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SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS

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Doctoral dissertation presented as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Political Science by the Department of Political Science at Federal University of Pernambuco. Area of study: **Area of study:** Democracy and Institutions (Comparative Politics)

Supervisor: Dr. Andrea Quirino Steiner
Co-supervisor: Dr. Nara Pavão

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To my parents Mauricio Francisco and Luzinete Martins

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ABSTRACT

Why do some people express more positive attitudes towards immigrants than others? I address this question by empirically analyzing attitudes toward immigrants in 32 developed and developing countries in two regions (Europe and the Americas), using two individual-level survey data sets (European Social Survey and the World Values Survey). Using social capital, specifically interpersonal and institutional trust, as the explanatory variable, I hypothesize that the higher the social capital, the more positive the attitudes towards immigrants. For this measurement, I employ multilevel modeling for a considerable number of indicators. With the exception of the coercive institutions in Europe and in the Americas, and National Institutions in the Americas, I find a significant and positive relation in all other indicators, which indicates mixed support for the hypothesis, with a clear positive prevalence in this relationship. Thus, these results suggest that social capital has the capacity to reduce the negative attitudes of people towards immigrants.

Keywords: social capital; public opinion; immigrants attitudes; Europe; Americas.

RESUMO

Por que algumas pessoas expressam atitudes mais positivas em relação aos imigrantes do que outras? Abordo esta questão analisando empiricamente as atitudes dos cidadãos em relação aos imigrantes em 32 países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento em duas regiões (Europa e as Américas), usando duas *surveys* em nível individual (European Social Survey and the World Values Survey). Usando o capital social, especificamente a confiança interpessoal e institucional como variável independente, argumento que quanto maior o capital social, mais positiva a atitude em relação aos imigrantes. Para esta mensuração, aplico uma metodologia multinível em um número considerável de indicadores. Com exceção das instituições coercitivas na Europa e nas Américas, e Instituições Nacionais nas Américas, encontro uma relação significativa e positiva em todos os demais indicadores, o que aponta para um suporte misto, com uma clara prevalência positiva nesta relação. Os resultados sugerem que o capital social tem a capacidade de reduzir as atitudes negativas dos cidadãos acerca dos imigrantes.

Palavras-chave: capital social; opinião pública; atitudes em relação aos imigrantes; Europa; Américas.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ARG	Argentina
AUS	Austria
BEL	Belgium
BOL	Bolivia
BRA	Brazil
CHI	Chile
COL	Colombia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
CZE	Czechia
DEN	Denmark
ECU	Ecuador
ESS	European Social Survey
EST	Estonia
FIN	Finland
FRA	France
GER	Germany
GUA	Guatemala
HUN	Hungary
IRE	Ireland
KMO	Kaiser-Meyer-Olklin
LIT	Lithuania
MEX	Mexico
NET	Netherlands
NIC	Nicaragua
NOR	Norway
PCA	Principal Components Analysis
PER	Peru
POL	Poland
POR	Portugal
PwC	Pew Research Center
PRI	Puerto Rico
SLO	Slovenia
SPA	Spain
SWE	Sweden
SWI	Switzerland
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
WVS	World Values Survey

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE PUZZLE

Mass migratory movements are nothing new in modern human history. They are studied by academia, present in people's daily life, and a recurring theme in political decisions. The reasons for migrating are diverse: from opportunities for a better life or a new job opportunity in another country, to the escape from domestic conflicts and poverty (Pew Research Center, 2016; UNHCR, 2019), reaching both spontaneous (i.e., economic immigrants) and forced reasons (i.e., refugees and asylum seekers).

The past four decades, however, have experienced a significant increase in migratory flow, especially towards Europe and the United States (USA). The persistence of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and Africa, among other causes, has forced hundreds to leave their homes to survive conflict and persecution, even though the migratory journey itself may put their own lives at risk (Zaun, 2017). In 2015 alone, at the height of the so-called European Refugee Crisis, more than 2.5 million non-EU residents arrived on the European continent, mostly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan[1] (Eurostat, 2016).

Such a phenomenon is not unique to Europe. Large migratory flows have recently stemmed from Venezuela and in Central American countries, challenging neighboring countries and causing constant border conflicts. The growing volume in migratory flows has grown in importance in domestic and international political agendas and is becoming one of the core challenges of humanity today.

Despite the Rapporteur of the Council of Europe's Committee on Migration's declaration that no state that considers itself genuinely democratic can refrain from facing its responsibilities in terms of protecting persecuted people (Committee on Migration, 1995), it is evident that all capitalist countries admit the entry of some immigrants but refuse others (Boräng, 2018), and that some are more receptive to foreigners than others. Variations are also found in the importance given to migration issues, including politicizing and mobilizing public opinion to strengthen political capital and support or reject a specific government. Given that countries must follow domestic institutional rules and international agreements, non-

[1] Although I recognize a substantial difference between the concept of immigrant and refugee (UNHCR, 2016; Bernard, 1976), this study focuses on public opinion. In this case, the fine line that separates the two categories is more evident in the legal and academic realms than in common sense (Adida et al., 2019; Hangartner et al., 2019). In addition, some basic needs of the two are similar (e.g., jobs). Only recently has the literature observed and separated the two categories (see Abdelaaty and Steele, 2020). For this reason, when selecting the data that will be used in the study, and presented in the next chapter, I decided to include the questions that use the term "refugee", and not only "immigrant" or "immigration".

compliance would represent misconduct. However, it is common to find discrepancies between what has been agreed, whether domestically or internationally, and practice. In short, politics and practice vary from legal admission to rejection, depending on the political context and opinion of voters. Some states, for example, accept the entry of well-educated migrant workers, but refuse refugees. However, this scenario can also vary (Boräng, 2018).

Different types of anti-immigrant attitudes in European countries are so common that fear and rejection of foreigners are commonly seen as socially shared norms. For instance, some may fear losing their jobs to foreigners while others may believe that their cultural values will diminish as social heterogeneity increases. After the post-2011 migratory flows, social attitudes became even more relevant and gained space within the political agenda and even helped shape integration domestic and supranational policies (Messing & Ságvári, 2018).

One may think that attitudes towards immigrants are conditioned by the size of the population or even the Gross Domestic Product (GDP); but how can variations be explained in countries where the size of the immigrant population is low, but anti-immigration attitudes are frequent? Messing & Ságvári (2018) point out that most researches use demographic, economic and educational factors, poverty levels, among other variables to exemplify such variation, even in countries that are geographically close, with relatively similar jurisdictions and integrated under the same bloc. The European case is an interesting one in this sense.

Until mid-2011, the number of immigrants and refugees heading to Europe was stable, around 250,000 per year (Eurostat, 2018). The Arab Spring and the beginning of armed conflicts in Libya and Syria caused a humanitarian crisis in the Middle East and North Africa and initiated exodus towards Europe. What had been a previously stable number of asylum applications since 2007 reached more than 400 thousand in 2013, 600 thousand in 2014 and more than 1.3 million in 2015 (see Figure 1).

Such a large volume of people, as stated by Johanna et al. (2019), generated both a humanitarian and governance crisis. In the first case, due to the high number of people who risked their lives in small boats, facing cold, hunger and often dying on the way; in the second, due to unprecedented institutional challenges. Despite constant meetings in Brussels, and the European Commission's attempt to create an agenda on migration, domestic practices diverged considerably. Germany started to receive refugees directly in its territory, but with the increasing number and domestic political pressure, reversed the decision and created barriers to make it difficult to cross the border with Austria (Pastore & Henry, 2016). France and Sweden followed suit. Across Europe, similar actions have spread. Hungary erected a fence on the border with Serbia. Spain did the same, followed by Bulgaria on the border with Turkey.

Eastern European post-communist countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, that already had a history of low receptivity (see Shevel, 2011), closed even more.

Figure 1. Asylum Claims Between 2010-20 (in millions)



Note. Based on Eurostat (2020).

In addition to making the deficiencies in the common asylum system evident, at least two phenomena could be observed: the importance of public opinion on migration issues, and the strengthening of populist anti-immigration politicians.

In a report prepared for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Berry, Garcia-Blanco & Moore (2015) warned that the growing number of refugees, coupled with the absence of decisive and coordinated action by European leaders, would be causing "public anxiety" about immigration across Europe. As a consequence, the leadership and coordination vacuum would be encouraging the strengthening of far-right anti-immigrant parties, such as the Golden Dawn in Greece, Swedish Democrats in Sweden, the National Front in the United Kingdom (UK), Pegida and Alternative for Germany, Rassemblement National in France, among others. Publicly, these parties portray immigrants more as a problem to be faced than beneficial to society. Berry et al. (2015) also point out that they are able to ignite public opinion and attitudes around the theme by provoking protests, mobilizing citizens and impacting public policies to make them more or less restrictive[2].

An interesting fact to be considered is that while far-right parties have been flourishing in Europe, there are few explicitly pro-immigration parties. In other words, variations and

[2] The authors use data from the media to measure positive and negative attitudes towards immigration. It was observed, for example, that Sweden has the most positive attitudes, while the United Kingdom has the most negative. In Germany, the extreme right won almost 13% of seats -90 seats out of 631. The extreme right is also occupying seats in other countries, like Italy, Sweden and France.

influence on attitudes occur much more due to these parties than the other way around. In general, public perception of the topic is negative; perceptions of insecurity and urban crime are constantly associated with immigrants while the popularity of far-right parties increases (see Berry et al., 2015).

Variations in attitudes towards immigrants are not exclusive to Europe. On the American continent, recent events have shown the impact of public opinion on migration issues, and the response of countries to these challenges. At least two recent phenomena have occurred in the Americas: migratory flows from Central America to the United States, and an exodus of Venezuelan refugees to several countries in South and Central America.

In January 2019, a caravan of over 1,000 people, mostly from Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala, marched towards the United States. Along the way, others joined, totaling more than 6,000 people. The reasons ranged from fleeing urban violence, gangs, drug trafficking and poverty to improving the quality of life[3]. Barred at the border between Mexico and Guatemala, Mexican military personnel tried to stop them, warning that they would hardly enter American soil. In addition to being irregular in Mexico, they wanted to enter the United States irregularly, making them easy prey for human traffickers and illegal middlemen. In the face of the large volume of people, a humanitarian crisis took place in the region. Mexico, due to the difficulties in containing the large volume of people, allowed some to follow, then went back on the decision after President Donald Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Mexican products if the country did not control the migratory flow.

Unlike the United States, Canada has gone against protectionist policies. With low fertility rates and an aging population, immigration has not been a problem, but part of the solution. Thus, even countries that are similar in linguistic and geographic terms, variations in receptivity can be noted.

An even more dramatic case is underway in Venezuela. The so-called *Socialism for the XXI Century*[4] which began with former President Hugo Chávez and was further implemented by Nicolás Maduro, has led Venezuela to an economic crisis never faced before. This has resulted in an increase in urban violence—which was already high—, unemployment, hunger, extreme poverty and high levels of corruption and electoral fraud (Corrales & Penfold, 2011; Alarcón, Álvarez & Hidalgo, 2016; Gamboa, 2016). More than 3.5 million Venezuelans have

[3] Historically, Latin America has been the region with the highest rates of urban crime in the world. For in-depth reading, see Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall*; and Andreas Schedler, *The criminal subversion of Mexican democracy*.

[4] For an in-depth discussion, see Corrales & Penfold (2011).

already left the country. It is the second largest human exodus today, second only to the Syrian case. If we add Guatemalans, Nicaraguans, Haitians and others, the number of Latin Americans on the move jumps to 4.5 million. However, the receptivity and subsequent distribution of these people has drawn attention. Although it is the richest country in the region and borders Venezuela, it is estimated that Brazil received just over 95,000 migrants from Venezuela, while Colombia has received more than 1 million, followed by Peru, Chile, Ecuador and Argentina. Despite this and taking into account the fact that the region has historically been known for sending out immigrants, not receiving them, the response from countries has been interesting. Many Latin American countries have secured temporary work visas, accommodated children in public schools and provided vaccines and medical treatments for contagious diseases. Compared to current American migration policy and the treatment of immigrants in the USA, and considering the different socioeconomic conditions, the region's response has been quite generous (Americas Quarterly, 2020).

The examples cited here show the size of the problem, but above all the extent to which public attitudes towards immigrants vary. While some see immigrants as an opportunity to revitalize the population, others seem them as a threat to national identity and sovereignty. Thus, given the current challenge of immigration in the world, studies on this topic are relevant and necessary.

In the literature, it is common to study how the economic links to receptivity towards foreigners. In other words, the idea that richer the country, the more job opportunities and the greater the receptivity to foreigners. The problem with this hypothesis is that (1) in several cases, poorer countries are more receptive to foreigners than the richer ones, as they aim to revitalizing areas that are economically stagnant and populations in decline, and (2) the fact that immigrants do not always change regions for economic reasons, but also due to cultural, linguistic affinity, among other reasons. Ziller & Heizmann (2020), for example, have analyzed how economic conditions affect attitudes of (dis)trust between natives and foreigners in Europe. The results suggest that in prosperous regions immigrants report higher levels of ethnic discrimination and less satisfaction with life. Their survey points out that immigrants are also more sensitive to discrimination and mistrust in richer regions compared to poorest regions. Recent research has also found similar results (see De Vroome et al., 2016; Verkuyten, 2016; Steinmann, 2019).

The aim of this study is to deep and shed light on this variation. Specifically, will be guided by people's attitudes towards immigrants, seeking to understand what makes people more or less willing to accept immigration in the world. In doing so, I hope to contribute and

offer important insights on public opinion studies related to international migration.

1.2 EXISTING EXPLANATIONS

Although analyses of perception and public opinion have been part of the literature for a long time, it was only in the last ten years that these studies began focusing more on migration issues. This kind of research generally focuses on economic and criminological explanations, and reaches both the macro, institutional and individual levels. In this topic, I briefly present the two main explanations in the literature, based on an economic and a criminological hypothesis, respectively. I will return to the debate more broadly in the next chapter.

The first explanation, the economic hypothesis, is based on the idea that citizens are more or less receptive to immigrants depending on the country's economic situation. When the economy is doing well and the market is booming, jobs are plentiful. Without job competition, and lacking manpower, there would be a need for immigrants to fill up open positions. In these terms, immigrants would improve the labor market and would create new opportunities, where even the natives would benefit (Adelman & Jaret, 1999; Lyons, Vélez & Santoro, 2013; Stansfields, 2013). When the scenario is the opposite, there is a perception that immigrants reduce the economic opportunities for the natives, increase job competition, and take jobs from the locals (Aydemir & Borjas, 2007), which would generate a scenario of revolt and conflict (Beck, 1996; Borjas, 1987, 2003; Catanzarite, 2003). At the institutional level, economic volatility provides the necessary elements to make government migration policies predictable to be implemented, be they more rigid or more flexible. Either way, the economy would be a good predictor for evaluation and decision making. Likewise, receptive or repulsive attitudes by citizens would vary depending on the mood of the economy.

This argument proposes a binary relationship - the economic scenario versus attitudes (positive or negative) - but disregards that intermediate and subjective factors can influence citizens' attitudes. The real economic scenario is not always perceived and interpreted in the same way by everyone. Depending on the individual or family financial situation, economic crises may not have the same expected impact for everyone. Those who already live in an unfavorable situation will tend to see increased immigration as a risk to stability. On the other hand, economic fluctuations tend to have less impact on those who have a stable economic situation. Thus, mixed attitudes can be expected according to social divides (Inglehart, 1997; Reid et al., 2005; Ferraro, 2015). In addition, variations in economic impact are not just individual. Just as there are countries that are richer than others, internally there are states and municipalities that are more financially balanced. In that case, what logic would apply? Would

citizens' attitudes be conditioned merely to economic health?

The second explanation, the criminological hypothesis, associates the presence of immigrants with an increase in urban crimes. Positive or negative attitudes by citizens would be subject to the idea that newcomers are dangerous, and that their increase aggravates local indicators of urban crime. According to this perspective, at least two mechanisms would explain this phenomenon: a direct mechanism and an indirect one. The first, present in classical criminological theory, argues that immigrants are more likely to commit crimes. In other words, the idea that their presence is directly linked to an increase in urban crime indicators. The second, present in social disorganization theory, argues that newcomers cause social dysfunction, characterized by community fragmentation and diminished social cohesion; i.e., the greater the social heterogeneity, the more difficult consensus would be and the easier it would be to commit crimes (Bianchi et al., 2012; Bersani, 2014; Feldmeyer, 2009; Olson et al., 2009). Despite the lack of robust empirical evidence for these arguments, public perception of this link has varied very little over time. The general belief that immigration has a direct relation to rising crime rates has been widely accepted and considered a social fact (Wadsworth, 2010). A study conducted by the European Social Survey (ESS)[5] showed that 28% of correspondents believed immigrants were bad for the economy, 26% said that they made the country a worse place to live, 37% that they pose a threat to society, and almost 42% believed that immigrants are responsible for raising crime indicators.

In the literature, studies that attempt to associate immigration and crime are nothing new. However, the vast majority of research finds that immigrants' rates of involvement in criminal actions are lower than those of natives, despite the widespread belief that they are more prone to engage in criminal conduct (Taft, 1933; Sampson, 2008; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009). Initiatives such as the Industrial Commission in 1901, the United States Immigration Commission in 1911, and the Wickersham Commission in 1931 represented initial experiments investigating the relationship between immigration and crime (McDonald, 1997; Levi & Dinovitzer, 2008). Despite a lack of evidence supporting such claims, popular belief in this unfounded link persists, keeping alive the anti-immigration sentiment that associates immigrants with criminality (McDonald, 1997).

[5] The scale used in the survey ranges from 0–10, with 0 being considered poor and 10 not poor. I consider responses between 1–3 as being in strong agreement with the idea that immigrants and refugees are a real danger to the country.

1.3 THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT IN BRIEF: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

The central argument of this study is that social capital is capable of impacting positively citizens' attitudes towards immigration. Although economics and criminology provide relevant and commonly used elements to measure human preferences, they fail due to their generalist arguments, that often perform less than variables such as identity, country of origin and race. In turn, social capital is able to not only touch these issues, but even economic variables and opinions about the criminal potential of foreigners. Fukuyama (2001) has already warned about the fact that rational theories simplify human actions as only seeking to maximize utility. As a result, they ignore social values and their importance in influencing economic events.

Due to its conceptual scope, at least one theme is central to the studies on social capital, as well as to the present study: trust. As its main component, trust is a necessary condition for the existence of social capital (Arrow, 1972; Coleman, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995), to the point of being represented as the lubricant of civic life (Putnam & Goss, 2001). For defenders of social capital as a generator of positive effects, the higher the level of trust between citizens of a given community, the greater the likelihood of interaction and cooperation between them.

But why does it make sense to assume that social capital impacts on migration issues? High indicators of social capital have been associated with well-being, security, economic prosperity, trust in institutions and democracy, among others (Stickel et al., 2009). In addition, high levels of social capital are seen as correlated to more efficient governments and more organized communities (Putnam, 1993). In these terms, it is wise to assume that depending on the level of social capital in certain locations, different attitudes—positive or negative—can be found towards newcomers.

Two dimensions will be analyzed in this study: interpersonal and institutional trust.

Interpersonal trust. Among the definitions of social capital in the literature, Putnam presents at least one that is quite interesting. He defines social capital as ''*features of social life networks, norms and trust that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives*'' (1993, pp. 67). Social capital refers to connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them (Putnam, 2000). It is clear that trust is a necessary condition for the existence of social capital. Although Putnam himself acknowledges that in some regions it is in decline, social relations and networking remain dependent on trust to exist and for groups to achieve their goals more efficiently. It is argued that when interpersonal trust is well consolidated on a large scale in

society, experiences of cooperation, strengthening of voluntary groups and associations tend to play a relevant role (Almond & Verba, 1963; Hooghe, 2003; Stolle & Rochon, 1999).

Regarding immigrants, while recognizing that attitudes can oscillate between positive and negative, the core premise of this study is that trust decreases the feelings of threat and increase levels of tolerance (McLaren, 2003; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011), and generate positive attitudes. Thus, interpersonal trust mitigates intergroup threats and has an indirect and positive impact on immigration attitudes. Together, these arguments lead me to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The higher the interpersonal trust, the more the positive attitudes towards immigrants.

Institutional trust. According to the theory of social capital, trust is not limited to the interpersonal level. Although there is no consensus (see Santos & Rocha, 2009), high levels of trust are believed to promote economic growth and the proper functioning of democracies (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997). At the institutional level, trust is measured by how much individuals trust institutions. Specifically, it analyzes how people trust institutions to fulfill their responsibilities satisfactorily, to represent them. In these terms, exogenous factors can influence the level of confidence. Empirical research shows that the more people fear terrorist attacks, for example, the more they tend to expect institutions to act and defend them (Nilsen et al., 2019; McCoy, 2019). Likewise, it is expected that confidence in the law, in justice, in the constituted powers and in other institutional instances will increase the more the shared capital. But what relationship can there be between trust in institutions and migration issues? There are several studies that show that people with higher levels of institutional trust also have higher levels of support for pro-immigration policies (see, for example, Macdonald, 2020).

Governments decide who stays and who leaves, for how long, what benefits and obligations they will have, whether they pose a threat to the natives, whether they can receive social benefits for their family (Macdonald, 2020). If people do not trust these actors to manage migration policies, then they will be less willing to support them, which will in turn generate negative attitudes towards institutions and immigrants. Thus, my second and last hypothesis reads:

Hypothesis 2: The higher the institutional trust, the more the positive attitudes towards immigrants.

1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN

This study sought to understand what leads citizens to express an opinion—positive or negative—in relation to immigrants. For this purpose, I employed a multilevel methodological approach, which captured opinions at an individual level, yet consolidated in a macro realm. By combining the two dimensions, the study allowed for a broad regional panorama of the perception of citizens and the determinants of their preferences. When looking at Europe and Americas in a comparative perspective, my desire is to provide a robust analysis of social capital and its possible impact on public opinion. The comparative perspective also allows me to verify convergences and divergences between the two regions that are historically important for the worldwide migratory flow.

Regarding the source of data, I used the European Social Survey, wave 7, to analyze European countries, and the World Values Survey, wave 7, for the Americas. This means I did not collect or generate new data, but used already existing information. A total of twenty European countries, and twelve American are analyzed. Both groups of countries served to test the formulated hypotheses. Wave 7, from the European Social Survey, totals 37,623 interviews conducted in 2014. Although other waves were conducted later, only those from 2002 and 2014 have specific sessions on migration. In the World Values Survey, the twelve countries total 17,817 interviews. Both surveys are internationally recognized for their high-quality and broad analytical scope, and are used by hundreds of researchers, as well as by local and international governments. All the questions used here have been tabulated and can be found in the appendices. They will be presented opportunely.

1.5 STUDY OUTLINE

The chapters of this dissertation have been ordered logically and sequentially, in order to capture the exploratory dimensions of social capital and how it impacts public opinion related to immigrants. The structure is organized as follows.

Chapter 2 presents the most relevant existing explanations regarding attitudes towards immigrants: the economic and criminological perspectives. Next I present the central explanation of this thesis: social capital. I detail what it is, its origin, definitions and divergences, and its positive and negative aspects. I then explain how social capital is related to attitudes towards immigration. I finish the chapter revisiting the hypothesis proposed and showing the contributions of this study.

Chapter 3 presents all data and methods used for the empirical analysis. The explanation

is separated for each survey and analyzed by region, in order to make it easier to understand how the data was handled.

Chapter 4 and 5 present the empirical analysis and tests the hypothesis for Europe and the Americas, while chapter 6 compares expectations between the two regions based on the findings.

Finally, the conclusion discusses the main implications of this study for social capital and international migration studies, as well as perspectives for future research.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter begins by deepening the discussion of the two main arguments in the literature that attempt to explain the attitudes, positive or negative, of citizens towards immigrants: the economic and criminological hypothesis. I then proceed to the core theoretical explanation that supports this research. Starting with a discussion on what is social capital, I also analyze the origins, definitions and conceptual divergences, and how the literature measures social capital. Afterwards, I explore the dark side of social capital—sometimes overlooked by the literature. I proceed with a discussion on the relationship between social capital and international migration, with special focus on social homogeneity and heterogeneity and the possible related erosion of social capital. At the end, I present the two hypotheses that will be tested in this study. I conclude presenting the contributions of this study for future analyses regarding public opinion, social capital and international migration.

2.2 UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

2.2.1 The Economic Perspective

The economic hypothesis assumes that attitudes towards immigrants are strongly linked to natives' perception of the impact they will bring to the local economy. It is known that immigration has an economic impact, mainly because it changes the size and composition of the workforce in the destination country. By increasing the labor force, consumption and the possibility of competition for job openings increase. Often natives fear this new workforce will encourage employers to cut wages due to the plentiful number of new workers. In the context of precarious work and hiring less qualified workers for relevant positions, immigration can be negative. Yet despite this attractive argument, research shows that the impact of immigration on stealing jobs is small, often zero (Aydemir & Borjas, 2007; Borjas, 2003).

