been used in varied contexts to deal with terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unconstitutional changes in governments, and the protection of civilians (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022). After the use of comprehensive sanctions in the 1990s and the lessons learned from its adverse humanitarian effects, especially in Iraq, the UN began imposing targeted sanctions on state and non-state actors.

The imposition of sanctions tends to reflect more the seriousness of a problem than the seriousness of engagement with it (CHESTERMAN; JOHNSTONE; MALONE, 2016). These problems may be related to rebellions, aggression, restoring legitimate government, human rights protection, disarmament, establishing peace, counter-terrorism, and promotion of good governance (WILSON, 2014). In the Security Council, debates over sanctions are connected to situations deemed threatening international peace and security and unlawful entities, as well as to its limits and negative consequences on populations.

3.7.1. Sanctions in the dictionary

The category "Sanctions" in the dictionary covers all mentions of sanctions measures, committees, and regimes, including references to arms embargo, assets freeze, travel ban, and

the process of listing individuals and entities for targeted sanctions. The following are five sentences representative of this category:

1) “On the question of sanctions, China has always maintained that the Security Council should exercise caution.” (Representative of China, 7532nd meeting, 9 October 2015).
2) “It is proof that sanctions violations will not be without consequences and that all States have an important role to play in the implementation of sanctions.” (Representative of France, 6786th meeting, 12 June 2012).
3) “Targeted sanctions against the Minister of Information and the Chief of General Staff of the Government Army may have unpredictable consequences.” (Representative of Russia, 7846th meeting, 19 December 2016).
4) “As other representatives have said, each test is a violation of Security Council resolutions, and the Council should support the rigorous enforcement of its sanctions in the face of such violations.” (Representative of the United Kingdom, 8682nd meeting, 11 December 2019).
5) “Further, all external military support inconsistent with the United Nations arms embargo must end.” (Representative of the United States, in a meeting recorded in document S/2021/483, 17 May 2021).

3.8. International Justice

Peace enforcement is a drastic measure aimed not only at solving a conflict but also to halt violations of international law and bring perpetrators of grave crimes to justice. The link between human rights and security is also typical of the post-Cold War period and led to the creation of ad hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone to deal with war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity committed in these situations (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022). Concerning the debates in the Council and the mechanisms to achieve conflict resolution, this section will focus on three judicial mechanisms connected to the maintenance of international peace and security: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Ad Hoc International War Crimes Tribunals, and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

3.8.1. The role of international tribunals

The ICJ is the judicial arm of the United Nations. It functions as an impartial body for settling legal disputes in accordance with international law and giving advisory opinions on legal questions. Its members are elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council,

and all Member States are parties to the ICJ Statute. The Court has no executive to enforce its decisions and no police to bring a party to justice. Hence, compliance with its decisions depends upon its own legitimacy and "the power of shame" if States fail to comply. The role of the ICJ in protecting and promoting human rights is restricted to those disputes brought to it that touch on states' human rights obligations, even though time has proven that the judges are not hesitant to invoke international human rights law where they see violations thereof in cases before them (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022).

To address the grave human rights violations in the 1990s, the Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994. They were designed to be exceptional, temporary, and with primacy over national courts. The Council also acted under Chapter VII to create the Special Court for Lebanon, which was inaugurated in 2009 (CHESTERMAN; JOHNSTONE; MALONE, And D. M., 2016). Residual functions once performed by the ICTY and the ICTR were absorbed by the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.

The process of establishing the ad hoc international criminal tribunals set the precedent for the Rome Statute in 1998 to establish the International Criminal Court (ICC). It has jurisdiction over persons for the most severe crimes of international concern and a provision by which the Security Council has the authority to refer situations to this tribunal. The ICC was created in 1998, but the establishment of an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide has been on the agenda of the UN since 1948 (CHESTERMAN; JOHNSTONE; MALONE, 2016).

Even though it is a treaty-based Court, when the UNSC acts under Chapter VII referring a situation to the ICC, the latter has jurisdiction over crimes committed in the territory and by nationals of states not party to the Statute. In this context, it could be said that the referral by the Council is an international legislative act, since it imposes new rules to be observed by any actors in the situations referred. This was done in the case of Darfur/Sudan in 2005 and Libya in 2011. The ICC has jurisdiction over individuals and deals with systematic or widespread perpetration of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. In its turn, the UNSC has the primacy to determine when aggression has taken place (GALAND, 2016; MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022).

International judicial organs are one of the ways of settling disputes and bringing perpetrators of human rights violations to justice. The Council holds debates over the work

done by the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, and UNSC members may discuss the need to adjudicate a dispute to the ICJ, create or question the establishment of an international tribunal, and refer cases of crimes against humanity to the ICC.

3.8.2. International justice in the dictionary

The category "International Justice" in the dictionary covers all content related to judicial measures at the international level, including mentions of international courts and tribunals. Additionally, it includes references to those crimes directly related to violations of international law, such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, human rights violations, atrocities, genocide, gender violence, racial discrimination, and so on. Below is a list of five sentences that fall under this category.

1) "China thanks President Agius, President Meron and Prosecutor Brammertz for their briefings on the work of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals." (Representative of China, 7960th meeting, 7 June 2017).
2) "The Secretary-General, on whose behalf Nicolas Michel, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, has just spoken, also plays a significant role in that regard, as demonstrated by the recent signing of the agreement on implementation of the International Court of Justice judgment concerning the Bakassi Peninsula." (Representative of France, 5474th meeting, 22 June 2006).
3) "In that regard, the report again concludes that there are insufficient grounds to transmit such a request, despite the information regarding the practice of torture and sexual violence in prison and despite the death sentence imposed on Abdullah Al-Senussi on 28 July by the court in Tripoli." (Representative of Russia, 7549th meeting, 5 November 2015).
4) "We fully support coordination between the Prosecutor Office, national enforcement agencies and INTERPOL with regard to apprehending the eight remaining fugitives, and we welcome the Prosecutor's initiatives to improve tracking activities." (Representative of the United Kingdom, 7960th meeting, 7 June 2017).
5) "Iraq's new Government must follow the paper trail and bring to justice those responsible for human rights abuses." (Representative of the United States, in a meeting recorded in document S/2020/397, 12 May 2020).

3.9. Counter-Terrorism

One of the main challenges for conflict resolution in the post-Cold War is dealing with multiple actors and differentiating who's working towards peace and who's a spoiler. In the context of peace enforcement by the United Nations, the discussion primarily revolves around how to counter violent non-state actors such as terrorist groups, entities, and individuals associated with transnational crime and how to address criminal activity and repression committed by State actors. For instance, the HIPPO report (UNITED NATIONS, 2015) highlights the concern about attacks perpetrated against civilians that are committed both by Governments and armed groups. Terrorism is considered an area of consensus among the P5, with 14 resolutions adopted between 2016 and 2020 addressing the subject, even though one resolution was vetoed by the United States in 2020 (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022; WHITE, 2021).

3.9.1. UN practice against terrorism

Since 1972, the UN General Assembly has discussed the subject of terrorism as a shared problem, creating norms addressing terrorist acts, even though there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism. In the Security Council, the matter was addressed in the 1990s, when the United States pushed for sanctions against Libya, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Al-Qaeda for supporting terrorism (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022).

The 9/11 attacks marked a pivotal moment, leading to Resolution 1368, which invoked self-defence rights under Article 51 for the first time and supported the US invasion of Afghanistan. The Council expanded sanctions globally against Al-Qaida and the Taliban (Resolution 1267) and passed Resolution 1373, mandating member states to enhance anti-terrorism measures and creating the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). In 2004, Resolution 1535 was adopted to create the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), which supports the CTC in monitoring the implementation of counter-terrorism measures.

Criticisms arose due to the legislative nature of Resolution 1373, the Bush administration's Iraq invasion under the guise of counter-terrorism, and the Council's resistance to including human rights concerns in its decisions, especially regarding due process in sanctions listings. Despite criticisms, the Council's counter-terrorism focus persisted and intensified with the rise of ISIS, leading, for example, to the adoption of resolution 2178, which

aimed at preventing the travel of foreign terrorist fighters (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018).

3.9.2. Drug-trafficking and piracy

Violence committed by non-state actors is not restricted to terrorist activity. Terrorist networks also have links to transnational crime, specifically drug trafficking and acts of piracy. Beginning in the early 2000s, the subject of organised crime was part of country-specific discussions, notably concerning Afghanistan and West Africa, and focused on its destabilising impact on post-conflict situations. In 2009, the Council added organised crime to its agenda as a thematic issue. In this sense, it is worth mentioning that the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has a Terrorism Prevention Branch precisely because of the links between them. Transnational illicit networks trafficking in drugs, weapons, people and money are considered one of the elements feeding on and fueling conflicts (UNITED NATIONS, 2015).

Piracy, an age-old problem, re-emerged as a significant threat in 2008, particularly in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast, disrupting major shipping routes. In response, the UN Security Council, under Chapter VII, authorised states and regional organisations to use all necessary means to repress piracy and armed robbery at sea (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018; MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022).

3.9.3. Counter-Terrorism in the dictionary

The category “Counter-Terrorism” in the dictionary was designed to cover all mentions of terrorism activity, including those related to organised crime, drug trafficking, and piracy. Additionally, it includes all negative ways of referring to non-state actors, such as terrorists, extremists, fundamentalists, warlords, radicals, and so on. The following are five sentences representative of this category:

1) “We should strengthen international cooperation in the fight against terrorism in the three areas of intelligence-sharing, stopping the use of social media for spreading extremist ideology, and cutting off the flow and financing channels of terrorists.” (Representative of China, 7774th meeting, 21 September 2016).
2) “Whether the armed groups are Congolese or foreign and whether or not they pose a serious military threat, it is the Congolese people who are the first to suffer

from their actions." (Representative of France, 5315th meeting, 6 December 2005).

3) "At the same time, additional practical steps are needed to combat the spread of the ideology of terrorism." (Representative of Russia, 7831st meeting, 12 December 2016).
4) "We must integrate our understanding of trafficking and modern slavery with our efforts to combat terrorism, and we must eradicate the use of slavery as a means to resource terrorist groups." (Representative of the United Kingdom, 8114th meeting, 28 November 2017).
5) "There is no nation on Earth more committed to confronting and defeating terrorism than the United States of America." (Representative of the United States, in a meeting recorded in document S/2020/870, 31 August 2020).

3.10. State Responsibility

The UN Charter provides a framework for regulating the use of force by states. The main provision is derived from Article 2 (4), which prohibits the threat or use of force and calls on all UN members to respect other states' sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence. This prohibition has two known exceptions: actions under Chapter VII and the right to self-defence contained in Article 51 of the Charter.

Especially when it comes to the use of force in self-defence, it is important to highlight two principles of customary international law related to this action: necessity and proportionality. On the one hand, the use of force must be necessary because it must be the last resort. On the other hand, action must be proportionate at least in two senses: 1) the use of force must be kept to the minimum necessary for self-defence, avoiding disruption to international peace and security, and 2) under international humanitarian law, the use of force must minimise human suffering. Therefore, states are responsible for avoiding excessive and disproportionate use of force (GARDAM, 2004).

Concerning the issue of human security, the ICISS report (2001) presents the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), linking sovereignty with responsibility as a way of addressing the situations in which a population suffers serious harm from internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert the suffering. These situations often involve states considered repressive and oppressive towards the population and governments seen as illegitimate and, therefore, referred to as dictatorships, tyranny, authoritarianism, regime, etc.

R2P was endorsed by the 2005 World Summit, which affirms that states have the responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The international community must encourage and help states to exercise this responsibility and, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, act under Chapter VII if peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing (UNITED NATIONS, 2005).

3.10.1. State responsibility in the dictionary

The category "State Responsibility" in the dictionary was designed to cover all mentions of typical unlawful state actions against civilians, including repression, oppression, extrajudicial killings, and disproportionate use of force, among others. Additionally, it includes all negative ways of referring to state actors, such as dictator, autocrat, despot, tyrant, regime, etc. The following are five sentences representative of this category:

1) "We are opposed to the Israeli security force's excessive use of force and call for investigating such violent incidents and ensuring accountability for them." (Representative of China, 9116th meeting, 25 August 2022).
2) "Although the Security Council yesterday unanimously adopted resolution 2286 (2016) to protect medical personnel and facilities, the regime is deliberately, systematically and methodically targeting them." (Representative of France, 7687th meeting, 4 May 2016).
3) "Dozens of eyewitnesses have confirmed the reports of the Kyiv regime's treatment of its people, and unlike the so-called witnesses from Ukrainian and Western investigations, they do not conceal their names and addresses." (Representative of Russia, 9104th meeting, 29 July 2022).
4) "We must stop pretending that the Al-Assad regime is acting in good faith." (Representative of the United Kingdom, 8990th meeting, 10 March 2022).
5) "As we learned over the weekend, Omran's older brother Ali died from the injuries that he received in the air strike, the result of the Al-Assad's regime's willful attacks to cut off eastern Aleppo." (Representative of the United States, 7757th meeting, 22 August 2016).

3.11. Non-Proliferation

The issue of arms control is not new in the international arena. In 1945, right after the signing of the UN Charter, atomic bombs were used against Japan. This pivotal event put

disarmament on the UN's agenda, reflected in the General Assembly's first resolution calling for the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022).

Disarmament is primarily related to arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fissile material, bacteriological, biological, toxin, and chemical weapons. There is also "micro-disarmament", related to practical disarmament in the context of conflicts and directed at light and small weapons and anti-personnel mines. Micro-disarmament can be a feature in peace settlements where the UN has played a peacekeeping role, but also relevant to post-conflict peacebuilding (UNITED NATIONS, 1995).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created in 1957 as a related agency of the UN to help spread information about the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The 1963 Cuban missile crisis led the world to deepen the discussions on atomic energy, which led first to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and then, in 1967, to the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The basis of the NPT is that non-nuclear weapons States that do not develop weapons will gain access to peaceful nuclear technologies and that nuclear-weapon States will give up their weapons in the future (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022).

In the twilight of the Cold War, a major case involving nuclear disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security was the discovery of the secret Iraqi nuclear weapons program in 1991, which prompted the Security Council to discuss arms control issues for the first time, leading to the creation of UN Special Commission for the Disarmament of Iraq (UNSCOM) to oversee the destruction of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and missiles as well as production and storage facilities and to monitor its long-term compliance (MINGST; KARNS; LYON, 2022).

With the increasingly diverse range of actors involved in transnational conflicts, the Security Council needs to address not only the issue of disarming States but also to avoid WMDs from falling into the hands of non-state actors such as terrorist groups. Resolution 1540 (2004) of the Security Council affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security and expressed grave concern about the risks of acquisition of such weapons by non-State actors.

3.11.1. Non-Proliferation in the dictionary

Non-proliferation is an important subject in the Security Council, which devotes a few thematic agenda items to focus on this issue, often in connection with North Korea and Iran. The category "Non-Proliferation" in the dictionary includes mentions of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, including references to treaties, regimes, weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and so on. The following are five sentences representative of this category:

1) "Last November, this Council adopted resolution 1441 (2002) by consensus, reiterating the firm determination of the international community to verify and destroy weapons of mass destruction in Iraq's possession." (Representative of China, 4707th meeting, 14 February 2003).
2) "France is also extremely concerned by Iran's activities beyond the nuclear issue, in particular arms exports and its ballistic missiles programme." (Representative of France, 6384th meeting, 15 September 2010).
3) "Did we not discuss a new mechanism with Council members of the Council at the conclusion of the multiple acts in the political spectacle surrounding the closure of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism?" (Representative of Russia, 8164th meeting, 23 January 2018).
4) "It has breached these obligations by using chemical weapons throughout the conflict in Syria." (Representative of the United Kingdom, 8849th meeting, 2 September 2021).
5) "Let us not forget that this diplomatic activity was preceded by more than three years of Iranian non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement." (Representative of the United States, 5500th meeting, 31 July 2006).

3.12. Summary

This chapter presented the typology of approaches to international intervention, developed by this research to be precise and comprehensive. Its purpose is to encompass all references to United Nations actions in international conflicts that arise during UNSC debates.

The category "Sovereignty" addresses the question of the limits of state and UN action in global affairs, covering content related to the principle of non-interference and violations of sovereignty. "Peacemaking", "Peacekeeping", "Peacebuilding", and "Humanitarian Assistance" were designed to cover all issues related to the United Nations engagement, from

roles of mediation to the deployment of traditional peace operations, post-conflict activities and delivery of aid to those affected by conflicts, health crises, and environmental disasters. Finally, "Sanctions", "International Justice", "Non-Proliferation", "Counter-Terrorism", and "State Responsibility" are connected to the subject of the use of force to address threats to international peace and security, with specifications about measures and actors.

The typology presented in this Chapter will be used to build a dictionary applicable to the UNSC debates through text analysis. This tool will be able to detect approaches to international intervention resolution that address the questions of how to act, which tools should be discussed, what are the main issues at stake, and who are the main actors whose roles must be put to debate. They do not necessarily reflect members' preference towards a given approach. The detection of categories can only for sure reflect the relevance of a given subject.

Chapter 1 explained the United Nations Security Council and how it works. This Chapter explained how the Council can act to address international conflicts through the creation of a typology of international approaches. The next Chapter brings a literature review of the permanent members' main views on how the Security Council should act to fulfil its responsibility to maintain international peace and security.

4. P5 DYNAMICS

The literature has devoted itself to understanding the Council's practice through its members, especially the permanent ones, with particular attention to how they express their positions in the debates. This thesis aligns with this research agenda, investigating how permanent members emphasise approaches to international intervention in their speeches.

This Chapter explains group formation among the permanent members and summarises the distinctive marks of each one's practice in the Security Council as found in the literature. Once we understand what previous research has found about the permanent members' stances in the Council, this thesis will be able to formulate expectations about what it can find through text analysis of the UNSC debates based on the typology of approaches to international intervention.

4.1. The main divisions in the Security Council

As we have seen in Chapter 1, the Council has freedom of action when deciding which situations endanger international peace and what to do about them. The UN Charter does not provide strict definitions for concepts such as threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and no other organ has the authority to assess the legality of its acts.

In this context, members have enough space to develop their own understandings of these concepts and propose different courses of action, with the permanent members imposing limits through the veto. The UNSC's public meetings are an opportunity to create narratives, giving meaning to politically significant events, intentions, and actions. When states hold conflicting perspectives on the world, the UNSC becomes an arena for competing narratives, each emphasising different elements of reality (FAIZULLAEV; CORNUT, 2017).

Unlike informal settings, a formal institution such as the Security Council provides a focus and a site for argument, pushing states towards positions they can justify on a basis that is not purely arbitrary or self-regarding. If, on the one hand, members have a considerable space to define their national interest and use this to impose limits on the Council's action, on the other, institutions such as the UNSC are useful for the great powers because they ensure acceptance of their policies, which depends on the institution's legitimacy. For example, even if permanent members hold different views about human rights concerns, this is not an easy

subject to discard or dismiss when a member elaborates on a public position concerning conflicts (KRISCH, 2010).

The Security Council is marked by two fundamental trends in the post-Cold War: increased consensus between the P5 and greater resort to Chapter VII. Convergence of interests was considerably easier, especially in issues such as counter-terrorism, conflict management in Africa, and nuclear non-proliferation (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018).

However, this period, particularly after the 2011 Arab Spring, also saw increased tensions between the P5 and consequent moments of paralysis inside the Council. The Council's inaction was also observed in the cases of Ukraine in 2014 and especially in 2022 after the Russian invasion and after the 2023 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas against Israel. These events contributed to the growing tensions inside the Council and its greater difficulty in reaching decisions.

Moments of convergence and divergence occur as a function of P5's interaction about how they view reality, the UN's role, and the most appropriate measures to resolve conflict. As mentioned before, division among the P5 in the Council is reflected in their different political interests. In scenarios where the Great Powers' interests do not directly conflict, there is potential for mutual benefit through cooperation. Nevertheless, even with the convergence of interests, it is necessary to deliberate and decide about the arrangement of the cooperation. The institutional framework of the UN Security Council is critical in these situations, since it provides a structure for negotiations and consensus-building, allowing permanent members to find a mutually beneficial approach despite their differing priorities (KRISCH, 2010).

Additionally, approaches may be driven by different diplomatic traditions and values. As we will see in more detail in this Chapter, Western powers tend to emphasise humanitarian concerns and democratisation. Russia, in turn, is more concerned with recovering its great power status and countering Western dominance. At the same time, China promotes the principle of sovereignty with greater emphasis and focuses on building a self-image of a responsible power (BRUGIER, 2023).

The literature recognises a division between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on one side, the P3, and China and Russia on the other (DÖRFLER, 2019; JONES, 2020; NICK PAY; POSTOLSKI, 2022; OKSAMYTNA; KARLSRUD, 2020; SIEVERS; DAWS, 2014). Since the end of the Cold War, the P3 has played a significant role in shaping

the policies of the Security Council. This influence has been exerted despite the veto power and frequently differing interests of Russia and China, as noted by Krisch (KRISCH, 2010).

Even though it is clear from the literature that there is an alignment between the Western powers in contrast to Russia and China, it is essential to add important nuances to the P5 interaction. For example, Frederking (2023) argues that, on the one hand, France, China, and Russia, these two more than the first, advocate procedural collective security, based on the idea of political obligation among great powers to pursue stability and enforce rules that support their interests. This involves minimising the importance of the United States in international security, the importance of multilateralism, and the centrality of the Security Council.