Although the economic hypothesis is one of the most studied, mixed results have been found. From an empirical point of view, other variables such as place of origin, religion, language and traditions tend to compete, and often have greater significance than economic performance. In a survey prepared for the Pew Research Center (PwC), Wike, Stokes & Simmons (2016) found that for many Europeans immigrants represent an economic burden, a group able to steal native jobs and social benefits. Similar results were found by Dancynger & Donnelly (2013). Their results show that, when faced with the increase in the number of immigrant workers in industries, support for immigration decreases, but only when the

economic situation goes bad; in other words, attitudes may be conditioned by the economic scenario (see also Dancynger & Donnelly, 2013). Malhorta et al. (2013) also found that anti-immigration attitudes are strengthened in environments of economic competition.

However, although these studies have found a link between negative attitudes and the presence of immigrants, it is worth noting that most of the empirical research has not found any relationship between the arrival of immigrants and the increase in unemployment, despite what common sense might say. Research has shown that immigrants act positively in the medium and long term by, for instance, revitalizing areas with a declining economy and population (Zhou, 2001; Lee & Martinez, 2002; Ferraro, 2015; Reid et al., 2005; Legrain, 2007; Powell et al., 2017). As countries tend to be vulnerable to economic volatility, the economic hypothesis is one of the most cited, but also one of the most questioned.

2.2.2 The Criminological Perspective

The criminological hypothesis argues that citizens' attitudes towards immigrants vary according to the perception of danger that immigrants may pose. It is common to argue that foreigners, being supposedly poorer, tend to look for crime as an alternative to social ascension (McDonald, 1997; Bradshaw et al., 1998; Butcher & Piehl, 1998; Reid et al., 2005; Legrain, 2007; Ousey & Lee, 2007; Crowley & Lichter, 2009; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Wadsworth, 2010; Green 2016).

Most researchers, as noted by Green (2016), have found no significant relationship between immigration and crime, or that immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than locals/natives (Sampson, 2008; Bersani, 2014). The analyses have covered several different categories: economy (Borjas, 1987, 2003; Boston, 1990; Akins et al., 2009), crime and urban violence (Butcher & Piehl, 1998; Lee et al., 2001; Feldmeyer, 2009; Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010, 2013; Martinez & Stowell, 2012; McDonald et al., 2013), gender and race (Sampson, 1987; Peterson & Krivo, 1993; Liska et al., 1998; Steffensmeier & Haynie, 2000; Nielsen and Martinez, 2006), and adolescence and juvenile delinquency (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Agnew, 2001; Morenoff & Astor, 2006; Desmond & Kubrin, 200). Analyses have also been carried out at both the macro (Yeager, 1997), regional (Ousey & Kubrin, 2009) and local levels (Alaniz et al., 1998).

Several arguments have been used to explain this phenomenon. Sociological theories argue that poverty may help explain why immigrants are allegedly more prone to crime (DeJong & Madamba, 2001). Most immigrants hail from places stricken by poverty, which offer little to no opportunities for education and social ascension. To make matters worse, immigrants

frequently face discrimination across labor markets and difficulties achieving economic and social stabilization (Lee et al., 2001). As a consequence, immigrants may indeed resort to criminality as a means to achieve economic ascension. With few job opportunities on the horizon, impoverished and discriminated against by locals, some immigrants may be overcome with frustration, which could lead to their use of violence (Agnew, 1992; Tonry, 1997). Moreover, these conditions may cause them to band together with other dissatisfied persons, cementing the ideal ground for urban gang formation and drug trafficking (Short, 1997).

Recently, issues such as political contestation have also been incorporated as potential crime inducers (Lyons et al., 2013; Ramey, 2013). In underserved areas removed from large urban centers, immigrants have little local political influence and may face exclusionary policies without the mobilization capacity to challenge or modify them. Immigration laws could be more concerned with excluding rather than integrating immigrants and their families into the local community. The combination of the difficulty of making themselves heard institutionally, added to the distrust of locals and to a lack of integration, could leave immigrants isolated and without legal assistance, making crime an alternative to isolation, exclusion, and social anomie (Kirk et al., 2012).

Recent empirical research in the USA has sought to study this relationship. However, most of this research has not been confirmatory. While investigating immigrant communities in the United States, especially the relationship between adolescents and urban crime, Kubrin & Desmond (2015) found no evidence that concentrations of immigrants increased local indicators of crime or juvenile delinquency. Contrary to criminological theories, their work claims that these communities are among the safest in the world. Similarly, while studying US Cities bordering Mexico, Lee et al. (2001) found that immigration did not increase the number of homicides among Latinos and African Americans, while Butcher & Piehl (2007) showed that the rates of incarceration among immigrants is around 20% lower than among natives. Hagan & Paloni (1999) found similar incarceration rates between immigrants and natives for violent crimes, drugs, and property in border towns of San Diego and El Paso. In cities with a strong Hispanic presence, such as Miami, Martinez & Lee (2000) noted that crime rates among Jamaican, Haitian, and Cuban immigrants were lower than among natives. Martinez et al. (2003), in turn, did not find a positive effect on the homicide rates when considering Cuban and non-native black immigrants, yet such an effect was found when considering Afro-Caribbean populations (Haitians and Jamaicans). In the case of Texas, while analyzing the crime rates in the state between 2011 and 2017, Nowrasteh (2018) concluded that the homicide rate among illegal immigrants was 25% lower than among non-immigrants (rates were also 11.5% lower

for sexual assault and 79% lower for theft).

Although most existing research has focused on the United States, according to Nunziata (2015) recent research has also looked at Europe. Bianchi et al. (2012), for example, analyzed the Italian provinces between 1990 and 2003 and found a relationship between immigration and crime. While initially finding a positive relationship between immigrant population size and crime rates, after including instrumental variables such as destination countries beyond Italy to check for causal impact, statistical significance disappears (except for the incidence of theft). In the case of the United Kingdom, Bell et al. (2013) analyze whether the major immigration waves (late 1990s to early 2000s, and post-2004) affected local crime rates. Although the first wave had a slight impact on property crimes, the second wave had a negative relationship. Regions previously ignored have also found a place in the scope of scientific research. Ozden et al. (2018) use Malaysian data from 2003–2010 and find that the increase in immigration was followed by a decline in crime rates, both in terms of violence and property crimes. One of the rare exceptions in the literature is the recent work of Piopiunik & Ruhose (2017). The authors find that German immigrants living in Eastern Europe who returned to Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall substantially increased crime rates.

In short, both the economic and the criminological hypothesis broaden our knowledge on sensitive issues of human behavior in terms of opinions—positive or negative—about immigrants. However, both lack empirical support, creating a vacuum between their theoretical arguments and the evidence found. Although it is plausible to assume that economic performance impacts on citizens' attitudes, it is too simple to link individuals' preferences to economic volatility. In other words, human beings would be devoid of individual preferences and subjective incentives. Understanding only the economic nuances would make human attitudes predictable. On the other hand, the criminological hypothesis provides more robust elements about the formation of human attitudes. It makes sense to imagine that most immigrants are poor, and therefore more prone to urban crime than the natives. In addition, due to the high vulnerability that some find themselves, they become easy prey for drug trafficking and for urban crime as a means of social ascension and income improvement. The problem is that, even with logical arguments, and research dating back more than a century, this relationship never finds consistent empirical support, nor a relationship between poverty and criminal attitudes.

2.3 THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

2.3.1 What is Social Capital?

Capital can be understood as the stock of resources that someone controls, which can be acquired by investment or inheritance (Esser, 2008, p. 23). As a resource, it can be used or mobilized by its holder in search of gains (Lin, 2004). In these terms, social capital is a type of capital where the bearer of the resources can use it due to his/her insertion in a network of relationships with other actors in order to obtain personal or collective profits. Social capital has been associated with interpersonal trust, civic participation, cooperation networks, voluntarism, among others. Examples of social capital can be found in the capacity of individuals to mobilize resources and generate an environment of collective trust. Putnam (2000, p. 19), by defining social capital as "*social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them*", summarizes its three main elements. While physical capital refers to physical objects, and human capital to the property of individuals, social capital is intangible, and lacks strong connections for its existence (Putnam, 2000). Furthermore, while the two first are individually owned, the shared capital is collective (Hooghe, 2003). In other words, the greater the level of connection and interpersonal trust between individuals, the greater the social capital between them. In general, the main proposition of social capital theory is that social relations are valuable tools for individuals, or groups of individuals, to achieve benefits that would be impossible to obtain on their own, or too costly to achieve.

It is worth mentioning that, although social capital is associated with the collective level, it is the result of individual actions and attributes. As Glaeser et al. (1999) point out, trust and networks are not merely the result of a historic accident, but of citizens' time and energy invested to form and consolidate ties with other actors. Social capital, thus, is the result of the actions of these individuals who unite around any theme that represents any meaning to them. In these terms, it is a community attribute. To Putnam (1995), social capital facilitates working together and the search for shared goals through networks of standards and trust. Both theory and empirical work on social capital, as Glaeser et al. (1999) recall, are oriented at the community level, and individual interests are minimized and seen as a characteristic of the group, not of the person in question.

At least two classical examples are useful in understanding the concept of social capital are presented by Coleman (1988). The first regards the diamond market in New York, and the second, the norms on reciprocity in Jerusalem.

> Wholesale diamond markets exhibit a property that to an outsider is remarkable. In the process of negotiating a sale, a merchant will hand over to another merchant a bag of stones for the latter to examine in private at his leisure, with no formal insurance that the latter will not substitute one or more inferior stones or a paste replica. The merchandise may be worth thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of dollars. Such free exchange of stones for inspection is important to the functioning of this market. In its absence, the market would operate in a much more cumbersome, much less efficient manner (Coleman, 1998, p. S98).

It should be noted that the Manhattan diamond selling and trading community, however, is controlled by the Jews, a closed community with strong ethnic and family ties. Marriages tend to be made between their own members, who attend the same synagogues. The close ties, whether through family affiliation, community or religious identification, allow for the creation of very close ties and the necessary trust to carry out the transactions. In case of deviation of behavior, the group itself would carry out the punishment, and community ties would be lost. The cost to the individual who would lose the benefits of being part of a community of mutual assistance would be very high, which discourages deviant behaviors. The second example is also illustrative:

> A mother of six children, who recently moved with husband and children from suburban Detroit to Jerusalem, described as one reason for doing so the greater freedom her young children had in Jerusalem. She felt safe in letting her eight year old take the six year old across town to school on the city bus and felt her children to be safe in playing without supervision in a city park, neither of which she felt able to do where she lived before (Coleman, 1998, pp. S99).

The reason for this difference is in the variations in social capital found in Jerusalem and the suburb of Detroit. While in Jerusalem social norms ensure that unattended children will be “looked after” by adults in the vicinity, such a social norm does not exist in most metropolitan areas of the United States. The examples provided by Coleman (1998) are useful both for understanding the value of social capital in economic matters, in the case of the New York diamond market, and for social norms, in the case of Jerusalem. It is clear, when the author claims that social capital is less tangible than physical capital, that it depends entirely on people's relationships: wherever there is an expectation of reciprocity and networks governed by trust and shared values, there will be social capital.

In interpersonal relationships, Paxton (1999) and Norris (2001) explain that there are two mechanisms present in social capital, one objective and the other subjective. In the first case, there must be some reason for the existence of networks among individuals. Something that makes them come together in a certain space (e.g. religious groups, voluntary associations, card-carrying groups, labor unions, etc.). Thus, the motivation is objective and generates a

desire to be physically present with other actors who share the same ideals. In the second, the relationship between individuals generates positive emotions. Such groups have, for the most part, a strong ideological connection, so that the relationship of trust and reciprocity do not need physical presence to materialize (e.g., social movements such as feminists, environmentalists, pacifist groups).

Due to its importance and almost omnipresence in several disciplines, the concept of social capital has been studied and challenged. Studies can be found on issues such as economics (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Beugelsdijk, de Groot & van Schaik, 2004; Beugelsdijk, 2006), democracy and government performance (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Newton, 2001; Norris, 2001; Coffé & Geys, 2005; Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005; Tavits, 2006; Santos & Rocha, 200), education (Coleman, 1988), urban violence (Rosenfeld, Messner, & Baumer, 2001; Helliwell, 2007), gender (Allen, 2009), migration (Lamba & Krahn, 2003; Cheong et al., 2007; Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010; Cheung & Philimore, 2013; Massey & Aysa-Lastra, 2011; Macdonald, 2020), among others, ranging from sociology to political science to criminology. Yet what drives most of these authors to value social capital as beneficial to society?

To Putnam (2000), high trust indicators produce a more efficient society compared to a suspicious one. In this perspective, trust is the lubricant of civic life. The more the mutual trust, the more the cooperation and civic engagement. In his relevant book *Making Democracy Work*, Putnam analyzes the foundations of Italian democracy, and finds that depending on the level of civic engagement in a region, institutions and the performance of local governments are more effective. Similarly, when analyzing 47 societies, Norris (2001) found that high rates of interpersonal trust, tolerance and cooperation are crucial for a vibrant democracy. On a similar note Fukuyama (1995, 2001) has argued that high trust indicators bring benefits to democracy and industrialization processes, while Knack & Keefer (1997) have argued that they have a positive impact on economic performance. Helliwell (2007) showed that higher levels of trust are associated with lower suicide rates and high levels of subjective well-being, while Macdonald (2020) showed that high levels of political trust exerts a positive influence on Americans' support for immigration. In short, although some authors show its negative side, a considerable number of studies has found a positive relationship.

2.3.2 Origins of Social Capital Studies

The social capital literature is generally linked to the works of several classic authors, such as Weber, Marx, Durkheim, de Tocqueville, among others (Woolcock, 1998; Halpern, 2005), and approaches issues ranging from democracy and political freedom, to the union of

workers in search of common interests. The modern concept of social capital and its use in the human and social sciences began with the work of Lyda Hanifan (1916) and was later consolidated in sociology and political science with the works of James Coleman, Pierre Bourdieu, Glenn Loury and Robert Putnam. Putnam (2000), in his book *Bowling Alone*, and Smith (2007) credited Hanifan as being the first to use the term social capital in his article *The Rural School Community Center*. Hanifan served as supervisor of rural schools in West Virginia, where he developed his concept. Writing in 1916, he defines:

> In the use of the phrase social capital I make no reference to the usual acceptation of the term capital, except in a figurative sense. I do not refer to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of a people, namely, goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit [...] (pp. 130).

At least two elements present in this concept are fundamental. First, social capital does not refer to the State, nor is it a good that money can buy, but is present in people's daily lives, such as sympathy and companionship, which allow for social unity. In other words, it is intangible. Naturally, Hanifan refers to rural communities, which he thought lacked such cohesion. Second, the success of any organization or community action only occurs when, prior to the action, there is an accumulation of enough social capital for its execution. Without this invisible stock, there is a risk that the initiative be doomed to failure. The author's concern was justified by his belief that there was a total lack of interpersonal relationships between rural residents, and that this absence affected both the individual level of citizens and their families and the action of the State and its institutions. On the other hand, the benefits that would be generated with the increase in social would, from his point of view, occur in several areas, from the performance of students in schools, to the engagement and cooperation among residents around common problems (Farr, 2004). It is clear that Hanifan's idea was to accumulate social capital in communities, with the aim of decentralizing the solution of local problems and fostering cooperation between people. The greater the trust and cooperation between the locations, the lower the costs of resolving disputes through institutional channels.

Although Hanifan started the discussion around the impacts of social capital on communities, the term was neglected for years, and was only taken up and popularized in the 1980s, by Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam.

French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu was the first scholar to undertake a systematic analysis of social capital (Fukuyama, 2001; Häuberer, 2011). His objective was to show the

benefits that could be achieved through voluntary collective participation. In his article *The Forms of Capital*, at least two forms of capital are presented: *cultural capital* and *social capital*. In the case of cultural capital, it could be represented through educational qualifications, while social capital would come through the social obligations of individuals. Both were converted, on occasion, into economic capital, and institutionalized in the form of titles of nobility. It is interesting to note that, although the book describes three forms of capital, both the cultural and the social forms are reduced to economic capital. From this standpoint, through social capital actors can gain access to economic resources, such as loans, agreements, and various negotiations; they can increase their cultural capital by means of their network of contacts; or they can become members of institutions and obtain benefits from them. Capital is not autonomous but results from the accumulated work that exists or is incorporated materially. Even if the accumulation process is long, it would be worth the effort due to the profits it would produce while being reproduced (Häuberer, 2011).

According to Bourdieu (1985), social capital is:

> [...] the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group—which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital, a "credential" which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word (pp. 248-249).

Social capital, according to his definition, presupposes relationship, permanent contact, and generating stability, honor and reputation for the agents involved. Its maintenance among members generates trust, respect and cooperation. In the long run, strengthening ties provides security, status and credit to the bearer. However, Bourdieu points out that the relationships between group members are supported by material or symbolic exchanges, which help solidify the relationship (e.g. gifts, or greeting each other when meeting on the street). Although simple, exchanges are able to reinforce and maintain long-lasting bonds (see Häuberer, 2011, pp. 38). According to this perspective, exchange relations make the link between the material and symbolic aspects of social life; however, they need to be visible for the beginning and for the maintenance of relationships.

Solidarity, and the benefits obtained from it, are always reinforced by Bourdieu. However, it does not mean that it is sought rationally or produced naturally. The initial acts of relationship must be repeated constantly and become beneficial in the short or long term. Exchanges generate signs of mutual recognition, and their repetition means group cohesion,

harmony of interests and cooperation between agents. As in other forms of capital, as mentioned Bourdieu associates social capital with economic capital, inasmuch as investing in sociability requires effort, dedication, time and energy, which leads to economic capital. For the members' investment in relationships and cooperation to be worthwhile, there must be some profit, otherwise the effort will not pay off[6].

Unlike Bourdieu and his emphasis on economic benefits, Coleman (1988) develops his concept of social capital based on the theory of rational choice. According to his point of view, all social systems, like trust and authority, emerge from the interaction of individuals, who in turn only devote time and resources to what interests them. When establishing relationships of trust and authority, acts of exchange and transfer of control occur (Häuberer, 2011). In his article *Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital*, Coleman (1998) introduces, describes and analyzes social capital in its structural forms and conditions:

> Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities, with two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors - whether persons or corporate actors - within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible. Like physical capital and human capital, social capital is not completely fungible but may be specific to certain activities. A given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others (pp. S98).

Coleman merges elements that generate social capital, such as reciprocity and group norms, uniting Loury's (1976) and Granovetter's (1985) ideas. The junction between economic gains and social relationships is present in every work of Coleman on social capital, as they are based on rational choice. For Coleman, sociologists see agents as sociable beings, and their actions as shaped by social norms, rules and obligations. In turn, economists see actors as self-interested, with independent goals and actions driven primarily the attempt to by maximize utility[7]. He rejects the idea that the actors are alien to the environment (rational choice), and that their goals are separate from each other. From his perspective, social context has a strong influence on individual actions by affecting the cost-benefit relationship in which they operate. Its definition focuses on the utility (benefits) that individuals can acquire from the groups in which they operate. The greater the interest of individuals in such benefits, the greater their engagement in a certain group. If the relationship between people generates social capital (e.g.,

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[6] In this case, when it comes to profit, it doesn't mean just monetary profit, but some kind of benefit in the relationship, whether personal or moral, that makes sense and is worth investing in.

[7] Coleman (1988, pp. S96).

mutual help, cooperation), interaction with other actors for mutual benefits creates obligations. In this way, the actors want to take advantage of the benefits of social capital, but do not invest resources to maintain them. As advantages are not predetermined, but established by the interaction of the actors themselves, it is up to them to invest and maintain, aiming at maximizing their actions and gains. As Coleman (1988, pp. S109) remembers: *"The central property of a multiplex relation is that it allows the resources of one relationship to be appropriated for use in others"*. Unlike other forms of capital, social capital exists only in the structures created and maintained by the actors themselves, and not independent of them[8].

Despite the contributions of Bourdieu and Coleman, which are central to the concept of social capital, Putnam was responsible for its popularization. He was able to transcend the sociological terrain and apply the analysis of social capital to the performance of Italian regional governments (1993), and later to questions of American politics (1995, 2000). Although he refers to Coleman's work to introduce the concept, Putnam redefines social capital from a communitarian perspective (Vitolas, 2011). In the case of Italy, it was operationalized to explain how traditions of civil engagement (e.g., electoral turnout, associational activities, newspaper readership) flourished in regions where there was a high indicator of social capital, to the point of impacting local institutions and generating greater institutional effectiveness and economic prosperity. According to Putnam, close social relationships provide the ideal ground for strengthening cooperation in pursuit of common goals: *"Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative. Virtuous circles result in social equilibria with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective well-being*" (1993, pp. 177).

As Vitolas (2011) remembers, the effects of social capital on the economy and on institutions are not direct but mediated by through civic vitality. In other words, positive effects only exist in societies with strong indicators of trust, social organization, cooperation, etc. In the case of Italy, empirical data showed that institutional development and performance were historically preceded by civil engagement, which is a precondition for positive effects in society and in the economic and institutional sphere.

At least three common characteristics can be cited in the works of Coleman and Putnam (Vitolas, 2011). Firstly, both lack a clear definition of social capital. In Coleman's case, it is not clear whether social capital refers to the social structures that individuals participate in or

[8] To illustrate, Coleman presents three examples, two of which are cited in the topic 2.3. The examples can be found at Coleman, 1988, pp. S99-S100.

the benefits that arise from those structures. Secondly, social capital adverse effects are rarely elucidated. Both in the works of Coleman and Putnam, the effects of social capital tend to be positively maximized, giving the impression that they always generate good results in society. The more social capital, the better. However, as will be demonstrated in section 2.4, recent research shows evidence of perverse effects of social capital. Finally, there is no clarity about the social levels at which social capital operates. It is often not clear whether the individual level has an impact on the institutional level or vice versa, or whether the two are self-correlating. Research such as that of Norris (2001) is able to better define the different analytical levels in the case of the effects of social capital on democratic development, for example.

It is important to highlight that, although such flaws are observed, it does not imply demerit (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Portes, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 2000). First, both authors claim that there is a variety and reach of social capital, at different levels and contexts. Second, because they are initial works that revisited and popularized the concept, it is natural for further refinement to occur in later research. Thus, criticism represents the need to refine a ubiquitous and fundamental concept of the social sciences. It should be noted that this thesis uses the most recent concepts and discussions of social capital. The following topic presents the main definitions in the literature, where I explain in which analytical sphere this study is located.

2.3.3 Definitions and Conceptual Divergences in the Literature

Social capital is a complex and multidisciplinary concept and has emerged as a core topic of discussion among academics and policy makers. Despite its ubiquity in the sciences, the term has been studied especially in economics, anthropology, sociology and political science. Theories of social capital are rooted in notions relationships of trust, rules of reciprocity, and informal networks, and encompasses beliefs, values, duties and obligations, friendship, civic engagement, promoting cooperation and impacting economic and institutional performance (Bhandari & Yasunobu, 2009). Yet despite its omnipresence, Dasgupta (2000) recalls that the fact that social capital is not tangible, durable or fungible like other forms of capital only makes its definition and measurement even more difficult.

The absence of clarity, breadth and of a unified concept has opened space for several definitions. While some are limited, others try to be too broad. However, all start with two premises: 1) social capital is a resource that is available to members of a social network, and 2) social structure represents the type of capital that group members can use to achieve their goals (Ostrom, 2009). Table 1 presents the main definitions found in the literature, in chronological

order.

Table 1. Definitions of Social Capital

Hanifan (1916)	In the use of the phrase social capital I make no reference to the usual acceptation of the term capital, except in a figurative sense. I do not refer to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of a people, namely, goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit [...].
Loury (1976)	An individual's social origin has an obvious and important effect on the amount of resources which are ultimately invested in his development. It may thus be useful to employ a concept of 'social capital' to represent the consequences of social position in facilitating individual acquisition of (say) the standard human capital characteristics. [...] this idea has the advantage of forcing the analyst to consider the extent to which individual earnings are accounted for by social forces outside the individual's control.
Bourdieu (1985)	[...] the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group—which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital, a "credential" which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.
Flap and De Graaf (1986)	An individual's personal social network, and all the resources he or she is in a position to mobilize through this network, can be viewed as his or her social capital.
Coleman (1988)	Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities with two elements in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors—whether persons or corporate actors—within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible.
Sprengers, Tazelaar and Flap (1988)	[...] someone's network and all the resources a person gets access to through this network can be interpreted more specifically as his "social capital" [...] someone's social capital is a function of the number of people from whom one can expect support, and the resources those people have at their disposal. Here social capital is seen as a means of production, that can produce better conditions of life.
Burt (1992)	[...] social capital refers to friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use your financial and human capital [...].
Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993)	[...] those expectations of action within a collectivity that affect the economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its members, even if these expectations are not oriented toward the economic sphere.
Putnam (1993)	[...] features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.
Putnam (2000)	Social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.
Lin (2001)	[...] investment in social relations by individuals through which they gain access to embedded resources to enhance expected returns of instrumental and expressive actions.
OECD (2001)	[...] networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups.
Fukuyama (2001a)	Social capital is shared norms or values that promote social cooperation, instantiated in actual social relationships.
Ostrom and Ahn (2003)	[...] social capital is an attribute of individuals and their relationships that enhances their ability to solve collective action problems.
Fukuyama (2002)	Social capital is an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals.
Lin (2004)	Investment of resources with expected returns in the marketplace.

Dasgupta (2005)	[...] I take social capital to mean interpersonal networks. The advantage of such a lean notion is that it does not prejudge the asset's quality. Just as a building can remain unused and a wetland can be misused, so can a network remain inactive or be put to use in socially destructive ways. There is nothing good or bad about interpersonal networks; other things being equal, it is the use to which a network is put by members, that determines its quality.
Warren (2008)	Individual investments in social relationships that have the consequences, whether or not intended, of enabling collective actions which return goods in excess of those the individual might achieve by acting alone.
World Bank (2010)	Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions [...] Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that holds them together.

At first, it is clear that social capital represents the resources that emerge from social relationships, acquired both at the individual and collective levels. These resources can benefit the individual in the pursuit of their goals or help members of a particular group around common issues. Most of the literature divides it into its relationship structure (group size, configuration and density) and content (norms, rules, values, institutions). In these terms, to understand the real dimensions of social capital, both the structure and the content must be observed (Bartkus & Davis 2009). According to Bourdieu, social capital encompasses resources linked to durable networks that are more or less institutionalized, while Coleman's definition emphasizes the utilitarian side and its functions. It is a resource accessible to members of a group that makes it possible to achieve certain objectives, which would not be possible in its absence. Burt (1992) on the other hand, treats social capital as something that keeps people connected, aiming at lasting bonds of friendship, and Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) sees it as a positive consequence of social relations (Ostrom, 2009). Despite the differences, the consensus is that social capital enables actors to obtain benefits through their participation in social networks and other social structures.

As convergences are large, I believe it is necessary to analyze the conceptual divergences, which will help situate this work in the midst of the multitude of interpretations present in the literature. For what this research proposes, I consider that at least three elements are fundamental to clarify the divergences and guide this study: level of analysis, whether social capital is a public or private good, and the effects generated by it.

Firstly, the magnitude of the concept, the possible variations in empirical analyses, and the lack of clarity at the analytical level has favored several interpretations and types of analysis. In the literature, some studies focus on the individual, interpersonal relationships and networks, while others look at societies and (in)formal institutions (Portes, 2000; Halpern, 2005). In the case of micro analyses, social capital is analyzed from the perspective of the resources that individuals access through their social relationships. In these terms, social capital is studied,

above all, by the volume, quality and type of resources that actors can access through their relationships, cooperation, reciprocity and trust. The second kind, meso-level analyses (such as Putnam's studies on Italy and the United States, and also Coleman's work) use a community perspective, in which collective resources emerge from social cohesion and civic engagement, facilitating collective action and community benefits. This perspective tends to emphasize normative structures that promote cooperation, such as cultural traditions, social identity, among others. Finally, macro-level analyses are linked to political systems and regimes, rule of law and political institutions. It tends to emphasize the capacity of institutions, national and supranational, to solve social problems, such as education, urban crime, etc. This approach, as Vitolas (2011) has pointed out, criticizes Putnam's analyses, through which social capital produces efficient political and economic institutions. The World Bank and the OECD, for example, emphasize the need for supranational institutions (macro level) that promote state reforms and thus create institutions responsive to citizens, based on a community perspective.

Secondly, Coleman was the first to consider social capital a public good, since it is a resource available to all who operate in a particular system of relations. Putnam follows Coleman when considering voluntary associations, civic orientation, and trust in others as resources available to cities, states and nations. In other words, it is not private property of those who benefit from it. More than that, under this perspective social capital is not only underprovided by private agents, but a product of social activities. He states:

> Unlike conventional capital, social capital is a "public good," that is, it is not the private property of those who benefit from it. Like other public goods, from clean air to safe streets, social capital tends to be underprovided by private agents. This means that social capital must often be a by-product of other social activities. Social capital typically consists in ties, norms, and trust transferable from one social setting to another (Putnam, 1994, pp. 10).

Contrary to Coleman and Putnam, Fukuyama (2001) believes that social capital is a private good. According to him, since cooperation is essential for individuals to achieve their goals, it is natural that they will produce it as something private, especially if it is to benefit themselves or a close friendship cycle. Similarly, Dasgupta (2000) states that social capital is not a public good, it is a private one that produces extensive positive and negative externalities.

Finally, it is very common to find in most of the literature the idea of a strong relationship between the level of social capital and the benefits generated. In other words, the more social capital the better. More cooperation, more civic engagement, better economic performance, more participation and democracy, among others. Norris (2001), for example,

argues that social capital is linked to economic development and democracy. For her, all societies rich in social capital are solid democracies, that high indicators of social capital produce high participation tolerance. In short, from her perspective it is a necessary condition for the democratization process. However, Fukuyama (2001, 2002), Dasgupta (2000) and Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005) disagree. Dasgupta has said that social capital can produce beneficial and harmful fruit. More professional education, for instance, generates more doctors, lawyers, engineers etc. Likewise, solidarity networks help hundreds of vulnerable people, and are essential to fulfill the role that the state often does not play adequately. However, there are many other groups that are also cohesive, organized, reciprocal, with high levels of trust among their members, but with the aim of doing evil. The Ku Klux Klan, the mafia, the well-known Brazilian criminal group PCC[9], among others. And not just criminal groups. Even some otherwise beneficial social groups tend to be hostile to some member's deviant behavior and promote psychological pressure and expulsion.

In short, there are three core components to the concept of social capital: generalized trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks. In this study, I limit the analytical range to the first component: trust[10]. Considering that citizens' attitudes vary according to context and individual perception, for the purposes of this study, both at the level of analysis (individual), as well as expected effects (positive or negative attitudes), the definitions of Fukuyama and Dasgupta seem to be more appropriate[11].

2.3.4 How is Social Capital Measured?

As social capital is unobservable, there is a great deal of discussion about its measurement, and due to its breadth and conceptual divergence there is no consensus. Measuring the stock of cooperative social relations based on standards of reciprocity and honesty is no easy task (Fukuyama, 2001a). According to Fukuyama (2001a), there are at least two broad approaches[12]. The first, to conduct censuses of groups and group memberships in a given society, and the second, the use of surveys to measure levels of trust and civic engagement.

Putnam (1993) suggests measuring social capital from information about groups and

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9 *Primeiro Comando da Capital* (First Capital Command).

10 The next topic explains why trust is the best proxy for studying and measuring social capital.

11 Although Putnam recognizes possible adverse effects of social capital, his research tends to consider positive results, in addition to the level of institutional measurement already explained in this topic.

12 A third alternative is also mentioned, however, because it is considered even by him as a mix of human capital and social capital. Due to its limited reach, as it is conducive to measuring social capital in private firms, I will focus on the first two.

group members, from sports clubs and church choirs to interest groups and political parties. In the case of Italy, he uses censuses and surveys to get an idea of the size of these groups and how they vary over time and across different geographical regions. The argument is that more socially cohesive societies tend to have more groups and associations and perform better economically and institutionally. Differences between northern and southern Italy showed positive correlations, leading Putnam to conclude that institutions were better where high levels of social capital were verified. However, Fukuyama (2001) recalls that only large social groups are capable of institutionally impacting. From his perspective small size groups, like families or soccer clubs, are great for socializing children, but not for exercising political influence.

The total number of groups provides an important indicator, but data limitations prevent precision. Fukuyama (2001) cites two examples. In 1949 the US Department of Commerce estimated about 201,000 nonprofit voluntary and business organizations, labor unions, civic groups, etc. Later, in 1989, Lester Salamon estimated 1.14 million nonprofits in the USA, which suggested a higher growth rate than the population as a whole. Warner et al. (1963) had also tried to count, but found around 22,000 different groups in a society with 17,000 people. Due to the lack of clarity and imprecision in the results, this type of measurement tends to not be a good indicator.

Another point to be considered is groups' internal structure. Since internal cohesion is fundamental to establish social capital, it must be considered that it varies, so this kind of analysis is also inaccurate. It is natural that each group has different levels of cohesion and scope for action. Church choirs, for example, are excellent for including new members, local work and ecclesiastical representation, but are not commonly able to lobby Congress. Other problems can be listed about cohesion. What matters most for social capital is not necessarily the level of internal cohesion of the groups or their size, but how they relate to others. Fukuyama recalls that groups with strong moral ties, in some cases, can decrease the level with which their members trust others, generating an inverse trust effect. Likewise, the attitudes of these groups can, in the medium and long term, cause distrust in others.

Given the limitations and inaccuracies to quantify groups and associations, measuring the total number of these groups by stock is not ideal, both because it involves inaccurate numbers and due to the difficulty in analyzing subjective issues that are crucial for social capital.

Another form of measurement that has been widely used involves survey questionnaires that seek to capture opinions about trust and civic engagement, such as the Latinobarómetro and the World Values Survey. The idea is for each survey to ask a series of questions ranging

from interpersonal trust, economy and happiness to political and social institutions. The objective is to estimate the confidence of citizens in different spheres and the willingness to participate in voluntary groups and associations, among other matters. Figure 2, for example, illustrates the use of survey data to correlate people's satisfaction with life and the economy. A strong correlation is perceived, where it can be seen that the countries where people are most satisfied with life tend to be the same where the population is satisfied with the economy, which suggests a relationship between economic prosperity and happiness.

Figure 2. Correlation Between Satisfaction with Life and Economy



Note. Based on 2014-15 data from the European Social Survey (round 7). The questions posed were: "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? Please answer using this card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied?" and "On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?".

Survey analyses are also prone to criticism. Van Deth (2008) states that issues involving norms and values are easily collected through survey techniques. For connections and networks, however, observation is difficult. In these cases, structural aspects of social capital, civil engagement, or even corruption are not observed directly, but polls are used to obtain information about perception, attitudes, etc. Depending on how the question is designed, variations can be found and possible biases included. Fukuyama (2001) has also warned that depending on how questions such as who asks and how the question was asked, divergent results may arise. The classical question "*Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?*" does not provide us

with precise information about trust among correspondents, since it can vary in level of trust with family members and church members, but not trust in immigrants.

Despite criticisms towards the survey methodology and how the questions are designed, both for the first (stock) and the second (survey) method, trust has been largely considered not only the main source, but also the best proxy for social capital measurement (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Portes, 1998; Paxton, 1999; Zak & Knack, 2001; OECD, 2001). In this sense, trust seems to be the most widely used measure of social capital, although not the only one. The dilemma of trust is taking into account not only the preferences of rational actors, but the expectation that they have regarding what other actors may come to do. In contexts where cooperation and individual civic engagement depend on the cooperation of all and where social capital is low, not cooperating can be rational because without general trust, it is not certain that the other actors will also keep their word. From a rational perspective, trust is paradoxical, because it decreases the cost of information while increasing cooperation (Warren, 1999). In this sense the context matters and has a strong influence on the way actors see the world around them (Santos & Rocha, 2009). Knack & Keefer (1997) state that trust reflects how much people are willing to cooperate, taking into account that others will also face the so-called prisoner's dilemma.

2.4 THE DARK SIDE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

The vast majority of social capital research emphasizes positive consequences. Such prevalence tends to lead researchers to ignore negative effects. However, the same mechanisms that allow positive results to be obtained, also allow undesirable consequences (Portes, 1998). Putnam argues that, although there are some negative consequences arising from cooperation, such as criminal organizations and urban gangs, the creation of more social capital is generally good for us (Putnam, 2000). In other words, by increasing social capital, possible adverse effects tend to be minimized, or eliminated. Despite Putnam's apparent innocence, Field (2008) states that he is not alone. Authors tend to emphasize the positive side, stating that negative factors are caused by other variables, and not directly caused by social capital itself.

In this section, I review seven negative effects of capital social identified in the literature: 1) reinforcement of inequality; 2) support of antisocial behaviors; 3) exclusion of outsiders; 4) suppression of diverse thoughts and actions from group members; 5) restrictions on individual freedom; 6) downward levelling norms (restrictions to innovations); and 7) the relationship between costs and benefits (Portes, 1998; Adler & Kwon, 2002; Field, 2008).

Firstly, social capital can promote and reinforces inequality because access to resources

for different types of networks is unequally distributed. While everyone can use their connections to promote their interests, some connections are more relevant than others, whether due to size, available resources or influence of members. For example, in a given poor society there is a group with strong social ties. However, its members are poorly educated and economically poor. What real impact will it have on society? Even though it might have a positive impact on local communities, and its existence is probably better than their absence, its capacity for influencing and pressuring political groups is very limited. On the other hand, groups with medium to high schooling and economic status can achieve powerful results due to their easy access to certain resources. In addition, groups in the second category tend to be more attractive than to new members the first, both due status and access to resources (although this will often attract free riders). In short, although both groups could have high indicators of cooperation, results may vary, which leads us to believe that high social capital does not always produce the same practical effects among social groups.

Second, one of the main objectives of social capital is approximation and sociability. However, just as people cooperate for beneficial purposes, people also cooperate and organize for socially and economically perverse purposes, and thus social capital can also end up promoting antisocial behaviors. The most cited example is organized crime, but there are many others, which vary in size, intent and actual impact. For example, rape is a crime often committed by someone who knows the victim or has ties that can be used to commit such a crime. Muram et al. (1995) remember that when crime is committed by close people, it tends to not be reported. Strong social ties in closed groups, with limited access to external influence, may promote undesirable norms and perverse behavior.

Yet the negative effects do not only occur in the domestic or social sphere, but also in the political sphere. Warren (2001) shows that the Antioquia region in Colombia, characterized by strong social ties, moral codes, high levels of trust, is the same region where the Medellin drug cartel was born, benefiting, precisely, from the ties and social connections to grow and expand. We can also look at Brazil and the political group popularly called “Big Center”[13]. The group is composed of medium and small parties that do not have a clear ideological orientation, whose objective is to always be close to the executive power, ensuring privileges and positions (clientelism). Although the parties are small or medium sized, when they come together they form a powerful bloc, averaging 45% of Brazilian National Congress. The group, despite being known for its bargains in exchange for positions and support, and for having corrupt members,

[13] “Centrão”, in Portuguese.

is able to approve or reject a president's impeachment, for instance. In Brazil, it is common to hear that without the “Big Center” there is no governance.

Third, the same bonds that hold members together are those that exclude others. In this case, strongly ideological groups tend not to tolerate those who think differently, and the feeling and practice of exclusion becomes more common than insertion. However, insertion is a desirable effect in environments with a high level of social capital. Another example are supremacist groups that act based on racial prejudice.

Fourth, in some cases new and/or potentially successful initiatives from members are deterred because homogeneity of ideas is preferred. Unique voices are undesirable in environments of intellectual homogeneity. Furthermore, leaders’ attitudes tend to discourage new thoughts within the group and make members unproductive, after all, why pursue changes and innovations if only leaders decide? In this case, the group becomes a fertile environment for free riders, who will seek only benefits with minimal effort. Adler and Kwon (2002) remember that solidarity benefits of social capital may backfire for the focal actors in several ways. Strong ties may reduce the flow of new ideas and generate parochialism and inertia. In Germany, firms are too loyal to establish new suppliers, and can thus be slow to verify and adopt new ideas.

Fifth, the restrictions on individual freedom. In villages or small community groups, it is common for people to know each other. On one hand, it allows children to play outdoors under the eyes of residents. However, social control in these groups can be quite high and very restrictive to individual freedoms, and it is not uncommon for young people to leave the community in search of more open and dynamic environments. Furthermore, the constant observance of others and intrusions in their privacy can be embarrassing and can limit altruistic and individual attitudes. In other words, community connections could turn out to be oppressive.

Sixth, regarding downward levelling norms (restrictions to innovations), in some cases group solidarity is maintained by opposition to society in general. In such cases, individual success stories undermine the group's unity and impact internal cohesion. This is because discrepant attitudes among members are not expected. The result is the strengthening of norms that operate to keep members oppressed according to the rules, forcing the most ambitious to leave the group.

Finally, we must consider the relationship between costs and benefits. The construction and maintenance of social capital requires considerable time and investment, which suggests that strong ties lead to high costs. The more the actors strengthen the connections, the more

costs are employed for their continuity. In these terms, Hansen (1998) states that weak ties are more effective, as they require less resources for their maintenance.

2.5 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Immigration can be considered one of today's crucial issues, where rapid demographic changes challenge governments and affect voting behavior (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2019). Increases in ethnic diversity has provoked intense debates about its impacts in Europe, the United States, and, recently, in South and Central America. Events such as the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe, the constant migratory flow to the United States, and the large human contingent that left Venezuela and spread throughout the Americas has made the issue global. It is estimated that the migration issue has been central to recent events, such as the election of Donald Trump and his anti-immigrant campaign, as well as the rise of parties and politicians in Europe defending expulsion and closing of borders to foreigners (Macdonald, 2020).

Although migratory flows have existed for centuries, public opinion is considerably heterogeneous in supporting immigration. And because it generates such variation, its study is current and necessary. Cultural factors, national identity, aversion to certain groups (Latinos, Africans, Muslims, etc.), economy, among other issues, are studied regarding how they shape public attitudes towards immigration. In this study, I examine whether interpersonal and institutional trust, which has been found to promote attitudes of tolerance and social cooperation (Fukuyama, 2001a), makes people more accepting of immigrants.

For this analysis, issues sensitive to social capital will be addressed, such as ethnic diversity, urban crime, religion and cultural life. In the next sections I present the main arguments of this research, and how they give theoretical support to the hypotheses that will be tested.

2.5.1 Does Diversity Erode Social Capital?

There is extensive academic debate, especially within the social sciences, concerning ethnic diversity and trust. The debate increased after the publication of *Making Democracy Work* (1993). In this relevant book, Putnam argues that the higher levels of social capital in northern and central Italy allowed people to solve collective action problems more quickly. Such effectiveness had a positive impact on local governments in the North. Since then, social capital theorists have often emphasized the positive effects in societies with high levels of interpersonal trust and networks (Halpern, 2005). This prevalence, as recalled by Coffé & Geys (2008), has incited the belief that social capital is something naturally positive. However,

empirical literature has found divergent results, such as a clear negative relationship between ethnic diversity and trust (Gundelach, 2013).

Two approaches attempt to explain this relationship. The first, usually called contact hypothesis, argues that diversity promotes tolerance and solidarity. As people have more contact with others, ignorance and fear decrease, and we start to trust others more. The hypothesis originates from a famous study by Stouffer (1949), former US soldier during the Second World War. In his survey, he questioned how white soldiers would feel if black soldiers served in the same platoon. Soldiers who had had previous contact with black soldiers were at ease with the idea, while those who had no contact with black soldiers opposed.

Later studies followed the same trend. Sociologist Allport (1954) claimed that more contact with people from another ethnic and racial background increases confidence and decreases ethnocentric attitudes. If white and black children study together, for instance, the likelihood of developing discriminatory attitudes is lower[14].

Four conditions are identified as necessary for this to occur: 1) equal status (both groups must be engaged in the relationship); 2) differences in academic background and assets cannot be used to discredit others; 4) cooperation (both groups must work together in a non-competitive environment); 3) common goals, members must trust each other in pursuit of common goals; and 4) support by social and institutional authorities (there must be support from authorities and institutions in the interaction between groups, serving as an incentive for positive contact).

In a survey carried out by telephone with 937 people, Herek and Glunt (2010) asked if any friends or relatives had revealed to be homosexuals. Approximately one third of the respondents responded positively. Regression analyzes showed that interpersonal contact was strongly associated with positive attitudes towards gay men, and that heterosexuals who had lived with gay friends or relatives had more positive attitudes than those who did not. In another survey experiment, Brown et al. (2003) investigated the effect of contact between white and black high school teammates on white student athletes' racial attitudes. The results indicated that white students who played in teams with a high percentage of blacks expressed more policy support for and greater positive affect towards blacks. Finally, Hopkins (2010), in studying what leads some people to treat immigrants as a threat, found that policies that are more hostile to immigrants are more likely to be implemented in communities that suffer from a large,

[14] Putnam (2007) cites this example and recalls that this logic served as the basis for the United States Supreme Court to require racial breakdown after the case *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954.

sudden flow of newcomers, and when national rhetoric emphasizes that threat.

Although some studies present evidence favorable to the contact hypothesis, a considerable number of empirical studies support the conflict hypothesis, which suggests, among other reasons, that due to limited resources, diversity promotes distrust towards outsiders and solidarity to those inside. In other words, the greater the physical contact with people of another race or ethnic origin, the more we become attached to *ours* and the less we trust the *other* (Blumer, 1958; Giles & Evans, 1986; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Hallberg & Lund, 2005; Bobo & Tuan, 2006; Putnam, 2007). This controversy, as recalled by Coffé & Geys (2006), mainly centers on the argument that diversity is obstructive to the creation of social capital, and serves as the basis for anti-immigrant speeches and extreme right parties.

A possible explanation for this argument is that, in heterogeneous communities, people trust and feel more comfortable interacting with people who are similar in terms of income, race and ethnicity (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000). In these terms, minority groups prefer to interact with other minority groups when they feel discriminated against by the majority. Hence the fact that social capital, mainly represented by trust, prospers among these groups but fails in heterogeneous communities.

The empirical literature usually analyzes the relationship between diversity and social capital at both the individual (micro) and aggregate (macro) levels.

At the micro level, studies often use multilevel analysis, studying the elements that explain the behavior of individuals. Putnam (2007), a strong supporter of the positive effects generated by social capital, recognizes that diversity can reduce social capital. He reported that those living in diverse areas have less trust in political leaders, neighbors, among others. Sampson et al. (1997), controlling for age and educational level, concluded that social capital is lower in heterogeneous communities. Alesina & La Ferrara (2000) found that age fragmentation is negatively correlated with levels of social capital. Based on 1991 British census data, McCulloch (2003) found that social heterogeneity is negatively related to social capital both for men and women. Costa and Kahn (2003) concluded that volunteering and trust, among people aged 25-54, are lower in heterogeneous communities. In a two-person trust game, Glaeser et al. (2000) found less trust between participants of different nationalities, which leads to the belief that racial diversity limits trust. In Canada, Soroka et al. (2006) found low levels of interpersonal trust in societies with greater racial diversity, but not for trust in government. Johnston et al. (2010) found partial support for the argument that national identity increases the sense of belonging and increases solidarity between people of similar ethnic groups. Other studies had similar results (see Webber & Donahue, 2001; Charles & Kline, 2002; Hooghe et

al. 2009; Shayo, 2009; Wright & Reeskens, 2013).

At the aggregate level, surveys tend to use cross-country and regional indicator survey analysis. Rothstein & Stolle (2001) and Rothstein & Uslaner (2004) show that income inequality is negatively correlated with generalized confidence. The greater the inequality, the lower the level of trust (Coffé & Geys, 2006). Delhey & Newton (2005), when comparing 60 countries, found a negative effect between social heterogeneity and trust. Even after excluding Nordic countries from Europe, commonly considered outliers in the literature, the results were consistent. Knack & Keefer (1997) also found similar results in 29 countries based on the World Values Survey. Finally, La Porta (1997) found a negative relationship between social capital and ethnolinguistic heterogeneity.

It is also worth emphasizing the article by Theiss-Morse (2009). Although not empirical, her theoretical critique is relevant to the study of social diversity. At least one criticism is central: people are attracted to similarities, not differences. In other words, homogeneous groups tend to be more attractive than heterogeneous groups. The author shows that the idea of civic engagement through institutional stimuli (as Allport argues) creates artificial structures. Participation should be aleatory. Theorists tend to exaggerate the benefits that social engagement and widespread trust can bring to societies. In the specific case of democracy, it shows that the most effective civic groups are homogeneous, not only because they are more coordinated, but because they develop stronger bonds of confidence than homogeneous groups.

Countering the popular saying, opposites do not attract!

2.5.2 Why Interpersonal Trust Matters for Immigration Attitudes

There are some possible mechanisms that connect trust to the most positive attitudes towards immigration (van der Linden et al., 2017). They can be direct or indirect, and both at the individual and aggregate level (Sipinen et al, 2020). In short, positive attitudes can be manifested by a belief, judgment or decision. In the case of the interpersonal trust, when asked if "most people can be trusted", the expectation is that the individual will respond based on trust and kindness, and his or her willingness to engage in reciprocal cooperation with others. After all, you only cooperate with those you trust. In the case of helping or cooperating with those who are not trusted, the motivation tends not to be trust, but some sort of need. In this case, it is artificial.