On the other hand, the UK and the United States are seen as more prone to embrace hegemonic collective security, an arrangement in which the most powerful state claims the right to enforce agreed-upon rules unilaterally. In this particular case, the UK would be in a more ambivalent position, attempting to reconcile its support for multilateralism with its partnership with the US.

Beyond the references above, extensive research focuses on studying the permanent members' differences and similarities towards the UN's role in global affairs. These contributions have relied on describing the overall division among the P5, while others focused on specific members, concepts, or conflicts.

The following lines briefly describe the main goals and results of studies on P5 interaction. Next, I organised these works' findings in more detail, adding contributions that analysed specific Council members, to present the main features of the permanent members' stances in the UNSC according to the literature.

4.2. The Western powers

The literature consistently recognises the alignment between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France within the UN system. This is evidenced in Security Council debates and other aspects of their work within the UN.

The three countries' similar positions are also observed in the General Assembly. When estimating ideal points in this UN body for the five permanent members of the Security Council, Voeten (2021) observed a clear and constant alignment in voting patterns in the Assembly among the P3.

In the Security Council, Medzihorsky et al. (2017) found P3 alignment in the Syrian conflict. These members showed a tendency to frame the conflict in terms of human rights violations and were more inclined to advocate for interventionist solutions. Their rhetoric aligned with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, emphasising the need for coercive outside intervention in response to perceived human rights abuses.

The P3 also displays higher levels of sponsoring activity to draft resolutions in the UNSC (MONTELEONE, 2015). More than that, the author observes a dominant coalition, primarily consisting of the US and European UNSC members, which frequently acts as a unified group. The drafts are commonly elaborated initially by the US or British missions, shared informally with the French, discussed at an informal meeting of the P5, and then brought to the Council for adoption.

Their collaboration is based on habitual coalition support rather than issue-specific preferences and only reached a low point during the first mandate of the Bush administration. Since then, the three members have started acting alone more often than before but have kept joint action as their dominant strategy. The content of the draft resolutions sponsored by the US and European countries often involves Chapter VII actions, UN peace operations, and humanitarian interventions, facing opposition from Russia and China (MONTELEONE, 2015).

The United States, the United Kingdom, and France often share similar views on the UN's role in international affairs and conflict resolution strategies. However, there are distinct differences within this group that are significant and warrant closer examination.

France and the UK share similar foreign policies and strategic cultures and are considered the most active members of the Security Council. The two countries have played prominent roles in drafting resolutions and shaping the Council's agenda, often converging on positions, with occasional differences in the Israel-Palestine conflict and Iraq in 2003. They have been leading the Council's engagement with conflicts in Africa, peacekeeping, and sanctions, among other issues, and, differently from their American ally, have not cast a veto since 1989. This attitude is mainly driven by the need to justify their permanent seats, a privilege that has been put in question due to the changes in the distribution of power since the end of the Second World War and the process of decolonisation (PARSONS, 1990; TARDY; ZAUM, 2016).

While France and the UK are major financial contributors to UN peacekeeping, their actual participation in operations is limited. France's involvement is higher than the UK's, with

contributions to UN operations in Lebanon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali. France prefers to operate according to UNSC resolutions outside UN command structures, blending security interests and commitment to regional stability. The UK, constrained by deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, has been less involved since a small force in Sierra Leone in 2000 (TARDY; ZAUM, 2016).

Considering the US-UK partnership, both countries were amenable to the idea that the use of force based on R2P could be authorised by bodies other than the UNSC. In its turn, France was responsible for suggesting that the veto should not be used to block military intervention for human protection but ultimately kept in line with the other permanent members' position about not limiting the use of the veto (MORRIS, 2015).

To gain a deeper understanding of the positions held by each Western permanent member of the Security Council, we will now briefly explore what the literature reveals about their stances. This examination will provide insights into each member's unique perspectives and policies within the Council's framework.

4.2.1. The United States

The United States has historically maintained an ambivalent relationship with the United Nations, characterised by fluctuating attitudes and approaches. On one hand, the US recognises and supports the UN as a platform for multilateral cooperation, appreciating its privileged status within the organisation. On the other, there have been instances where the US has emphasised its exceptionalism about specific global rules and pursued its national interests through unilateral actions that bypass the Security Council (FREDERKING, 2007).

During the Cold War, the United States mainly used the Security Council to block collective security measures and promote their interests through its veto power, showing reluctance to support findings of a "threat to the peace". In the 1990s, the US started favouring Security Council action, with speeches' arguments to support a "threat to the peace" finding in the Security Council commonly related to enforcing and promoting law and defending and promoting human rights, often starting by assessing the gravity of the situation (PAIGE, 2019).

The United States' more profound engagement with the Security Council can be characterised by pursuing "maximum diplomatic flexibility". This strategy is rooted in the United States' efforts to expand the Council's powers and solidify its authority. For example, the US sought Council approval for the interventions in the 1990s for humanitarian reasons,

urged it to create the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and drafted Resolution 1373, requiring states to adopt measures against terrorism. This effort to expand the Council's powers was accompanied by the use of the veto to limit Council actions that oppose its interests and by allowing itself to act unilaterally to defend its interests, even without UNSC authorisation (BOSCO, 2016).

From 1990 to 1996, the US engaged in the Council for actions such as the collective response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and to deal with conflicts in Cambodia, Namibia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, with successful results. The relationship with the United Nations began to become more tense, especially after the failures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, and after the US and NATO went to war against Serbia without Council approval (STEDMAN, 2016).

Even though the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted the Council to act in more unity, two cases complicated the relationship between the US and the UN: Afghanistan and Iraq. As explained by Stedman (2016), initially, the Council supported the US's military response to Afghanistan, giving it legality through Resolution 1368, which invoked the right of self-defence. The US embraced international help in mediation, policing, and transitional governance assistance but excluded it from military operations.

The real conflict arose over Iraq. The US was already moving towards unilateralism during the Clinton administration, gradually usurping the Council's prerogative in addressing noncompliance by Saddam Hussein toward UNSC resolutions and openly mentioning regime change as a US foreign policy goal. After the terrorist attacks, the US pushed for invasion authorisation but faced the Council's refusal due to scepticism about US intelligence and concerns about regional stability.

In this scenario, the US went to war with a coalition, ignoring the Council. This marked the low point in the relationship, with talks in Washington about leaving the UN. However, the US recognised that it would need the UN to improve the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan and saw the utility of peacekeeping missions, especially in Africa, in terms of burden-sharing (STEDMAN, 2016). Concerning this latter point, UN peace operations are seen by Washington as part of a range of tools to deal with threats beyond its borders in cases where there is not enough national interest to put US troops on the ground (KARLSRUD, 2017).

In terms of values, throughout the post-Cold War era, US foreign policy, regardless of the administration, has consistently focused on promoting democratic values and supporting

the use of military force in humanitarian crises (STEDMAN, 2016). Bakalova and Jüngling (BAKALOVA; JÜNGLING, 2020) described the United States' approach to peace and conflict settlement as consisting of a focus on good governance, the establishment or strengthening of democratic institutions, and the restoration of justice, with less emphasis on the cessation of hostilities.

This view on peace was most explicit in the cases of Libya and Syria, where the United States framed the situation as an oppressed people's peaceful struggle against authoritarian leadership. The opposite occurred in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, with a focus on non-interference and the aggression perpetrated by a third state: Russia. Despite the US emphasising non-interference in the Georgia and Ukraine conflicts, an approach seemingly atypical for its traditional stance, the underlying argumentation aligns with the US's broader conception of peace and the justifiability of using force to achieve peace.

4.2.2. The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom's role in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is marked by the challenge of justifying its permanent membership amidst a relative decline in global power. To compensate, the UK has leaned into diplomatic activism, notably in drafting resolutions. The nation's delegation at the UNSC is highly respected for its expertise in legal and procedural nuances. Its reputation is partly attributed to its permanent status, which guarantees institutional knowledge and resources. The permanent status, along with a large UN delegation and the strategic placement of UK nationals in key UN Secretariat roles, amplifies the country's influence and access, bolstering its diplomatic capital – a crucial factor in maintaining its permanent membership (RALPH; GIFKINS; JARVIS, 2020).

However, diplomatic capital alone is insufficient for the UK to uphold its special responsibilities in the Council. Material commitments, like development aid and peacekeeping personnel, are also essential. While the UK scores well in financial contributions to the UN, its service personnel contribution to peacekeeping missions is limited. This becomes more critical given the increasing complexity of such missions, often designed by powerful Northern countries but executed by nations from the global South. This disparity highlights the need for either increased material leadership from the UK or a more inclusive approach towards nations with significant peacekeeping contributions (RALPH; GIFKINS; JARVIS, 2020).

The UK's approach to the UNSC is multifaceted. It balances its strategic partnership with the US and its commitment to multilateralism, often endorsing collective security and international cooperation. Yet, it frequently aligns with US unilateral actions, even supporting interventions without Security Council authorisation, a stance that sometimes contradicts its multilateral aspirations (FREDERKING, 2007).

Historically, the UK's engagement with the UN has evolved. During the Cold War, the UK showed reluctance towards UN peacekeeping activities. The UK involvement in UN peacekeeping during this period is described as limited and often favouring the colonial system over the UN. The Cyprus conflict in 1964 marked a shift, with the UK engaging constructively in the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, recognising the potential benefits of UN peacekeeping (CURRAN; WILLIAMS, 2016).

After the Cold War, the UK's engagement in UN peacekeeping became more complex. The UK had a crucial role in shaping the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia but faced many challenges regarding the clarity of its mandates, the use of force to ensure humanitarian assistance, and the relationship with the belligerent groups. The Srebrenica massacre and Sarajevo attack in 1995 led to a shift towards more robust action. In Rwanda, the UK opposed reinforcing the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and, after the problems faced by peacekeeping operations in other situations such as Somalia and Angola, the UK followed the general international pattern of retreating from UN peacekeeping (CURRAN; WILLIAMS, 2016).

The intervention in Sierra Leone in 1999 marked a significant yet complex return to peacekeeping. The UK intervened in support of support of President Kabbah and against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) through Operation Palliser. The intervention initially aimed to evacuate UK citizens but evolved into a broader role, including stabilising the region and training local forces. The UK's intervention persuaded RUF fighters to cooperate with the UN. However, the UN later suggested that it would have been better if UNAMSIL was given the necessary capabilities (CURRAN; WILLIAMS, 2016).

Since the conclusion of UNPROFOR, the UK's focus has shifted towards NATO and the global war on terror, reducing its active involvement in UN peacekeeping. Despite this, the UK has maintained a political and financial role in supporting UN peacekeeping, with Cyprus being a notable exception where the UK has had a more active military role (CURRAN; WILLIAMS, 2016). The UK has been a leading figure in UN activities in Cyprus, Darfur,

Libya, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Yemen (TARDY; ZAUM, 2016). However, controversies still occurred. In 2016, the UK decided to withdraw its police officers from the UN mission in South Sudan during an upsurge, leading to criticism and questioning of its permanent membership (NICHOLS, 2016). Like France, the UK actively uses UN peace operations to achieve its policy goals (KARLSRUD, 2017).

More recently, concerns emerged about the impact of Brexit on the UK's role in the UNSC, precisely its image as a multilateral partner, a legitimate (formerly) European member of the Council alongside France, and its overall diplomatic utility in terms of available hard and soft power. Despite this, the UK continued to lead and participate in UN initiatives, such as the response to the Ukraine crisis and the deployment of troops in Mali.

However, the decision to reduce the Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget has somewhat dented the UK's global reputation as a leading aid provider (HADFIELD; WHITMAN, 2023). Additionally, on 14 November 2022, James Heappey, the UK Armed Forces Minister, announced the early withdrawal of UK forces from the MINUSMA mission in Mali. The decision was attributed to the actions of the Malian Government, including its coups and partnership with the Wagner Group, and restrictions imposed on multinational forces in Mali[3].

The United Kingdom's general approach is marked by the importance of humanitarian issues and the need to intervene if the Security Council is deadlocked, especially in cases of egregious human suffering. This view finds echo in the positions of the United States and France, as seen in the joint actions against Syrian forces in 2018, but with the UK emphasising the need for a legal doctrine and openly challenging the Security Council's primacy (NEWMAN, 2021).

When supporting the finding of a threat to the peace, the United Kingdom's position is similar to that of the United States, combining an assessment of the gravity of the situation and the promotion of law. However, the UK tends to emphasise more aspects of legal reasoning, and the issue of systematic violations of the laws of war receives more attention than the gravity threshold. This is reiterated in the UK's pursuit of a legal doctrine to justify the joint action in Syria in 2018 (NEWMAN, 2021; PAIGE, 2019).

[3] Available at https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9634/. Access on: 26 January 2024.

4.2.3. France

France views its permanent status in the Security Council as conferring prestige and a moral position in international politics. Like the United Kingdom, it has to address the challenge of justifying its permanent membership, showing diplomatic activism in the Council. France has strategically used its status to secure key positions for its nationals within the UN, particularly in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations since 1997, extending its influence in global peace and security matters (TARDY; ZAUM, 2016).

Unlike the UK, France more openly sees the UNSC as a place to pursue its security interests. It devotes much of its efforts to building initiatives to deal with conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, which are very present in the Council's agenda. The country has led operations in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Mali, and Syria (TARDY; ZAUM, 2016).

France has been the only European country consistently deploying military forces in sub-Saharan Africa. Initially, French military operations were characterised by direct involvement. However, over time, this strategy evolved significantly. The focus shifted towards peacebuilding and local empowerment, moving away from classic regime support. This transformation entailed a combination of security assistance with a strong emphasis on social and political reforms. Traditionally, the French military, focused on the use of force, has been hesitant about peacekeeping roles, preferring the UN as a follow-up actor in stabilisation phases or for parallel deployments (KARLSRUD, 2017; RECCHIA; TARDY, 2020).

The mid-1990s are a moment of change in France's approach to its African interventions. Notably, the French involvement in Côte d'Ivoire from 2002 to 2004 underscored the risks associated with unilateral actions, which could fuel nationalist sentiments within the target state and neighbouring countries, undermining France's regional influence. This realisation steered France towards a more multilateral approach, which can be explained more broadly to be driven by the need to share material burdens, seek legitimacy amidst local and international critiques, and align with the European Union's emerging Common Security and Defence Policy (RECCHIA; TARDY, 2020).

However, despite this shift towards multilateralism, France maintains a stance that balances coalition operations with the political and operational capability to conduct military interventions independently when deemed necessary. France also actively supports regional military efforts against terrorism, exemplified by the establishment of the Group of Five Sahel

(G-5 Sahel) in 2014 to fight terrorist groups in the Sahel region, complementing its operations (KARLSRUD, 2017; RECCHIA; TARDY, 2020).

France prefers to support the finding of a "threat to the peace" in the Security Council, but, according to Paige (PAIGE, 2019), with no overall approach guiding its justification. Differently from the UK and the US, the French speeches tend to emphasise that the facts and the situation on the ground make the finding of a threat to the peace self-evident, without a strong link to the idea of a gravity threshold, as found in the UK and the US approaches. The author also shows how the arguments based on the idea that situations should be resolved through peaceful diplomatic and political negotiation were employed in French discourses as a form of coercive measure towards the parties in conflict (PAIGE, 2019).

France aligns with the US on the promotion of human rights and universal moral values but resists American dominance. It criticised US unilateralism post-9/11, advocating collective security based on state cooperation and respect for the Security Council's authority. Exceptionally, France supported NATO's intervention in Kosovo for humanitarian reasons despite lacking Security Council authorisation, viewing it as a unique case rather than a precedent (FREDERKING, 2007).

4.3. The Russian-Chinese loose coalition

China and Russia are often referred to as "status seekers" in the sense that they try to project their image on the international stage but with different approaches. China is a rising power trying to portray itself as a responsible great power, expressed in its more moderate approach concerning international intervention and growing role in peacekeeping. On the other hand, Russia tries not to lose its position in the global order and aims to recover the prestige of superpower lost after the fall of the Soviet Union. This frustration impels it to be more aggressive (CHEN; YIN, 2020; FREDERKING, 2023; WENQI; XINYU, 2016).

Russia, China, and parts of the Non-Aligned Movement see US actions as assaults on global order, especially those related to Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya. This view was made more explicit in the case of Russia, especially after Putin's return to power in 2012, which reoriented the Russian foreign policy towards a more confrontational stance against the West in the pursuit of its re-emergence as a global power. In the case of China, its economic growth led the country

to adopt a more assertive foreign policy, aimed at protecting its investment and energy interests (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018).

The two countries have in common their reluctance to accept the use of force based on the Responsibility to Protect without Council approval (HURD, 2018) and including references to Chapter VII in Council resolutions to avoid giving the US any cover at all to use force (BELLINGER, 2013). Both Beijing and Moscow align with the strict definition of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as outlined in the 2005 UN World Summit, focusing on the first two pillars: the protection responsibilities of the state and international assistance and capacity building. Both governments are wary of the Western powers' use of R2P, often perceiving it as a tool for promoting regime change against themselves or their allies. In this sense, they emphasise the need for any forcible action to be authorised by the Council (CHEN; YIN, 2020; MORRIS, 2015).

The idea of a partnership between the two countries can be seen in the work of Monteleone (2015), who saw signs of coalition-building in drafting resolutions since 2001. The two countries showed tendencies to sponsor draft resolutions with EU countries and the United States only due to occasional convergence of preferences, making opposition to drafts sponsored by the US and EU states through abstentions and the use of the veto.

One particular event is often used to illustrate the China-Russia partnership: their joint use of the veto in the Syrian crisis since 2011. In this case, China's objections were often rooted in realist perspectives, focusing on national interests, while Russia's objections were more critical, pointing out perceived injustices in global hierarchies (FREDERKING, 2023). Additionally, the Chinese speeches during the UNSC debates were seen as more moderate, while Russia displayed a more openly confrontational stance (CHEN; YIN, 2020).

This event represented a significant shift for China, moving from its traditionally low-profile stance in the UNSC to a more assertive position that openly aligned with Russia's emphasis on non-interference (TRENIN, 2016). This shift was also interpreted as part of a broader process aimed at challenging the legitimacy of the existing international order and diminishing the role of the United States within it (CHAZIZA, 2014; MATTOS, 2018).

The context behind such a partnership involves Russia's role as China's key arms supplier, a major oil and natural gas source, and a strategic counterweight to US influence. This "axis of convenience" makes China reluctant to oppose Russia on Council matters. China

generally prefers not to be isolated within the P5, aligning more with the USA and others when Russia supports or leans towards the US position (WUTHNOW, 2013).

Aside from the situation in Syria, Russia and China developed a common position in the cases of alleged human rights violations in Zimbabwe and Myanmar (TRENIN, 2016). In the case of Myanmar, China argued that human rights violations were not the concern of the UNSC, while regarding Zimbabwe, it considered that the situation was still under the context of domestic affairs (FUNG, 2019).

The two countries express a common rejection of US global supremacy, but they display different ways of making opposition and distinct approaches to the principle of sovereignty. On the one hand, Russia's invasions of Georgia and Ukraine show that this notion is less considered. On the other, China did not join Russia's vetoes in the cases of Georgia, Ukraine, the Srebrenica genocide commemoration, and partly in the Syrian crisis, indicating a more significant concern over state sovereignty and reservations over Russia's interventionism (EINSIEDEL, VON; MALONE, D. M., 2018). The two countries' distinct positions in the UNSC will be explained in more detail in the following lines.

4.3.1. China

Since replacing the Republic of China in the UN Security Council in 1971, the People's Republic of China has transitioned from a near-rejectionist stance, with low participation, to an active and influential world power within the Council. The initial years were marked by China casting abstention votes or simply not voting, an attitude that could be explained by its novice position in the organisation and lack of interest in the country cases discussed in the Council, being focused on building stronger relationships with Third World states. The first vote only came in 1981, in support of the mandate extension for the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (FUNG, 2019; WENQI; XINYU, 2016).

Voeten (VOETEN, 2021) observed a change in China's voting patterns in the General Assembly, moving away from the United States, United Kingdom, and France after the Tiananmen events, and becoming closer to them by the end of the 1990s, when started aiming World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and economic integration. In this period, China began valuing the Security Council as an expression of multipolarity, often echoing positions adopted by Russia and France (FUNG, 2019; WENQI; XINYU, 2016).

China also engaged in peace operations, sending military observers to Namibia in 1989 and the Middle East in 1990. The first time China deployed an organic military unit on a peacekeeping mission occurred when it sent engineering troops to Cambodia in 1992-1993 (WENQI; XINYU, 2016). China supported missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and East Timor in the context of concerns over its international reputation, mainly due to the Tiananmen events. These events also limited China's ability to offer views about just interventions, prompting it to be a more compliant player, which partly explains why China did not block international interventions led by the West in the 1990s (FUNG, 2019; WENQI; XINYU, 2016).

Still in the 1990s, China allowed the establishment of no-fly zones in Iraq, expressing concerns over their humanitarian impact and the importance of respecting Iraq's sovereignty. The same occurred in the case of Bosnia's no-fly zones, with China highlighting their exceptional nature and the need for host nation consent. Conversely, China's response to NATO's intervention in Kosovo was more assertive. Perceiving NATO's actions as a guise for promoting hegemony under the pretext of human rights, China did not hinder action but threatened to veto any authorisation for the use of force against Serbia (WENQI; XINYU, 2016).