Surveys tend to ask questions in a general way, because the level of trust varies. One can trust his family and friends, but not the government, for example. When verifying the level

of confidence in general, the question also considers people in general (Uslaner, 2002). However, it is important to highlight that survey analyses usually not only capture the contextual context, but also the individual one; hence the recurrence of both questioning generalized trust and delimiting interpersonal and institutional trust.

As previously exposed, there is little consensus in the literature as to whether heterogeneous contexts generate positive expectations in people's confidence. Stolle (2002) suggests that confidence in foreigners increases through interaction. This means that the more the contact and the more heterogeneous the group, the more trusting attitudes towards strangers. Lower confidence indicators result from the absence of contact with the other. In the case of immigration, negative attitudes tend to prevail in environments of little contact, leading to feelings of threat associated with immigration (Stolle, 2002; Uslaner, 2002). People who trust more tend to see shared values as natural to the dynamic process of civilization. In this case, immigration is not negative, but part of the process.

Based on the theoretical arguments presented in this section, while recognizing that attitudes can oscillate between positive and negative, the core premise of my argument is that trust decreases the feelings of threat and increases levels of tolerance (McLaren, 2003; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011), generating positive attitudes towards immigrants. Thus, interpersonal trust mitigates intergroup threat and has an indirect and positive impact on immigration attitudes. Together, these arguments lead me to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The higher the interpersonal trust, the more the positive attitudes towards immigrants.

2.5.3 Why Institutional Trust Matters for Immigration Attitudes

As exposed previously, trust operates not only at the individual level, but also at the institutional level. People may trust their friends and not trust the government, for instance, which suggests that trust is not the same for everyone.

Institutional trust is important for the proper functioning of democratic governments. High indicators of distrust and public support create a climate of political instability and disapproval for governments (Hetherington, 1998; Macdonald, 2020) and make citizens less willing to pay taxes (Fairbrother, 2019). It is prudent to consider that if citizens do not trust their institutions, they will soon not approve migration policies. Trust indicators serve as a thermometer of responsiveness for governments regarding the people who legitimately chose them to govern. In the specific case of immigration, how does this mechanism work?

When a government's policies benefit one group more than others, institutional trust is activated by that group, but varies in levels of support from the population (Rudolph, 2017; Macdonald, 2020). When a certain group is benefited, either materially or ideologically, and in return the others, who will not be directly benefited, have to pay the costs, there is a variation in trust. This scenario is common regarding social policies. When poor or black people benefit from social programs, rich and white people tend to disagree, so distrust increases. It is important to note, however, that the opposite also applies.

Macdonald (2020) cites other examples. When liberals are asked to support Social Security Privatization, or when conservatives are asked to support redistributive spending, institutional trust is activated, and it varies from those who benefit from those who will have to pay the costs without receiving direct benefits. Immigration is one of the possible cases in this scenario. Although there are empirical studies showing that immigration does not increase urban crime and can still economically revitalize stagnant areas, as discussed previously, people's perception do not always follow this trend, which requires governments to pay close attention to the opinions and preferences of their citizens.

When people believe that the government is corrupt, confidence indicators tend to fall, and citizens tend to suspect that programs are inefficient, and resources are misused. Because immigration has a substantial impact at the local and national levels, there is a need for confidence in institutions to be high, as it gives actions legitimacy. Governments decide who stays and who leaves, for how long, what benefits and obligations they will have, whether they pose a threat to the natives, whether they can receive social benefits for their family (Macdonald, 2020). If people do not trust these actors to manage migration policies, then they will be less willing to support them, and negative attitudes towards institutions and immigrants will follow. Thus, my second and last hypothesis reads:

Hypothesis 2: The higher the institutional trust, the more the positive attitudes towards immigrants.

2.6 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH

This research aims to contribute to the literature by carefully exploring the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants in 32 nations, covering two continents. More specifically, to investigate if social capital, here represented by interpersonal and institutional trust, can be linked to citizens' positive preferences towards immigrants. In the literature, this relationship has been studied in consolidated democracies such as Switzerland, Germany, the United

Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and specific regions like Nordic and postcommunist countries (Cinar & Rose, 2020). By incorporating countries and regions neglected by the literature, such as Latin America, this study expects to transcend the existing literature on social capital and international migration (which commonly focuses on single-country cases) by broadening the geographical scope, offering a global-level analysis, and covering this observed gap. Yet why is it important to study Latin America and other countries in the region? Both the United States and Europe have increased barriers to the entry of immigrants, which may lead them to other alternatives such as countries with less barriers. In this sense, whether due to the linguistic proximity or the greater ease of entry, this region must be observed in the literature.

In addition, this study includes commonly neglected institutions in the literature, such as the police and the armed forces. It is common to include the government, political parties, and even parliament. Coercive institutions, although not usually included, often have close contact with immigrants, as they are responsible for domestic law and order (such as the police), as well as border surveillance (such as the armed forces), where many immigrants cross. I hope to contribute by showing the relevance of considering these institutions as well.

3 DATA AND METHOD

3.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter presents all data and methods used for the empirical analysis. I begin explaining the sources from which the secondary data will be collected. I also discuss specific characteristics of the surveys chosen. I proceed detailing the dependent, independent, and control variables, and how they will be mobilized analytically. Then, I explain the method applied and conclude by summarizing the descriptive statistics, which will help to visually understand the data used in this study.

3.2 DATA SOURCES OF THIS STUDY

3.2.1 European Social Survey

The individual data used for the analysis of Europe come from the European Social Survey (ESS), a very high-quality database which covers important social issues, like media, trust, politics, religion, gender, and other socio-demographic fields.

Between 2002 and 2018, the ESS included nine waves. Immigration issues are present only in waves 1 (2002) and 7 (2014). For the purpose of this study, I use wave 7. Although twenty-one countries participated, I excluded Israel from the analysis, totaling twenty countries. Unfortunately, important countries like Croatia and, especially, Italy, did not participate in this wave. Italy has been a gateway for immigrants from the Mediterranean and one of the strongest economies in Europe. Table 2 summarizes the number of observations (*N*) for each country.

Table 2. List of Countries Studied in the European Social Survey – Wave 7 (2014)

Country	Abbreviation	Observations
Austria	AUS	1,795
Belgium	BEL	1,769
Czechia	CZE	2,148
Denmark	DEN	1,502
Estonia	EST	2,051
Finland	FIN	2,087
France	FRA	1,917
Germany	GER	3,045
Hungary	HUN	1,698
Ireland	IRE	2,390
Lithuania	LIT	2,250

Netherlands	NET	1,919
Norway	NOR	1,436
Poland	POL	1,615
Portugal	POR	1,265
Slovenia	SLO	1,224
Spain	SPA	1,925
Sweden	SWE	1,791
Switzerland	SWI	1,532
United Kingdom	UK	2,264
Total Number of Observations (N)		37,623

The total number of observations in the sample is significant (N = 37,623). Although Italy did not participate, the number of countries is representative and allows me to draw a good European panorama.

3.2.2 World Values Survey

To analyze the Americas, wave 7 (2017-2021) of the World Values Survey (WVS) database was used. This survey is one of the most respected in the world and is conducted in a great number of countries and encompasses almost 90 percent of the world population. Its themes range from social values to people's political life, which makes the database universal. According to the website, the survey started in 1981, using rigorous and high-quality research designs. It is the largest cross-national survey on human beliefs: WVS interviews almost 400,000 correspondents, covering poor and rich countries.

The World Values Survey has also been considered one of the most used databases by national governments to researchers from all areas and fields of study. It offers a very good number of questions on migration and social and interpersonal trust, and a considerable number of socio-demographic questions.

Table 3 presents all countries included in this study, as well as the number of observations (N) of each country. Because this study only analyzes the countries of the American continent, Andorra, Australia, Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, Taiwan, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Jordan, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Macau, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Egypt were removed from the analysis.

Table 3. List of Countries Studied from the World Values Survey – Wave 7 (2017-2021)

Country	Abbreviation	Observations
Argentina	ARG	1,200
Bolivia	BOL	1,200
Brazil	BRA	1,204
Chile	CHI	1,200
Colombia	COL	1,200
Ecuador	ECU	1,200
Guatemala	GUA	1,000
Mexico	MEX	1,200
Nicaragua	NIC	1,000
Peru	PER	1,200
Puerto Rico	PRI	1,127
United States	USA	2,596
Total Number of Observations (N)		17,817

3.3 EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT OF TRUST AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE

3.3.1 Dependent Variables — Attitudes Towards Immigrants

To analyze citizens' attitudes towards immigrants, eight indicators were created based on the ESS, round 7: Social Acceptance, Institutional Acceptance, Qualifications, Economy, Urban Crime, Religion, Race/ethnic groups, and Culture[15].

Social Acceptance—The scale has four alternatives (allow many/some/few/none). When asked if the correspondent would accept the entry of immigrants from poor countries into Europe, and the correspondent marks the first alternative, it means that he/she accepts and has a positive opinion towards immigrants. Since the first option is positive, scales have been inverted to create a pattern from the negative to positive view.

Institutional Acceptance—The scale has five alternatives (agree strongly/agree/ neither agree nor disagree/disagree/disagree strongly). When asked if the government should be generous judging applications for refugee status, and the correspondent marks the first alternative, it means that he/she has a positive view towards immigrants. Since the first option is positive, scales have been inverted to create a pattern from the negative to positive view. This question replaces Social Acceptance when the empirical analysis of the institutional trust

[15] The tables and figures with all descriptive analysis for all indicators are on Appendix B, tables B.1 to B.13.

hypothesis is done.

Qualifications—This indicator seeks to capture citizens' preferences in relation to the necessary qualifications for immigrants to be accepted. In all, four categories were included (to speak the recipient country's official language, to be committed to the country's way of life, to have work skills needed in the country, and to be white). Unlike Social Acceptance, scales range from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates a positive point of view and 10 a negative one. In this case, they have also been reversed. Note that this indicator consists of more than one question. In this case, for the creation of a single indicator, the four items were loaded onto a single factor in a Principal Components Analysis (PCA). Table B.14 (appendix B) presents the correlation matrix of the four components and figure B.1 (appendix B) presents the four components in a scree plot. The first component explains 53% of variation. Finally, table B.15 (appendix B) presents the Kaiser-Meyer-Olklin test (KMO), which varies from 0 to 1. The closer to 1, the better the database adequacy and the factor analysis. Kaiser and Rice (1974) suggest at least 0.5 as acceptable, while Pallant (2007) suggests 0.6. The average was 0.716, which shows that the database is adequate for factor analysis and for the creation of this indicator.

Economy—This indicator also has more than one question about immigrants (take jobs away from natives, take out more than they put in, are good or bad for the recipient country's economy). The scale also varies from 0 to 10. Since the first alternative is negative, scale reversion was not necessary. PCA was also carried out to create this indicator. Table B.16 (appendix B) shows the correlation between variables, and figure B.2 (appendix B) presents the three components in a scree plot. The first explains 68% of variation. Finally, the KMO (table B.17, appendix B) test reached an average of 0.69, which validates the indicator's creation.

Urban crime—When asking whether immigrants increase the percentage of local crimes, this question seeks to capture the criminal perception of foreigners. There was no need to change the scale, which ranged from 0 to 10.

Religion—The question seeks to capture whether immigrants undermine or enrich local religious beliefs and practices. There was no need to change the scale, which ranges from 0 to 10.

Race/ethnic groups—This indicator questions whether the respondent allows many/some/few/none immigrants from different races than that of the majority. Since the first alternative is positive, the scale has been inverted.

Culture—This question asks whether immigrants undermine or enrich the recipient country's cultural life. There was no need to change the scale.

Below I detail the indicators and the questions used for each one. For all of them, the

expectation is the same: interpersonal and institutional trust will have a positive effect, i.e., it will positively impact attitudes towards immigrants.

Social Acceptance

- Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries in Europe.

Institutional Acceptance

- Some people come to this country and apply for refugee status on the grounds that they fear persecution in their own country. Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. Firstly [...] The government should be generous in judging people's applications for refugee status.

Qualifications

- Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to [...] be able to speak [country's official language(s)]?

- Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to [...] be committed to the way of life in [country]?

- Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to [...] have work skills that [country] needs?

- Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to [...] be white?

Economy

- Using this card, would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?

- Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?

- Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?

Urban crime

- Are [country]'s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?

Religious beliefs and practices

- Using this card, do you think the religious beliefs and practices in [country] are generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?

Race/ethnic groups

- Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority.

Country's cultural life

- And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?

3.3.2 Independent Variables — Interpersonal and Institutional Trust

Interpersonal trust refers to how much people trust each other, or how much they are reciprocal, trustworthy, fair and helpful. For this measurement, I used the well-known question: "generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?". Since the scale is already from the negative to positive, no change was required.

While interpersonal trust refers to how much people trust each other, institutional trust refers to how much citizens trust institutions, whether local (i.e., government, politicians) or supranational (i.e., United Nations). To capture the institutional trust, seven institutions were included. All vary in scale from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating the most negative view towards institutions, and 10 indicating an extremely positive view. Since the scale is already from the negative to positive, no change was required. The seven are: Country's parliament, Politicians, Political Parties, Legal system, Police, European Parliament, and the United Nations[16].

Country's Parliament, Politicians, and Political Parties were highly correlated among themselves (table B.26, appendix B). In this case, the indicator "National Institutions" was created. The figure B.3 (appendix B) features the three components in a scree plot. The first component explains 55% of variation. Finally, table B.27 (appendix B) presents the Kaiser-Meyer-Olklin test (KMO), which result was 0.7, validated by both Kaiser and Rice (0.5) and

[16] The tables with the descriptive analysis for all variables are in Appendix B, tables B.18 to B.25.

Pallant (0.6).

Although the EU Parliament and the United Nations are international institutions that are highly correlated (0.697), the KMO was 0.5. Because the adequacy was very low and it was not validated by Pallant (0.6), the creation of this indicator was rejected.

Below I detail the variables and the questions used for each one. For all of them, the expectation is the same: interpersonal and institutional trust will have a positive effect in all indicators presented in section 3.3.1, i.e., it will positively impact attitudes towards immigrants.

Interpersonal Trust

- Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

National Institutions

- Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. [country's parliament?]

- Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. [politicians?]

- Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. [political parties?]

European Parliament

- Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. [European Parliament?]

United Nations

- Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. [United Nations?]

Legal System

- Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. [the legal system?]

Police

- Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. [the police?]

3.3.5 Control Variables

Before presenting the control variables of this study, I will explain what they are and what their purpose in the statistical model.

According to Salkind (2010) in his *Encyclopedia of Research Design*, in experimental design and data analysis a control variable is one that is not of primary interest, and that constitutes a strange factor which impact on the model must be controlled or eliminated. It refers to the researcher's desire to add an additional analysis of the main explanatory variable that may help eliminate bias. Controlling for a potential confounder, according to Salkind, is thus desired to isolate the effect of the variable of interest on the result of interest, reducing or eliminating possible bias. For example: suppose a researcher wants to study a chemical reaction (dependent variable), and how it behaves with different reagents (independent variables). In this case, the researcher can control for different temperatures (control variable) to verify whether, depending on the temperature, the main reaction is unchanged or varies.

For the purpose of this study, I use standard control variables that affect a person's level of interpersonal trust. First, I include economic and socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, level of education, unemployment, and self-assessed household income. Second, three dummy variables capture if the own respondent and his/her father and mother were born in another country. I also include a question which asks if the respondent has close friends who are of different race/ethnic groups. Third, three attitudes are captured to identify political preferences and institutional performance. Left-right position for ideological preference, and satisfaction with democracy and economy. They were recorded on a scale from 0 to 10.

Studies confirm that lower educated citizens tend to respond more negatively to immigration than higher educated ones (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). Sipinen (2020) presents at least two explanations. First, in European countries immigrants are, on average, less educated in comparison with natives; it's well-known that the less educated fear a risk of growing labor competition. Second, those with higher education tend not to be afraid of diversity or of interacting with strangers because their cognitive sophistication allows them to overcome

difficulties in a more practical way. For this reason, I include level of education, expecting that more educated respondents be more prone to answer positively on immigration attitudes.

Regarding economic issues, studies Malhorta et al. (2013) show that a better financial situation leads to favorable attitudes on immigration. While most financially organized people don't fear for jobs competition, people in more fragile financial situations do.

In political-ideological terms, studies show great difference across left-right positions and (in)tolerant views of immigration. Leftists are less likely to oppose immigration and to support discriminatory policies. Including such control variables will allow me to have a broader view of citizens' preferences and attitudes in various aspects[17].

3.4 EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT OF TRUST AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS IN THE AMERICAS

3.4.1 Dependent Variables — Attitudes Towards Immigrants

To analyze citizens' attitudes towards immigrants, six indicators were extracted from WVS, round 7: Acceptance of immigrants as a neighbor, Development impact, Culture, Urban crime, and Economy. Unlike ESS scales, WVS uses smaller scales, and does not follow a pattern[18].

Social Acceptance—The scale has only two alternatives (mentioned/not mentioned). When questioning which category the correspondent would not be satisfied with having as a neighbor, the "mentioned" means a negative view of the related category, while "not mentioned" means the respondent does not care. Since the first option is negative, there was no need to change the scale. Note that the indicator consists of three questions. In this case, for the creation of a single indicator, I have done a single factor in a PCA. Table B.48 (appendix B) presents the correlation matrix of the three components. Figure B.4 (appendix B) features the components in a scree plot. The first component explains 64% of variation. Finally, table B.49 (appendix B) presents the KMO test. The overall value was 0.67, which passed both the Kaiser and Rice (0.5) and the Pallant (0.6).

Institutional Acceptance— The scale has four alternatives (let anyone come who wants to/let people come as long as there are jobs available/place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here/prohibit people coming here from other countries). Since the first alternative is positive for immigrants, it was reversed.

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[17] The tables with the descriptive analysis for all control variables are in Appendix B, tables B.28-B.39.
[18] The tables with the descriptive analysis for the five indicators are in Appendix B, tables B.40 to B.47.

Development impact—The scale has five alternatives (rather/quite bad; not good, nor bad; quite/very good). No change was required.

Culture—The scale has three alternatives (disagree/hard to say/agree). When questioned whether immigrants strengthen cultural diversity and the respondent marks the first option (disagree), it is considered that he/she has a negative view on the relationship between immigrants and cultural diversity. In this case, no change was required.

Urban crime and Economy—Scales have three alternatives (disagree/hard to say/agree). When questioned whether immigrants increase urban crime and unemployment, and the respondent marks the first option (disagree), he/she is considered to have a positive viewpoint. In this case, the order of the two scales was reversed.

Below I detail the indicators and the questions used for each one. For all of them, the expectation is the same: interpersonal and institutional trust will have a positive effect, i.e., it will positively impact attitudes towards immigrants.

Social Acceptance

- On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors? [people of a different race]
- On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors? [immigrants/foreign workers]
- On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors? [people who speak a different language]

Institutional Acceptance

- How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?

Development Impact

- Now we would like to know your opinion about the people from other countries who come to live in [your country] – the immigrants. How would you evaluate the impact of these people on the development of [your country]?

Culture

- From your point of view, what have been the effects of immigration on the development of [this country]? For each of the following statements about the effects of immigration, please, tell me whether you agree or disagree with it: [strengthens cultural diversity]

Urban Crime

- From your point of view, what have been the effects of immigration on the development of [this country]? For each of the following statements about the effects of immigration, please, tell me whether you agree or disagree with it: [increases the crime rate]

Economy

- From your point of view, what have been the effects of immigration on the development of [this country]? For each of the following statements about the effects of immigration, please, tell me whether you agree or disagree with it: [increases unemployment]

3.4.2 Independent Variables — Interpersonal and Institutional Trust

For the independent variable, I used the classical question that asks if "most people can be trusted or you need to be very careful in dealing with people". However, different from the ESS, which score varies from 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted, the WVS offers only two options: most people can be trusted or one needs to be very careful. Since the first option is positive, the scale was reversed.

Turning to citizens' trust in institutions, seven institutions were included. Unlike the ESS, the scale offers four alternatives (a great deal/quite a lot/not very much/none at all). In this case, the scales were reverted to maintain the negative pattern as first alternatives. The seven are: Armed forces, Police, Supreme court, Government, Political parties, Parliament, United Nations[19].

PCA was done for the creation of the "National Institutions" indicator, which includes the Government, Political Parties, and the Parliament. Table B.58 (appendix B) shows the correlation between variables, and figure B.5 (appendix B) features the three components in a scree plot. The first explains 55% of variation. Finally, the KMO (table B.59, appendix B) test reached an overall value of 0.7, which validates the creation of this indicator.

With the creation of the National Institutions indicator, five institutions will be analyzed: National Institutions, Armed Forces, Police, Supreme Court, and the United Nations.

Below I detail the variables and the questions used for each one. For all of them, the expectation is the same: interpersonal and institutional trust will have a positive effect in all indicators presented in section 3.4.1, i.e., it will positively impact attitudes towards immigrants.

[19] The tables with the descriptive analysis for all variables are on Appendix B, tables B.50 to B.57.

Interpersonal Trust

- Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

National Institutions

- I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [Government]

- I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [Political parties]

- I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [Parliament]

Armed Forces

- I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [Armed forces]

Police

- I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [Police]

Supreme Court

- I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [Supreme court]

United Nations

- I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [United Nations]

3.4.5 Control Variables

Control variables for Latin America are very similar to the European analysis. First, I include socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, level of education, employment, and perceived household income. Second, following the ESS, I use three dummy variables to capture if the own respondent and his/her father and mother were born in another country. Finally, left-right position for ideological preference. Unfortunately, questions regarding satisfaction with democracy and economy were in the questionnaire but were not used in practice. In this case, they were not included[20].

3.5 METHOD

As a methodological approach, I employ a multilevel modeling design that is tailored to the cross-sectional nature of data (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). This approach is also called a longitudinal comparative study, because although individuals (micro-units) are not observed repeatedly, countries (macro-units) don't vary (Jeannet, 2019). The advantage of this model is that it allows access to the effects of lower and higher-level variables simultaneously. The use of multilevel analysis also helps to avoid the ecological fallacy that occurs when data is analyzed at one level, but conclusions are formed at another level (Hox, 2010). Due to its explanatory capacity, multilevel analysis is the most common method for comparative attitudinal studies (Gelman and Hill, 2007).

Due to the analytical approach—an upper-level variable moderating a lower-level relationship, I use random effects. Studies recommend the use of random effects due to their greater precision in parameters estimations (Heisig, Schaeffer & Giesecke, 2017), as well as statistical inferences (Bryan & Jenkins, 2016; Schmidt-Catran & Fairbrother, 2016; Bell, Fairbrother & Jones, 2018). Failure to use it can result in severe statistical errors and inferences (Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019).

3.6 SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

This section summarizes all descriptive statistics used both for the study of Europe and the Americas, as discussed in this chapter. Tables 4 and 5 present all variables and indicators created from ESS and WVS, and tables 6 and 7 show all variables and their number of observations, including the controls.

[20] The tables with the descriptive analysis for this variable is on Appendix B, tables B.60 to B.68.