A more assertive China could be seen especially in matters concerning Taiwan. Beijing perceives the political and military support provided by the United States to Taiwan as a form of interference, and it uses its position on the Security Council to safeguard its interests regarding Taiwan and its one-China policy. In the 1990s, even though in a moment of support to UN peace operations, China used its veto power to prevent peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, Guatemala, and Macedonia, countries that attempted to recognise Taiwan (FREDERKING, 2023; FUNG, 2019; WENQI; XINYU, 2016).

In the 2000s, China significantly stepped up its troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions and its contributions to the UN budget. A notable instance was in 2004, when China supported the creation of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and subsequently deployed troops there. This marked a first for China, as it was their initial deployment of peacekeeping forces to a country with no formal diplomatic relationship (FUNG, 2019).

During the 2000s, China continued to engage in peacekeeping operations and made further contributions, such as police officers to Haiti and engineers to Sudan and the DRC, surpassing France as the largest P5 contributor by 2009 (KARLSRUD, 2017). Over recent

decades, China's stance on UN peacekeeping has evolved from neutrality or hostility to firm support, becoming the largest troop contributor among the Security Council's P5 and the eighth among all UN members as of 31 October 2023.

Despite China's known position in the defence of sovereignty, some cases, such as Darfur, attracted more curiosity about China's response. Following the UNSC's involvement in the crisis in 2004, China advocated weaker sanctions in 2004 to avoid destabilisation and humanitarian issues. Behind these reasons, some have argued that China's oil dependence on Sudan played an essential role in this non-interventionist position. Despite this, China abstained from Resolution 1593, which referred Darfur to the International Criminal Court, and contributed over 300 troops to UNAMID, likely swayed by potential adverse effects derived from the 2008 Olympics and African leaders' concerns (FUNG, 2019; WENQI; XINYU, 2016).

The Libyan crisis also elicited a nuanced reaction from Beijing. Initially, China supported sanctions and chose to abstain from voting on the use of force. However, as the situation evolved, it aligned with India and Russia in calling for a ceasefire, arguing that the allied forces had overstepped the UN mandate. This experience in Libya subsequently influenced China's approach to the Syrian crisis, placing a greater emphasis on protecting sovereignty and exercising its veto power in response (WENQI; XINYU, 2016).

One of the main characteristics of China's approach to international affairs is its emphasis on sovereignty as a core principle, influenced by its history of foreign interference and present since its founding in 1949. Premier Zhou Enlai's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, emphasising sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, equality, and peaceful coexistence have been fundamental to China's foreign policy. These principles were reaffirmed in the 2011 white paper on China's Peaceful Development (WENQI; XINYU, 2016).

This approach is also reflected in China's position towards peacekeeping, emphasising its principles and opposing robust mandates (KARLSRUD, 2017), and R2P, focusing mainly on humanitarian protection, UN authority, conflict prevention through development, respecting regional organisations, preferring dialogue over force, and strict implementation of UN resolutions (CHEN; YIN, 2020). It is worth noting how China's use of its veto power in cases like the Syrian conflict reflect a broader strategy of "norm containment" to avoid the expansion of R2P (BRUGIER, 2023).

Additionally, China's interpretation of what constitutes a threat to peace is the most restrictive among the P5. It strongly emphasises upholding the principle of non-interference, the idea that Council action will assist in bringing about a peaceful resolution, and adherence to international law and the Council's mandate (PAIGE, 2019).

The cases mentioned above highlight that China's defence of sovereignty has many nuances. Rhetorical defence of non-interference does not necessarily lead to a veto, but matters concerning Taiwan may prompt China to prevent peacekeeping efforts, even when intensely engaged in these activities. Another critical aspect of China's stance is the importance of its economic development.

According to Fung (2019), the preference for abstention and focus on rhetoric are related to factors such as China's prioritisation of its economic development and the absence of core national interests in those situations. Such interests are derived from its perspective on stability and economic growth, the former being a prerequisite for the latter. In Chinese foreign policy, instability abroad is connected to negative impacts on economic interests, the possibility of Western intervention, refugee flows and cross-border issues, and the preservation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (WUTHNOW, 2013).

4.3.2. Russia

As previously noted, Russia seeks to affirm its status on the global stage, actively working to establish itself as a major power with its regional sphere of influence. This ambition makes it act more aggressively in the Council against Western dominance, using its veto power to safeguard its interests and to obstruct military actions by the US and NATO that it deems unfavourable. Additionally, Russia shows reluctance towards peacekeeping missions with robust mandates and uses bargaining tactics in negotiations with the P3 about their establishment. Ultimately, Russia envisages a Security Council constituted of coequals capable of preventing the emergence of a global hegemony exercised by a sole power (KARLSRUD, 2017; TRENIN, 2016).

During the closing stages of the Cold War, there was anticipation of a cooperative era between the waning Soviet Union and the nascent Russian Federation. The transition from rivalry to collective security in world politics began with Mikhail Gorbachev's rise in the Soviet Union and his "new thinking" in foreign policy. This shift was reflected in Gorbachev's

advocacy for the UN's role in peacekeeping in a 1987 Pravda article, his UN speeches in 1988 and Boris Yeltsin's inaugural address to the Security Council in 1992 (FREDERKING, 2023; TRENIN, 2016).

After the Cold War, Russia participated in UN peacekeeping in the Balkans, Middle East, and Africa, notably in Bosnia-Herzegovina under NATO. However, it felt its prestige diminished, and over the years, it reduced its engagement in global peacekeeping. The main event behind this movement was NATO's intervention in former Yugoslavia in 1999. Russia started seeing Western actions as threats and, concerned primarily with the United States' unrivalled power in a unipolar world, adopted a more rigid stance, even threatening to use its veto power in the case of Kosovo. Consequently, Russia began to be seen by the West as a spoiler. While the P3 was expanding its views on what constitutes a threat to the peace, Russia moved to a more restrictive approach (FREDERKING, 2023; PAIGE, 2019; TRENIN, 2016).

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a new opportunity for collaboration between Russia and the West emerged, as illustrated by Russia's support of Resolution 1373 and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. However, a significant divergence emerged with the US intervention in Iraq. Russia advocated for strong resolutions urging Saddam Hussein's compliance with the UN but opposed the US invasion, viewing it as a repetition of what happened in the Kosovo conflict. This disagreement marked a shift in Russia's approach, leading it to adopt a more assertive stance in international affairs and distancing itself from Western political influence (TRENIN, 2016).

This movement occurred in other parts of the UN system. Voeten (2021), when estimating ideal points based on voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly, observes that the Soviet Union became closer to the United States after Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and shifted its position once again after the election of Vladimir Putin 1999, this time moving away from the Americans.

The 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia worsened the relationship with the West, even with a brief period of improved relations during Obama's reset in 2009, which facilitated joint efforts in intensifying sanctions against Iran and condemning Muammar Qaddafi. However, these moments of collaboration were short-lived. Putin's reelection in 2012 marked another turning point in Russian foreign policy, steering it towards deeper Eurasian integration and fostering stronger ties with Beijing.

After Russia's negative assessment of NATO intervention in Libya, it adopted a stricter stance towards the Syrian crisis, using the veto to block Council action. This movement away from the West was solidified after the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Despite these situations, Russia supported Western efforts in Mali in 2013, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2013, and the Ivory Coast in 2011 (TRENIN, 2016).

Russia also looks for UN support to combat transnational threats such as drugs, terrorism, and organised crime, mainly using domestic resources. Its primary concern in drug trafficking is Afghanistan, where much of the heroin consumed in Russia comes from. The Russian concern over terrorist threats is rooted primarily in groups from the Northern Caucasus, which developed links with al-Qaeda and its affiliates (PAIGE, 2019; TRENIN, 2016). Concerning this issue, Scherzinger (2023) detected slightly higher mentions of terrorism in Russia's speeches in the UNSC when compared with the other permanent members.

Regarding its overall stance on global affairs, Russia adopts a negative and narrow definition of peace and conflict settlement based on the need to establish ceasefires and protect basic human rights. It tends to emphasise non-interference and domestic political settlement as means to achieve peace, reintegration, and national reconciliation due to their importance in restoring state institutions. This position is illustrated in the cases of Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, in addition to Russia's limited endorsement of R2P, highlighting that the use of force requires Council authorisation (BAKALOVA; JÜNGLING, 2020; TRENIN, 2016).

However, the cases of Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2014, and Ukraine 2022 deviate from this general approach. In the cases of Georgia 2008 and Ukraine 2014, Russia's discursive strategy relied on presenting invasions as appropriate humanitarian interventions, more aligned with a liberal understanding of peace. These invasions were justified through the notion of a Russian [co]compatriot population and the defence of self-determination of this population (BAKALOVA; JÜNGLING, 2020; BENDIX, 2022). Paige (2019) also observed mentions of the right of self-determination in Russia's speeches when assessing whether situations could be considered threats to the peace.

Conversely, in the 2022 full-scale invasion, Russia could not justify a threatened compatriot population outside Donbas. Additionally, its framing of an existential threat from "neo-fascists" in Ukraine was dismissed, creating a stark contrast with international norms and intensifying its role conflict with the US (BENDIX, 2022).

4.4. Expectations

This Chapter briefly described how the literature sees the divisions among the permanent members of the Security Council and the main characteristics of their positions towards international security and the United Nations' role in international conflicts. The literature recognises a division between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, the P3 on one side and China and Russia on the other.

The Western powers are mainly characterised by their emphasis on humanitarian values and democratisation. They favour the use of force even without Council authorisation if based on humanitarian concerns. China and Russia oppose this view, opposing the Western impetus towards humanitarian intervention with a position focused on the defence of sovereignty and self-determination.

However, even though China and Russia demonstrate a shared view in the cases of Libya and Syria, their positions regarding international security differ significantly. China assumes a more constant defence of sovereignty and pursues engagement with the UN through peacekeeping missions. Russia, in turn, emphasises sovereignty to block Western action but may adopt a more interventionist stance to uphold its interests, as seen in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine.

This thesis aims to look at the differences and similarities between the permanent members following previous efforts but based on a typology of approaches to international intervention, which encapsulates the most relevant themes about UNSC practice, and further text analysis of the UNSC debates. Condensing what the literature has to say about each permanent member's stance in the Security Council and thinking of the approaches presented in Chapter 2, we can think of a few expectations that deserve attention when analysing the results of this thesis investigation:

1) Overall, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France share similar views on international intervention, with greater emphasis on humanitarian concerns and holding states accountable for human rights violations.
2) China emphasises the defence of sovereignty, the pursuit of peaceful means, and the importance of economic development.
3) Russia also emphasises the defence of sovereignty but may adopt an interventionist stance when it serves its interests and has concerns over terrorism, especially drug trafficking in Afghanistan.

Based on the picture presented by the literature about how each permanent member sees itself and the UN on the international stage, this thesis proceeds with a text analysis of the UNSC debates on a novel typology to elaborate its own mosaic of the P5 in the Council. The next Chapter presents the data analysed in this study. It describes how the ideal types of approaches to international intervention are used to build a dictionary that can be used for text analysis of the debates.

5. MATERIALS AND METHODS

This chapter has two primary purposes: to present the data used in the analysis and to describe the methodology adopted in this research. The first goal is to familiarise the reader with the primary material used in this research: the transcripts of the Council meetings. In addition, this part shows the database constituted of the speeches extracted from the transcripts and the main metadata mobilised in this research. This thesis relies on a different version of the UNSC Debates Dataset, limited to the 14,170 speeches the UNSC permanent members delivered from 1992 to 2023.

The second part describes how this data will be analysed to answer this thesis' research question: What are the differences and similarities of the UNSC permanent members' approaches to international intervention? It explains the text as data approach adopted by this thesis and how previous research used it to analyse UN documents. Additionally, this part presents the main contribution of this research: a dictionary designed to detect the main approaches to international intervention in UNSC debates, based on the literature on conflict and the UN framework about its tools and practice, and applicable to all UNSC debates in the post-Cold War period, irrespective of the topic.

To ensure transparency, this second section describes in detail all the steps necessary to build the dictionary, providing an overview of its content and the main keywords detected in the UNSC debates after its application. This dictionary may be used in further research to answer other relevant questions in the field of IR, focusing on specific categories, conflicts, or members, and put in perspective with other types of data.

5.1. The UN Security Council Debates Dataset

This study relies on the UNSC Debates Dataset (SCHOENFELD *et al.*, 2019), a corpus constituted of 82,165 speeches delivered in the Council from 1992 to 2020 in its current version[4]. The efforts to build the dataset involved mainly gathering official transcripts of public UNSC meetings available online in PDF format from the United Nations Digital Library[5]. After collecting the PDFs, the next step was data processing, which consisted of separating the

[4] The first version of the dataset was released in April 2019 by Mirco Schoenfeld, Steffen Eckhard, Ronny Patz, and Hilde van Meegdenburg, containing 65,393 speeches from 1995 to 2017. I became part of this project in 2020, to support in updating the dataset, including new speeches and metadata.
[5] Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en. Access on: 26 January 2024.

meeting transcripts into individual speeches and organising important metadata, including the speakers' name, the date of the speech, the meeting symbol, the topic discussed, and other relevant details.

The version of the dataset used in this thesis is limited to 14,170 speeches made by the permanent members but covers a larger period than the current version, from January 1992 to December 2023. This thesis' dataset also mobilises a more limited set of metadata than the current version, strictly focused on the information that will be essential to answer its research question. Table 1 summarises information on the variables contained in the dataset used in this work:

Table 2: Variables of the dataset

Variable	Description
"content"	The actual text of the speeches made in the UNSC
"filename"	An individual ID for each speech
"spv"	The meeting symbol
"date"	The date when the speech was delivered
"speaker_name"	The name of the person speaking on behalf of the UN member
"country"	The name of the country represented by the UN mission
"broad_agenda_item"	The broad subject discussed in the meeting
"specific_agenda_item"	The specific subject discussed in the meeting

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Additionally, Figure 1 presents an excerpt from a meeting transcript to familiarise readers with its structure and content. It helps illustrate where in the text one can find information about each debate and its members. The top of the figure contains vital information such as the meeting symbol (S/PV.9243), the date of the meeting (13/01/2023), and the adopted agenda item (Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine). Regarding the participants, the layout of the transcripts is designed for clarity. At the beginning of each speech, the name of the speaker is displayed in bold, followed by the name of their country in parentheses.

Figure 1: Excerpt of a UNSC meeting transcript



We will continue to provide humanitarian aid in Ukraine, for example by supplying mobile heating devices. We support justice for victims, including promoting the documentation and investigation of crimes committed against them. And we are committed to a participatory and transparent reconstruction process under Ukrainian leadership, as set out in the Lugano Principles.

Last year, war returned to Europe with full force. As members of the Security Council, we have the responsibility to do our utmost to ensure that this year is marked by a just peace, in accordance with international law, i n in the world

Mr. De Rivière (France) (*spoke in French*): I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing.

For almost a year, with bravery and determination, Ukraine has been resisting the Russian aggression unleashed in violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. Russia had bet on the rapid collapse of the Ukrainian army and authorities. Eleven months later, the offensive on Kyiv have been repulsed, and the Kharkiv region and the city of Kherson have been liberated.

With each Ukrainian victory on the ground, Russia reacts in a cowardly manner by bombing civilian infrastructure. These strikes have a clear objective: to terrorize civilians and break the morale of the Ukrainian people. The Kremlin's unilateral announcement of a ceasefire, which Russia and its proxies have not respected, is further proof of its cynicism.

The Russian strikes violate the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law and international criminal law. These acts constitute war crimes, and they will not go unpunished. France will continue to stand by the Ukrainian courts and the International Criminal Court.

While its ammunition stocks are dwindling and it is in great difficulty on the ground, Russia is seeking to obtain supplies by all means, including by violating Security Council resolutions. For example, it makes extensive use of drones supplied by Iran. The United Nations must investigate these transfers, which violate resolution 2231 (2015), and report its findings to the Security Council. To compensate for its many losses, Russia also does not hesitate to mobilize Wagner Group mercenaries, which include many criminals.

The Russian aggression is having devastating consequences for global food security, which is being used by Russia as a weapon of war and an instrument of blackmail. The Black Sea Grain Initiative has proved to be effective in lowering food prices and allowing food to reach those who need it most. Several million tons of wheat have been exported, most of it to non-European countries. We expect Russia to ensure the full implementation of this agreement.

We also welcome the concrete initiatives taken by Ukraine. France is providing assistance through the Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission initiative and the European solidarity corridors.

By continuing its headlong rush forward and increasing the number of acts of violence, Russia is repeatedly showing that it does not want peace. It bears sole responsibility for the continuation of hostilities. Through the 10-point peace plan proposed by President Zelenskyy, Ukraine, for its part, is tracing a path towards a just and lasting peace. This will not be possible without a total withdrawal of Russian troops from all Ukrainian territory. That is the only way to end the suffering of the Ukrainian people, who are courageously fighting for their freedom.

In that context, France will continue to provide the Ukrainian people with the support they need to exercise their right to self-defence and preserve their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.

Mr. Zhang Jun (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): In his New Year's message, Secretary-General Guterres stated that in 2023 we need peace now more than ever. Helping Ukraine and the European region restore peace and stability is an unshirkable responsibility of the international community, and of the Security Council in particular. It is also a goal that we should redouble our efforts to achieve in the new year.

I wish to make the following four observations. First, conditions for dialogue and negotiations must be created. The current situation in Ukraine is the result of the long-term accumulation and continuous evolution of deep-seated security imbalances in Europe. Only when the parties concerned overcome their differences and sit down at the negotiating table can we find the fundamental solution to end the war and rebuild the European security architecture.

The path of peace talks is not a smooth one, but as long as we do not give up on our efforts and demonstrate

Source: Elaborated by the author.

We mobilise information on the content of the speech to investigate the permanent members' approach to international intervention. We also focus on who, when, and about which subjects, respectively stored in the variables "content", "country", "date", "broad_agenda_item", and "specific_agenda_item". The remaining metadata ("filename", "spv", and "speaker_name") identify the original meeting transcripts for manual reading and further detail about the speeches.

The following few lines will offer an overview of how meeting transcripts present in the dataset are distributed over time. It will be possible to see that the number of Council meetings increased over the years in the post-Cold War. Next, this study explains in more detail what type of information is contained in the variables "broad_agenda_item" and "specific_agenda_item", offering a look at the most discussed subjects in the Council[6].

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, following the end of the Cold War, the Security Council's activity level increased significantly. This is reflected in the frequency of its public meetings. Figure 2 below displays the evolution in the number of UNSC public meetings from 1992 to 2023.

In 1992, around 100 public meetings were held. By 2023, this number had escalated to over 300 meetings, indicating a substantial rise in the Council's engagement and deliberations on global issues. This increase underscores the expanding role and responsibilities of the Security Council in addressing international security and peacekeeping challenges in the post-Cold War era.

[6] More about the practice of the UNSC can be checked in the "Highlights of Security Council Practice". Available at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/annual-highlights. Access on: 26 January 2024.

Figure 2: Evolution of UNSC public meetings (1992-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Concerning the subjects discussed in the UNSC, as explained in Chapter 1, each meeting addresses a particular topic or issue, known as "agenda item". Every meeting transcript brings information about the adopted agenda item right on the first page and on the headers of each page. For example, meeting S/PV.8958 addressed the agenda item "The situation in the Middle East". In Figure 1, we can see in the PDF transcript the agenda item adopted in meeting S/PV.9243: "Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine". The labels chosen for the agenda item, however, do not necessarily tell the whole story about which particular situation was discussed in the Council.

To gather further information on which subjects are addressed in the Council meetings, it is crucial to consider the work done by the Security Council Practices and Charter Research Branch, an advisory and research arm of the Security Council Affairs Division in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The branch is responsible for elaborating the "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council", under the mandate conferred by the General Assembly Resolution 686 (VII), entitled "Ways and means for making the evidence of customary international law more readily available".

The Repertoire provides detailed information on the Security Council's interpretation and application of the UN Charter and its Provisional Rules of Procedure. One of the contributions of the Repertoire is to offer additional information on subjects discussed in each of the Council's meetings. First, it organises agenda items according to six broad labels,

covering different regions of the world and general topics: “Africa”, “Americas”, “Asia”, “Europe”, “Middle East”, and “Thematic Issues”. The first five agenda items refer to country-specific issues, such as the situations in Haiti, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Syria. In contrast, Thematic Issues refer to broad themes such as Protection of Civilians, Women and Peace and Security, and Small Arms. For example, meeting S/PV.8958 is categorised as “Middle East”, while meeting S/PV.9243 is labelled “Europe”.

Secondly, it offers more specific information about the agenda items adopted in each meeting. Concerning our two examples, according to the Repertoire, meeting S/PV.8958 addressed the situation in Syria, while S/PV.9243 discussed the situation in Ukraine. The dataset used in this thesis contains 99 specific agenda items, distributed among the six broad agenda items as defined by the Repertoire.

The broad and specific labels related to agenda items serve as key tools in identifying the subjects that motivated the Security Council to hold meetings and discuss potential solutions to global challenges. To illustrate which situations garnered the most attention from the Security Council between 1992 and 2023, Figure 3 displays the top 10 specific agenda items that have prompted the most meetings in the Security Council, grouped by broad agenda item and periods.

Figure 3 shows how the Council shifted its attention over time. Conflicts in Africa are a constant presence in the Council agenda, appearing in the top 3 in all periods. Agenda items related to Europe are dominant especially in the 1990s, returning to the center of the debates more recently due to the situation in Ukraine.

The turn of the century changes a lot the ranking of agenda items. After the end of the decade of the peace processes, the Arab-Israeli conflict begins to be highly debated. Looking at all the data, this conflict is the most discussed in the post-Cold War, with 359 public meetings. The 21st century is marked not only by the conflict between Israel and Palestine, but also by the situations in Sudan/South Sudan, the second most debated conflicts in the post-Cold War, and Syria.

Figure 3: Top 10 most discussed subjects in the UNSC per period



Source: Elaborated by the author.

The agenda item labels will allow this research to investigate how the differences and similarities between the P5 are reflected in particular situations. We will be able not only to observe which approaches to international intervention are most emphasised by each permanent member but also to detect which topics they are addressing. They will increment our description of how each member emphasises intervention approaches by adding context about which situations are the main drivers of a particular emphasis.

5.2. Text as data and the UNSC debates

There is a consolidated body of literature focused on the study of voting patterns and text analysis. The first looks at how members are distributed in terms of favouring or opposing decisions and resolution in the UN bodies (ADHIKARI, 2019; BAILEY; STREZHNEV; VOETEN, 2017; BAILEY; VOETEN, 2018; HANANIA, 2021; KIM; RUSSETT, 1996; MOSLER; POTRAFKE, 2020; NURULLAYEV; PAPA, 2023; PLOUFFE; SLINGSBY, 2019; VOETEN, 2021; YU, 2022).

The second research agenda, with which this thesis is more connected, aims to understand the interaction between states through their speeches. This is particularly important in the case of the Security Council, since unanimity of voting is very frequent, making it more challenging to retrieve significant insights through voting patterns.

Concerning the studies on conflict using computational tools, it is worth mentioning the work of Maerz and Puschmann (2020), which synthesises empirical research that investigates conflict, adopting a text-as-data approach. Particularly, the field of UN studies and text analysis encompasses a wide range of research areas, including analyses of the statements made at the general debate of the General Assembly (BATURO; DASANDI; MIKHAYLOV, S. J., 2017; BRUNN, 1999; GURCIULLO; MIKHAYLOV, S., 2017; WATANABE; ZHOU, 2022), the relationship between UNSC speeches and outcomes such as development aid (CZAIKA, 2008) and UNSC decisions and resolutions (SCHERZINGER, 2023). Also, sentiment analysis was performed to retrieve insights from UN annual reports (THORVALDSDOTTIR; PATZ, 2021), UN evaluation reports (ECKHARD; JANKAUSKAS; *et al.*, 2023).

UNSC documents, predominantly speeches, were analysed with a focus on specific concepts and subjects, such as peacebuilding (BADACHE; HELLMÜLLER;

SALAYMEH, 2022), climate change (SCARTOZZI, 2022), the notion of threat (SAKAMOTO, 2023), R2P and the use of force (CHEN; YIN, 2020; SCHERZINGER, 2022a, 2022b), and health (VOSS; KUMP; BOCHTLER, 2022). Additionally, studies have applied text analysis to detect patterns in specific conflicts, such as Syria (MARTINI, 2020; MEDZIHORSKY; POPOVIC; JENNE, 2017), Afghanistan (ECKHARD; PATZ; *et al.*, 2023), and Ukraine (BENDIX, 2022).

Concerning the methodology used in these studies, it is important to ascertain first that text analysis encompasses tools that can be placed in a continuum from text-as-text techniques, rooted in a more qualitative approach, to text-as-data, which enters the field of computational tools and machine learning (BENOIT, 2020; MOREIRA; PIRES; MEDEIROS, 2022). The studies mentioned above used a wide range of techniques to analyse UN documents, such as discourse analysis (MARTINI, 2020), content analysis (BADACHE; HELLMÜLLER; SALAYMEH, 2022), a mix of discourse and content analysis (SCARTOZZI, 2022), keyword search and off-the-shelf dictionaries (BRUNN, 1999; MEDZIHORSKY; POPOVIC; JENNE, 2017; SCHERZINGER, 2022a; VOSS; KUMP; BOCHTLER, 2022), sentiment dictionaries (CHEN; YIN, 2020; THORVALDSDOTTIR; PATZ, 2021), varied approaches to topic modelling (HANANIA, 2021; SCHERZINGER, 2023; WATANABE; ZHOU, 2022), and word embeddings (SAKAMOTO, 2023).

Following a similar path to some of the studies mentioned above, this thesis adopts a text-as-data approach, particularly dictionary analysis, to identify specific patterns in speeches delivered in the UNSC. Dictionary methods involve creating a dictionary where concepts, also referred to as entries or keys, are linked with a series of patterns. These patterns are then used to match keywords in a text (BENOIT, 2020; GRIMMER; ROBERTS, M. E.; STEWART, 2022; MOREIRA; PIRES; MEDEIROS, 2022).

Dictionary methods in text analysis serve as an intermediate approach between qualitative content analysis and fully automated methods. Its qualitative feature derives from the fact that the development of a dictionary method requires well-defined categories informed by theoretical frameworks and a deep understanding of the context in which the documents were produced. On the quantitative side, once a dictionary is established, its application predominantly involves computational tools. These tools quantify the presence of the dictionary's keys by measuring the frequency of their associated keywords within the text. This process allows for a systematic and scalable

analysis of large text corpora, providing insights into the prevalence and significance of specific concepts within the texts.

One main contribution of this thesis to the studies in International Relations (IR) is methodological. It consists in providing a dictionary that is able to detect the main approaches to international intervention in UNSC debates. The distinctive mark of this dictionary, when compared to other studies in the field, is that its categories were built both on the literature on conflict and UN foundational documents about its tools and practice.

Additionally, the dictionary was built to be applicable to all UNSC debates since the end of the Cold War, irrespective of the topic. In this sense, it can be used in further research about the Council as a whole, specific categories, and specific conflicts, covering, therefore, a broad spectrum of research possibilities in line with how the UNSC debates have been studied in IR.

5.2.1. The six steps of building the dictionary

The development of the dictionary for analysing approaches to intervention was guided by the research process stages proposed by Grimmer et al. (2022) and the "semi-automatic dictionary building process" (S-DBP) outlined by Deng et al. (2019). The former provided a framework for this study's research design, while the latter was instrumental in constructing a robust dictionary.

Grimmer et al. (2022) present that text analysis methods can contribute to three objectives of the research endeavour: discovery, measurement, and inference (prediction or causal inference). Studies can encompass all of these objectives, different combinations, or focus on one of them. Instead, it might concentrate on a specific aspect, such as developing a new measure for an already established concept, which is the case of this thesis.

The phase of discovery consists of conceptualisation to develop the research question. Based on the relevance of the UNSC debates to understand how countries position themselves in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security, this thesis aims to answer the following question: What are the differences and similarities of the UNSC permanent members' approaches to international intervention?

To address this question, it is necessary to measure the prevalence of approaches to international intervention within the speeches of the UNSC permanent members. This thesis has concentrated on formulating concepts that embody these approaches, drawing from the conflict resolution literature and key UN documents. Subsequently, a dictionary was constructed to measure the frequency of these concepts in the UNSC debates. The theoretical foundation facilitating the creation of these concepts was outlined in Chapter 2. The following lines will comprehensively explain the process of constructing the dictionary, adhering to the six steps outlined in the S-DBP model.

The first step consists of defining what is the dictionary objective. In this study, our dictionary was built to monitor the evolution of specific concepts related to international intervention in accordance with the UN framework, the literature on conflict resolution and UN practice, and the UNSC debates' transcripts.

Second, it is necessary to assess the relevance, appropriateness, and completeness of the corpus used to create the dictionary. The UNSC debates dataset can be considered relevant because the Council is the forum where countries discuss the maintenance of international peace and security, which involves different options of intervention. In this sense, it is adequate to answer this study's research question. Additionally, it is appropriate because it consists only of textual content: speeches. Finally, it is complete because it covers all subjects and situations debated in the Council since 1992, therefore facilitating keyword collection for the different categories.

The third step involves describing the use of pre-processing techniques aimed at preparing the corpus for the analysis. The corpus began with 25,197 speeches delivered by the permanent members from 1992 to 2023. To delimit our unit of analysis and avoid measurement errors, we needed to follow two basic pre-processing steps. Initially, we removed all 10,271 procedural speeches made by Member States acting as Presidents of the Council.

Because Presidents run the meetings and coordinate the order of speakers, they often signal who is going to speak next, saying, for example, "I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom". Other than that, Presidents may deliver speeches in their national capacities, in the capacity of a UN subsidiary organ, if the country represented chairs a Committee, for example, or to present the outcome of a Presidential Statement. Since the dataset contains the list of speeches delivered in these three formats,

to remove the procedural speeches, we need to keep speeches made in national capacities and remove the rest. After this step, the corpus consisted of 14,926 speeches.

After removing procedural speeches, we delimited what we are going to consider as "one speech", our unit of analysis. During a meeting, the representatives can deliver further statements in addition to the main speech they delivered first. These speeches can be useful if one aims to analyse the dynamics of the Council meetings and verify if they resemble more a lively discussion or just a session of monologues.

However, since this research does not intend to capture the specific dynamics of the discussions during a Council's meeting but solely detect which approaches to international intervention were most emphasised, it considers as "one speech" the bulk of statements delivered by a member in a specific meeting. In terms of pre-processing the dataset, we needed to collapse all statements made by a member in a given meeting into one. After pre-processing the corpus, it totalised 14,170 speeches made by permanent members in their national capacities.

The fourth step of the dictionary-building process consists of entry identification and categorisation. Chapter 2 of this thesis detailed the theoretical foundations behind the dictionary's categories. Based on them, keyword collection was initiated through manual reading of a random sample of 640 speeches, 20 per year, covering all agenda items and UNSC participants, not being restricted to the permanent members.

The fifth step continues keyword collection through extension and simplification. The thesis relied on the *quanteda* package developed for R (BENOIT *et al.*, 2018) to perform automated text analysis, which allows for dictionary building with "glob"-style pattern matching, amplifying the dictionary's capacity to detect keywords in speeches. For example, the entry "counter-terrorism" contains the pattern "extremis*", which is able to match "extremist" and "extremism".

The extension of dictionary entries with synonyms was possible through the identification of related words using *quanteda* functionalities. This part of the process must be attentive to the problem of sensitivity when choosing the dictionary patterns (BENOIT, 2020). On the one hand, patterns that are too broad may match false positives. For example, if we had chosen "extrem*" instead of "extremis*", the pattern would additionally match words such as "extreme", which can be employed in speeches in contexts very different from that envisioned by the category "counter-terrorism".

On the other hand, patterns that are too restrictive may fail to capture terms that are connected to the dictionary's categories. This is the problem of specificity (BENOIT, 2020), or false negatives, *i.e*. keywords not detected during manual reading and identification of related keywords.

Ultimately, the process of choosing the patterns for each dictionary key must face the problem of ambiguity, which is directly related to the fact that language is essentially marked by polysemy. For dictionaries to work correctly, it is essential to understand the context in which the keywords are used and account for their possible meanings. For example, after reading a sample of the speeches, we identified that the word "settlement" can be used both as related to agreement and encampment. Because these two meanings are essential in the context of international intervention, it was necessary to collect two-word expressions to prevent ambiguity, for example, "conflict settlement" and "colonial settlement". For the whole dictionary, multi-word expressions were collected to deal with the problem of ambiguity.

Finally, the sixth and last step is validating the dictionary. The following validation steps were adopted: (i) Manual reading of the most representative documents for each category, *i.e.* the speeches with higher frequency of each category; (ii) Comparing the results of the dictionary with existing knowledge established in the literature.

5.2.2. Overview of the dictionary

The current version of the dictionary contains 555 entries, each one linked to only one category. Figure 4 displays the relative frequency of dictionary terms in the dataset, highlighting the impact of specific patterns on the frequency of different categories in the text analysis. It reveals that single, distinct patterns heavily influence categories like peacekeeping, sanctions, counter-terrorism, and state responsibility. In contrast, other categories demonstrate a more even distribution of influence across multiple patterns.

Figure 4: Most frequent keywords per category



Source: Elaborated by the author.

The entire dictionary, encompassing all its categories, subcategories, and patterns, is accessible in an online repository[7]. This repository also includes a series of schematic representations illustrating the categories, aimed at enhancing understanding of the context behind each one.

5.2.3. Applying the dictionary

With the dictionary ready to be applied, it is essential to decide how to measure the presence of the categories in the speeches. Since we aim to measure emphasis on approaches to international intervention and to facilitate further investigation on how categories can be combined in a speech, we calculate the number of keywords matched in a speech divided by the speech's total number of tokens, not considering stopwords (ECKHARD; JANKAUSKAS; *et al.*, 2023; SCHERZINGER, 2022b; THORVALDSDOTTIR; PATZ; ECKHARD, 2021). This approach follows one of the forms of measuring through dictionary methods presented by Grimmer, Roberts, and Stewart (2022, p. 180): "to measure the extent to which documents belong to particular categories".

Dictionary methods rely on a specific form of text representation known as "bag of words". The idea behind this model is that each document is represented by counting the frequency of its words (GRIMMER; ROBERTS, M. E.; STEWART, 2022).

The main strength of this model is its simplicity. However, it implies losing the structure of the document and word order. Since this research looks solely at the prevalence of particular concepts in speeches, it treats the order of the words as negligible.

The outcome of representing text as a bag of words is a document-feature matrix, where each row represents a document, and each column defines a feature that we use to represent the document. The process of creating such a representation involves multiple decisions, such as choosing the unit of analysis, tokenising, and reducing complexity (GRIMMER; ROBERTS; STEWART, 2022). To demonstrate how this works, let us consider this excerpt of a speech delivered by the representative of the United States in the 5209th meeting on 21 June 2005:

> "Furthermore, Security Council resolutions and peacekeeping mandates regularly identify key protection issues, including the deliberate targeting of civilians, forced displacement, the use of sexual and other forms of gender-based violence, the

[7] Available at: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/18ncDBzbkIdwz1GLtEiBaqDpNd3aM1dF7?usp=sharing.

> recruitment and use of child soldiers - in violation of international law - the need for unhindered humanitarian access at reasonable times and places and the safety of United Nations and associated humanitarian personnel".

In this example, let us treat this excerpt as our unit of analysis. The next step will be to tokenise this document, *i.e.*, breaking it up into discrete words (GRIMMER; ROBERTS, M. E.; STEWART, 2022). A token is the individual unit of a document; it is not necessarily a word (punctuation marks may also be considered tokens) and must be defined by the researcher, who can build multi-word expressions and remove unnecessary tokens, also known as stopwords. This part of the process consists of reducing the complexity of the document and limiting it to the content that will be analysed. After tokenising the document, converting its features to lowercase, and removing stopwords, a document-feature matrix would look like this:

Table 3: Example of a document-feature matrix before applying the dictionary

Document	furthermore	security	council	resolutions	peacekeeping	…
Document 1	1	1	1	1	1	

Source: Elaborated by the author.

When applying the dictionary, only the frequency of the words matched by the dictionary patterns are counted, ignoring the remaining words. In this study, the measurement of emphasis on approaches to international intervention is done by calculating relative shares of each dictionary category on the basis of overall words (PUSCHMANN *et al.*, 2022). This form of calculating emphasis has the advantage of minimising the impact of speech-writing styles (by removing stopwords) and the variation of speech length between countries and over time. Let us look again at the excerpt presented above, but this time focusing on the words detected by the dictionary:

> "Furthermore~~,~~ Security Council resolutions ~~and~~ **peacekeeping** mandates regularly identify key protection issues~~,~~ including ~~the~~ deliberate **targeting of civilians**~~,~~ forced **displacement**~~, the~~ use ~~of~~ sexual ~~and other~~ forms ~~of~~ **gender-based violence**~~, the~~ recruitment ~~and~~ use ~~of~~ **child** soldiers ~~– in~~ violation ~~of~~ international law ~~– the~~ need ~~for~~ unhindered **humanitarian** access ~~at~~ reasonable times ~~and~~ places ~~and the~~ safety ~~of~~ United Nations ~~and~~ associated **humanitarian** personnel".

In the provided text, after removing punctuation marks and stopwords, a total of 40 tokens were identified. This will be considered the number of overall words in this excerpt. Out of these, seven tokens were matched by patterns from the dictionary, constituting 17.5% of the

total number of tokens. The matched tokens are connected to different categories of the dictionary:

- one token is related to peacekeeping (“peacekeeping”), which is 2.5% of the total tokens.
- five tokens are associated with humanitarian assistance (“targeting of civilians”, “displacement”, “child”, “humanitarian”, and “humanitarian”), making up 12.5% of the total tokens.
- one token pertains to international justice (“gender-based violence”), which is 2.5% of the total tokens.

The frequencies reveal that the most emphasised category in this excerpt is humanitarian assistance, with minor mentions of peacekeeping and international justice. A document-feature matrix after applying the dictionary to the excerpt will have this structure:

Table 4: Example of a document-feature matrix after applying the dictionary

Document	peacekeeping	humanitarian_assistance	international_justice
Document 1	1	5	1

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Every token detected by the dictionary was “read” as a mention of a particular category. The words and expressions “targeting of civilians”, “displacement”, “child”, “humanitarian”, and “humanitarian” were all treated as mentions of the approach “humanitarian assistance”. This process of converting textual content into numerical mentions of specific concepts is what allows this research to measure the emphases of the permanent members to approaches to international intervention in their speeches.

Before delving into the results, it is beneficial to apply the dictionary to the speeches of all permanent members. This will provide an initial overview of the categories within the dataset and identify which specific patterns from the dictionary receive the most matches. By doing so, we can gain a preliminary understanding of the permanent members' thematic focuses, setting the stage for a more in-depth analysis of the results.

Figure 5 shows a word cloud of the 100 most common terms from the permanent members’ speeches, categorised by distinct colours for each dictionary category. All ten categories are represented, with “humanitarian” having the most matches, followed by

“terrorist”, “peacekeep”, “dialog”, and “sanction”. The most prevalent category in the word cloud is “peacemaking”, featuring 22 of the 100 patterns.

Figure 5: The most frequent dictionary terms

Source: Elaborated by the author.

5.2.4. Limitations

It is necessary to recognise the limitations of our study and methodological approach. First, all speeches in the dataset are in English. When addressing the Council, representatives may speak not only in English but also in Chinese, Russian, Arabic, and so on. The UNSC meeting transcripts are made available in the UN's six official languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. In this context, it is necessary to keep in mind that many of the speeches delivered at the Council are mediated by interpretive bodies, as observed by Jones (2022).

Secondly, we must differentiate between mentioning a particular approach to international intervention and supporting it. For example, when a member mentions words and expressions related to the approach "peacekeeping", it does not necessarily follow that the member supports the deployment of a peacekeeping operation to address a conflict. The speech may describe the developments concerning a peacekeeping operation and even request its withdrawal:

> "At the same time, considering precedents in other United Nations peace-keeping operations and the current serious financial difficulties of the United Nations, we believe that the United Nations Mission in Haiti should withdraw as scheduled" (3638th meeting, 29 February 1996, Representative of China).

Some categories are more related to expressions of support or opposition, such as "counter-terrorism". It is counterintuitive to think, for example, that a speech mentioning terrorist activities is purely descriptive or even supportive. Ultimately, however, for this research, it is crucial to consider that emphasis on an approach does not imply support or any intention to do something. Therefore, this research does not draw conclusions about the permanent members' preferences towards international intervention but solely detects which approaches they consider relevant to discuss in the UNSC debates.

Another limitation derives from the bag of words model explained above. Since the order of the words matters for communicating ideas and points of view, important information is lost when we ignore the structure of the speeches.

5.3. Summary

This chapter presented the dataset used in this research, comprising 14,170 speeches delivered by the UNSC permanent members from 1992 to 2023 in their national capacities. We took a first look at the dataset's structure, especially the main information mobilised in the research: the content of the speeches, the authors, the date, and the subject.

Concerning the methodology, this section explained in detail the process of building the dictionary of approaches to international intervention, which textual patterns it includes, and how it will be applied to the permanent members' speeches. Finally, it talked about its limitations, with a particular focus on the idea that measuring emphasis does not imply assessing intentions or preferences.

Having established the type of data under analysis and the methodology for examining it, the next chapter of the thesis explores how dictionary categories are emphasised in the Council debates, with the aim of answering this thesis' research question: What are the differences and similarities of the UNSC permanent members' approaches to international intervention?

6. RESULTS

This Chapter presents the main results about the differences and similarities of the UNSC permanent members' approaches to international intervention in the Council debates. The presentation of the results is mainly focused on the content of the debates. The purpose is not to conduct in-depth case studies, but to demonstrate how the dictionary can be useful in detecting meaningful rhetorical variation and support in retrieving insights from the speeches. In this sense, this chapter describes the differences and similarities of the permanent members' approaches to international intervention as told by their speeches. As noted in the introduction, the analyses from this chapter 6 can be both replicated and expanded through the interactive dashboard available at https://antonio-pires.shinyapps.io/dash_thesis_unsc/. This tool invites readers to explore the data further and uncover new insights.