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for all Indicators Created from ESS

Indicators and variables	Question	Min-max
Social acceptance	Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries in Europe	1-4
Institutional acceptance	Government should be generous in judging people's applications for refugee status	1-5
Qualifications	*Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to [...]*	0-10
	Speak country's official language	
	Committed to the way of life	
	Have work skills that country needs	
	Be white	
Economy	Immigrants take jobs away, or generally help to create new jobs?	0-10
	Immigrants take out more than they put in?	0-10
	Immigrants are bad or good for country's economy?	0-10
Urban crime	Immigrants make crime problems worse or better?	0-10
Religion	Religious beliefs and practices are undermined or enriched?	0-10
Race/ethnic groups	Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	1-4
Culture	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched?	0-10
Interpersonal trust	Most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful?	0-10
Institutional trust	*How much do you personally trust each of the institutions?*	0-10
	National Institutions	
	European parliament	
	United Nations	
	Legal system	
	Police	

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for all Indicators Created from WVS

Indicators and variables	Question	Min-max
Social acceptance	*Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?*	1-2
	People of a different race	
	Immigrants/foreign workers	
	People who speak a different language	
Institutional acceptance	The government should prohibit people coming here from other countries or let anyone come who wants to	1-4
Development	How would you evaluate the impact of these people [immigrants] on the development of [your country]?	1-5
Culture	Immigration strengthens cultural diversity	0-2
Urban crime	Immigration increases the crime rate	0-2
Economy	Immigration increases unemployment	0-2
Interpersonal trust	Most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	
Institutional trust	*How much confidence you have in them?*	1-4
	National Institutions	
	Armed forces	
	Police	
	Supreme court	
	United Nations	

Table 6. List of Variables for Europe

Variables	*N*	*M*	SD
Dependent variables			
Social Acceptance	34,533	2.58	.88
Institutional Acceptance	36,472	3.16	1.10
Qualifications	36,594	7.63	1.46
Economy	37,005	4.77	2.44
Urban crime	35,661	3.71	2.00
Religion	35,116	4.94	2.14
Race/ethnic groups	36,649	2.59	.87
Culture	36,483	5.62	2.48
Independent variables			
Interpersonal trust	37,561	5.21	2.35
National Institutions	36,416	3.60	2.42
Trust in the legal system	36,942	5.33	2.64
Trust in the police	37,381	6.34	2.40
Trust in the European Parliament	35,222	4.23	2.51
Trust in the United Nations	34,793	5.21	2.52
Control Variables			
Age	37,548	49.39	18.67
Gender	37,601	1.52	.49
Unemployment	37,452	.28	.45
Income	37,285	3.06	.82
Respondent’s origin	37,612	.90	.29
Father’s origin	37,381	.85	.35
Mother’s origin	37,537	.86	.34
Friends	37,474	1.62	.71
Satisfaction with economy	37,005	4.77	2.44
Satisfaction with democracy	36,525	5.26	2.54
Education	37,385	13.37	7.83
Ideology	33,456	5.03	2.16

Table 7. List of Variables for the Americas

Variables	*N*	*M*	SD
Dependent variables			
Social Acceptance	17,530	1.91	.27
Institutional Acceptance	17,445	2.49	.87
Development impact	17,421	2.99	.99
Culture	17,152	1.24	.84
Urban Crime	17,294	.795	.84
Economy	17,419	.698	.83
Independent variables			
Interpersonal trust	17,637	1.14	.34
National Institutions	17,296	1.89	.88
Armed Forces	17,524	2.47	.98
Police	17,687	2.22	.94
Supreme Court	17,499	2.06	.90
United Nations	15,846	2.23	.94
Control variables			
Age	17,812	41.15	16.6
Gender	17,815	1.51	.49
Unemployment	17,622	3.34	2.1
Respondent’s origin	17,732	1.02	.15
Father’s origin	17,499	1.05	.22
Mother’s origin	17,561	1.05	.22
Education	16,127	3.46	1.9
Household income	17,415	4.80	2.1
Ideology	15,507	5.58	2.6

4 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE

4.1 OVERVIEW

In this chapter, I test this study's hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The higher the interpersonal trust, the more the positive attitudes towards immigrants.

Hypothesis 2: The higher the institutional trust, the more the positive attitudes towards immigrants.

The chapter is structured in three parts. First, I present all the indicators for Europe and how each country has behaved regarding each of them. To do this, I calculated the average for each one and ordered them from smallest to largest. I then illustrate how interpersonal and institutional trust behaves for each variable and correlate them in a scatter plot. The correlation helps to visualize how each country behaves in relation to the two indicators. Finally, I present the multilevel regression results without and with controls. The discussion of the results is interspersed with a theoretical analysis, but a more detailed discussion is in place in chapter 6. At the end, I discuss if/which hypotheses were confirmed or not.

4.2 ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS: AN OVERVIEW

The search to understand what makes people accept more, or less, immigration in the world is becoming more and more common. Diverse issues, such as race, poverty, language, criminal behavior, among others, are considered when the natives determine their preferences in relation to foreigners. Although most research looks at the United States, studies on Europe have expanded considerably, especially after the Arab Spring (Dinesen & Sønderskov, 2015; Koopmans & Schaeffer, 2015). Thus, studying citizens' attitudes has become more frequent.

The first indicator analyzed (figure 3) seeks to capture the level of Social Acceptance in relation to foreigners. Specifically, the question asks whether the respondent agrees to allow immigrants from poorer countries to live in Europe. But why poorer countries? The literature has already observed that poverty is often negatively associated in different settings. Poor people tend to be associated with international trafficking and to several social delinquencies. As discussed previously, such a relationship to crime has never received robust empirical support in the literature (Adelman & Jaret, 1999; Legrain, 2007; Lyons, Vélez, & Santoro,

2013; Stansfield, 2013). However, as shown in figure 3, poverty has a relative impact on citizens' preferences. Most citizens responded "allow a few"/ "allow some" (2, 3), which represented 73%[21] of the indicator. This suggests that poverty is not seen positively by respondents. However, it is not possible to say whether the impact is strong or weak, since the responses were concentrated basically on the median alternatives[22].

Hungary, Lithuania and Estonia had the largest number of respondents who reject the entry of immigrants from poor countries, while Germany, Norway and Sweden had the most receptive respondents.

The next indicator, Institutional Acceptance (figure 4), questions whether the government should be generous with asylum applications[23]. It is known that some countries, due to economic, cultural differences, and even internal political interests, vary in acceptance. Germany, for example, accepted around 1 million applications in 2015, while Hungary received far less (Zaun, 2017). When questioning whether the government should be generous, the question captures citizens' opinions about what the state should do. To my surprise, it seems that citizens' opinions do not always reflect institutional actions. Considering once again Germany, although it is the richest country in Europe and the one that received the most refugees, the population is not among the most receptive in this case. On the other hand, Portugal, was the one with the highest percentage of acceptance by the population.

Poverty was not the only factor to be considered by respondents. Figure 5 illustrates the four categories used for the creation of the Qualifications indicator[24]. To "speak country's official language" appears to have a strong impact when deciding whether the immigrant should be accepted or not. Almost 20%[25] of respondents considered it extremely important that the immigrant speak the local language. It makes sense to assume, from the respondents' standpoint, that foreigners can hardly adapt without knowing at least the local language. In these terms, it is prudent to assume that linguistic knowledge is essential for arrival and adaptation to the local context. Respondents from countries like the United Kingdom, France and Belgium, especially, seem to believe it is very important that foreigners speak the country's official language, while that was not so true in Denmark and Sweden.

Similarly, almost 25%[26] responded that it is extremely important that the immigrant be

[21] See appendix B, table B.1.
[22] See appendix C, figure C.1, for graph per country.
[23] See appendix C, figure C.13, for graph per country.
[24] See appendix C, figures C.2-C.5, for graphs per country.
[25] See appendix B, table B.3.
[26] See appendix B, table B.4.

committed to the country's way of life. In other words, respondents believe adapting to the local lifestyle and customs is essential for assimilation and greater contact. This does not necessarily mean that the newcomer should ignore or abandon his/her traditions, but in order to be closer, it is suggestive to suppose that a foreigner will hardly feel welcomed if he/she does not try to adapt to the local lifestyle.

Regarding work skills overall, respondents seem to believe that it is necessary for the foreigner to have the labor characteristics the country needs. While Estonia and Lithuania strongly believe that immigrants need to have the work capacities that the country needs, Norway and Sweden don't.

The scenario is completely different from the previous ones regarding skin color. Most correspondents do not consider skin color as a very necessary criterion. In general, 47%[27] marked option 10. Such prevalence can be observed, since most people responded between 7 and 9. The exceptions were Lithuania, Hungary and Czechia.

The next indicator, as already demonstrated in previous chapters, is one of the most used by researchers to justify the preferences, positive or negative, of citizens in relation to immigrants. Figure 6 presents the three questions used to create the Economy indicator[28]. In general, the three capture very similar preferences. The central question is whether immigrants impact the local economy, whether by creating or stealing jobs from the natives, whether by paying enough taxes or enjoying social benefits without counterparts, and whether they are overall good or bad for the economy.

In general, for all questions, the results were balanced. The majority of correspondents marked option 5 and most country results were within the expected. France, however, was a surprise. It is one of the countries that most immigrants in the world, but the results showed people in general believe that they are bad for the country's economy. On the other hand, respondents from Switzerland, Germany and the Nordic countries have very positive attitudes.

In the case of Urban Crime, as already mentioned, the indicator is one of the most used to measure acceptance or disgust towards immigrants. Such prevalence makes sense. Committing crimes has a major impact on society, and depending on what the crime is, the impact is even greater. In the case of local theft and robbery, the negative perception is lower than for homicide. When caused by a native, the social feeling is bad, but when caused by a foreigner, social revolt is even greater and fuels the idea that immigrants increase local crime

[27] See appendix B, table B.6.
[28] See appendix C, figures C.6-C.8, for graphs per country.

rates. Figure 7 depicts such an impact[29]. Interestingly, countries with high acceptance rates, such as Norway and the Netherlands, strongly believe that immigrants cause crimes, while Estonia and Poland don't. This result was a surprise. In sum, 88% of respondents answered 0-5, while only 12% between 6-10[30].

While urban crime has been used by conflict theorists, religion has been one of the most relevant indicators for contact theorists. This is because it is common for religious groups to welcome the poorest immigrants and refugees (Hollenbach, 2020). In many cases, especially among Catholics and Protestants, it is common for religious groups to assist the state in regions where formal institutions are unable to act or that are simply neglected (Smidt, 2003; Swart, 2006). However, it is very likely that there are some religious groups acting and fulfilling the role that the state plays poorly. Hence the proximity of these groups to immigrants of high social vulnerability. For this reason, religion is a core indicator for social capital. In the case of the question analyzed, figure 8, as can be seen, there is a great balance[31].

Another indicator of great relevance is Race (figure 9). The number of respondents that answered "allow a few" or "allow some" suggests that race and ethnicity are taken into account when considering whether the country should, or shouldn't, allow immigrants to enter[32]. While Hungary and Czechia were the least receptive to allowing immigrants of different races, Norway and Sweden were the most receptive.

As discussed before, there is a strong common sentiment that immigrants undermine local culture, and the more heterogeneous the society, the more difficult the cooperation. Since immigrants make the society more diverse their presence is not welcomed. Regarding the cultural life question, there was not a strong negative image of immigrants. Figure 10 shows that most respondents chose options 5-8[33], which suggests that the perception that immigrants undermine local cultural life is not so ingrained[34].

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[29] See appendix C, figure C.9, for graph per country.
[30] See appendix B, table B.10.
[31] See appendix C, figure C.10, for graph per country.
[32] See appendix C, figure C.11, for graph per country.
[33] See appendix B, table B.13.
[34] See appendix C, figure C.12, for graph per country.

Figure 3. Bar Graph of the Social Acceptance Indicator



Note. This question was not applied in Czechia. For this reason, the country was not included.

Figure 4. Bar Graph of the Institutional Acceptance Indicator



Figure 5. Bar Graphs of the Qualifications Indicator



Figure 6. Bar Graph of the Economy Indicator





Figure 7. Bar Graph of the Urban Crime Indicator



Figure 8. Bar Graph of the Religion Indicator



Figure 9. Bar Graph of the Race/Ethnic Groups Indicator



Figure 10. Bar Graph of the Culture Indicator



Now that I have analyzed all indicators in this section, the next one presents an overview of interpersonal and institutional trust for all countries.

4.3 INTERPERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST: AN OVERVIEW

Figure 11 presents the average interpersonal trust in European countries[35]. The scale ranges from 0-10, where 0 is fully distrustful and 10, fully trustful. Basically, it is noticed that the Nordic countries have higher percentages of interpersonal trust, while Portugal, Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary have lower confidence. Portugal reached the highest percentage of respondents that chose 0, while Denmark had the highest that chose 10. In general, it appears that, although belonging to the same bloc and with relatively close jurisdictions, there is a great disparity between countries.

Specific studies on interpersonal trust in Portugal are scarce compared to Nordic countries. The literature has already observed that, in many cases, Nordic countries are outliers. The report *Trust—The Nordic Gold*, conducted by the Nordic Council of Ministers in 2017, presents some reasons why these countries have achieved high levels of confidence and presented scores that differentiated them substantially from countries not only in Europe, but from all over the world. Nordic countries have historically high levels of quality of life, health

[35] See appendix C, figure C.14, for graph per country.

care, stable economic growth and low levels of corruption. Together, they broaden citizens' perception that it is worth paying their taxes, as governments are responsive to citizens, and interpersonal trust is viewed as a mechanism by which citizens can more effectively achieve their personal and collective goals (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2020; Delhey & Newton, 2005).

In general, the institutional trust scenario is quite different. Unlike interpersonal trust, where there was greater balance, it is noted that people do not trust institutions very much, especially politicians and political parties.

The next figure represents the three institutions used for the creation of the National Institutions indicator (figure 12). Starting with trust in the local parliament[36], the lowest rates were found in Slovenia, followed by Poland and Lithuania. On the other hand, countries like Norway, Sweden and Switzerland had the highest trust average. The results were quite similar to trust in politicians[37], as well as political parties, with the lowest averages coming from Slovenia and Poland[38].

The country's laws and rules, represented here by the indicator Legal System (figure 13), are responsible for representing a nation's entire set of laws, including immigration policies[39]. If the citizen trusts the legal system a lot, therefore, it can be assumed that he/she trusts the immigration policies and governmental attitudes towards immigrants. While Slovenia, Poland and Portugal showed low levels of trust, Finland, Norway and Denmark showed the most trust in their legal systems.

At the institutional level, the European Parliament (figure 14) is also responsible for drawing up immigration policies and important decisions that impact the entire continent. Surprisingly, the United Kingdom was the country with the lowest average. Although it is not the aim of this study to analyze the UK case alone, the results suggest a link between the population's dissatisfaction with the EU parliament and Brexit (Denisson et al., 2020). It was also surprising that the Nordic countries were not the ones that showed the greatest confidence in EU Parliament[40], but the Eastern European countries. In this last case it is worth remembering that it is understandable that the EU Parliament be the ideal environment for the poorest countries of the EU to be able to plead their demands. In addition, Russia's constant threat might make these countries seek protection and greater proximity to the richest countries in the supranational sphere.

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[36] See appendix C, figure C.15, for graph per country.
[37] See appendix C, figure C.16, for graph per country.
[38] See appendix C, figure C.17, for graph per country.
[39] See appendix C, figure C.18, for graph per country.
[40] See appendix C, figure C.19, for graph per country.

The only coercive institution studied in Europe is the police[41]. It is known that the institution is responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the domestic sphere, and that the police's relationship with foreigners is not always peaceful. It is common for them to request documents, arrests, deportations, among others. Therefore, it can be assumed that, if a citizen trusts this institution a lot, he/she tends to believe that its attitudes towards foreigners are correct. Figure 15 shows that respondents from Poland, Hungary and Slovenia trust the police the least, while those from Norway, Denmark and Finland trust it the most.

Another supranational institution responsible for discussing international migration policies is the United Nations[42] (figure 16). Beyond its worldwide reach, the United Nations has some international bodies responsible for migration and refugee issues, such as the UNHCR and the UN DESA. It was observed that respondents from Slovenia, Austria and Poland trusted the United Nations the least, while those from Denmark, Sweden and Norway showed the most trust.

In short, patterns can be observed. Eastern European countries generally have the least confidence in others and also in institutions, while Nordic countries express the highest percentage of confidence.

Figure 11. Interpersonal Trust in European Countries



41 See appendix C, figure C.20, for graph per country.
42 See appendix C, figure C.21, for graph per country.

Figure 12. Bar Graphs of the Trust in National Institutions



Figure 13. Bar Graph of Trust in the Legal System



Figure 14. Bar Graph of Trust in the European Parliament



Figure 15 Bar Graph of Trust in the Police



Figure 16. Bar Graph of Trust in the United Nations



4.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND INTERPERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST

Although the results presented so far provide a relevant scenario regarding the indicators analyzed, they are not enough. Correlating the indicators (dependent variable) with interpersonal and institutional trust (independent variable) provides a more detailed view of how each country behaves and whether social capital has any effect on this correlation. In this section I will provide a more in-depth analysis of this issue.

4.4.1 Interpersonal Trust

Correlations are important tools in statistical analysis and have been widely used in studies on social capital and topics such as democracy, the economy, etc. (Norris, 2001). Figure 17 illustrates the relationship between Social Acceptance and interpersonal trust. Poland, Slovenia, Portugal and Hungary are the least accepting of immigrants from poor countries, while the Nordic countries, in addition to the higher interpersonal trust, are the most accepting.

When correlating the four questions used to create the indicator Qualifications, we found that the correlation was strong for the Nordic countries, which shows that interpersonal trust has a positive effect on acceptance by immigrants. The correlation was even stronger in the case of the Economy indicator and interpersonal trust. In other words, a country's economic

scenario impacts on citizens' opinions.

The next indicator presents a different reality. The perception that immigrants worsen local crime indicators can be seen. This idea, as previously explained and observed (see figure 7), has already been discussed in the literature. There is a strong feeling that foreigners commit more crimes than natives. Even respondents from Nordic countries tend to think that immigrants increase urban crime.

Religion is another relevant indicator. The belief that immigrants harm local religion is strongest in Czechia, and much lower in Nordic countries.

The next indicator is perhaps one of the most used by those who see immigration as a threat to national identity. The theory of ethnic threat argues, for example, that social heterogeneity, caused by increased immigration, can threaten the country's ethnic characteristics. Respondents from Hungary and Czechia strongly believed in this relationship, while those from Sweden and Norway did not.

Finally, Culture is a core indicator for both conflict and contact theorists. The idea for conflict theorists is that immigrants, by increasing social heterogeneity, undermine local culture, while contact theorists claim that contact with people from other cultures reduces prejudice and increases assimilation. Once again Nordic countries showed high cultural acceptance, while Portugal and Eastern European countries showed the lowest.

Figure 17. Relationship Between Interpersonal Trust and Social Acceptance, Qualifications, Economy, Urban Crime, Religion, Race, and Culture





4.4.2 Institutional Trust

While interpersonal trust is measured by a single variable, institutional trust includes five. As there are many, I illustrate the correlation between all seven indicators with the National Institutions indicator.

Starting with the Institutional Acceptance indicator, when questioning whether the government should be generous in accepting asylum applications, and correlating the answers with National Institutions, it appears that the most positive relationship is found in Nordic countries, with higher levels of social acceptance. On the other hand, Slovenia, Poland and

Portugal have low levels of institutional confidence, despite relative acceptance by foreigners. As can be seen, the relationship does not follow a linear pattern, and there is great dispersion between countries.

In the case of the necessary qualifications for the acceptance of a foreigner, again Nordic countries are the least demanding. Issues such as being white, being committed to the country's lifestyle and speaking the local language are more demanded in Poland, Slovenia and Portugal, and less in Sweden, Norway and Denmark.

As already discussed, the economy is one of the most used predictors to explain positive and negative attitudes towards immigrants. Nordic countries have the highest confidence rates and the belief that immigrants are good for the economy. In other words, the correlation suggests that the greater the institutional confidence, the more likely for citizens to believe that immigrants are beneficial to the economy. It is important to note the strong correlation of 0.87, which suggests that high confidence in National Institutions leads people to believe that immigration positively impacts the country's economy.

The same cannot be said of the relationship with the Urban Crime indicator. Countries vary substantially in the belief that immigrants increase rates of urban crime. Even Nordic countries, despite the high institutional confidence rates, tend to validate this issue. Norway, for example, had more negative responses in option 1, the most negative, (9,39%), than Poland (2,65%)[43].

In the case of the religion and trust in National Institutions indicator, Nordic countries tend to believe less that immigrants are a threat to local religion than Poland, Slovenia and Portugal.

As already discussed, Race is an important indicator for both conflict and contact theories. By correlating with trust in national institutions, Nordic countries, especially Sweden, are more accepting to the entry of immigrants of a different race, while Slovenia, Poland and Portugal tend to be less accepting less.

Finally, there were no changes in the pattern regarding the Culture indicator compared to previous indicators. In general, Sweden has shown high rates of institutional trust and positive attitudes towards immigrants in virtually all settings.

[43] See appendix C, figure C.9, for graph per country

Figure 18. Relationship Between National Institutions and Institutional Acceptance, Qualifications, Economy, Crime, Religion, Race, and Culture





After analyzing the correlations of the seven indicators and the trust in National Institutions, we can observe a pattern: Nordic countries on the one hand, with the highest acceptance rates for immigrants and the highest institutional trust, while Poland, Portugal and Slovenia showed the lowest rates. This suggests that the most negative attitudes can be found in these countries.

4.5 MULTILEVEL REGRESSIONS RESULTS

This section deepens the analysis by presenting the multilevel regression results for institutional trust in Europe and the seven indicators that capture people's attitudes towards immigrants.

4.5.1 Interpersonal Trust

Table 8 presents the regressions results between interpersonal trust and the seven indicators proposed for the measurement of attitudes towards immigrants. In each indicator there are two columns: the left column shows the results without the controls, while the one on the right, with the controls. In this way, the analysis allows us to see if there was any change before and after.

Table 8. Interpersonal Trust Multilevel Regressions Results (Europe)

Variables	(1) Social Acceptance		(2) Qualifications		(3) Economy		(4) Urban Crime		(5) Religion		(6) Race/ethnic groups		(7) Culture	
Interpersonal	0.0698***	0.0469***	0.0693***	0.0564***	0.166***	0.101***	0.162***	0.103***	0.167***	0.112***	0.0681***	0.0449***	0.256***	0.166***
Trust	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Ideology		-0.0651***		-0.125***		-0.0754***		-0.0880***		-0.125***		-0.0642***		-0.175***
		(0.002)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.002)		(0.006)
Democracy		0.0351***		0.0125**		0.0892***		0.0831***		0.113***		0.0355***		0.177***
satisf.		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.002)		(0.007)
Economy		0.0171***		0.0148**		0.0739***		0.0745***		0.0431***		0.0137***		0.0566***
satisf.		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.003)		(0.008)
Respond. origin		-0.00117		0.205***		-0.201***		-0.115		-0.136*		-0.0140		-0.0254
(native=1)		(0.026)		(0.042)		(0.039)		(0.062)		(0.065)		(0.024)		(0.069)
Father's origin		-0.0504*		-0.0578		-0.0845*		-0.194***		-0.214***		-0.0393		-0.158**
(native=1)		(0.023)		(0.036)		(0.035)		(0.054)		(0.057)		(0.021)		(0.061)
Mother's origin		0.0491*		0.0202		-0.120***		-0.0245		0.0308		0.0367		-0.113
(native=1)		(0.023)		(0.037)		(0.036)		(0.055)		(0.059)		(0.022)		(0.062)
Friends		0.145***		0.202***		0.258***		0.206***		0.297***		0.176***		0.442***
		(0.007)		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.018)		(0.019)		(0.007)		(0.020)
Age		-0.004***		-0.0127***		0.002***		-0.0034***		-0.007***		-0.0037***		-0.00240**
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.000)		(0.001)
Gender		-0.0413***		-0.131***		0.0690***		-0.0782***		-0.126***		-0.0355***		-0.190***
(male=1)		(0.010)		(0.016)		(0.015)		(0.023)		(0.025)		(0.009)		(0.026)
Employment		0.0226*		0.0729***		-0.0422*		-0.0632*		0.0202		0.0118		0.0754*
(unemp.=1)		(0.011)		(0.018)		(0.017)		(0.027)		(0.028)		(0.010)		(0.030)
Income		0.0660***		0.0301**		0.125***		0.0629***		0.0706***		0.0584***		0.145***

		(0.007)		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.017)		(0.018)		(0.007)		(0.019)
Education		0.0131***		0.0216***		0.0259***		0.0122***		0.0246***		0.0153***		0.0542***
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.002)
Constant	2.217***	2.007***	-0.333**	0.0221	-0.873***	-1.863***	2.874***	2.654***	4.091***	3.877***	2.238***	1.988***	4.288***	3.025***
	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.115)	(0.128)	(0.081)	(0.090)	(0.104)	(0.161)	(0.091)	(0.148)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.144)	(0.185)
Observations	34,490	24,304	36,557	25,729	34,203	24,629	35,621	25,310	35,007	25,042	36,601	25,744	36,447	25,772

Note. Standard error in parenthesis
*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

As can be seen, the relationship was statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) in all seven models. For each increase in interpersonal trust, Social Acceptance, Qualifications and Race/Ethnic groups increase in about 5% each, while Economy, Urban Crime and Religion the increase is of about 10% for each. The indicator with the greatest effect was Culture, increasing by almost 16%. It means that more interpersonal trust substantially lessens the fear that immigrants undermine the country's cultural life. At first, the results show a strong relationship between interpersonal trust and all indicators, which suggests that high levels of social capital generate very positive attitudes towards immigrants.

Turning to the control variables, beginning with ideology, the coefficients were significant ($p < 0.001$) for all seven indicators. The survey scale ranges from 0-10, where 0 is identified as left, and 10 right. The coefficients were significant and negative, which suggests that left-wing people have more positive attitudes towards immigrants than those on the right. Although an important portion of the literature argues that party ideology and ideology has little influence on migratory preferences and policies (Natter, Czaika & Haas, 2020), and that there is often a great overstatement when affirming that the right is able to have a great impact on attitudes towards immigration (Alonso & da Fonseca, 2011), the regression results coincide with the other portion of the literature. This shows a predisposition of the left to accept immigration in the world more than the right (Halla, Wagner & Zweimüller, 2017; Edo et al., 2019) and, as a consequence, to express more positive attitudes towards immigrants than those on the right wing.