On the one hand, the permanent members attribute great relevance to peacemaking and humanitarian assistance. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France are strongly aligned in their approaches to international intervention, justifying considering these three members as a group, the P3. On the other hand, concerning the differences, the P3 highlights the categories of humanitarian assistance, state responsibility, international justice, and non-proliferation, China is focused on sovereignty and peacemaking, and Russia demonstrates greater concern over counter-terrorism. To depict these results, we start with a broad and superficial look at the permanent members' position and, little by little, delve into the details about how each one of them emphasises approaches to international intervention in specific situations and periods.

Our itinerary begins with an overview of the most mentioned approaches to international intervention for each permanent member, looking at the Council as a whole, aggregating all agenda items and covering the years from 1992 to 2023. Next, I present an analysis of how each approach was mobilised over time, comparing the emphases of the permanent members. This first analysis will provide a big picture of how the permanent members are distributed in terms of approaches to international intervention and offer a first look at which approaches bring them closer to each other and which make them more distant from each other.

The second part of the Chapter (subsections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4) will delve into the permanent members' distinctive features. It outlines how the most emphasised approaches are employed in the UNSC debates through illustrative cases. The conclusion summarises the

results, briefly presenting what this research observed about the differences and similarities of the permanent members' approaches to international intervention.

6.1. Overview

The first section of this chapter starts with an overview of how the permanent members prioritise different approaches to international intervention. Figure 6 illustrates the most emphasised strategies for each permanent member, based on all speeches delivered in the Council from 1992 to 2023.

At the top of the rankings, all permanent members strongly emphasise peacemaking and humanitarian assistance. The United States and China dedicate 1.25% of their tokens to humanitarian assistance, this value being 1.15%, 1.12%, and 0.90% for the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, respectively. Russia displays less mentions of humanitarian assistance, but this category still appears as its number one in the ranking.

The second most relevant category is peacemaking. Even though displaying the higher share of mentions of humanitarian assistance alongside the United States, China prioritises peacemaking, with 2.10% share of mentions. It is the second most emphasised category for the other four members: 1.10% in the case of French speeches, 0.92% for the UK, 0.90% for Russia, and 0.77% for the US.

Figure 6 also shows the similarity between Western powers, with their top six approaches being identical and receiving a comparable number of mentions, with only small differences in the order of the categories. China distinguishes itself not just through its focus on peacemaking but also for its greater emphasis on peacebuilding (1.02%) and considerably lesser attention to international justice (0.18%) and state responsibility (0.01%). Meanwhile, Russia is notable for its higher number of mentions of counter-terrorism (0.72%) compared to the other four members.

When analysing which categories are the most emphasised by each permanent member, it is essential to look at which dictionary words are being mentioned in speeches and increasing the presence of each category. This adds a bit of context to the categories being measured because we can retrieve insights about how they are being employed in practice.

Figure 6: Share of mentions of dictionary's categories in the permanent members' speeches



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 7 reaches the level of the dictionary patterns to understand which words are more present in a member's speech in comparison with the others. The graph displays the 20 top most distinctive dictionary terms for each member, based on relative frequency (keyness) of dictionary terms[8].

The chi-squared value of the terms is signed positively if the observed value in the target exceeds its expected value. In other words, the higher the chi-squared value of a given term, the higher the probability that its use by the target is not occurring by chance, implying that the term is a key feature of the target when compared with the reference.

Figure 7 presents the results of this analysis in the form of 5 ordered bar plots, one for each permanent member. Dictionary terms are grouped by colour, according to which category they represent. Figure 6 displayed the share of mentions of each category per member. Figure 7 displays the relative share of mentions of each category per member.

China's most distinctive terms have higher chi-squared scores, indicating that its emphases on approaches to international intervention have more contrast with the other four members. Figure 7 shows again how China gives more relevance to peacemaking and peacebuilding, but now we can see that patterns related to the principle of sovereignty, particularly "sovereignty" and "territorial integrity", are relatively more present in Chinese speeches.

Additionally, Figure 7 shows which specific words distance China from the others. Compared with the other members, when emphasising peacemaking, Chinese speeches tend to mention more neutral ways of referring to the actors involved in a conflict, using the word "parties". Chinese mentions of peacebuilding, in turn, include words related to development, reconstruction, and stability.

[8] This was calculated based on the relative frequency (keyness) of dictionary terms, using the quanteda package, with each permanent member (target) compared with the other four members (reference)

Figure 7: Relative share of mentions of dictionary patterns in the permanent members' speeches



Source: Elaborated by the author.

The analysis of the relative share of mentions of dictionary's terms shows once again that Russia mentions more counter-terrorism, particularly employing words such as terrorists, militants, radicals, and extremists. It is important to highlight that, concerning the subject of counter-terrorism, Russia places emphasis on the issue of drug trafficking, illustrated by the patterns "drug threat" and "narcotic". The literature already highlighted this feature in the Russian position in the UNSC, as seen in Chapter 3. Additionally, Russia demonstrates concern over sovereignty, particularly violations of this principle, with distinctive features such as "external interference" and "internal affairs".

Finally, concerning the P3, two points are essential to observe. First, the most distinctive words of the United Kingdom and France have lower chi-squared values. This means that, when we compare each of these two countries with the other four, the difference is less pronounced when we compare China with the other members, or Russia, or the United States. The alignment between the Western powers is one possible factor that explains these lower chi-squared values. Since three of the five members have high similarity in mentions of approaches to international intervention, when we compare one of them with the other four to look for distinctive keywords, the chi-squared tends to be lower.

Even with lower chi-squared values, it is possible to see an alignment of emphases. This time, however, two categories with a lower share of mentions in Figure 6 appear here as distinctive features: international justice and state responsibility. On the one hand, mentions of the former appear as critical features for all three members, with patterns expressing judicial measures and crimes against humanity. On the other, state responsibility appears as a critical feature, especially for the United States, due to the use of the word "regime", typically employed to refer negatively to governments considered to be repressive and illegitimate. Keywords related to humanitarian assistance are also present, related mainly to victims of conflict, such as civilians and children.

The next part of our analysis is to observe how the permanent members emphasise categories over time. Figure 8 displays the evolution of the share of mentions of each category per member from 1992 to 2023. Each facet corresponds to a category, and the vertical axis shows the share of mentions each category received.

Concerning the similarities, we can observe that the distance between the permanent members varies according to the approach to international intervention. Some categories are emphasised more equally than others. For example, the categories of peacekeeping, sanctions,

and non-proliferation not only receive lower mentions but also display less variation between members. International justice and state responsibility received less attention, but it is possible to see a more significant divergence between members beginning in 2011.

Regarding the two primary categories highlighted in Figure 6, peacemaking and humanitarian assistance, the former is also prioritised by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia but receives significantly more attention from China. As for humanitarian assistance, it is not only a key focus, but also members emphasise this category similarly over time. A notable shift occurred in 2018, when Russia began to reduce its focus on this area, though the overall trend remains similar.

Figure 8 shows how China's focus on sovereignty, peacebuilding, and peacemaking is consistent over time, especially in relation to this latter category. Analysing annual mentions, China consistently highlights peacemaking more than any other member throughout the period, while notably avoiding topics like international justice and state responsibility. Regarding Russia, we see once again its greater emphasis on counter-terrorism, especially from 2009 on. Lastly, concerning the P3, Figure 8 demonstrates how the alignment of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France is consistent over time and across all categories.

To sum up, Figure 8 reiterates the central insights retrieved from the previous graphs but situated in time. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France devote greater attention to humanitarian assistance, state responsibility, and international justice. The first category is more equally mentioned by the five members across time, with the exception of Russia from 2018 on, but these three members displayed a higher share of mentions (Figure 6) and more distinctive patterns related to this category (Figure 7). Mentions of state responsibility and international justice appeared as distinctive marks in Figure 7 and have received greater emphasis, especially since 2011. It is essential to highlight the increase in mentions of sovereignty in 2022, surpassing China and Russia.

China emphasised peacemaking more than the other four members during the whole period under analysis. It displayed more mentions of peacebuilding, especially from 2000 on, and of sovereignty, particularly in the 1990s and since 2011. Additionally, Chinese speeches displayed a constant reluctance to mention state responsibility and international justice.

Figure 8: Evolution of the share of mentions of dictionary's categories in the permanent members' speeches (1992-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

A higher emphasis on counter-terrorism marks Russia, but this is true especially from 2008 on. Similar to China, it also displayed significant mentions of sovereignty, especially in 1999 and since 2009, and fewer mentions of state responsibility and international justice. It is essential to highlight the state responsibility received greater attention in 2022 and 2023, reaching and surpassing the frequency of mentions of the P3.

The conclusion of this overview contains one figure displaying the results of an additional analysis on the evolution of the share of mentions of the dictionary's categories. Figure 9 presents correlation matrices, one for each category, comparing the permanent members with each other. It is possible to see how the categories of sovereignty and state responsibility display more significant divergence between the members, especially when comparing the P3 with Russia and China. This analysis further highlights the importance of looking at how permanent members employ these two categories despite their low frequency of mentions in comparison to other categories.

This Chapter began analysing the differences and similarities between the permanent members with an overview of the Council, comparing them with each other on a more aggregated level, and then delving into the details of which specific dictionary terms were most prevalent and how emphases vary over time. The analyses presented already confirm the main insights from the literature as presented in Chapter 3 about the UNSC permanent members: i) P3 alignment, with markedly more mentions of humanitarian assistance, international justice, and state responsibility; ii) China more focused on issues of sovereignty, peacemaking, and peacebuilding, the latter particularly connected to matters of development, and iii) Russia's more significant concern over counter-terrorism matters, with special attention to drug trafficking.

To add more context to the permanent members' stances in the Council, this chapter proceeds with three subsections describing the main features of the P3, China, and Russia, exploring their distinctive approaches. We will look at how they employ the dictionary's categories, looking at relevant cases and the textual content of the speeches.

The primary goal of these subsections is to understand in more detail how permanent members mobilise the categories in their speeches. It does not conduct case studies about specific conflicts; instead, it uses these cases to illustrate the permanent members' main approaches. Additionally, this thesis does not delve into explanations about why a given

category was emphasised in a particular case but only describes the context in which it was employed.

The following subsection focuses on the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Since the literature and the analyses conducted in this overview demonstrate their strong alignment, this thesis dedicates a subsection to understanding the P3 as a group but also highlighting relevant differences in their approaches. This study proceeds with a focus on China and concludes with an analysis of Russia.

The end of each subsection contains several figures with the results of analyses of the presence of the dictionary's categories in the UNSC debates, with different scopes. They support case selection and serve as the basis for understanding how categories vary over time, the distinctive features of each permanent member over specific agenda items, and the main combinations of categories in the members' speeches.

Figure 9: Correlation matrices on the evolution of the share of dictionary's categories from 1992 to 2023



Source: Elaborated by the author.

6.2. The Western powers

The overview demonstrated how the Western powers are closely aligned in terms of approaches to international intervention. Their list of priorities is almost the same, as shown in Figure 6. They have similar distinctive features, as seen in Figure 7, and they display very similar variation over time, as presented in Figure 8.

Due to their high similarity and to be more concise, this study will investigate how France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, the P3 group, emphasise approaches to international intervention in the same subsection. We will see in more detail how these categories are employed in their speeches, what makes them different from Russia and China, which situations illustrate the P3's distinctive approach, and, more importantly, which features make the Western powers distinct from each other. Following the results presented in the overview, this subsection discusses how the P3 employs its distinctive categories: humanitarian assistance, international justice, state responsibility, and non-proliferation.

6.2.1. Humanitarian assistance and peacemaking: The case of Yemen

Figure 10 displays a heatmap with the evolution of the share of the category of humanitarian assistance by the P3 per agenda item. Each tile represents an agenda item, ordered according to the share of mentions of humanitarian assistance by the P3. One of the topics that received more mentions of this category was the conflict in Yemen, especially after 2015, when the crisis reached a peak and Yemen's President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi sent a letter to the Council president asking the Council for its "urgent intervention" and to protect Yemen's constitutional legality (DAY; BREHONY, 2020). This increase in mentions of humanitarian assistance can also be observed in Figure 14.

Additionally, when we compare the relative use of dictionary terms, it is possible to observe differences in the approaches of each permanent member (Figure 15). China focused on peacemaking and sovereignty, referring to the actors involved in the conflict as parties. Russia, in turn, also stresses the importance of peacemaking but with attention to the issue of terrorism.

The Western members were all focused on humanitarian assistance but with slightly different perspectives. France paid greater attention to the protection of civilians,

the United Kingdom stressed the issue of food insecurity more, and the United States referred to the situation on the ground, also looking at sanctions, state responsibility, and non-proliferation. The list of sentences below illustrates how humanitarian assistance was addressed in the debates:

1) "Ongoing military clashes can lead only to the further deterioration of the situation, exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and promote the anarchy and chaos that terrorist groups actively exploit to spread their presence and influence in Yemen". (Representative of Russia, 7596th meeting, 22 December 2015).

2) "We are extremely concerned that the humanitarian situation in Yemen continues to plunge to new depths as the country battles an economic crisis, an increasing risk of famine and a major outbreak of coronavirus disease (COVID-19)". (Representative of the United Kingdom, 8757th meeting, 17 September 2020).

3) "I state emphatically: the protection of civilians, free and unhindered access to humanitarian aid and the protection of humanitarian and medical personnel are not options; they are obligations under international law for all the parties to the conflict". (Representative of France, 8361st meeting, 21 September 2018).

4) "And we condemn the Houthis for their violence against internally displaced persons sites on the outskirts of Ma'rib, as well as the almost daily drone and ballistic missile attacks on Saudi Arabia". (Representative of the United States, meeting recorded in document S/2021/372, 15 April 2021).

5) "All parties to the conflict must ensure safe and unimpeded humanitarian access and keep the avenues open for the import of food, oil and other commodities". (Representative of China, meeting recorded in document S/2021/465, 12 May 2021).

The P3 frequently linked humanitarian assistance with peacemaking, as shown in Figure 16. In the US's speeches, 15.24% of sentences that discussed humanitarian assistance also brought up peacemaking, while in UK and French speeches, this was true for 11.5% of sentences. This pattern in their rhetoric acknowledges the humanitarian crisis in Yemen while portraying the conflict's actors not as criminals but as parties engaged in a dispute, thereby emphasising the need for both humanitarian response and peace negotiations:

1) "Until we achieve a political solution, we implore all the parties to take the measures necessary to protect civilians and critical civilian

> infrastructure and to ensure unfettered access for humanitarian goods and personnel and the movement of essential commercial goods". (Representative of the United States, 8379th meeting, 23 October 2018).
>
> 2) "I think that there are three important steps that the parties must take to mitigate the worst effects of the COVID-19 outbreak: first, agree to a ceasefire; secondly, engage with the United Nations-led political process; and, thirdly, improve humanitarian access". (Representative of the United Kingdom, meeting recorded in document S/2020/313, 16 April 2020).
>
> 3) "All parties must respect international humanitarian law, in particular in terms of the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure, and ensure safe and unhindered humanitarian access, including the protection of humanitarian and health personnel and facilities". (Representative of France, meeting recorded in document S/2020/411, 14 May 2020).

Concerning the situation in Yemen, the main approach of the P3 consisted of addressing the humanitarian situation in the country and investing in the idea that the actors involved were not spoilers but parties that could engage in political solutions, refrain from hostilities, and facilitate humanitarian access. Despite that, the P3 did not refrain from condemning acts perpetrated by the Houthis (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2015, 2021a, 2022a, 2022b), demonstrating concern over threats posed by terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Islamic State, and denouncing external interference coming from Iran, blamed for fuelling the conflict.

In this context, it is important to note that all members of the P3 expressed concerns about Iran's involvement in the conflict. Particularly, the United States referred to Iran as the "Iranian regime" on more than one occasion. This choice of terminology underscores the United States' strong opposition to the policies of the Iranian government (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2018b, 2018c, 2020b).

To sum up, the conflict in Yemen was predominantly approached through the lenses of humanitarian assistance and peacemaking, with the United States specifically highlighting state responsibility, albeit less frequently, and directing it towards an outside state. In contrast, the situation in Syria, another humanitarian crisis, was tackled with a different strategy, where there was a greater emphasis on state responsibility (see Figure 11).

6.2.2. Humanitarian assistance and state responsibility: The case of Syria

In the UNSC debates on Syria, the P3 emphasised mainly humanitarian assistance, with France again more focused on civilian protection, but now with the United States and the United Kingdom devoting more attention to the impact of the conflict on children. Emphasis on humanitarian assistance was predominant, especially after 2013 (see Figure 17). The group's rhetoric typically combined humanitarian assistance with state responsibility, as shown in Figure 19. According to the data, 19.59% of the US sentences mentioning the former also mentioned the latter, with 11.88% in the case of the UK and 15.5% in French speeches. The list below illustrates how this connection appeared in the debates:

> 1) "The routine denial of humanitarian aid by Damascus is sadly just one in a long list of the Al-Assad regime atrocities, along with torture, the forced disappearances of more than 100,000 people, the dropping of barrel bombs, the multiple confirmed cases of chemical-weapon attacks, the displacement of millions of Syrians and other despicable acts". (Representative of the United States, meeting recorded in document S/2020/758, 29 July 2020)
>
> 2) "It is against that backdrop that I call on the regime to allow for immediate, safe and unhindered access to humanitarian assistance to meet fully the needs of those who require food and medical supplies". (Representative of the United Kingdom, 8171st meeting, 29 July 2020)
>
> 3) "We strongly condemn attacks, specifically by the regime, against civilians and civilian infrastructure, especially against humanitarian and medical infrastructure" (Representative of the United States, 8664th meeting, 29 July 2020).

In the debates concerning Syria, unlike those about Yemen, the P3 recognised the existence of a humanitarian crisis and attributed specific responsibility for the situation. They argued that one of the key actors, the Syrian Government, was not merely a party to the conflict but directly accountable for the crisis. All Western members referred to it as the "Syrian regime", indicating their strong opposition, marking a clear stance that differs from the discussions on the conflict in Yemen. The word "regime" appears as a distinctive feature for all three members, as displayed in Figure 18.

State responsibility was central in the P3 response to the Syrian conflict, contrasting with the positions held by Russia and China. Concerning Russia, it emphasised humanitarian assistance like the P3, but made a connection with the category

of counter-terrorism (see Figure 20). In its turn, Chinese speeches focused on peacemaking and sovereignty (see Figure 21). In this case, the defence of Syria's sovereignty led China to use its veto power on a few occasions (CHAZIZA, 2014).

On the one hand, in the context of the debates on Syria, China combined peacemaking and sovereignty, calling for respect for Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity while stressing the importance of a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process in line with Resolution 2254 (2015) and without external interference. On the other, Russia combined counter-terrorism and humanitarian assistance, expressing concerns about the challenges and obstacles posed by terrorist groups in delivering humanitarian aid, especially emphasising terrorist controls over regions like Idlib. Additionally, Russia explicitly mentions the P3, accusing them of supporting terrorist groups and referring negatively to Western actions towards Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2020a, 2021b, 2023).

The P3's main approach towards Syria was combining mentions of humanitarian assistance and state responsibility (see Figure 19), expressed in the attribution of responsibility to the Syrian government for the dire humanitarian crisis in the country. This case also demonstrates how mentions of international justice and non-proliferation accompany emphasis on state responsibility.

Western opposition to the Syrian government included not only accusations of blockage of humanitarian aid but attacks against civilians, including torture and the use of chemical weapons against its own population. In this sense, the Syrian conflict illustrates how the P3 correlates its distinctive categories: humanitarian assistance, state responsibility, international justice, and non-proliferation. Moreover, the speeches also highlighted the category of non-proliferation. The combination of these categories is explicit, particularly from 2017 on:

> 1) "This bears all the hallmarks of the Al-Assad regime, and the use of chemical weapons is a war crime". (Representative of the United Kingdom, 7915th meeting, 5 April 2017).
>
> 2) "The earthquake is a new tragedy added to the tragedies suffered by Syrians over the course of 12 years of war: the bombing of civilian populations, the use of chemical weapons and the systematic use of torture and sexual violence by the regime, which have been widely documented by the United Nations". (Representative of France, 9272nd meeting, 28 February 2023).

> 3) "The United States supports these and other efforts aimed at holding the Al-Assad regime responsible for the use of chemical weapons and other ongoing atrocities against Syrian civilians, including mass detention, torture and indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure". (Representative of the United States, meeting recorded in document S/2021/109, 3 February 2021).

The primary approach of the P3 towards the situation in Syria can be summarised as acknowledging a humanitarian crisis with a focus on holding the Syrian government responsible. The Western opposition against the Syrian government was grounded on accusations that the government blocked humanitarian aid, committed crimes against humanity, and used chemical weapons against its civilian population.

The debates on Syria reveal a strong polarization between the Western powers and China and Russia. The permanent members display a shared emphasis on the existence of a humanitarian crisis but opposing narratives about accountability, as described in previous studies (JONES, 2020; MARTINI, 2020; MEDZIHORSKY; POPOVIC; JENNE, 2017; PETITEVILLE; TANNOUS; TORDJMAN, 2023).

This polarization is made explicit by the dictionary. The Western members focused on state responsibility, while Russia highlighted issues related to counter-terrorism, and China highlighted the importance of sovereignty and non-interference. It is worth noting that, in this case, these emphases are connected to practical measures that were described in detail in the study of Petiteville, Tannous, and Tordjman (2023). The P3, accusing the Syrian government of human rights violations, tried to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Russia, in defence of Al-Assad and emphasising the need to combat terrorists, gave military support to the Syrian government. China, focused mainly on the defence of sovereignty, did not engage in military actions, acting in the Council through its veto powers.

The cases of Yemen and Syria demonstrated how the P3 employed mentions of humanitarian assistance and state responsibility in their speeches, with the Syrian conflict illustrating the combination of their three distinctive approaches. To continue understanding how Western members emphasise approaches to international intervention in the UNSC debates, let us focus on the category of international justice.

6.2.3. International justice: The case of Libya

Mentions of international justice were present in the debates on Syria, but the emphasis on this category was particularly stronger in the case of Libya (see Figure 12). The P3 approach during the UNSC debates on Libya involved an emphasis on international justice, but the main combination was not with state responsibility, as in the Syrian debates, but peacemaking and peacebuilding.

The debates on Libya, different from the Syrian conflict, began with consensus. In response to the outbreak of violence in Libya in early 2011, the UNSC convened to address the escalating situation. During the second public meeting on the situation, on 26 February 2011, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The resolution condemned the violence against civilians and demanded its immediate cessation. It also referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), imposed an arms embargo, and instituted a travel ban and asset freeze against Muammar Qaddafi and his close associates. Additionally, the Council established a committee to monitor compliance with these measures and expressed readiness to consider further actions, including humanitarian assistance to Libya (UN DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, 2016).

Considering this context, it is comprehensible that there was already a common denominator between the P5 on the issue of state responsibility since consensus is necessary to refer a case to the ICC. This category was present in the P3 speeches and connected to international justice, but its share of mentions remained low from 2011 to 2023.

The UNSC debates on Libya are useful for highlighting not only how the P3 combines categories but especially how it changes its priorities over time. As can be seen in Figure 22, from 2011 to 2017, the main focus was on international justice, moving to peacemaking in 2018 and then peacebuilding in 2021.

From 2011 to 2017, the P3 similarly mentioned international justice. They expressed strong concerns about the situation in Libya, emphasising the need for justice and accountability for human rights abuses, including torture, sexual violence, and attacks on civilians, allegedly perpetrated by Libyan government forces and militia groups.

Additionally, the three members stressed the importance of cooperation with the ICC, the need for Libya to adhere to international laws and obligations, and the urgency of combating impunity and ensuring fair trials:

> 1) "The Prosecutor has highlighted the deeply troubling actions of the Libyan Government and its security forces, including incidents in which Al-Qadhafi forces fired on civilians, reports of torture, rape, deportations, enforced disappearances, the use of cluster munitions and heavy weaponry against targets in crowded urban areas, and the blocking of humanitarian supplies". (Representative of the United States, 6528th meeting, 4 May 2011).
>
> 2) "France, which recently organised an open debate in the Security Council on the situation of victims of ethnic and religious violence in the Middle East (see S/PV.7419) and, along with other members of the Council, urged for a referral to the ICC, can only encourage the Prosecutor to continue investigating such acts, some of which may constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity". (Representative of France, 7441st meeting, 12 May 2015).
>
> 3) The United Kingdom wishes to underline the importance of continuing judicial cooperation between the Office of the Prosecutor and the Libyan authorities in order to tackle impunity for atrocities. (Representative of the United Kingdom, 7441st meeting, 12 May 2015).

The debates on Libya saw an increase of P3 mentions of peacemaking over the years, reaching a first peak in 2016 and surpassing those of international justice in 2019. This trend coincides with the establishment of the Government of National Accord in 2015 (RICHARDSON, 2021). In this period, Western members emphasised the importance of the parties adhering to the ceasefire agreement and advocated for national reconciliation through the UN-led political process.

In 2021, a new executive authority was named in Geneva, leading to the formation of the Government of National Unity (ZAPTIA, 2021). In the UNSC debates, this moment coincides with the P3 stressing the importance of peacebuilding more than before. Mentions of this category highlighted mainly the urgency of holding free and fair elections and the disarmament and reintegration of armed groups:

> 1) "We continue to credit the work of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and encourage the speedy implementation of all the terms of the 2020 ceasefire agreement, particularly the removal of foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries and the identification and categorisation of armed groups for

possible disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration". (Representative of the United States, 9351st meeting, 19 June 2023).

2) "With regard to Libyan armed groups and militias, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process in Libya must begin without delay, in parallel with the reconstruction of unified security institutions". (Representative of France, meeting recorded in document S/2021/498, 21 May 2021).

3) "The priorities for the new Government are clearly set out in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum road map: to organise free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2021, to address the basic needs of the Libyan people, to commence a process of national reconciliation and to implement fully the 23 October ceasefire agreement". (Representative of the United Kingdom, meeting recorded in document S/2021/292, 24 March 2021).

The debates surrounding the Libyan crisis provide a window into how the P3 shifted their priorities in response to the evolving situation. Initially, from 2011 to 2017, the focus was predominantly on international justice, mirroring developments with the International Criminal Court (ICC). The emphasis on peacemaking began to surge in 2017, overtaking international justice by 2018, which corresponded with the formation of the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya. Subsequently, there was a marked increase in the emphasis on peacebuilding from 2020 to 2021. This shift brought peacebuilding to the forefront of the ten approaches, reflecting the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the evolving nature of the crisis and response strategies.

6.2.4. Non-proliferation: The case of Iraq/Kuwait

Non-proliferation emerged as a key concern for the P3 in the situations of Syria and Yemen, highlighting their focus on controlling the spread of weapons. However, this issue was central, particularly in the debates on Iraq/Kuwait from 1992 to 2004 (see Figure 13).

Two particular episodes are relevant for this research, based on the results of the dictionary (see Figure 23): 1) the debates in 1996, when all permanent members low their emphases on humanitarian assistance and particularly the United Kingdom focused more

on non-proliferation, and 2) the year of 2002, when the P3 speeches reached a peak of mentions of non-proliferation.

Concerning the first case, among the meetings on Iraq/Kuwait in 1996, only two of them occurred with members' statements. On 27 March 1996, the Council reacted to a report submitted by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait.

The report contained provisions for the monitoring and verification of Iraq's undertaking not to reacquire proscribed weapons capabilities, pursuant to resolution 687 (1991), which required the country to destroy all of its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capability, and established an inspection commission.

The second meeting of that year occurred on 12 June 1996 to vote and adopt resolution 1060 (1996), co-sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom. The resolution was a reaction to the Iraqi authorities' refusal to allow inspectors access to sites designated by the commission. It condemned the denial of access and demanded cooperation from Iraq. The resolution was adopted by consensus, and all Council members agreed with the language adopted in the resolution.

During this period, even with the Council acting based on consensus, it is possible to observe that the P3, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, adopted a more assertive stance. This very specific event is useful in that it illustrates the different rhetorical paths chosen by the P3.

All Western members agreed on the resolution and that Iraq should allow access to inspectors, but the US emphasised its opposition to the Iraqi government through the use of the word "regime", the UK stressed the dissatisfaction of the commission, and France opted to mention the categories of sovereignty and peacemaking:

> 1) "The Special Commission has made it clear to Iraq that it is still not satisfied that the information it has obtained and the explanations it has been given provide a complete picture of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes". (Representative of the United Kingdom, 3672nd meeting, 12 June 1996).
>
> 2) "It should be clear to all that the progress that has occurred in dismantling Iraq's weapons-of-mass-destruction capability is the result of UNSCOM's determination to follow the evidence wherever it might lead and

whether the Iraqi regime likes it or not". (Representative of the United States, 3672nd meeting, 12 June 1996).

3) "Our hope today is that the Chairman of the Special Commission, who is charged with ensuring the full implementation of the provisions of resolution 687 (1991) and of the other relevant resolutions dealing with the disarmament of Iraq, will pursue his dialogue with the Iraqi authorities with the will to do everything possible to reconcile the objectives of his mission, as expressed in the relevant resolutions, with the necessary respect for the sovereignty and political independence of Iraq, as also expressed in the relevant resolutions". (Representative of France, 3672nd meeting, 12 June 1996).

This case is an example of the strategy of "war by other means" adopted by the United States to deal with the situation of Iraq/Kuwait. The UNSC debates of 2002 are inserted in another context: they were the first Council public meetings addressing this agenda item and with members' statements after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (LOWE *et al.*, 2010).

The 9/11 shifted US strategy, now perceiving Hussein's presumed pursuit of WMD as a potentially serious threat. In the January 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush identified Iraq as part of an "axis of evil". The September 2002 US National Security Strategy contained provisions in favour of pre-emptive military action.

Lastly, the US speech in the General Debate of the UN General Assembly qualified the conduct of Iraq, referred to as the "Iraqi regime", as a threat to the authority of the UN and a threat to peace (LOWE *et al.*, 2010). The word "regime" was a distinctive feature of US speeches in the UNSC debates (see Figure 24).

During meetings S/PV.4625 and S/PV.4644, the P3 emphasised non-proliferation similarly, but with different connections. The United States, more so than in 1996 and to a greater extent than France and the United Kingdom, emphasised its opposition to the Iraqi government. Additionally, the United States brought up the concept of sovereignty, referencing Iraq's past invasions to underscore its stance:

1) "This is a regime that has invaded two of its neighbours and tried to annihilate one of them; a regime that has used chemical weapons on its neighbours and its very own citizens; a regime that has lied about its development of weapons of mass destruction; a regime that signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and then proceeded to develop a major nuclear weapons programme. […] But the President also said that the choice for Iraq

> is straightforward: 'Either the Iraqi regime will give up its weapons of mass destruction, or, for the sake of peace, the United States will lead a global coalition to disarm that regime". (Representative of the United States, 4625th meeting, 17 October 2002).
>
> 2) "Stronger inspections will be crucial to ensuring that all countries have confidence in them and that Iraq makes the decision to comply rather than to continue hiding its weapons of mass destruction - crucial, if we are to succeed in achieving a peaceful resolution of this issue". (Representative of the United Kingdom, 4625th meeting, 17 October 2002).
>
> 3) "For nearly four years now, the international community has not been able to verify whether Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction and whether it is pursuing programmes to that end". (Representative of France, 4625th meeting, 17 October 2002).

These statements are in line with the main discussions of the period. The US wanted a forceful action via the Security Council. The UK, for its turn, reached a compromise with the US, pushing for the return of inspectors in Iraq through resolution 1441, adopted on 8 November 2002.

The resolution decided that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations and recalled that it would face "serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations" (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2002b). This ambiguity was intended to allow an automatic authorisation of the use of force in case of Iraq's non-compliance.

Finally, France was open to the use of force as long as the Council authorised it. This was not the position that prevailed, with President Chirac stating in 2003 that military action was the "worst of solutions" (LOWE *et al.*, 2010, p. 400). The increase in mentions of sovereignty in French speeches in 2003 underscores this stance.

This section analysed how the United States, the United Kingdom, and France emphasised approaches to international intervention in the UNSC debates, focusing on their distinctive categories: humanitarian assistance, state responsibility, international justice, and non-proliferation.

Based on the results presented by the dictionary and investigating more deeply the content of the debates, we could see how the P3 mobilises its distinctive categories, looking at how they are connected and how emphases change according to conflict development, the latter perspective specific to the analysis on the Libyan case.

Concerning the differences between the Western members, we saw how the United States stands out for its greater emphasis on state responsibility, marked by the use of the word “regime” when referring to states it is opposed to. In the cases of Yemen and Syria, France emphasised humanitarian assistance similarly to the UK and the US, but with a greater focus on the issue of the protection of civilians. Lastly, the United Kingdom adopted a distinct approach in the debates on Iraq/Kuwait in 1996 and 2002, with greater emphasis on relying on the work of inspectors, while maintaining a critical position towards Iraq.

Figure 10: Evolution of the P3's mentions of humanitarian assistance per agenda item



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 11: Evolution of the P3's mentions of state responsibility per agenda item



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 12: Evolution of the P3's mentions of international justice per agenda item



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 13: Evolution of the P3's mentions of non-proliferation per agenda item



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 14: Evolution of the share of P3's mentions of dictionary's categories – Yemen (2011-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 15: Relative share of mentions of dictionary patterns in the permanent members' speeches – Yemen (2011-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 16: Co-occurrence of categories in P3's speeches in the UNSC debates on Yemen (2011-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 17: Evolution of the share of P3 mentions of dictionary's categories – Syria (2011-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 18: Relative share of mentions of dictionary patterns in the permanent members' speeches – Syria (2011-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 19: Co-occurrence of categories in P3's speeches in the UNSC debates on Syria (2011-2023)

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 20: Co-occurrence of categories in Russia's speeches in the UNSC debates on Syria (2011-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 21: Co-occurrence of categories in China's speeches in the UNSC debates on Syria (2011-2023)

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 22: Evolution of the share of P3 mentions of dictionary's categories – Libya (2011-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 23: Evolution of the share of P3 mentions of dictionary's categories – Iraq/Kuwait (1992-2002)

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 24: Relative share of mentions of dictionary patterns in the permanent members' speeches – Iraq/Kuwait (1992-2002)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

6.3. China

The overview showed how China's distinctive features are related to more emphasis on peacemaking, sovereignty, and peacebuilding, confirming what the literature says about Chinese positions in the UNSC. In this subsection, we will see in more detail how these categories are employed in Chinese speeches, to which country-specific situations they are connected, and on which occasions China adopted different approaches.

6.3.1. Peacemaking: the baseline

Regarding peacemaking, as mentioned above, what makes China distinct from the other four members is its use of neutral ways of referring to the actors involved in a conflict, particularly using the word "parties". This pattern remains even in the face of highly complex and polarised situations, such as the Ukrainian crisis (see Figure 25).

In this particular case, the Council is divided by the Western powers on one side, framing Russia as the aggressor and Ukraine as the victim, therefore emphasising sovereignty, the Russian delegation mentioning terrorist groups and referring to Ukraine pejoratively as the "Kyiv regime", which is part of the notion of state responsibility, and China adopting a neutral position, expressed by its preference in the use of the word "parties". The list of sentences below illustrates these discursive differences:

1) "France reiterates its unwavering support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine in the face of Russia's aggression". (Representative of France, 9195th meeting, 16 November 2022).
2) "Tomorrow the United States will take further measures to hold Russia accountable for this clear violation of international law and Ukraine sovereignty and territorial integrity, but we and our partners have been clear that there would be a swift and severe response were Russia to further invade Ukraine". (Representative of the United States, 8970th meeting, 21 February 2022).
3) "This is an invasion which, as the United Nations, OHCHR and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine have confirmed, continues to be marked by grave violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law; the death, injury and displacement of thousands; the arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, sexual violence, torture and summary execution of

Ukrainians by Russian forces; the mass disruption of education and forced deportations of children; and, of course, the attacks on civilian infrastructure and objects, including the devastating attacks on residential buildings in Dnipro just this weekend, which Ukrainian officials have said killed at least 40 people". (Representative of the United Kingdom, 9245th meeting, 17 January 2023).

4) "Their only aim is to terrorize the civilian population — an act that is also expressly prohibited under international humanitarian law but that is fully in line with the tactics of the Kyiv regime, which has long since resorted to open terrorism". (Representative of Russia, 9399th meeting, 17 August 2023).
5) "To eliminate the nuclear safety risk at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, the international community must responsibly promote the de-escalation of the situation, step up diplomatic efforts, seek political solutions, guide the parties back to dialogue and negotiations and achieve a ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities as soon as possible" (Representative of China, 9114th meeting, 23 August 2022).

This case shows how the emphasis on peacemaking may not only have the function of supporting peaceful means and solutions but also can be the ground for a non-interventionist stance. In other words, to be in favour of pacific settlement of disputes may be connected not only to an active pursuit of a peace process, but also to a preference for non-involvement in the conflict.

Treating actors in a conflict as parties aligns with fostering dialogue and mediation efforts, a key aspect of Chinese diplomacy. This approach also underscores the theme of sovereignty. The underlying principle is that treating conflict participants as moral equals rather than aggressors or victims enables them to independently reach a peaceful resolution without external interference, particularly enforcement actions. The following lines will examine this link, delving into China's stance on the principle of sovereignty.

Chinese speeches mainly revolve around connections between peacemaking, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance (see Figure 28). However, one of its particularities resides in the way China mentions the category of sovereignty. When this category is used in a sentence, it is often accompanied by mentions of peacemaking: 19.26% of the Chinese sentences mentioning the former also mention the latter. Below is a list of sentences that demonstrate this connection:

1) "The Chinese delegation believes that the effective realisation of sustained peace and stability in the Balkans requires strict adherence to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, in particular to the principles of the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity". (4105th meeting, 28 February 2000, on Kosovo).
2) "We call on all the concerned parties, including countries of the region, to cooperate in earnest, respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, offer support to the TFG, and advance the domestic political process of reconciliation so that substantive progress can be achieved as soon as possible". (6113rd meeting, 28 April 2009, on Somalia).
3) "The parties concerned should uphold Yemen sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity, and support a broadly inclusive political solution, to be achieved through dialogue and negotiations […]". (8512nd meeting, 15 April 2019, on Yemen).

The combination of these two categories in China's approach to international intervention is based on the need to respect sovereignty while supporting dialogue between the parties to the conflict. In other words, to emphasise the peaceful settlement of disputes implies not only stressing the importance of peaceful solutions but also works as a way of upholding the principle of sovereignty.

China stresses the importance of sovereignty consistently for all country-specific situations. However, on some occasions, this emphasis was particularly strong (see Figure 26): 1) Iraq/Kuwait from 1992 to 2002, 2) Lebanon from 2004 to 2007, and 3) Venezuela in 2019.

6.3.2. Two moments of sovereignty: The case of Iraq/Kuwait

The Chinese approach towards Iraq/Kuwait began with higher mentions of sovereignty and then gave way to a focus on humanitarian assistance (see Figure 29). From 1992 to 1994, China's mentions of sovereignty were directed at stressing the need to respect Kuwait's sovereignty and positively assessing the Council's response towards the invasion:

1) "Over the past year, in order to remove the consequences of the invasion and to ensure peace and stability in the Gulf region, the international

community has acted in cooperation, with fruitful results" (3059th meeting, 11 March 1992).

2) "We wish to reaffirm that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait, like that of all other Members of the United Nations, should be fully respected" (3439th meeting, 17 October 1994).

Starting in 1995, China shifted its focus to emphasise the need to respect Iraq's sovereignty. The context is the humanitarian impact of sanctions imposed on Iraq. China did not block Council action at the time and was in favour of the implementation of Resolution 687 (1991), which required Iraq to acknowledge the sovereignty of Kuwait, respect the established borders, and dismantle its weapons of mass destruction program. However, it showed reservations towards how the resolution was being implemented.

1) "But it must be pointed out that questions regarding the channel of shipment for Iraqi oil exports and the distribution of humanitarian funds to the three northern Governorates of Iraq, as mentioned in the draft resolution, are matters within the purview of Iraq sovereignty to which a proper solution should be found, in full consultation with Iraq, to ensure the implementation of the mechanism embodied in the draft resolution" (3519th meeting, 14 April 1995).

2) "At the same time, we believe that a sovereign State's legitimate security concerns should be respected by all parties; that Security Council resolution 687 (1991) should be fully implemented; and that Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence should be respected" (3792nd meeting, 21 June 1997).

Mentions of sovereignty and peacemaking decreased over time, giving way to mentions of humanitarian assistance and sanctions. The reason for this connection was the calls for the lifting of sanctions based on humanitarian considerations and in light of Iraq's implementation of the resolutions (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 1995a). In 2002, shortly before the US invasion of Iraq, emphasis on peacemaking took the lead, reflecting the Chinese calls to the international community to seek a comprehensive settlement of the Iraqi question through political and diplomatic means (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2002a).

6.3.3. Three moments of sovereignty: The case of Lebanon

The second case involves a series of events that took place in Lebanon. One particular feature of this occasion is that mentions of sovereignty in Chinese speeches were connected only to the categories of international justice and humanitarian assistance (Figure 32). Even though China mentioned peacemaking in its speeches, it highlights the principle of sovereignty without considering it part of a strategy to reach peaceful solutions. Here, as we will see, mentions of sovereignty are deeply related to the framing of a situation as an internal affair, one of the distinctive terms in Chinese speeches (Figure 31).

The year of 2004 was the one in which China made more mentions of sovereignty in the UNSC debates on Lebanon, considering the period from 2004 to 2007 (Figure 30). In the first public Council meeting about the country since 2000, the United States and France held the position that Syria was interfering in Lebanon's sovereignty, maintaining armed forces in the country and imposing changes in the electoral process (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2004b). In the face of this situation, the US and France introduced a resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces and declaring support for a free and fair electoral process.

During the 5028th meeting, the representative of Lebanon stated that Syrian troops came to Lebanon in response to their legitimate request and that the issue of presidential elections was an internal matter. China echoed the arguments raised by Lebanon, stating that these questions "fall within the purview of the internal affairs of Lebanon" (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2004b, p. 5), but did not block the adoption of the resolution, choosing abstention instead.