Still in the political field, satisfaction with democracy also showed significant results. Except for Qualifications ($p < 0.01$), all the coefficients of the other models were significant at 1% ($p < 0.001$). In other words, people that are more satisfied with democracy express a greater acceptance of immigration in the world. In fact, although satisfaction with democracy has declined over the years (Pew Research Center, 2019) the literature has already observed that democratic regimes express higher rates of interpersonal trust than authoritarian ones (Warren, 1999).

Now I will analyze three indicators commonly discussed and highly related to the conflict and contact literature: economy, unemployment and income. The reasons have already been discussed in the theoretical chapter.

Starting with satisfaction with the economy, except for Qualifications ($p < 0.01$), all other models were significant ($p < 0.001$). In particular, the conflict hypothesis operates at the individual level. People dissatisfied with the economy tend to see an increase in immigration as a threat to national economic stability, which leads to negative attitudes. Because good

economic health represents stability, immigration can be seen as a problem that causes uncertainty. The results found are consistent with this argument. In countries with the lowest rates of satisfaction with the economy, the more the immigrants in the country, the lower the positive attitudes towards immigrants. Although Herreros & Criado (2009) show that in some cases the effect is inverse, the same authors remember that they are specific cases, from some countries that strongly impact the results. At the aggregate level, however, the results tend to point in the expected direction. Of the models, Economy and Urban Crime stand out as those with the greatest magnitudes (7%).

In line with the economic scenario, there were important results regarding unemployment. The main argument is that unemployment increases dissatisfaction with immigration, and most of the results were in line with what was expected. In the case of economy and urban crime, it can be inferred that unemployed people are less satisfied with immigration, and also see a relationship between immigration and urban crime. In this case, there was also no surprise. As they are more socially vulnerable, unemployed people may believe that immigrants are going to steal their jobs, which leads them to have negative attitudes. However, as already mentioned, it is worth noting that the empirical literature does not support this argument. When analyzing only the attitudes, however, the results are in line with the expected.

Finally, people with low income levels have less positive attitudes towards immigrants than those with high levels. The explanation may be in line with unemployment, as low income is associated with greater social vulnerability, which causes a feeling of uncertainty (Rothstein & Stolle, 2001; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2004; Coffé & Geys, 2006). Increasing immigration would seem like an even greater risk for people who already lack adequate income.

These three indicators are often highlighted by advocates of conflict theory to explain the reasons why immigration may be negative. In turn, the variable “friends” has been highly elucidated by contact theory. The argument is that the more the friends, especially those from different ethnic groups, the more the positive attitudes and the less the prejudice. The results found support this argument. It appears that both coefficients were high ($p < 0.001$) as to the magnitude. Economy reached almost 26%, Religion 17%, and Culture 44%, which suggests that a longer cycle of friendship, especially with people from different cultures, reduces the chances of negative feelings towards immigrants. The variable “friends” has also been one of the most used in social capital studies and is always cited in studies regarding homogenous and heterogenous societies.

Following the gender and origins of the respondents, the variables respondent’s origin,

father's origin, and mother's origin presented interesting results.

If the respondent is native, he/she is 20% more likely to have negative attitudes than if he/she is a foreigner. Despite this result, it makes sense to suppose that natives have more predisposition to reject immigration. It would be strange to suppose that an immigrant would be against immigration itself. Regarding the father's origin, it can be observed that if the respondent's father was born in the country, he/she tends to think that immigrants commit more crimes, for example. In the case of the mother's origin, the opposite happens. If the mother is native, the negative feeling remains in relation to urban crime, but it changes regarding acceptance and qualifications. In terms of gender, the results were inconclusive. With the exception of Economy, the results suggest that men express more positive attitudes in all others indicators.

Although the significance for age was high ($p < 0.001$), the effect was small. For almost all indicators, younger people tend to express more positive attitudes towards immigrants. Finally, as expected, high levels of formal education can be associated with a higher acceptance rate for immigrants. That is, people with high levels of education have more positive attitudes.

4.5.2 Institutional Trust

Turning to institutional trust, table 9 presents the results of the regressions between the seven indicators of attitudes and the five institutions analyzed.

Table 9. Institutional Trust Multilevel Regressions Results (Europe)

Variables	(1) Institutional Acceptance		(2) Qualifications		(3) Economy		(4) Urban Crime		(5) Religion		(6) Race/ethnic Groups		(7) Culture	
National	0.0383***	0.0219**	0.00570	0.0379***	0.146***	0.0674***	0.181***	0.122***	0.0797***	0.0407**	0.0206***	0.0109*	0.116***	0.0310*
Institutions	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.016)
EU Parliam.	0.0326***	0.0337***	0.0324***	0.0130*	0.0427***	0.0353***	0.0566***	0.0471***	0.0844***	0.0685***	0.0218***	0.0132***	0.0900***	0.0758***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.009)
UN	0.0157***	0.0160***	0.00584	0.00166	0.0200***	0.0137**	0.0112	0.00959	0.0383***	0.0350***	0.0188***	0.0122***	0.0650***	0.0553***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Legal System	0.0286***	0.0212***	0.0628***	0.0376***	0.0732***	0.0371***	0.0557***	0.0318***	0.0860***	0.0458***	0.0368***	0.0189***	0.130***	0.0746***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Police	-0.0133***	-0.0101**	-0.0647***	-0.0423***	-0.00719	-0.00634	-0.0111	-0.00962	-0.0162*	-0.00831	-0.00742**	-0.00278	-0.0008	0.0018
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Ideology		-0.0902***		-0.127***		-0.0806***		-0.0915***		-0.130***		-0.0667***		-0.183***
		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.002)		(0.006)
Democracy		0.0200***		0.00464		0.0573***		0.0401***		0.0693***		0.0247***		0.117***
satisf.		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.003)		(0.008)
Economy		0.0112**		0.0124*		0.0659***		0.0562***		0.0311***		0.0118***		0.0482***
satisf.		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.003)		(0.008)
Respond. origin		0.0437		0.195***		-0.179***		-0.0869		-0.107		-0.0141		0.0210
(Native=1)		(0.035)		(0.043)		(0.041)		(0.063)		(0.067)		(0.025)		(0.071)
Father's origin		-0.102***		-0.0453		-0.0653		-0.175**		-0.199***		-0.0409		-0.167**
(native=1)		(0.030)		(0.038)		(0.036)		(0.056)		(0.059)		(0.022)		(0.062)
Mother's origin		-0.0823**		0.0106		-0.117**		-0.0356		0.0177		0.0417		-0.0929
(native=1)		(0.031)		(0.039)		(0.037)		(0.057)		(0.060)		(0.023)		(0.064)
Friends		0.139***		0.198***		0.257***		0.196***		0.290***		0.173***		0.443***

		(0.010)		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.018)		(0.019)		(0.007)		(0.020)
Age		0.00288***		-0.0120***		0.00305***		-0.00154*		-0.0050***		-0.00282***		0.000636
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.000)		(0.001)
Gender		-0.0886***		-0.137***		0.0719***		-0.0749**		-0.111***		-0.0368***		-0.172***
(male=1)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.024)		(0.025)		(0.010)		(0.027)
Employment		0.0450**		0.0759***		-0.0426*		-0.0597*		0.0285		0.0147		0.0729*
(unemp.=1)		(0.015)		(0.019)		(0.018)		(0.027)		(0.029)		(0.011)		(0.031)
Income		0.0294**		0.0382**		0.134***		0.0743***		0.0747***		0.0633***		0.163***
		(0.010)		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.018)		(0.019)		(0.007)		(0.020)
Education		0.0076***		0.0232***		0.0276***		0.0139***		0.0261***		0.0160***		0.0564***
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.002)
Constant	2.905***	2.797***	-0.0502	0.322*	-0.624***	-1.632***	3.204***	3.001***	4.054***	3.920***	2.270***	2.042***	4.245***	2.983***
	(0.085)	(0.105)	(0.123)	(0.136)	(0.085)	(0.098)	(0.123)	(0.168)	(0.104)	(0.158)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.156)	(0.196)
Observations	32,575	23,978	32,677	23,987	31,114	23,157	32,039	23,669	31,64	23,456	32,621	23,969	32,668	24,032

Note. Standard errors in parenthesis
*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

Starting with National Institutions indicator, all were significant at 1% ($p < 0.001$). Of the indicators, Urban Crime, Economy and Culture had the greatest magnitude. For each increase in trust in national institutions, Culture increases in almost 3%, Economy 6%, and Urban Crime in about 12%. In other words, high levels of trust in National Institutions substantially increase positive attitudes, especially for these three indicators. Regarding the EU Parliament, the effect was positive at 1% for all indicators. Although the magnitude was not the same as that of national institutions, all went in the expected direction and positively impacted citizens' attitudes. As previously seen, citizens rely more on National Institutions than on the European Union Parliament. The EU Parliament is responsible for many agreements and laws relative to migration issues. It can be observed that high levels of trust are associated with more positive attitudes towards immigrants. Similarly, with the exception of qualifications and urban crime, the United Nations was also significantly correlated to all variables at 1%. Finally, trust in the legal system was also significantly correlated at 1%.

In a different scenario, confidence in the police was significant in three models, but with a negative sign. First, it is important to note that people's confidence in the police proved to be high. Of the respondents, almost 38% marked options 8-10[44], which is quite high. Unlike trust in the other institutions analyzed, greater confidence in the police might signal a greater acceptance of repressive actions against immigrants. This is understandable, since it is the institution responsible for local and, in some cases, border control. It makes sense to assume that greater confidence implies acceptance of its actions. Although the magnitude was not high, the results point in this direction.

Moving on to the control variables, it is observed that, in all models, people on the left tend to express more positive attitudes towards immigrants, especially when considering the Culture and Qualifications indicators. In the case of satisfaction with democracy, almost all models were significant, as well as satisfaction with the economy, which reinforces the argument that citizens satisfied with democracy and the economy have more positive attitudes towards immigrants.

If we consider factors such as the origin and age of the respondent, we see, again, that the fact that the citizen was born in the country makes him/her almost 18% more likely to associate immigrants with urban crime. However, as already explained, as it is a dummy variable (foreign/native), and it is natural that the natives have a more negative view of foreigners. It would be strange to suppose that the immigrants were against themselves.

[44] See appendix B, table B.25.

Likewise, if the respondent's father is a native, attitudes tend to be negative also. In the case of age, there are some changes. Both acceptance and the economy maintained their significance then correlated to institutional trust, but with the sign reversed. Although a detailed analysis is necessary, it should be noted that institutional trust is not the same thing as interpersonal trust. While the former is more associated with adults and their greater bond and interest in the functioning of institutions, the latter tends to be more accessible to all age groups, especially young people. In this case, it is noticed that older people trust institutions less and, therefore, tend to have more negative attitudes. It should be noted, however, that the magnitude was very low.

With the two variables strongly associated with the conflict theory, income and unemployment, it was possible to observe that employed people have more positive attitudes regarding acceptance and qualifications, while unemployed people link immigrants to economic problems and urban crime. This suggests empirical support for the conflict theory. Similarly, people with higher perceived household incomes have more positive attitudes towards immigrants than the poorest people.

4.6 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

This topic summarizes whether the proposed hypotheses have been confirmed or not.

4.6.1 The Interpersonal Trust Hypothesis

According to the first hypothesis, it's expected that the higher the interpersonal trust, the more the positive attitudes towards immigrants. The results show a positive and statistically significant relationship for all seven indicators, which suggests that social capital positively impacts citizens' attitudes towards immigrants. In general, the indicator Culture presented the higher magnitude. This means that higher levels of social capital make people believe that immigrants enrich a country's cultural life instead of undermining it. Even after the inclusion of the controls, the significance remained. The results were robust, which confirms the first hypothesis.

4.6.2 The Institutional Trust Hypothesis

Contrary to the first hypothesis, five institutions were analyzed to check for institutional trust. National institutions, the EU parliament, the United Nations and the legal system were fully confirmed. In other words, for all of them, high levels of institutional trust are associated with

positive attitudes towards immigrants.

The police was the only institution in which high levels of trust and attitudes were associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants. In other words, high levels of trust in the police means more distrust in immigrants. Although it is not the aim of this study to make value judgments, a possible explanation may be related to the institution's own performance. Basically, the police is responsible for maintaining order and, in some cases, supporting the army in border surveillance. Because the use of force is recurrent against illegal immigrants, it makes sense to assume that high confidence indicators in the police credit their actions against possible deviations from local law and order. I will return to this discussion in chapter 6.

4.6.3 Summary

Table 10 summarizes the seven indicators and whether each of them was confirmed according to the proposed hypothesis or not. "Confirmed" means that one or all indicators were statistically significant and in the positive direction according to the proposed hypothesis, while "Not confirmed" means one or all indicators were negatively associated with high levels of trust and attitudes towards immigrants.

Table 10. Summary of Interpersonal and Institutional Trust Hypotheses for Europe

	Confirmed	Not Confirmed
Interpersonal Trust	X	
National Institutions	X	
European Parliament	X	
United Nations	X	
Legal System	X	
Police		X

5 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS IN THE AMERICAS

5.1 OVERVIEW

Similar to the previous one, this chapter tests the hypotheses proposed by this study:

Hypothesis 1: The higher the interpersonal trust, the more the positive attitudes towards immigrants.

Hypothesis 2: The higher the institutional trust, the more the positive attitudes towards immigrants.

This chapter is also structured into three parts. First, I present all of the indicators and how each country has behaved regarding each of them. For this, I show the average for each one, ordered from lowest to highest. After presenting all of the indicators, I illustrate interpersonal and institutional trust for all variables. I then correlate them in a scatter plot. The correlation helps visualize how each country behaves in relation to the two indicators. Finally, I present the results of the multilevel regressions results without and with the controls. The discussion of the results is interspersed with a theoretical analysis in order to interpret them in the light of the theory. As in the previous chapter, my main intention is to present the results. A more detailed discussion is presented in chapter 6. At the end, I discuss which hypotheses were (or not) confirmed.

5.2 ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS: AN OVERVIEW

Figure 19 illustrates the three questions used to create the Social Acceptance indicator. The questions present three different categories and ask what kind the respondent would accept or not as a neighbor. In general, it is clear that most people do not mind having neighbors that are of a different race, are foreign workers and/or speak a different language[45]. Guatemala was an exception, although the disparity was not high. The three categories are very relevant for both contact and conflict theories, as well as others, such as social disorganization theory and ethnic fragmentation theory. This is because the neighbor represents great geographical proximity and, directly or indirectly, is part of the daily life of any community. In these terms, conflict theory argues that this proximity is bad, and generates social conflicts, which would not be good for local cooperation or for the search for common goals. In turn, contact theory

[45] See appendix D, figures D.1 to D.3 for graphs per country.

understands that the effect is reversed. Greater proximity would reduce prejudice and increase assimilation. The figure shows that foreigners are not rejected by the population, and that having them as neighbors would not be a big problem.

Figure 20 represents the indicator Institutional Acceptance. While respondents from Bolivia and Ecuador believe that the government should prohibit the entry of people who wish to come to work, this is not so true among those from Guatemala and Puerto Rico. Although the disparity was not great between countries, Guatemala was a surprise, since the country has shown a strong rejection of foreigners[46]. For this indicator, however, the result was different.

The next figure illustrates the Development indicator[47]. Respondents from Colombia and Guatemala had the least faith that immigrants positively impact the country's development. Although the United States is the country that receives the most immigrants in the world, the respondents from the Puerto Rico territory (considered separately in the survey) had the most positive opinion on this issue—slightly higher than those from the USA.

Figure 22 represents the indicator Economy. An even greater disparity can be seen, which proves the relevance of economic factors in citizens' preferences. The bar graph shows that respondents from countries like Peru and Colombia strongly believe that immigrants increase local unemployment, while respondents from Mexico and Puerto Rico don't have that belief[48].

Turning to urban crime, figure 23 shows that respondents from Peru and Colombia, once again, are the ones who most believe immigrants increase urban crime rates, while this belief is not as strong among those from Brazil and Puerto Rico[49].

Finally, respondents from Peru and Colombia are the ones that most believe that immigrants strengthen local culture, while this belief is the weakest among those from the United States and Puerto Rico the least.

A pattern can be seen in the last three figures. Peru and Colombia always have the most negative perceptions, which shows that both have a very negative view of the relationship between immigration and the economy, urban crime and cultural diversity[50].

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46 See appendix D, figure D.8 for graph per country.
47 See appendix D, figure D.4 for graph per country.
48 See appendix D, figure D.7 for graph per country.
49 See appendix D, figure D.6 for graph per country.
50 See appendix D, figure D.5 for graph per country.

Figure 19. Bar Graph of Social Acceptance Indicator



Figure 20. Bar Graph of Institutional Acceptance Indicator



Figure 21. Bar Graph of Development Indicator



Figure 22. Bar Graph of Economy Indicator



Figure 23. Bar Graph of the Urban Crime Indicator



Figure 24. Bar Graph of the Culture Indicator



5.3 INTERPERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST: A GENERAL OVERVIEW

Although most of the research on immigration in the American continent is limited to the United States and Canada, recent events, such as the Venezuelan crisis, have led newcomers to seek alternative countries (often still in development and/or less rigorous), which might make social ascension easier. Figure 25 presents a general overview of the twelve American countries included in this study. Overall, the level of interpersonal trust in the Americas is low, and in none of the countries studied was confidence higher than mistrust[51]. Even in the United States, the country with the highest percentage of confidence, the difference is not so great. However, it should be noted that, unlike the ESS, the WVS scale has only two alternatives, which

[51] See appendix D, figure D.9 for graph per country.

concentrates the measurement and gives the respondent with fewer options.

Previous studies have already observed the low levels of trust in Latin American countries. Norris (2001), using data from the WVS for 47 countries, found that Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Argentina are among those with the lowest levels. In her index, based on the WVS, Brazil was the last. Mattes & Moreno (2018), when analyzing Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, concluded that Latin America, in several indicators, has trust rates lower than Africa. Güemes (2019), analyzing the trust indicators in the region through the World Values Survey, found that Latin America is the most distrustful region in the world, with an average of trust around 32%, compared to Asia (57%), Africa (53%) and European countries (40%). The author also draws attention to the lack of studies in the region. Other authors such as Zmerli & Castillo (2015), Inglehart (1997) and Inglehart & Welzel (2010) came to the same conclusion. However, it is important to note that most of these studies about Latin America analyze trust in institutions, which makes studies on interpersonal trust scarce, and the relationship with migration issues even.

The next figure illustrates the National Institutions indicator. In all of them, Peru had the lowest percentage of confidence, while Chile, Ecuador and the United States had the highest percentages[52].

Turning to the confidence in the armed forces[53] (figure 27), we must remember that it is one of the institutions that, due to the use of force, is active in border surveillance, where illegal immigrants pass, and, in some cases, arrests and requests for deportation. Nicaragua has the lowest percentage of confidence, while the United States has the highest. It is worth mentioning that, in the United States, this institution has been very active on the borders, since the country receives a large number of immigrants from neighboring countries and from abroad in general.

While the armed forces operate at the borders and at the service of the state on specific missions, the police (figure 28) are closer to the reality of ordinary people, in cities, neighborhoods and communities. Its performance is also coercive and vigilant, often being responsible for the arrests and deportations of illegal immigrants. Again, the highest percentage of confidence was found in the United States, while the smallest was found in its neighbor Mexico[54].

In the case of the supreme court (figure 29), the institution responsible for judging, in some cases, immigration issues, once again respondents in the United States showed the most

[52] See appendix D, figures D.10 – D.12 for graph per country.
[53] See appendix D, figure D.13 for graph per country.
[54] See appendix D, figure D.14 for graph per country.

trust, while those from Mexico showed the least[55]. It is important to highlight that citizens' confidence might vary depending on the history of each supreme court's decisions.

Finally, as already exposed, the United Nations (figure 30) has several institutions that deal with immigrants, in addition to their worldwide reach on immigration issues. While for national institutions Peru had the lowest percentage of confidence, in the case of the United Nations, Bolivia and Guatemala are the ones who showed the least trust, and Peru increased the percent of trust. Instead of the United States, Chile and Puerto Rico showed the most towards this institution.

Figure 25. Interpersonal Trust in American Countries



Figure 26. Bar Graphs of Trust in National Institutions



[55] See appendix D, figure D.15 for graph per country.



Figure 27. Bar Graph of Trust in the Armed Forces



Figure 28. Bar Graph of Trust in the Police



Figure 29. Bar Graph of Trust in the Supreme Court



Figure 30. Bar Graph of Trust in the United Nations



5.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND INTERPERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST

Now I will correlate all five indicators with interpersonal trust in the Americas. In the case of institutional trust, as there are several institutions, I illustrate the correlations with the indicator National Institutions.

5.4.1 Interpersonal Trust

Figure 31 correlates the Social Acceptance indicator with interpersonal trust. It appears that most countries have high social acceptance rates, but low interpersonal trust. Guatemala and Nicaragua had low acceptance and low interpersonal trust, while the United States had the

highest.

The next figure illustrates the relationship between Development and interpersonal trust. Unlike Social Acceptance, there is a greater balance and distribution of responses. Respondents from Nicaragua and Colombia showed low levels of interpersonal trust and tended to reject the idea that immigrants are good for the country's development. On the other hand, those from Peru, despite the low level of confidence, believed that immigration is positive for development. Those from the United States showed the highest trust, indicating positive attitudes.

Culture is one of the most important indicators of social capital, as already noted in the previous chapter. Although just over 50% of the respondents stated that immigration strengthens cultural diversity, the percentage of those who do not believe was also relevant (almost 30%). This indicator requires careful observation, as the conflict literature has argued that national culture is what characterizes and differentiates one nation from the others. In these terms, an increase in immigration would undermine local culture and cause the country to gradually lose its national identity. From what has been observed, the number of those who disagree was large, but those who agree cannot be ignored either. Respondents from Colombia and Peru were the ones that most associated immigrants with cultural risk, while those from Chile, Puerto Rico, Argentina and the United States had the most positive attitudes. The strong correlation suggests that culture is closely associated with social capital.

As already observed, the relationship between urban crime and immigration has been one of the most addressed topics by sociologists, economists and political scientists who study the relationship between immigration and urban problems. Figure 31 confirms this feeling. Almost 50% of respondents stated that immigrants increase the crime rate. Those from Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru were the ones that more associated immigrants with crimes, while those from Puerto Rico and Argentina were the least. In the case of the United States, the relationship was intermediate. It is important to highlight that Latin American countries are among the most violent in the world, which makes the sense of insecurity very present.

Finally, the last indicator has economic and social impacts, and is considered one of the main indicators of discord for conflict theorists. Under this perspective, unemployment would also be strongly associated with economic volatility: in times of crisis, the belief that immigrants increase unemployment strengthens, while in times of prosperity it decreases. In general, the perception was highly negative. Respondents from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Guatemala were the ones who most believed in this relationship, while those from Mexico, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico and the United States showed the least belief.

Figure 31. Relation Between Interpersonal Trust and Social Acceptance, Development, Culture, Crime, and Economy



5.4.2 Institutional Trust

Figure 32 shows citizens' opinions when asked what the government should do in relation to people from other countries who want to come to work. There are four alternatives: prohibit people, place strict limits, let people come in case of jobs available, and let anyone come. Most respondents marked the median options, which makes the result inconclusive. Such

variance can be seen in the scatter plot. When correlating the acceptance of immigrants with confidence in institutions, it appears that the United States and Argentina have the highest acceptance rates, showing that institutional trust impacts citizens' preferences. The same cannot be said for Peru. In addition to low confidence, the level of acceptance for immigrants was low. In this case, the correlation suggests that trust in national institutions has little effect on citizens' preference.

Just like the previous figure, figure 32 shows that the United States and Argentina believe that immigrants have a positive impact on the country's development, while that is not the case in Peru. However, in addition to being weak, the correlation was negative, which suggests that the greater the confidence in national institutions, the more the negative opinion regarding the impact of immigrants on the country's development.

As already noted in Europe, the perception that immigrants increase local crime rates is high. The scenario is no different in the Americas. Almost 50% of correspondents believe that they increase urban crime. When correlating with confidence in National Institutions, it appears to have little impact in Peru, but a large one in Argentina, the United States and Chile.

The negative perception of immigrants, in the case of the Americas, is not limited to urban crime. The belief that they are bad for the local economy and rising unemployment can be clearly seen. Almost 60% of respondents stated they have a negative impact. When correlating with confidence in institutions, it is noticed that Peru has very low levels of confidence, as well as a strong negative feeling that immigrants increase unemployment. Puerto Rico and Mexico, despite moderate institutional confidence, showed a positive perception. The United States, however, is the country with the greatest institutional confidence and positive perception of immigrants.

Finally, the last indicator shows that more than 50% respondents had the belief that immigrants strengthen cultural diversity instead of undermining it. The United States is the country where institutional trust is most correlated with this belief, while in Peru had the least impact.

Consistency is evident in countries. The United States, Argentina and Chile are among the countries where institutional trust was most correlated with all indicators, while in Peru the opposite occurred. Mexico, Brazil, and Puerto Rico, among others, take turns at an intermediate level.