The second event which prompted Council action was the 2006 Lebanon War. On 12 July 2006, a Hezbollah military wing fired rockets against Israel from the Lebanese territory. Israel blamed the Government of Lebanon for the raid, but the latter denied any knowledge of the raid. In response, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) attacked Lebanon with a series of incursions on 13 July 2006.

The Security Council held a meeting on 14 July 2006 to discuss the situation. The representative of China, while opposing the "practice of Hezbollah militias" (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2006, p. 11), framed the situation in terms of Israeli armed aggression against Lebanon's sovereignty with humanitarian impact: "We denounce the

armed aggression by Israel against Lebanon. […] It violates the sovereignty of Lebanon and has caused a grave humanitarian crisis" (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2006, p. 11).

The third event is connected to the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to prosecute those responsible for the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. The tribunal was established by Resolution 1757 (2007), following an agreement between the UN and the Lebanese government. However, the Lebanese Parliament was unable to ratify the agreement for the tribunal's establishment. Due to this political impasse, Resolution 1757 (2007) mentioned Chapter VII of the Charter to ensure the establishment of the tribunal.

China was not opposed to the Special Tribunal and did not use its veto power. It abstained during the voting and expressed reservations about the mention of Chapter VII, emphasising that the establishment of the tribunal was in Lebanon's own internal affairs:

> "This move will give rise to a series of political and legal problems that are likely to add to the uncertainty surrounding the already turbulent political and security situation in Lebanon and create a precedent of Security Council interference in the domestic affairs and legislative independence of a sovereign State" (5685th meeting, 30 May 2007).

6.3.4. Sovereignty and humanitarian assistance: The case of Venezuela

The situation in Venezuela was very brief. The Council convened only four debates in 2019 and 1 in 2020 on this agenda item. The background involves Maduro's election for a second term on 10 January 2019 amidst opposition protests, a dire economic situation, and contestation of the electoral process, leading to the self-proclamation of Juan Guaidó as interim President. The United States argued that the crisis in the country deserved attention from the Council, demonstrated support for Guaidó, and proposed a meeting under the agenda item "Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela" (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2019b, p. 2).

The Council put the provisional agenda to vote to decide whether a meeting addressing the situation in Venezuela should be convened. Ten members voted in favour of the resolution, while China, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, and South Africa were against it, and Côte d'Ivoire and Indonesia abstained. Since the voting was about a procedural matter, the veto power did not apply, and therefore, the agenda was adopted.

China expressed its opposition to the inclusion of this agenda item, demonstrated support for the Venezuelan Government, and stressed that the situation in the country was a domestic matter, not a threat to international peace (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2019b). The Chinese delegation reiterated this position throughout the year, repeating calls for the Venezuelan Government and opposition to seek a political settlement through dialogue and consultation within constitutional and legal frameworks, vetoed a draft resolution for considering it part of foreign interference in Venezuela, opposed the use of unilateral sanctions, and provided emergency aid to the country (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e). This approach is reflected in the results obtained from the application of the dictionary, which displays a strong connection between sovereignty and humanitarian assistance.

Additionally, there is a link between peacemaking and peacebuilding, with 20.61% of Chinese sentences referencing the latter also mentioning the former. As discussed in Chapter 2, peacemaking activities are crucial not only at the onset of conflicts but also in post-conflict situations. Chinese rhetoric intertwines these categories, advocating dialogue as a means to national reconciliation and a precursor to reconstruction and economic development. The list of sentences below illustrates this connection:

1) "We hope that all the ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina will stay focused on the well-being and long-term interest of the nation, and take practical measures to build up political trust, promote national reconciliation, consolidate the gains of the political process, settle their differences through dialogue, fully implement the Dayton Peace Agreement, and continue to strive for greater progress in all fields of reconstruction". (6860th meeting, 13 November 2012, on Bosnia and Herzegovina).
2) "We support Libya in continuing to advance the political transition, and we hope that all parties in Libya will attach importance to the interests of the country and the people, maintain national unity, commit themselves to resolving differences through dialogue and properly meet all the challenges in the political transition so as to achieve national reconciliation and accelerate national reconstruction and development". (7059th meeting, 14 November 2013, on Libya).
3) "We hope that the parties concerned in Liberia will, in the interest of the nation and people, seek a peaceful solution through negotiations and dialogue et en early date for the ultimate realisation of national

reconciliation, so as to achieve speedy restoration of domestic peace and stability and embark upon national reconstruction". (3138th meeting, 19 November 1992, on Liberia).

4) "China hopes that all parties in Colombia will give priority to the peace process, further broaden consensus, continue to promote the full implementation of the peace agreement, strengthen inclusive political dialogue and accelerate socioeconomic reconstruction so as to ultimately realize peace and development". (8511th meeting, 12 April 2019, on Colombia).

From the 2000s on, China's mentions of peacebuilding increased and reached higher levels of emphasis compared with the other four members, as shown in Figure 8. The situation in Haiti reveals the Chinese concern over peacebuilding, particularly in issues related to economic development and its connections to peacemaking. These two categories represent the stronger connections between categories in the UNSC debates on Haiti (Figure 37).

6.3.4. Peacebuilding: The case of Haiti

Chinese concerns over peacebuilding in Haiti reached higher levels in two distinct periods: 1995-1999 and 2005-2016 (Figure 35). In 1995, Haiti had the opportunity to hold the first democratic elections since 1990. China expressed optimism about Haiti's future, saying that "life has gradually returned to normal" (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 1995b, p. 10). It stressed the importance of conducting elections but mentions of electoral processes were lower in comparison with the other four members. The distinctive mark of Chinese speeches on peacebuilding in Haiti are mentions of reconstruction and stability (see Figure 36). During this period, it has been emphasised on more than one occasion that the primary tasks of Haiti were reconstruction and rehabilitation, urging the international community to contribute to the economic development of the country.

The Chinese delegation supported the establishment of the UN missions in Haiti with mandates to promote institution-building, especially through assisting Haitian authorities in the professionalisation of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Even though supporting these missions, China always pointed to the necessity of economic reconstruction and, in 1999, argued that the UN should shift its focus to peacebuilding:

> "Therefore, we have always held the view that, given the overall situation, MIPONUH should consider completing its work so that the relevant agencies can play a greater role in peace-building" (4074th meeting, 30 November 1999).

In December 1999, the General Assembly established the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) by a consensus vote. This peacebuilding mission was mandated to consolidate the results of previous missions as was tasked to promote human rights and reinforce the institutional effectiveness of the Haitian police and the judiciary[9].

In 2004, the Security Council convened a meeting following a request from the Representative of Jamaica. Speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Representative stated that the situation in Haiti was rapidly deteriorating and could no longer be considered an internal matter (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2004a). At that moment, China did not make mentions of peacebuilding, but focused instead on peacemaking and humanitarian assistance:

> "We urge all sides in Haiti to resolve the crisis by peaceful means, through dialogue, in the best interests of their people and their nation. All sides should redouble their efforts to that end so as to prevent further bloodshed and conflict. […] We call on the international community to provide the people of Haiti with emergency humanitarian assistance. China will participate in the international community's efforts to help ease the current situation in Haiti and to attain lasting peace, stability and development in that country" (4917th meeting, 26 February 2004).

The focus changed in 2005, when it started emphasising national reconciliation and elections. Again, mentions of electoral processes were present, but less so when compared to the other four members.

In 2006, Haiti successfully held general elections after postponements due to security concerns and logistical difficulties. From 2006 to 2017, China continued stressing the importance of conducting elections, addressing economic challenges, and supporting the work of MINUSTAH as a way to create a safe environment for reconstruction and development, these last two being its distinctive themes.

[9] Available at: https://search.archives.un.org/international-civilian-support-mission-in-haiti-micah. Access on: 26 January 2024.

Mentions of humanitarian assistance increased after the 12 January 2010 earthquake, connected with emphases on reconstruction and stabilisation. There were also mentions of peacebuilding in 2017, coinciding with the closure of MINUSTAH, which transitioned to a smaller follow-up peacekeeping mission[10].

One aspect of China's overall stance on peacebuilding and what makes it different from the other permanent members is the focus on sustainable development, as displayed in Figure 7. The context of these mentions of sustainable development is the Chinese reiterated calls for the international community to support the implementation of the 2030 agenda, present in meetings addressing different situations, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Ukraine, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and many others:

1) "The international community should help affected countries improve their sustainable development capacities in order to enable them to fully implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, swiftly reduce poverty and achieve common prosperity". (8119th meeting, 30 November 2017, on the maintenance of international peace and security)
2) "The international community should continue to increase its focus on the political, economic and humanitarian situation in Haiti and help the country maintain national stability, promote economic development, improve its people's livelihoods and implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development". (8419th meeting, 12 December 2018, on Haiti)
3) "The international community should actively provide assistance to South Sudan, especially targeted assistance in the economic and health sectors, scale up investment in agriculture, energy, infrastructure and health care, and help South Sudan implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development". (Meeting recorded in document S/2020/914, 16 September 2020, on Sudan/South Sudan).
4) "The international community should adapt measures to local conditions, increase assistance to coastal countries in port construction, aquaculture and fishing, support the development of the marine economy in the Gulf of Guinea, engage in international cooperation, rationally develop and utilize marine resources, help regional countries achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as soon as possible and completely eliminate

[10] Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minustah. Access on: 26 January 2024.

> the underlying causes that are the breeding ground for piracy". (9198th meeting, 22 November 2022, on Africa).

To conclude, a deeper analysis of China's emphasis on the dictionary categories helps us understand in more detail why it can be considered a "cautious partner" (SNETKOV; LANTEIGNE, 2015). It highlights the need to respect sovereignty and find peaceful solutions and tends not to mention international justice and state responsibility. This pattern can be observed over time and across many situations.

This analysis showed the core content of what makes China's approach to international intervention distinct among the P5. It connects respect for sovereignty with the pursuit of peaceful solutions rooted in a neutral perspective about the actors in dispute. Additionally, it stresses the importance of peacemaking in post-conflict scenarios, often arguing how peaceful means are important in the achievement of national reconciliation and pave the way for peacebuilding efforts, focused mainly on reconstruction, economic development, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Figure 25: Evolution of China's mentions of peacemaking per agenda item



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 26: Evolution of China's mentions of sovereignty per agenda item



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 27: Evolution of China's mentions of peacemaking per agenda item



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 28: Co-occurrence of categories in China's speeches in the UNSC debates (1992-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 29: Evolution of the share of China's mentions of dictionary categories – Iraq/Kuwait (1992-2002)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 30: Evolution of the share of P3 mentions of dictionary's categories – Lebanon (2004-2007)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 31: Relative share of mentions of dictionary patterns in the permanent members' speeches – Lebanon (2004-2007)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 32: Co-occurrence of categories in China's speeches in the UNSC debates on Lebanon (2004-2007)

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 33: Relative share of mentions of dictionary patterns in the permanent members' speeches – Venezuela (2019-2020)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 34: Co-occurrence of categories in China's speeches in the UNSC debates on Venezuela (2019-2020)

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 35: Evolution of the share of China's mentions of dictionary categories – Haiti (1995-2017)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 36: Relative share of mentions of dictionary patterns in the permanent members' speeches – Haiti (1995-2017)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 37: Co-occurrence of categories in China's speeches in the UNSC debates on Haiti (1995-2017)

Source: Elaborated by the author.

6.4. Russia

The overview showed how Russia's distinctive features are related to more emphasis on counter-terrorism, especially since 2008. Furthermore, as described in the literature, Russia adopts an ambiguous stance in relation to the principle of sovereignty, sometimes defending it against external interference and sometimes using interventionist practices, as in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine.

In our analysis of the P3, we saw how Russia combined humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism and sovereignty to defend the Syrian government and oppose Western action. Here, we will counterbalance this example with the case of Ukraine, in which Russia emphasises the category of state responsibility to a greater extent (see Figure 39).

6.4.1. Counter-terrorism: The case of Afghanistan

Regarding counter-terrorism, as mentioned in the overview, what makes Russia distinct from the other four members is its greater concern over drug trafficking. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the literature on Russian foreign policy highlights how this concern is directly related to the situation in Afghanistan, so let us investigate how Russian speeches mobilise the category of counter-terrorism in Afghanistan, which other categories also play a relevant role, and how it differs from the other four members.

Figure 38 shows that the situation in Afghanistan has been one that has attracted the most mention of counter-terrorism by Russia since at least 1999. Additionally, Figure 40 shows how this category was predominant in Russian speeches from 2003 to 2017 in the UNSC debates on Afghanistan, when peacemaking and humanitarian assistance started to be mentioned more.

The first case occurred at the beginning of the political transition in Afghanistan, after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and the establishment of an interim authority (LOWE *et al.*, 2010). In 2003, the Council convened two public meetings with members' statements. On this occasion, all permanent members emphasised the importance of structuring the combat against drug trafficking.

The 4711th meeting, which occurred on 24 February 2003, featured briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the Ambassador of Japan in charge of Afghan aid coordination, and the Special Representative of the Government of

Germany for the training of the Afghan police force. The main subject was the challenges related to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, involving infrastructure improvements, regional cooperation, and security issues outside Kabul. The representative of Russia used that opportunity to question the interaction between the Afghan security forces and the services of the neighbouring countries in the blocking of the flow of drugs from Afghanistan and how the UN could assist more in that effort (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2003a).

The Council meeting on 17 June 2003 was convened to address specifically the issue of drug trafficking in Afghanistan. The Russian delegation was exercising the presidency of the Council that month and requested the meeting, suggesting that the discussion should centre on the "challenge of combating the Afghan drug threat" (UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 2003b, p. 26). The Russian statement highlighted its country's significant challenges with drug trafficking, specifically heroin from Afghanistan, due to its geographical location. It further called for increased international cooperation to strengthen border control and law enforcement agencies in countries along drug trafficking routes.

The meeting resulted in the adoption of the presidential statement S/PRST/2003/7. The document expressed concerns about increasing drug trafficking and its links to terrorism, as well as the spread of HIV/AIDS related to drug abuse. Additionally, it emphasised the need for international cooperation in combating drug production and trafficking and the importance of integrating these efforts into broader reconstruction and development programs.

The category of counter-terrorism, with emphasis on combating drug trafficking, is the main distinctive feature of Russian speeches from 1994 to 2023, as displayed in Figure 41. Additionally, this category was employed mainly in connection with peacemaking and peacebuilding, as shown in Figure 42, although to a low degree: only 5.12% of the sentences mentioning counter-terrorism also mentioned one of these two categories.

Mentions of peacemaking and counter-terrorism started to appear, especially from 2010 on, coinciding with a change in the global strategy towards Afghanistan. During the London Conference in January 2010, Hamid Karzai made a high-profile statement on his Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), which was intended to lay the ground

for peace dialogue at a strategic level with Taliban-led insurgents' leadership (XIANGYU; CHUNYAN; YUFAN, 2012). Mentions of peacebuilding and counter-terrorism were more consistent over the years, mainly through emphasising combating drug trafficking as a way to reconstruct Afghanistan.

Russia's mentions of counter-terrorism declined over the years, reaching the level of emphasis expressed by the other members and increasing its mentions of humanitarian assistance, also jointly with the other members. Mentions of humanitarian assistance started to increase sharply in Russia's statements in 2020 and became predominant in 2022. This shift in rhetoric coincides with the COVID-19 pandemic, but mainly with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and the subsequent Taliban takeover, which exacerbated the humanitarian situation, impacting especially the lives of women and girls.

Despite increased emphasis on these categories, Russia did not abandon the issue of drug trafficking. The list of sentences below illustrates how Russian speeches addressed the categories of counter-terrorism, peacemaking, and humanitarian assistance in the UNSC debates on Afghanistan:

1) "In order to counter the Afghan drug threat, the Russian Federation, in its capacity as presidency of the G-8 and with the active assistance of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, hosted in Moscow last year the Second Ministerial Conference on Drug Trafficking Routes from Afghanistan, which gave significant impetus to developing the Paris-Moscow process of international assistance with respect not only to stemming illicit drug production and trafficking and the smuggling of precursors through Afghanistan's neighbours, but also in the areas of health care and the resolution of social problems". (5641st meeting, 20 March 2007).
2) "That [to implement the comprehensive strategy for peace, security, reconstruction and integration] will require suppressing the terrorist threat, training effective, combat-capable Afghan security structures, suppressing drug trafficking, achieving national reconciliation, creating effective mechanisms of State authority, restoring economic potential and developing democratic institutions". (6394th meeting, 29 September 2010).
3) "It is necessary to patiently work with the Afghan people to build a State that is politically and ethnically inclusive, free of terrorism and narcotics and economically stable and developed, while it respects and safeguards

the rights of all its citizens, including religious and ethnic minorities, women and girls". (9227th meeting, 20 December 2022).

In the UNSC debates on Afghanistan, Russian speeches consistently highlighted concerns about drug trafficking. This issue persisted as a key point for Russia, regardless of the changing dynamics on the ground and alongside new focuses like peacemaking and humanitarian assistance.

6.4.2. State responsibility: The case of Ukraine

The second case studied in this subsection is the conflict in Ukraine. The main goal is to illustrate how Russia mentions state responsibility in its discourses and how it contrasts with its defence of sovereignty and non-intervention, as we have seen in the case of Syria.

This second case must be split into two phases: before and after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The first phase relates to more mentions of peacemaking and peacebuilding, while the second is connected to a focus on state responsibility and humanitarian assistance, as can be seen in Figure 43.

The first phase, from 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, to December 2021, is characterised by a focus on peacemaking and peacebuilding, as well as mentions of sovereignty. These categories were predominant in Russia's speeches during this period.

1) "What everyone, including the Security Council, should in fact be doing is to help the parties to the conflict to maintain complete observance of the ceasefire, prevent bloodshed, and engage in an honest and fundamental national dialogue on issues of constitutional reform and rebuilding a Ukrainian State on a just and inclusive basis". (7287th meeting, 24 October 2014).
2) "It says that the restoration of full control of the borders by Ukraine should begin on the first day after local elections and be completed with a comprehensive political settlement with the implementation of article 11, which states that consultations should take place and an agreement made with the various representatives of the districts in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions". (7683rd meeting, 28 April 2016).
3) "Before our meeting, we circulated the text of the package of measures as an official document of the Security Council so that all those here present could have an opportunity to refresh their memory as to the fact that not

only is Russia not mentioned there, but also that the 13 points contained therein set out a clear sequence for implementation: ceasefire, amnesty, constitutional reform, with the provision of special status to Donbas and the right to linguistic self-determination, then the holding of elections and only after that the restoration of Government control throughout the conflict zone". (8726th meeting, 18 February 2020).

4) "Has there been dialogue on modalities for local elections and the future regime in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as stipulated in paragraph 4 of the Minsk package?". (Meeting recorded in document S/2021/159. 11 February 2021).

The emphasis on peacemaking and peacebuilding during this period reflects the belief that resolving conflict hinges on fostering dialogue, which in turn lays the groundwork for reconstruction and reform. This approach is particularly rooted in the context of the referenda in the districts of Donetsk and Luhansk and the defence of the right to self-determination.

We have seen in the subsection about China how it focused on mentions of peacemaking in the UNSC meetings on Ukraine. Figure 44 brings the distinctive features of all permanent members, and it is important to underscore how they may emphasise different aspects of the same category. For example, the United States and the United Kingdom made references to sovereignty, with a focus on words that express violations of sovereignty, such as annexation and aggression, in reference to the Russian annexation of Crimea. Russia, in its turn, emphasised sovereignty with a distinct focus on self-determination, as highlighted in the excerpts of Russian speeches above.

Concerning mentions of counter-terrorism, Russian speeches distinctively cite words such as "terrorists", "radicals", "militia", and "rebels". In this particular case, these words were employed not only to label actors involved in the conflict but also to disapprove the use of these terms in reference to the inhabitants of Donetsk and Luhansk.

1) "The centre of Kyiv and many towns in western Ukraine have been overrun by armed national radicals chanting extremist anti-Russian and anti-Semitic slogans". (7125th meeting, 3 March 2014).
2) "All dissidents are being called terrorists and separatists, and they are being persecuted in all kinds of ways". (7683rd meeting, 28 April 2016).
3) "Today the Ukrainian authorities do not even want to engage in dialogue with them [the Donbas representatives who signed the Minsk agreements

> in 2015], labelling them not just separatists but terrorists". (8726th meeting, 18 February 2020).

In their approach, the P3 avoided labelling groups as "terrorists", instead opting to describe them as "separatists" or "armed groups". This terminology choice may be related to the idea that dialogue was still a viable option, illustrated by the frequent references to peacemaking in their speeches. The conflict was still being addressed with emphasis on the importance of respecting ceasefires and the Minsk agreements.

The data further highlight this link between counterterrorism and peacemaking: in speeches by the United States, 13.36% of sentences mentioning counterterrorism also referred to peacemaking. Comparable figures were 8.57% for the United Kingdom and 23.81% for France, indicating a nuanced relationship between these concepts in their diplomatic discourses.

This link was particularly present in the first two years of the conflict. The dictionary detected 570 sentences mentioning counter-terrorism and peacemaking in the speeches delivered by the P3 on UNSC debates on Ukraine between 2014 and 2021. 501 sentences were from speeches made in 2014 and 2015. The sentences below demonstrate how these two categories were employed in the P3 speeches:

1) "But de-escalation implies that Russia will calm the armed groups it is equipping and training; that it will see that the OSCE observers are freed - having still not publicly condemned their capture in the first place - and open negotiations with Ukraine; that free elections will be held on 25 May under international supervision in order to give the Kyiv authorities indisputable legitimacy; and that negotiations begin between Russia and Ukraine". (Representative of France, 7167th meeting, 2 May 2014).
2) "Ukraine is holding direct dialogue with the separatists - a bitter pill to swallow, but one that they have swallowed for the sake of peace and for the sake of the implementation of the Minsk agreements". (Representative of the United States, 7457th meeting, 5 June 2015).
3) "Russia seeks to undercut Ukraine at every opportunity, undermining the ceasefire, supplying the Russian-backed separatists with weapons and calling illegitimate elections - all in breach of the Minsk agreements". (Representative of the United Kingdom, 8461st meeting, 12 February 2019).

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the situation witnessed a dramatic shift. The P3 redirected their attention towards humanitarian

assistance, sovereignty, and international justice. In the Council debates, these categories were used to emphasise Russia's breach of Ukraine's sovereignty and how its actions post-invasion exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine and constituted crimes against humanity.

1) "For let us return to the facts, which are extensively documented: since the February 2022 invasion, the Russian authorities have perpetrated multiple violations of international humanitarian law, which amount to war crimes, by deliberately targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure". (Representative of France, 9470th meeting, 8 November 2023).
2) "But now Putin war is driving up the costs of providing food assistance, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations estimates that as many as 13 million more people worldwide may be pushed into food insecurity as a result of Russia invasion of Ukraine". (Representative of the United States, 9008th meeting, 29 March 2022).
3) "This is an invasion which, as the United Nations, OHCHR and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine have confirmed, continues to be marked by grave violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law; the death, injury and displacement of thousands; the arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, sexual violence, torture and summary execution of Ukrainians by Russian forces; the mass disruption of education and forced deportations of children; and, of course, the attacks on civilian infrastructure and objects, including the devastating attacks on residential buildings in Dnipro just this weekend, which Ukrainian officials have said killed at least 40 people". (Representative of the United Kingdom, 9245th meeting, 17 January 2023).

In its turn, Russia's focus on peacemaking and peacebuilding diminished, shifting instead to primarily emphasise state responsibility and humanitarian assistance, along with mentions of international justice and counter-terrorism. In its speeches, Russia used these categories to express strong opposition to the Ukrainian government, often referring explicitly to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and labelling the government as a "regime".

This word became the main distinctive feature in Russian speeches if we consider only the words included in the dictionary, as shown in Figure 45. Further, Russia blamed the Ukrainian government for the deteriorating humanitarian situation and accused it of violating international humanitarian law and even portraying its actions as terrorism.

1) “Ukraine has unquestionably become a completely totalitarian State in the Nazi mode, where the norms of international humanitarian law are flouted with impunity”. (9135th meeting, 22 September 2022).
2) “Since February 2022, Russia has actively advocated the continuation of international humanitarian assistance through the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross to the civilian population in Donbas, who for several years have been forced by the Kyiv regime to live under fire and in totally isolated conditions”. (9357th meeting, 23 June 2023).
3) “Their only aim is to terrorize the civilian population — an act that is also expressly prohibited under international humanitarian law but that is fully in line with the tactics of the Kyiv regime, which has long since resorted to open terrorism”. (9399th meeting, 17 August 2023).

Comparing the positions of the permanent members in UNSC debates on Syria and Ukraine highlights how different situations can lead to varied emphases on approaches to international intervention. In Syria’s case, the P3 mobilised the categories of state responsibility and humanitarian assistance to underscore their opposition to the Syrian government. Meanwhile, Russia focused on counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance, and sovereignty, framing the situation as a humanitarian crisis primarily caused by opposition groups, which it labelled as terrorists, and Western interference.

In the UNSC debates on Ukraine, the dynamics are reversed compared to Syria. Particularly after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the P3 concentrated on highlighting humanitarian assistance and sovereignty. They condemned Russia for violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and for actions that exacerbated the crisis and potentially constituted crimes against humanity.

Conversely, Russia leaned on the categories of state responsibility and humanitarian assistance, positioning itself in opposition to the Ukrainian government. Russia held the Ukrainian government accountable for the deepening humanitarian crisis, illustrating a stark contrast in how the P3 and Russia framed and responded to the situation in Ukraine.

This subsection has examined how Russia mobilises approaches to international intervention in the UNSC debates, with a particular focus on its distinctive emphasis on counter-terrorism. Through the application of the dictionary, the situation in Afghanistan

emerged as a primary concern for Russia in the context of counter-terrorism, with drug trafficking being a key aspect highlighted in its speeches.

Additionally, the analysis of the debates on the conflict in Ukraine revealed how Russia's interventionist stance is expressed through the dictionary's categories. Here, Russia primarily focused on the categories of state responsibility and humanitarian assistance, contrasting with its approach in the Syrian debates, where sovereignty and counter-terrorism were more prominently emphasised. This comparison illustrates the varied ways in which Russia engages with and frames different international conflicts in the Security Council.

Figure 38: Evolution of Russia mentions of counter-terrorism per agenda item



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 39: Evolution of Russia mentions of state responsibility per agenda item



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 40: Evolution of the share of Russia's mentions of dictionary's categories – Afghanistan (1994-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 41: Relative share of mentions of dictionary patterns in the permanent members' speeches – Afghanistan (1994-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 42: Co-occurrence of categories in Russia's speeches in the UNSC debates on Afghanistan (1994-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 43: Evolution of the share of Russia's mentions of dictionary categories – Ukraine (2014-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 44: Relative share of mentions of dictionary patterns in the permanent members' speeches – Ukraine (2014-2021)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 45: Relative share of mentions of dictionary patterns in the permanent members' speeches – Ukraine (2022-2023)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

6.5. Summary of approaches

The dictionary developed in this research was constructed with the primary aim of identifying and quantifying emphases on specific categories related to international intervention in the speeches of the permanent members of the Security Council. These categories were carefully chosen based on extensive literature review and the manual analysis of UNSC transcripts, ensuring that they reflected the most relevant themes in the Council's debates. The methodology was designed to isolate and highlight the importance attributed to each category, providing a structured approach to analyzing the rhetorical priorities of each member state.

However, as the analysis progressed, it became evident that the perspectives of the permanent members on specific cases of international intervention could not be fully captured by looking solely at the emphasis on individual categories. Instead, the connections between categories emerged as a critical factor in understanding their positions. These connections reveal distinct roles that categories play within the broader rhetorical framework, and their interplay provides deeper insights into the nuances of each member's stance. It is through the dynamic relationships between categories that the members' approaches to international intervention are most effectively expressed and understood. In this section, a summary of the category combinations identified during the analysis and their meanings will be presented, with a focus on dyads of categories for matters of simplification.

The first combination worth mentioning is sovereignty-peacemaking, a distinctive feature in Chinese speeches. This combination was analysed mainly in the debates on Syria, Yemen, and Ukraine, where it underscores that conflict resolution should be achieved by the parties involved, without external interference. Interestingly, mentions peacemaking are not necessarily used to encourage actively pursuing peace but rather to support a position against intervention.

This particular function of peacemaking as non-intervention can also be observed in other contexts. The link between peacemaking and counter-terrorism was highlighted by the P3 in the Ukrainian crisis and by Russia in debates on Afghanistan. In the former, the issue of separatists, and in the latter, drug trafficking, were presented as serious concerns in the speeches. However, references to peacemaking softened the overall stance, suggesting the possibility of dialogue to achieve peace. In debates on Yemen, the P3 combined humanitarian assistance with peacemaking to highlight the plight of civilians, while avoiding placing responsibility on any specific actor.

In all these cases, references to peacemaking, particularly those framing the actors involved in a conflict as “parties” or “sides”, often convey a stance of non-involvement in the situation. When combined with categories such as humanitarian assistance and counter-terrorism, this non-involvement is expressed by acknowledging the seriousness of the situation while urging the actors to resolve their differences through peaceful means. This approach does not necessarily translate into active mediation efforts but may instead be limited to expressing hope that the parties will find a resolution. On one hand, the emphasis on peacemaking aligns with the UN’s principle of seeking peaceful solutions. On the other, limiting the approach towards international intervention to hope risks fostering inertia.

While peacemaking tends to soften the tone of speeches by maintaining neutrality towards the actors involved and expressing hope for the future, references to counter-terrorism and state responsibility often indicate that at least one actor is being held accountable for the conflict and its consequences. When these categories appear in a speech, the speaker is typically assigning blame and adopting a more confrontational stance. Additionally, with fewer mentions of peacemaking, this stance often implies the impossibility of dialogue as a means to resolve the conflict.

This dynamic was evident in the debates on Syria, where the P3 linked humanitarian assistance to state responsibility to oppose the Assad government, while Russia combined humanitarian assistance with counter-terrorism to assign responsibility to non-state groups. Similarly, in discussions on Ukraine, Russia employed the combination of humanitarian assistance and state responsibility to hold the Ukrainian government accountable for the conflict. In debates on Iraq/Kuwait, the United States paired non-proliferation with state responsibility to accuse the Iraqi government of violating non-proliferation commitments.

While mentions of peacemaking tend to express non-involvement, state responsibility and counter-terrorism often signal a more assertive stance, where responsibility for the conflict is attributed to specific actors. These categories are frequently used to assign blame and emphasize accountability, leading to a more antagonistic tone in speeches.

To conclude, we can identify at least three distinct patterns in the combination of categories. The first is sovereignty-peacemaking, which reflects a position rooted in respecting non-interference and placing the responsibility for conflict resolution solely on the parties involved. This pattern emphasises the principle of sovereignty while discouraging external involvement.

The second pattern involves peacemaking combined with categories more associated with the situation on the ground, where peacemaking serves to soften the speaker's stance. In this case, the speech acknowledges the seriousness of the situation, such as recognising the conflict as a humanitarian crisis or identifying spoilers on the ground, while expressing hope for peaceful solutions. This moderate approach can lead to efforts at mediation or, conversely, to inaction.

The third pattern links humanitarian assistance with state responsibility or counter-terrorism, signaling a harsher, more confrontational position. Speakers adopting this approach tend to assign blame, pointing to the gravity of the situation while directly accusing specific parties. This combination often includes references to international justice, detailing the violations committed by the accused parties. The lack of mentions of peacemaking in this context makes the speaker's stance even harsher, as it reinforces the idea that dialogue is not considered a viable option for resolving the conflict.

Further research could investigate how these categories are emphasised in debates and how members relate them to one another, aiming to uncover rhetorical patterns within the UNSC. These patterns could provide valuable insights into Council practices, particularly in understanding how its members position themselves across a spectrum that ranges from non-intervention to mild engagement and outright confrontation.

7. CONCLUSION

This conclusion summarises the main findings of this thesis, highlighting the key insights gained from the automated text analysis of UNSC permanent members' speeches. It reflects on the broader implications of the results, discusses the validation and utility of the dictionary developed in this research, and explores its potential applications for future studies. The section also identifies avenues for further investigation, emphasising how the dictionary can serve as a foundational tool for analyzing rhetorical patterns and their alignment with real-world events.

This thesis analysed the differences and similarities between the UNSC permanent members' stances on international intervention through an automated text analysis of their speeches from 1992 to 2023. It involved the steps of data collection and processing, the elaboration of a typology of "approaches to international intervention", and the building of a dictionary.

Chapter 6 presented the results in two parts, based on the application of the dictionary. First, it offered a big picture of how the permanent members are distributed in terms of approaches to international intervention, highlighting the main differences and similarities on a more superficial level, considering the 32 years of UNSC activity in the post-Cold War. Second, it conducted in-depth analyses of the P3, Russia, and China, providing a detailed description of their distinctive features and how their main approaches to international intervention are mobilised in their speeches.

In the overview, we could observe how all permanent members tend to place more emphasis on peacemaking and humanitarian assistance. The predominance of peacemaking is understandable if we consider that one of the purposes enshrined in the UN Charter is that international disputes must be settled through peaceful means (UNITED NATIONS, 1945). In this sense, to make peace is always a relevant theme. Concerning the high importance of humanitarian assistance, this is also in line with the historical background of the Security Council, which embraced the notion of human security as part of its responsibility (UNITED NATIONS, 2005).

Still on the similarities, the dictionary detected a strong alignment between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The three members display the same top seven most emphasised categories, with similar degrees of mentions. The distinctive features of this group,

when compared to Russia and China, are the emphasis on humanitarian assistance, state responsibility, international justice, and non-proliferation.

The cases of Syria, Libya, and Iraq/Kuwait illustrated how these four categories combined form the baseline of Western powers' stance in international conflicts: to oppose in strong terms governments viewed as illegitimate and deemed responsible for atrocity crimes, humanitarian crises, and violation of the rules of non-proliferation. This baseline reflects what previous studies assessed about the Western powers in the UNSC (BADACHE; HELLMÜLLER; SALAYMEH, 2022; FREDERKING, 2023; SCHERZINGER, 2023; STEDMAN, 2016; TARDY; ZAUM, 2016).

In the case of Yemen, they expressed a more moderate approach based on the combination of humanitarian assistance and peacemaking, reflected in the idea that the parties to the conflict could engage in peaceful solutions and alleviate human suffering. The dictionary confirmed previous studies about global responses to the crisis (DAY; BREHONY, 2020; MURTHY, 2018).

When analysing the approaches of China and Russia, we could also take a look at the Western powers' emphases in other cases. Regarding peacebuilding, the case of Haiti showed how the Western powers gave more attention to issues related to democratic development and electoral processes, a finding consistent with other studies (BADACHE; HELLMÜLLER; SALAYMEH, 2022).

The debates on Ukraine, studied here with a focus on Russia, were also an opportunity to see the Western members emphasising a category not present in their baseline: sovereignty. The example demonstrated in more detail why an emphasis on sovereignty is not necessarily related to a non-interventionist approach, like in the positions of China and, to a lesser extent, Russia.

Confirming the study of Bakalova and Jüngling (2020) with examples extracted from the speeches, the Western members' emphasis on sovereignty is aligned with a confrontational position because it is based on mentions of violations of this principle, using words such as "aggression", "annexation", and "invasion". A greater use of this word reflects the designation of a state that violated international law, in this case, Russia. The debates on Ukraine also show a West less prone to speak of non-state actors involved in the conflict as "terrorists", preferring the use of terms such as "separatists", "insurgents", and "armed groups".

Concerning the differences within the group, the results show that further case studies are necessary to uncover the distinctive features of each Western member, especially in relation to the United Kingdom. This research found a particularly strong alignment of distinctive keywords and categories between the UK and the US.

In this research, we observed that the United States focuses comparatively more on state responsibility, specifically due to its use of the word "regime" to demonstrate opposition to other states. France and the United Kingdom focused more on matters related to peacekeeping in the debates on Haiti. The French mission particularly displayed a higher emphasis on civilian protection and was less engaged in emphasising state responsibility than the US and the UK, as illustrated in the debates on Venezuela and Iraq/Kuwait.

Based on the dictionary, this study outlined the main approaches emphasised in Chinese speeches: peacemaking, sovereignty, and peacebuilding. This confirms the finding of an extensive literature that asserts that China focus on the pursuit of peaceful means, the principle of non-interference, and economic development (CHAN, 2015; CHEN; YIN, 2020; JONES, 2020; MORPHET, 2000). In this research, we saw how China's baseline consists of connecting peacemaking and sovereignty to defend that the actors involved in a conflict, referred to as "parties", must engage in peaceful means by themselves, with no external interference. This combination is strong and was present in all cases analysed in this research.

A slightly different position is presented when China highlights the importance of peacebuilding efforts, as shown in the cases of Afghanistan and Haiti. China connects peacebuilding with peacemaking, expressing the necessity to engage in economic reconstruction and sustainable development, which are viewed as ways to achieve national reconciliation.

Lastly, the analysis of Russia's speeches revealed a distinctively higher emphasis on counter-terrorism (PAIGE, 2019; SCHERZINGER, 2023; TRENIN, 2016). Concerns over non-state actor activity were particularly intense towards the issue of drug trafficking in Afghanistan, connected with peacebuilding in the context of the reconstruction of this country after the US intervention.

The analysis could also investigate how Russia adopts a general approach consisting of the defence of the principle of non-interference, but also may engage in a more confrontational and interventionist position (BAKALOVA; JÜNGLING, 2020). When analysing the P3 in the

debates on Syria and China in the debates on Venezuela, we saw how Russia put a relatively higher emphasis on the category of sovereignty, contrasting with the P3 and siding with China.

However, in the UNSC debates on Ukraine, the dictionary detected an important rhetorical shift before and after the 2022 Russian invasion. From 2014 to 2022, Russia placed a significant emphasis on peacemaking and peacebuilding, in addition to mentions of counter-terrorism, mainly to disapprove of the use of negative labels to refer to the inhabitants of Donetsk and Luhansk. After the invasion, Russia turned to prioritise state responsibility and humanitarian assistance, often referring to the government of Ukraine as the "Kyiv regime".

The dictionary demonstrated how Russia's position in Ukraine mirrored the Western stance towards Syria, emphasising state responsibility and humanitarian assistance. The similarity between the approaches can further be recognised if we consider the reiterated use of the word "regime" to delegitimise a state.

The dictionary was able to draw a picture of the permanent members' approaches to international intervention, highlighting similarities and differences. It confirmed that the permanent members do not dismiss issues related to humanitarian assistance, one of the most emphasised categories. Additionally, it contributed to demonstrating that, even if humanitarian issues are deemed relevant for all permanent members, they may diverge in the connections between categories, resulting in different and, at times, opposing views about the same situation. The P5 may agree about the existence of a humanitarian crisis but disagree or adapt their views about how to solve it and who should be held accountable.

Beyond the initial patterns observed at a cursory level, the dictionary has been instrumental in uncovering specific variations. These variations offer deeper insights and support in the validation of the dictionary. It reflected:

1) The beginning of the civil war in Yemen through mentions of humanitarian assistance;

2) Changes in the Libyan administration through mentions of peacemaking and peacebuilding;

3) The increase in tension concerning the situation in Iraq/Kuwait leading to the US invasion in 2003, through mentions of state responsibility and non-proliferation.

4) The closure of MINUSTAH in 2017, through mentions of peacebuilding.

5) The Russian invasion in 2022 and the subsequent heightening of tensions through mentions of sovereignty, state responsibility, and humanitarian assistance.

The dictionary's efficiency in identifying rhetorical variations that are congruent with real-world changes indicates that the Security Council responds to these changes. Furthermore, it demonstrates that such reactions are discernible and measurable through text analysis. This research is not apt to uncover causal relations between the UNSC debates and conflict development. The alignments between rhetoric and changes on the ground described above only serve as a robustness check for the dictionary. The fact that the dictionary confirmed the results of previous research and reflected real-world changes supports its validation.

The main goal of this thesis was to describe the differences and similarities of the UNSC permanent members' approaches to international intervention. Its main contribution is a dictionary that can serve as a tool for analysing the UNSC debates, grounded in a typology that was, for its turn, built through an intense literature review of key UN documents and the literature on international conflicts, and the manual reading of a random sample of speeches delivered in the Council. The analysis of the permanent members in debates about varied situations was part of the effort to demonstrate its validity and usefulness in future research.

The results demonstrated how connections between categories matter and may result in different rhetorical constructions. Peacemaking, when associated with sovereignty, may imply not the active pursuit of peaceful means, but non-interference, as we saw in the case of China. In other words, if actors in a conflict are viewed as capable of solving their dispute by themselves, no involvement is necessary. Emphasis on sovereignty and counter-terrorism may express the idea that intervention is necessary because of the existence of a violent non-state actor while at the same time opposing intervention conducted without the consent of the host state. This was the case for Russia in the debates on Syria. Other combinations are possible, and their investigation can reveal more about the dynamics of the Council.

For example, it is viable to explore the interaction between the Western members' four distinctive categories to understand more about how the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is employed in the UNSC debates. This research did not include this concept in the dictionary, due to its complexity, but the results open an opportunity to consider the interplay of specific categories as a reference to R2P, especially the link between humanitarian assistance and state responsibility.

Since the dictionary reflected changes in reality, another possible use of the dictionary is to include its categories as dependent or independent variables in causal research designs to assess the Council's responsiveness. Does the Council speak more of humanitarian assistance when the intensity of humanitarian situations increases? If so, is it true for all members of the Council? What about the relationship between mentions of counter-terrorism and terrorist activity? Is it possible to predict the developments on the ground based on changes in rhetoric during the UNSC debates?

The dictionary proved itself to be a useful tool in case selection and case study. The frequency of mentions of a given category in the debates about a specific topic may support case selection for a more in-depth analysis. Additionally, the dictionary provides easy access to the content of speeches, being useful in the selection of speeches and meeting transcripts to be read manually during a study.

This thesis represents a larger and long-standing effort to understand how the major powers interact on the international stage. It brings attention to the rich information contained in the UNSC meeting transcripts and provides a tool to be used in future research. The possibilities that were opened include the use of other types of data, the study of other cases and members, the inclusion of categories in causal research designs, and the use of the dictionary to build more sophisticated tools and methodologies. There is always room to improve, and only repetition can unfold new possibilities, new limitations, and, hopefully, new findings.

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