Figure 32. Relation Between National Institutions and Institutional Acceptance, Development, Crime, Economy, and Culture



5.5 MULTILEVEL REGRESSIONS RESULTS

This section deepens the analysis by presenting the multilevel regression results for institutional trust in the Americas and the five indicators that capture people's attitudes towards immigrants.

5.5.1 Interpersonal Trust

Table 11 presents the regression results between interpersonal trust and the five indicators proposed for the measurement of attitudes towards immigrants.

Table 11. Interpersonal Trust Multilevel Regressions Results (Americas)

Variables	(1) Social Acceptance		(2) Development		(3) Urban Crime		(4) Economy		(5) Culture	
Interpersonal	-0.0313	0.0104	0.223***	0.181***	0.193***	0.220***	0.193***	0.215***	0.164***	0.152***
trust	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Age		-0.00180*		-0.00205***		-0.00220***		-0.00205***		-0.00115*
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Gender		-0.00652		0.0604***		-0.0230		-0.00360		0.00233
(male=1)		(0.023)		(0.017)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)
Employment		-0.00471		0.000406		0.00559		0.00335		0.000848
(unemp.=1)		(0.006)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Respond. origin		-0.150		-0.387***		-0.152**		-0.160**		-0.235***
(native=1)		(0.089)		(0.067)		(0.057)		(0.058)		(0.059)
Father's origin		-0.0807		-0.178**		-0.00899		-0.102		0.00977
(native=1)		(0.081)		(0.061)		(0.053)		(0.053)		(0.054)
Mother's origin		0.0174		-0.172**		-0.0509		-0.0332		-0.119*
(native=1)		(0.082)		(0.062)		(0.054)		(0.054)		(0.054)
Education		0.0314***		0.0272***		0.00746		0.0159***		0.0459***
		(0.007)		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.005)
Income		0.00569		0.00789		0.00183		0.00610		0.00807*
		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Ideology		-0.0180***		-0.0208***		-0.0203***		-0.0190***		-0.0148***
		(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)
Constant	0.00506	0.330*	2.716***	3.552***	0.596***	0.958***	0.476***	0.857***	1.057***	1.342***
	(0.125)	(0.130)	(0.086)	(0.110)	(0.081)	(0.104)	(0.067)	(0.092)	(0.054)	(0.081)
Observations	17330	12547	17268	12593	17138	12507	17259	12589	16999	12455

Note. Standard errors in parentheses
*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

With the exception of the Social Acceptance indicator, all of the others were significant at 1% ($p < 0.001$). This means that high levels of interpersonal trust have a positive effect on attitudes towards immigrants in all indicators. For each increase in interpersonal trust, 18% more likely to believe that immigrants positively impact in the country's development. Even after including the control variables, all four indicators maintained their significance. While Development and Culture decreased their magnitude, Urban Crime and Economy increased it.

Regarding place of origin, as expected, immigrants showed the most positive attitudes regarding their impact on almost all indicators. In turn, it was more common for natives to have negative attitudes. Likewise, both the father's and mother's origins go in the same direction. If the respondent's father is an immigrant, there is a chance of almost 40% that he/she will have positive attitudes towards immigrants in the case of Development than if he is a native. In the case of the mother's origin, if she is an immigrant, this chance is almost 18%.

Considering the level of education, the results show that people with a higher level of education have more positive attitudes than those with a low level. The same result was found in income: people with high levels of income are associated with more positive attitudes.

Finally, the results show that left-wing people have more positive attitudes than right-wing people, while young people tends to express more positive attitudes than older. The result is in line with what was found in Europe.

5.5.2 Institutional Trust

Table 12 presents the results for the five proposed indicators with the five institutional variables.

Table 12. Institutional Trust Multilevel Regressions Results (Americas)

Variables	(1) Institutional Acceptance		(2) Development		(3) Urban Crime		(4) Economy		(5) Culture	
National	-0.0130*	0.00220	-0.00682	-0.00451	0.00391	0.00479	0.00959	0.00544	-0.0215***	-0.0116
Institutions	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Armed Forces	-0.0510***	-0.0435***	-0.0417***	-0.0374***	-0.0649***	-0.0605***	-0.0561***	-0.0405***	-0.0175*	-0.0128
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Police	0.00291	0.00188	-0.0381***	-0.0323*	-0.0135	-0.00889	-0.00918	-0.00558	-0.0128	-0.00144
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Supreme	0.0220*	0.0213	0.0699***	0.0712***	0.0292**	0.0351**	0.0214*	0.0233	0.0434***	0.0367**
Court	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
United	0.0788***	0.0643***	0.0869***	0.0677***	0.0572***	0.0496***	0.0402***	0.0294***	0.101***	0.0849***
Nations	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Age		-0.00445***		-0.00169**		-0.00178***		-0.00183***		-0.000904
		(0.000)		(0.001)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Gender		0.0205		0.0725***		-0.00830		-0.000486		0.00522
(male=1)		(0.015)		(0.018)		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.016)
Unemployment		0.00213		0.00189		0.00998**		0.00454		0.00179
(unemp.=1)		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Respond. origin		-0.0945		-0.409***		-0.157**		-0.178**		-0.253***
(native=1)		(0.058)		(0.069)		(0.059)		(0.059)		(0.060)
Father's origin		-0.119*		-0.189**		0.0202		-0.0637		0.0391
(native=1)		(0.054)		(0.064)		(0.054)		(0.055)		(0.055)
Mother's origin		-0.0708		-0.139*		-0.0429		-0.0385		-0.115*
(native=1)		(0.055)		(0.065)		(0.056)		(0.056)		(0.057)
Education		0.0329***		0.0267***		0.00906		0.0170***		0.0490***

		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)
Income		0.0120***		0.00672		0.00246		0.00594		0.00693
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Ideology		-0.0257***		-0.0236***		-0.0198***		-0.0199***		-0.0166***
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)
Constant	2.403***	2.802***	2.823***	3.619***	0.819***	1.109***	0.726***	1.077***	1.003***	1.254***
	(0.074)	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.116)	(0.085)	(0.109)	(0.071)	(0.097)	(0.058)	(0.085)
Observations	15,288	11,310	15,269	11,325	15,240	11,299	15,326	11,361	15,212	11,288

Note. Standard errors in parentheses
*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

Beginning with National Institutions, the results were significant and negative in two models. In the case of Institutional Acceptance, for each increase in trust in National Institutions, there was a reduction of about 1% in the belief that the government should be generous in the applications of refuge. Similarly, Culture was significative and negative at 1% ($p < 0.001$), increasing people's suspicion that immigrants strengthens local culture. For these two indicators, the effect of institutional confidence was negative.

The next two institutions also presented a negative scenario. In the case of the armed forces, with the exception of Culture, all other indicators were significative at 1% ($p < 0.001$), which suggests that the greater the confidence in this institution, the greater the negative perception in relation to immigrants. In the case of the police, the only indicator that was significant was Development, but also in the negative direction. It is worth mentioning that these two institutions are repressive, which makes it understandable that a citizen who trusts a lot tends to credit value in the actions commonly applied by the two.

Finally, only the Supreme Court and the United Nations showed a positive relationship with the indicators. In the case of the United Nations, the Culture indicator showed a strong magnitude. With each increase in confidence in the United Nations, the belief that immigrants strengthen local culture increased in about 10%.

After the inclusion of the control variables, some changes can be observed. National Institutions lost its significance, and no indicator was significant in any model. In turn, both the armed forces and the police kept the negative direction of the variables, which reinforces the argument that an increase in confidence in coercive institutions reduces positive attitudes towards immigrants. Conversely, both the Supreme Court and the United Nations maintained their significance, showing a positive relationship between trust in institutions and citizens' attitudes.

Following the control variables, despite the low magnitude, younger people are more prone to positive attitudes than older people. In case of gender, the results suggest that men express more positive attitudes than women. However, only the indicator Development received significance.

Regarding the employment status of the respondents, the results suggest that unemployed people in general have more negative attitudes towards immigrants regarding Urban Crime.

When analyzing the origin of citizens, it is clear that if the respondent is an immigrant, attitudes are more positive. This result was already expected and is in line with previous ones in this variable. The same can be seen in relation to father's origin. If the correspondent's father

is an immigrant, attitudes are positive and significant both in relation to Institutional Acceptance and to Development. The same result was found regarding the mother's origin, but in relation to the indicators Development and Culture.

Finally, people with a higher level of education had more positive attitudes towards immigrants than those with a low level of education. The same can be seen in income. The higher the income, the more positive the attitude. Also, the result confirms that left-wing people are more receptive to immigrants than those that are right-wing.

5.6 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

This section summarizes whether the proposed hypotheses have been confirmed or not.

5.6.1 The Interpersonal Trust Hypothesis

According to the first hypothesis, it's expected that the higher the interpersonal trust, the more positive the attitudes towards immigrants. The results show a positive and statistically significant relationship for at least four indicators, which suggests that social capital positively impacts citizens' attitudes towards immigrants. In general, the indicators Urban Crime (22%) and Economy (21,5%) presented the higher magnitudes. This may suggest that higher levels of social capital reduce people's belief that immigrants increase the levels of urban crime and of unemployment. Even after the inclusion of the controls, the significance remained. The results were robust, which allows me to state that the first hypothesis was confirmed.

5.6.2 The Institutional Trust Hypothesis

Positive significance was observed for National Institutions, which suggests positive attitudes in at least two indicators. However, after the inclusion of the controls, the significance disappeared in all of them. In that case, I can't reject the null hypothesis. Because no indicator maintained its significance, the hypothesis was not confirmed for this variable.

Second, both the armed forces and the police presented negative and significant results, contrary to the proposed hypothesis. Even after the inclusion of the controls, the negative direction remained. However, as previously observed, this result makes sense, which strongly suggests that the greater the confidence in the armed forces and police, the more negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Finally, the Supreme Court and the United Nations were the two institutions which confirmed the proposed hypothesis, as they have a positive impact on the perception and opinion of citizens in relation to immigrants.

5.6.3 Summary

Table 13 summarizes the seven indicators and whether each of them was confirmed according to the proposed hypothesis or not. “Confirmed” means that one or all indicators were statistically significant, in the positive direction, according to the proposed hypothesis, while “Not confirmed” means one or all indicators were negatively associated with high levels of trust and attitudes towards immigrants.

Table 13. Summary of Interpersonal and Institutional Trust Hypotheses for the Americas

	Confirmed	Not Confirmed
Interpersonal Trust	X	
National Institutions		X
Armed Forces		X
Police		X
Supreme Court	X	
United Nations	X	

6 EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

6.1 OVERVIEW

In this chapter I analyze, from a comparative perspective, the main empirical findings of chapters 4 and 5. Nevertheless, it is important to say that I will not compare regression results. Such analysis does not make sense, since the databases are different, the format of the questions is different, and the methodology of each survey has peculiarities—all of this hinders adequate comparison. I will, however, analyze the expectations of this research for each region, and what the results tell us about them. The chapter is structured in three parts. First, I present a general outline of the main findings of the research and discuss each of them in a separate section. Second, I analyze the most extreme cases in Europe and the Americas by discussing the main points observed and how they compare to the findings of this study and the literature. Although the analysis is not exhaustive, the main goal of this chapter is to understand the results in the light of the literature, and the possible explanations for them.

6.2 A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE RESULTS

Social capital as a predictor of citizens' preferences in relation to immigrants has gained ground and rivaled traditional explanations related to the economy and to urban crime (Coffé, 2009). Although there is a considerable amount of literature that criticizes its possible effects on society (see Theiss-Morse and Hibbing, 2005), it is worth questioning what has led to this emergency. From a rational point of view, trust would be meaningless, since it is not certain that the other person will reciprocate. In other words, *not trusting* would be rational (Warren, 1999). The results, however, suggest that, for most indicators, social capital operated positively and with great magnitude in attitudes towards immigrants.

Some initial considerations can be listed about the results, which will serve as the basis for this chapter.

A. Eastern European countries versus Nordic countries

The results showed a pattern. In practically all scenarios, Eastern European countries were the least receptive to immigrants, both in interpersonal and institutional matters, with special attention to Hungary. On the other hand, Nordic countries took turns being the most positive. In some cases, Sweden, in others, Norway and Denmark.

B. Guatemala, Peru, and Nicaragua versus the United States

For almost all indicators, Guatemala, Peru and Nicaragua were among the least positive in relation to immigrants, while the United States the most positive. But what can explain this difference? And how can social capital help in this explanation? I will return to this discussion later in the chapter.

C. United Kingdom and trust in the EU Parliament

One of the biggest surprises of this research was the low percentage of positive attitudes from the United Kingdom in several indicators (see figures 5, 8, 10 and 14). The United Kingdom was the country with the least confidence in the EU Parliament (see figure 14). Such mistrust of the population may explain some recent events, such as the withdrawal from the European Union, as one of the biggest disagreements has been precisely the immigration policies applied by the bloc (Denisson et al., 2020).

D. The relevance of Urban Crime, Culture and Economy

By far, Urban Crime, Culture and Economy were the indicators that most impacted attitudes towards immigrants. See, for example, figure 18, which correlates the Economy with the National Institutions indicators in Europe. The correlation was strong and positive (0.87), suggesting that high confidence indicators in National Institutions leads to the belief that immigrants positively impact the national economy. Similarly, figure 31, which correlates the Culture indicator with interpersonal trust (0.72), suggests a strong relationship between both. I will return to this discussion in the next sections.

E. Coercive institutions and social capital

In both regions, all coercive institutions presented results contrary to the proposed hypotheses. In other words, high confidence indicators in the armed forces and the police seemed to reduce positive opinions regarding immigrants. In this case, are coercive institutions enemies of social capital? I will also deepen this analysis.

F. The contact hypothesis and the findings of this study—the variable "Friends"

One of the variables in this study, related to contact theory and with a strong magnitude in all results, was "Friends" (analyzed in the European case). In the case of the Culture indicator,

for example, with each increase in the number of friends of different nationalities, there was an increase in about 44% in the perception that immigrants strengthen local culture (see Table 8). The magnitude was high, which requires an analysis of this result and what the literature says about it.

G. Ideology and attitudes toward immigrants

One of the variables that most cause social and political discussion is ideology. Literature has shown that right-wing parties are less receptive to immigration than left-wing parties. The results found agree with the literature, and because it is an increasingly current debate, I will deepen this discussion and link it to how social capital behaved in the findings of this study.

6.3 DISCUSSION OF THE MOST RELEVANT FINDINGS

6.3.1 The Power of Culture

Culture is one of the most relevant indicators for studies on social capital, and is practically ubiquitous when correlated with immigration issues. This is because the cultural baggage brought by immigrants makes the community more culturally heterogeneous. When questioning whether "*[country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries*", in Europe, and if "*immigration strengthens cultural diversity*", in the Americas, the questions capture people's perception of how much immigration is capable of positively or negatively impacting the country's cultural life. It is well-known that anti-immigrant sentiment has grown in the world. But what does the literature tell us about this phenomenon? And how do the results found here contribute to these studies?

Conflict theory argues that the increase in social heterogeneity, caused by immigration, threatens countries' culture. According to this perspective, the threat can occur in two ways: realistic and symbolic (Citrin et al., 1990; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004). Realistic threats would be represented by job competition and dispute over scarce resources, in addition to the belief that foreigners benefit more from the resources than the natives. In the literature, political scientists have found mixed results for realistic threat and its impact on public opinion in relation to immigrants (Newman et al., 2012). However, statistical results fail both to confirm this belief and to find robust results of this impact in the opinion of citizens. In contrast, symbolic threats (where culture is located) usually present robust results regarding the impact on the opinion of citizens (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Among these threats is the idea that

local culture, beliefs, values and national identity will be harmed by the presence of immigrants (Huntington, 1996). In addition to the empirical results, this symbolic threat is used to guide political positions and support restrictive immigration policies (Hood &Morris, 1997). On the other hand, contact theory states that the increase in immigration reduces prejudice, because as long as we know each other more, we assimilate cultures different from ours better and understand that they do not threaten us.

However, as already exposed, most of the empirical literature supports the theory of conflict, and not contact. Some research can be cited about the relationship between culture and social capital, and how the findings fit this literature.

In an extensive literature review over a period of 20 years, covering at least 100 studies of immigration attitudes in about two dozen countries, Hainmueller & Hopkins (2014) argue that the most consistent findings are found in research guided by symbolic threats, especially cultural ones. Similarly, Card et al. (2012), using the 2002 ESS, note that cultural indicators had a greater impact on attitudes towards immigrants than economic ones. Although the belief that immigrants are a fiscal burden is latent, symbolic threats are stronger. In the case of Italy, Sniderman et al. (2000), using the 1994 Nationally Representative Survey, found that correspondents did not distinguish Eastern Europeans and African immigrants in relation to their cultural threat. Regardless of the immigrant's origin, it is enough that he/she is a foreigner for the perception of symbolic threat to guide citizens' preferences. Similarly, Sniderman et al. (2000) found that symbolic factors are twice as important in citizens' preferences as economic factors.

Using the ESS between 2002-2014, totaling 22 countries, Economidou et al. (2020) found that, in highly multicultural societies, social capital has a positive effect and makes citizens more receptive to immigrants. Similarly, Gundelach (2013), using the WVS between 2005-2008 and covering 47 countries, found that social capital prevails in countries with high cultural diversity, unlike countries with low social capital. Economidou & Gundelach are followed by other studies (see Herreros & and Criado, 2009; Dancyger, 2013; Macdonald, 2020; Sipinen et al., 2020).

In the opposite direction, Jeannet (2019), using the same ESS, found an inverse relationship between social capital and attitudes towards immigrants. In her longitudinal comparative study, she specifically analyzed political distrust and founds that growth in foreign populations is associated with higher political distrust. Jeannet is not alone in her findings (see also Coffé and Geys, 2006; Coffé, 2009).

In this study, the results leave no doubt in respect to the Culture indicator, and support

the group of authors who found a positive association between social capital and attitudes towards immigrants. In the case of Europe, all of the interpersonal and institutional variables that received any significance agreed with the literature that found a positive relationship. The scenario was similar in the case of the Americas. In other words, the Culture indicator fully agreed with the other surveys that show a positive relationship between social heterogeneity (where there is cultural multiplicity) and positive attitudes towards immigrants.

6.3.2 The Impact of the Economy

Although Culture is important in explaining attitudes towards immigrants, as noted in the literature, and has achieved explanatory capacity that is many times greater than economic factors, the economy is not far behind. Except for the armed forces in the case of the Americas, all other indicators were positive and significant, which validated the tested hypotheses.

Before a comparative analysis of the results of this research with the literature, it is important to highlight that the economy has been closely associated with social capital, and widely used in social capital studies. I dare say that, compared to cultural issues, economic factors have been more studied than cultural issues. Long-standing research seeks to find evidence that social capital impacts a series of economic indicators. Arrow (1972) and Fukuyama (1995), for example, argue that a society's level of confidence impacts its economic success or failure, while Putnam (1993) states that, in societies with high indicators of social capital, institutional and economic performance is more efficient. The literature, however, varies substantially, with some studies showing how the economy impacts social capital, while others show how social capital impacts the economy.

Regarding the impact of social capital on the economy, I begin by citing a famous study by Knack & Keefer (1997). The authors present evidence that social capital matters for the measurement of economic performance. However, trust and civic norms are stronger in countries with more equal incomes, where institutions prevent predatory impulses from the executive branch, and countries with populations with high educational and ethnically homogeneous indicators. Yet what would be the mechanism that would lead to economic success? Basically, all economic transactions lack a certain level of confidence, in the sense that the other party might not comply with what has been agreed. rust (or the lack of it) permeates relationships that span bonds between neighbors and families all the way to business negotiations. Trust lowers transaction costs, since trust lessens the fear of being exploited in economic transactions. In these terms, the frequency of judicialization and litigation can diminish. The authors also point out that high confidence indicators reduce the dependence on

formal institutions to enforce agreements.

Yet what is the relationship between economic variables and attitudes towards immigrants? Basically, one point of view would be that increased immigration would generate economic pressure and increase competition for job openings, which would lead to a perception that immigrants steal jobs from the natives. The negative perception would be greater among low-skilled natives, which are more sensitive to economic volatility (Inglehart, 1990; Mayda, 2006; Isaksen, 2019). However, it is important to note that empirical research does not support this common sentiment. Although this country is not the subject of this study, it is worth mentioning an important natural experiment in Israel. During the 1990s, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, more than 700,000 Russians arrived in Israel and raised the percentage of the working population by more than 15%. Although poverty and unemployment were expected to rise, between 1989 and 1997 rates fell considerably, and the market absorbed the surplus labor. Years later, Israel remains a thriving regional power in technological development, despite its small territorial extension (Powell et al., 2017).

When associating social capital with citizen's attitudes, the literature does not diverge a lot, and recognizes its positive impact. Economidou et al. (2020) show that, despite different social contexts and economic conditions, such as ethnic diversity and cultural origin, social capital reduces the perception that immigrants are bad for the economy.

The results of this study are in line with most empirical research available to date. Except for the armed forces in the case of the Americas, all other results showed a positive relationship. In other words, social capital seems to reduce the negative sentiment towards immigrants, suggesting that greater personal and institutional trust is associated with positive attitudes. See, for example, figure 18, with a strong correlation (0.87), which suggests a strong, positive and statistically significant correlation between social capital and the sentiment that they do not have a negative impact on the national economy. However, it should be noted that this impact does not appear to be strong and equal for all countries. While in Slovenia, Portugal, Poland, and Spain social capital the correlation was weak, in Norway, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden it was very strong. In general, however, the effect was positive and in agreement with most of the empirical literature.

6.3.3 Are Coercive Institutions Enemies of Social Capital?

This is a very sensitive issue. Apparently, the literature lacks specific studies on the relationship between coercive institutions (e.g., police and armed forces) and the impact on citizens' attitudes in relation to immigrants. Authors often use institutions like the government,

politicians and political parties, and ignore these. Studies that use social capital and its relationship with coercive institutions generally aim to show its relevance for the implementation of community policies to achieve greater success (Pino, 2001). For instance, they have shown: that officers and other officials with greater social capital perform better in community policing (Robinson, 2003; Choi, 2010), partial evidence that social capital reduces the distrust of blacks regarding the police in the United States (Macdonald and Stokes, 2006), arguments that the effectiveness of police actions depends on the level of social capital in communities (Hawdon, 2008), and benefits of social capital in assisting, recovering and making the transition of veterans to civilian life (Albertson et al., 2015), etc. But what about the immigrants?

Apparently, there is a big gap in studies on coercive institutions, social capital and immigration. While studies on immigration and coercive institutions abound, when including topics such as trust in this relationship, the number of studies is still low. Research, however, has shown that they also matter and should be included in this type of studies on migration.

Some important issues have been raised around studies that attempt to associate urban crime and immigration. The relationship between coercive institutions and immigration tends to be shown in a conflicting way, often portraying immigrants as potential criminals and coercive institutions as restorers of law and order. Menjívar et al. (2018), in an extensive literature review, cites several examples of how the term "crimmigration" has become common in associating urban crime with immigrants, and how enforcement policies are seen as beneficial for their reduction. However, as already exposed, there is not robust empirical support for the idea that immigrants are prone to crime (see topics 1.2 and 2.2.2).

Research shows that community trust in the police is essential if the institution's objectives are to be achieved more quickly. For example, when residents rely heavily on local law enforcement institutions, the level of reporting crime is higher. That is, the population becomes a strong ally of the institution (Murphy et al., 2014). Yet despite the relative success in this relationship, in some cases, Pass et al. (2020) recall that when it comes to communities with a high degree of ethnic diversity, public confidence in the police is still a challenge, since ethnic minorities tend to trust the police less than the natives (Bird, 1992; Brown and Benedict 2002; Murphy and Cherney 2011). Such mistrust could be explained by the experiences of these minorities with the police, not only in relation to arrests and detentions, but also due to ignorance around local laws and behaviors (Meredyth et al., 2010). Thus, if experience and perception are negative, it is unlikely that immigrants will trust the police to act on their behalf.

On the other hand, if immigrants are portrayed as potentially dangerous, and if trust in

the police is shaped by experiences and expectations in their competence to stop crime and maintain order (Tyler, 2005), community trust in the institution might be high. In these terms, it is understandable that social capital has a negative effect on attitudes towards immigrants: in this sense, the greater the confidence in the coercive institutions, the less the perception that immigrants are good for the economy, for local culture, for religious diversity, etc. My initial expectation was that social capital, in terms of institutional trust, would minimize a possible aversion of immigrants on the part of the natives, and would generate greater confidence and positive attitudes towards immigrants. Such an expectation, however, failed regarding coercive institutions. For both Europe and the Americas, the results suggest that trust in such institutions decreases positive attitudes towards immigrants.

Two additional observations are worth mentioning: first, I am not saying that all immigrants are good and do not commit social deviations. Consider, for example, the recent case of the immigrant Brahim Aouissaoui, a 21-year-old Tunisian that killed three people inside a church in the city of Nice, France. Aouissaoui, as well as hundreds of migrants, crossed the Mediterranean near Lampedusa. The perpetrator of the attacks arrived on European territory on September 20, 2020, and in just over a month he committed a crime that shocked the world. The images that crossed the world don't show Aouissaoui, but show the police entering the church and shooting several times[56], fulfilling their role of maintaining law and order. The images reinforced the idea of the general criminal potential of immigrants and the positive image of the police in this kind of role. Additionally, in recent decades, terrorist attacks by immigrants have been common (see some examples in Nowrasteh, 2016, 2019 and Landgrave and Nowrasteh, 2019), which has also helped contribute to a stereotype that - although it might be true for some - it is not true of all immigrants.

The goal here is to simply explore possible explanations for the results found in this research and the literature, where natives trust the police more than immigrants, and where an increase in confidence in this institution reduces the positive perception of them. Although empirical research shows that immigration does not substantially impact aggregate crime rates (Bove and Böhmelt, 2016; Forrester et al., 2019), Legewie's natural experiment (2013) showed that terrorist attacks, like this one in Nice, impact attitudes towards immigrants.

Secondly, the lack of studies that seek to understand the causal mechanisms of this inverse relationship between institutional trust and attitudes in the literature is evident. This was not a goal of this study, but it does shed light on a gap that will benefit from future research on

[56] The images can be seen at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dLE2EIOkuNs.

the topic. It is easy to find research that studies the relationship between immigration and urban crime, but it is much more difficult to find how social capital and coercive institutions relate to immigrants, positively or negatively.

6.3.4 Let's be Friends?

Social capital is directly linked to contact, relationship networks, community participation. One of the variables that showed the greatest significance was "Friends". Unfortunately, the variable was found only in the ESS questionnaire. The argument that the increase in the number of friends of other nationalities reduces prejudice and leads to positive attitudes towards immigrants, although it is not supported by great part of the literature , not only was empirically confirmed in this study, but also presented great significance both in the interpersonal and institutional spheres. Some research supports these findings.

Oliver et al. (2020) analyze whether the Utrecht Refugee Launchpad had a positive effect on the reception and inclusion of refugees. The experiment, at the local level, aimed to unite natives and refugees by bringing together, in co-housing, young local tenants with asylum seekers in order to improve integration and local relations. The results showed that the bonds of friendship formed between natives and asylum seekers allowed for faster local insertion than the traditional asylum seekers, coordinated by the local authorities. Although the research found that relationships were ephemeral and unsustainable, due to its short duration and time of the experiment, the initiative showed that prejudice and indifference decrease when people from other cultures are placed in common contact with the locals.

Recent research has also sought to analyze the impact of the increase in the circle of friendships in social capital. Greenhow and Burton (2011) analyzed whether social capital has a positive impact on the performance of low-income students. Specifically, the authors accessed students' social networks. The results showed a positive association between the use of social networks, showing that those who used the networks more and formed longer-lasting friendship relationships performed better, and were also able to solve problems and find opportunities faster compared to those who those who did not use the social networks a lot or were not in the habit of making friends and using social networks[57]. To study these ties of friendship, Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, among other nationalities were included in the analysis.

Similarly, Ellison et al. (2007) analyzed the relationship between the use of Facebook

[57] It is important to highlight that social networks are not always positively associated with all indicators. The research in question was guided in a single dimension. However, positive and negative points are increasingly raised about the use of social networks and their impacts on different social spheres.

and the formation and maintenance of social capital among undergraduate students. The analyses showed that the use of Facebook, whether for maintaining friendships or creating new friends, is associated with measures of psychological well-being, in addition to benefiting users with low self-esteem and satisfaction with life. Research has shown not only the relationship between social capital and the use of social networks but, above all, how the act of increasing your social networks and new friendships reduces prejudice.

6.3.5 Left versus Right

One of the most recent phenomena associated with increased immigration in the world is the strengthening of far-right parties. The anti-immigration discourse has been widely used by this group, especially in Europe. The results of this research support this phenomenon. In all four tables (8, 9, 11 and 12) all models were significant and negative. Both the scale of ESS and WVS vary from 0-10, being 0 far left and 10 far right. The negative sign shows that people on the left have more positive attitudes towards immigrants than those on the right. But what explains this phenomenon? Which mechanism can be associated between the far right and anti-immigration sentiment?

Halla et al. (2017) analyzed whether the presence of immigrants in Austrian communities affected voting in far-right parties, specifically in the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). The authors find that the flow of immigrants has a significant impact on votes for the FPÖ. Other findings are even more interesting. The effect of immigration is greatest where unemployment among natives is high, and competition for work is greatest where natives are highly educated and where there are more immigrant children. To be successful, far-right parties need to associate immigrants with some kind of threat, whether cultural or economic:

> [...] economic theory suggests that immigration hurts natives supplying production factors closely substitutable by those of immigrants. In contrast, individuals who supply complementary factors will gain from immigration. Presenting antiimmigration platforms, far-right parties should appeal to voters who lose from immigration. Specifically, low-skill immigration would be perceived as particularly problematic by Austrian voters. Moreover, we hypothesize that voters in high unemployment communities and in communities with strong labor market competition among natives and immigrants should be more inclined to the far right in response to immigration (Halla et al., 2017, pp. 1359).

In other words, if far-right parties and politicians fail to convince natives that immigrants pose a threat, it will be more difficult to get votes.

In the case of the United States, Mayda et al. (2015) found that when the flow of immigration is steady, Democrats benefit from immigration. On the other hand, when the flow

is greater than the normal, Republicans are benefitted.

Another relevant study presents a natural experiment conducted in Greece, in the Aegean islands. Dinas et al. (2019) tested whether exposure to refugees increases support for far-right parties. The authors show that in municipalities and cities that experienced a sudden increase in the flow of immigrants, electoral support for the far-right parties increased by 2 percentage points, which means an increase in more than 40 percent, on average.

Not all research finds a positive relationship in this sense, however. In a natural experiment in Austria, Steinmayr (2016) found a negative relationship between exposure to refugees and support for far-right parties. The results are contrary to what Halla et al. (2017) found in the same country. The authors suggest support for the contact theory, with exposure being able to reduce prejudice against refugees. As the exposure increases, in the medium and long term, aspects such as fear of competition for work decrease, reducing the anti-immigration sentiment. Similarly, by collecting data from the Comparative Manifestos Project in 18 West European countries, between 1975 and 2005, Alonso and Fonseca (2011) concluded that the impact of the extreme right on electoral behavior has been overstated in previous studies.

6.4 TRUST IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS

This section presents a general overview of trust in Europe and the Americas, and what the results of this research inform about this panorama. I then analyze the most extreme cases - the Eastern European countries, Peru, Guatemala and Nicaragua with the lowest percentages, and the Nordic Countries and United States with the highest—and what the literature says about the cases and results found here.

6.4.1 Overview

Studies on trust in Europe are abundant in the literature. Based on data from the ESS, the findings of this research agree with most of them. In other cases, as in the results for coercive institutions, it presents a result that is still little discussed. In short, some findings should be noted. In the case of the Americas, studies have been mostly conducted in the United States and have mixed results, agreeing on some points and disagreeing on others in this work.

Starting with the indicator Social Acceptance, most respondents (67%) responded 2 or 3, which shows that poverty has been considered by the natives, but with much less force than expected[58]. This is because common sense strongly associates poverty with various social

[58] See Appendix C, Table C.1.

delinquencies, although this has not been linked to robust empirical analyses (Short, 1997; Bankston, 1998; Clark, 1998; DeJong and Madamba, 2001; Nunziata, 2015). In that sense, skin color (figures 5 and Appendix C, Table C.5), used to create the Qualifications indicator, also had a lesser effect on citizens' preferences than expected. Although cases of racism are common, not only in Europe, but around the world, Europeans do not consider skin color to be a relevant requirement for the acceptance of immigrants.

Another curious fact is that citizens trust local parliaments (figure 12 and Appendix B.19) more than the EU Parliament (figure 14 and Appendix, Table B.22). Although the difference was not substantial, it shows the institution's discredit within public opinion. The main objective of the EU Parliament is the convergence of interests between members around issues such as security, the environment and immigration Richer countries, among them the United Kingdom, Austria, Spain, France and Germany (figures 12, 14, and Appendix, tables C.15 and C.19) were among those which respondents trusted the EU Parliament the least. On the other hand, contrary to expectations, the respondents of Lithuania and Hungary, generally among those who showed the lowest confidence, showed the most trust towards the EU. These two indicators show the dynamics of institutional trust in Europe.

Regarding the case of Portugal, surprisingly (and contrary to the Eastern European countries, which generally had the lowest confidence rates) the country had the lowest percentage of interpersonal trust (figure 11), and the highest percentage of Institutional Acceptance (figure 4). This apparently contradictory case reveals the dynamics of trust. It was expected that high confidence indicators generate greater acceptance for immigrants and refugees. However, in the case of Portugal, the scenario is reversed for these two indicators. Figure 33 shows that the percentage of respondents with the lowest interpersonal trust rate is almost 20%, while the percentage of people who believe that the government should be generous in refugee applications is almost 60%.

Figure 33. Percentage of Interpersonal Trust and Institutional Acceptance in Portugal



Turning to the Americas, the findings confirm what the literature has already observed: except for the United States, the percentage of interpersonal and institutional trust in the American continent is very low. This is different from Europe, where there is a greater balance between Nordic, Western, and Eastern countries. Most countries in the Americas have a low percentage of confidence, which is reflected, in some cases, in attitudes towards immigrants.

Another interesting case was observed in Brazil. As a Brazilian, the results presented by the country call my attention. Historically, the country has been considered, by common sense, a friendly, receptive country, where people laugh easily and help their neighbors more than European countries, for example. However, contrary to expectations, the country was, in some indicators, among the least positive (see figures 25 and 26), and had some of the lowest percentages of interpersonal trust. Would Brazil be a hypocritical country that appears to be friendly, but which practice is inconsistent? Although these indicators were low, in most there was a balance, with a clear tendency towards a more positive attitude towards immigrants on the part of respondents, which does not allow me to say that such distrust in these two indicators is enough for greater rejection. in practice. However, as said, the results draw attention.

In relation to interpersonal trust, people are not too concerned about having immigrants as neighbors. This result contrasts with the percentage of confidence in the region, which is mostly low. In turn, respondents from Brazil and Puerto Rico were those who had the least belief that immigrants increase crime.

Regarding coercive institutions, respondents from the USA trust their armed forces and police a lot. In this sense, it is worth remembering that the armed forces are very important for the country. In addition to being the largest military and technological power in the world, the American armed forces have military bases all over the planet, in addition to historic partnerships with several countries. It is natural that, due to its power and efficiency, public

opinion be very positive in relation to this institution.

In economic issues, respondents from Peru and Colombia strongly believe that immigrants are bad for the local economy, while those from Mexico and Puerto Rico had the most positive relationship (figure 22). The scenario repeats itself for Urban Crime (figure 23). In turn, the USA is the country which respondents most believe that immigrants strengthen local culture (figure 24). In general, the USA is practically an outlier in the region (see figure 31) when it comes to interpersonal trust. When it comes to institutional trust, there is a greater balance between countries. But what does the literature on the Americas say?

In the Americas, excepting the United States, the literature has also noted the lack of studies (Güemes, 2019). However, it is unanimous that the percentage of interpersonal and institutional trust is very low. But what can explain this fact? One of the possible explanations is social inequality (Machado et al., 2011; Zmerli & Castillo, 2015). Latin America, for example, is the most unequal region in the world, both economically and socially, with a recent history of authoritarianism and civil strife. Rothstein (2011) also concludes that inequality has a very strong effect on social trust, which is clearly reflected in the region:

> In societies with high levels of economic inequality and with few (or inefficient) policies in place for increasing equality of opportunity, there is less concern for people of different backgrounds. The rich and the poor in a country with a highly unequal distribution of wealth, such as Brazil, may live next to each other, but their lives do not intersect. Their children attend different schools, they use different health care services and other public facilities, and in many cases the poor cannot afford any of these services. The rich are protected by both the police and private guards, whom the poor see as their natural enemies. In such societies, neither the rich nor the poor have a sense of sharing a fate with the other group. Generalized trust is low, while particularized (or in-group) trust will be high. In turn, each group looks out for its own interests and is likely to see the other's demands as at variance with its own well-being. Society is seen as a zerosum game between conflicting groups (pp. 154).

Another possible explanation is the citizens' perception of the corruption and the effectiveness of public services. The World Bank (2015), in analyzing the cases of North Africa and the Middle East, concluded that citizens' low satisfaction with education, health, and perception of institutional corruption are the main determinants of interpersonal, and—especially—institutional trust. Blind (2006) states that confidence decreases with corruption, political scandals, and the perception that the government does not implement policies to generate jobs, and citizens lose confidence that their representatives act honestly and in favor of the population.

6.4.2 The Cases of Eastern European Countries and Guatemala, Peru and Nicaragua

In practically all indicators, Eastern European countries had the lowest acceptance rates for immigrants, and the lowest social capital indices. The result is nothing new. The literature has already observed that, in many cases, countries like Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Czechia have a very negative perception of immigrants. In a report prepared for the Foundation Friedrich Ebert, Messing & Ságvári (2019) show, with their index of rejection, that these countries have the most negative attitudes towards immigrants. But what can explain such rejection?

Klaus (2017) argues that one of the possible causes of such a disparity between Eastern and Western countries can be explained by the securitization of immigration. Since the 1980s, immigration has been increasingly politicized in the region, and immigrants have been portrayed as a threat to social security and stability, with the potential to weaken national traditions and social homogeneity. The author also recalls that this discourse reproduces the myth that there is a Western community or civilization in the same format as in ancient times, and that it could be restored through the exclusion of immigrants. In the case of the European continent, the results suggest that this discourse is stronger precisely in Eastern European countries. In this sense, if immigrants are a threat, hostile policies become acceptable, and they are treated more from a security perspective than from a human rights perspective. Hungary and Poland have shown to be cases that fit this anti-immigration narrative. Both are among the countries with the highest rates of hostility to immigrants and refugees. Hungary has gone beyond Poland and built fences on the border in a clear sign of rejection (see Appendix E, figures E.1, E.2 and E.3).

Another possible explanation is defended by Boda & Medve-Bálint (2014). For the authors, the disparity of these countries in comparison with others is directly related to the perception of confidence that they have in institutions. If citizens do not trust their institutions, their attitudes tend to be negative in several dimensions. Analyzing several European countries, the authors show that the high distrust leads citizens to reject redistributive to educational policies, for instance.

However, one of the most in-depth analysis has been provided by Shevel (2011). Unlike other studies, that compare Eastern European countries with Western ones, Shevel analyzes the countries themselves and what leads them to have such negative attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. The author argues that when there is no consensus on which type of group should be privileged by state policies, a space for nondiscriminatory policy is opened. Her study shows

how, after the fall of communism in those countries, nationalism matters, and impacts citizens' attitudes:

> [...] the politics of national identity functions as the main guides in refugee policy making, with receptivity to refugees depending on the *degree of agreement* among the main political forces over the boundaries of the nation. If the major political forces imagine the ideal nation similarly, as they did in Russia, the politics of national identity results in what I called a consensus definition of the official nation contained in the laws on citizenship and diaspora, and refugees who belonged to the thus defined nation are accepted more readily than others. On the other hand, if major political actors disagree on the question of the nation's boundaries, as was the case in Ukraine, no refugee group – not even the ethnic group seen by some to be the core of the nation – receives preferential treatment (pp. 269).

In other words, national identity policies would be able to guide greater receptivity or rejection to refugees depending on how they are formulated domestically and accepted by political actors. The greater the consensus on what type of policy to be implemented, as in the case of Russia, the greater the privilege received by certain ethnic groups at the expense of others. The smaller the privileges, the greater the openness to ethnic diversity, as in the case of Ukraine.

In sum, it is noticed that the results of this research fit with what most of the literature also finds. However, the low amount of research on Western European countries is noteworthy. The few studies are generally guided by cultural issues, where immigrants and refugees are mostly seen as a cultural threat.

Turning to the Americas, Guatemala, Peru, and Nicaragua took turns among the lowest percentages of confidence in practically all indicators, as well in the attitudes towards immigrants.

In the case of Peru, for example, despite the economic growth observed in recent decades, public opinion polls show that Peruvians are unhappy with the country's economic situation, have a perception of government corruption, face high rates of social inequality, and high levels of insecurity. In 2008, a quarter of respondents stated that they, or a member of their families, had already been victims of urban crime in the previous year (Carrión, 2009). Together, these problems lead not only to low levels of confidence, but also low levels of political participation. If people do not trust the government, they therefore have no incentive to pay taxes, since they doubt that the government will deliver the necessary services.

Peru's recent history reinforces this scenario. During the government of Alberto Fujimori, 1990-2000, the former president dissolved the congress and interfered with the judiciary, the public prosecutor, and the supreme court, in partnership with the armed forces.

All of this institutional breakdown led to economic collapse and the worst cases of corruption in Peru's recent history (Rothstein, 2011; Cohaila, 2020). In this sense, Rothstein & Uslaner (2005), although they argue that inequality is the best predictor of trust, understand that corruption also has a strong impact:

> While our argument puts inequality at the beginning of the causal chain, we also believe that honest government is essential for the enactment of universalistic social welfare programs. There may not be a direct tie between effective government and trust, but dishonest government undermines trust at least indirectly—and it makes universalistic welfare policies difficult to enact [...] Corruption leads to greater inequality, which in turn produces lower levels of trust (pp. 53-54).

The scenario is no different in Guatemala. Despite the agreement signed in 1996, which ended three decades of civil war and made room for a period of democratization, the country still suffers from high indicators of corruption, inequality and urban crime (Zmerli & Castillo, 2015), and other serious social problems. In a national survey in the country, data showed that at least 15% of the population reported paying a bribe to access water.

Nicaragua suffers from similar problems. The country's recent history has been turbulent. The country lived a history of dictatorship for 43 years (1936-1979), led by the Somoza family. After long and bloody civil conflicts and war between 1979-1990, the election of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro began a period of economic stability with assistance from the International Monetary Fund. However, due to its weak economy and international instability, major economic oscillations followed, preventing the country from organizing itself (Ramirez, 2013). It should also be noted that the country's geography is marked by environmental catastrophes, leading to social disorder and other problems. The country's situation is difficult, and problems such as drug trafficking, domestic and sexual violence are frequent.

The cases reported here in both regions suggest a close reality, and a relationship between the country's economic, social, and political situation and trust, reflecting on their attitudes towards immigrants. If the population does not trust institutions and other people, it is understandable that their attitudes be negative towards immigrants. The scenario found agrees with much of the literature: low indicators of interpersonal and institutional trust are associated with negative attitudes. In the case of this research, most results confirm this relationship, especially in Latin American countries.

6.4.3 Nordic Countries and the United States

If the results showed Hungary, Poland, and Czechia among the least receptive to

immigrants, a completely opposite scenario was found in Nordic Countries. Likewise, while in the first case there is a vacuum of analysis trying to understand the phenomenon, the literature on Nordics is considerable. It is not new that in many cases they are outliers, and distance themselves not only from other European neighbors, but from all of the world. Thus, the results of this research are in line with the literature. But what can explain these high levels of confidence in the region?

At least four central explanations can be observed in the literature: social homogeneity; economic development and modernization; democracy and good governance; and voluntary associations and civil society.

Social homogeneity—Nordic countries are among the ones with the greatest similarities between individuals in the world. Such similarity ranges from identity, racial, religious, cultural, and income issues, among others. If trust is built through common bonds, then, the more heterogeneous the society, the higher the levels of social trust. On the other hand, the more heterogeneous, the more conflictive and the less cooperative. Although highly questioned, including by the results of this research, there is robust empirical support in the literature for this proposition (Knack & Keefer 1997; Alesina & La Ferrara 2000; Costa & Kahn 2002; Coffé, 2009).

On the other hand, if we analyze the Eastern European countries, the level of social homogeneity is as high as the Nordic one. Due to the communist period, when the flow of foreigners was minimal, social homogeneity deepened further. Shevel (2011) recalls that, before 1989, virtually no refugees went to Eastern Europe. No flow of people, less social heterogeneity. So, how can we explain the low percentage of confidence in these countries by this logic? Although the argument may offer explanatory elements, it is highly questionable.

Economic development and modernization—This argument shows that economic prosperity is correlated with social trust (Knack & Keefer 1997), whereas the most prosperous countries are precisely those with the highest confidence rates (Jan & Kenneth, 2004). Rothstein & Uslaner (2004) point out that equal opportunity narrows the gap in the labor market between the richest and the poorest. It is not enough just to be rich. The quality of wealth and access to resources makes all the difference. In the case of Brazil, for example, although it is common for rich and poor to live geographically close, the social gap is wide, and geographic proximity is not reflected in equal opportunities:

> In societies with high levels of economic inequality and with few (or inefficient) policies in place for increasing equality of opportunity, there is less concern for people of different backgrounds. The rich and the poor in a country with a highly unequal

> distribution of wealth such as Brazil may live next to each other, but their lives do not intersect (Rothstein & Uslanor, pp. 46).

In this sense, Nordic countries would be an example of exception. Not only is the gap between the rich and the poor smaller, and there is an incentive for more equal access to resources.

However, a reflection is necessary here. In relation to immigrants, the richest are not always necessarily the most receptive, despite having the highest confidence percentages. This relationship also varies between the indicators. See, for example, figures 6 and 16, in chapter 4. Respondents from Austria and Norway are the ones that most believed that immigrants increase rates of urban crime, while Estonia and Poland had the least belief, contrary to the expectation for these countries. In addition, I have already mentioned that respondents from Portugal most believed that the government should be generous in refugee applications, despite having the worst percentages of interpersonal trust. Also, Portugal is not among the richest countries. Although it has explanatory capacity and robust results in the literature, economic prosperity alone does not explain the whole problem.

Voluntary associations and civil society—The most prominent work in relation to this argument was that of Putnam (1993, 2000), which associated a greater presence of voluntary groups and associations with greater confidence indicators. More than that, in regions with more groups, economic performance would be better and institutions more efficient. However, as recalled by Rothstein & Uslaner (2004), this statement has not withstood empirical tests. The mere presence of associations is not able to explain behavior and neither does social trust. In addition, as already noted in this research, not everyone who participates in groups and associations does so out of love for a cause. Sometimes personal interest, and the desire to gain an advantage, speaks louder than ideological belonging. In addition, these groups are highly changeable. New associations open and close constantly, and many cannot resist time. Such variation prevents a robust analysis, since the scenario found now will not be the same the next year.

Democracy and good governance—This is probably one of the strongest arguments to explain the high levels of trust in the Nordic countries. Countries in this region have historically achieved low indicators of corruption, quality public services, economic freedom, guarantee of individual freedoms, good levels of education, and the state is transparent with public accounts (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2017). Rothstein & Uslaner (2004) also point out that:

> Countries with histories of greater equality such as the Nordic nations also had histories of less repressive and more honest governments. Greater equality and less corruption lead to more inclusive (universalistic) social welfare programs and to greater generalized trust (pp. 44).
>
> The Nordic countries have put a lot of effort into creating equality of opportunity, not least in regard to their policies for public education, labor market opportunities, and (more recently) gender equality (pp. 51)

The population, in turn, perceives these indicators and places their trust in the government. As confidence increases, citizens are more comfortable paying their taxes, as they believe the government will be honest and responsive in its demands. Such confidence, as verified in the region, is not found elsewhere, which makes these countries, in some cases, outliers.

In relation to immigrants, the practice of these countries reveals what this research found. In the last decades, Nordic countries have been very attractive to immigrants, offering a robust and inclusive social support system, which has led to increased immigration in the region (Valenta and Bunar, 2010).

Turning to the USA, the country receives millions of immigrants a year, and because it is the largest economy in the world, it is natural that the amount of research is large, both about studies on social capital and attitudes toward immigrants.

In his famous book *Bowling Alone* (2000), Putnam warns of a decrease in American civic engagement, supporting his theory that capital would be declining in the USA. Jones (2019), in turn, confirms many of Putnam's concerns. According to him, trust and voluntary associations in America have decreased quite a bit since the 1970's. And more than that: Americans were happier before the 1970s than now; Americans spend fewer social evenings with friends; levels of trust are considerably higher among Americans that went to college than those that didn't (and both have lost trust over time); trust in America has dropped primarily at younger ages; and males exhibit higher levels of trust, which has declined significantly for both the sexes (pp. 181-199). Despite some positive points observed over the years, the drop in the level of trust and voluntary participation is evident, issues central to social capital. However, although the scenario described by Jones reinforces those of Putnam, they are not consensus. Paxton (1999) provides a robust model for social capital analysis during a 20-year period and concludes that previous studies have a large gap between the concept of social capital and measurement, in addition to presenting very simple measurement indicators. Her results show that, although there is a small decline in interpersonal trust between 1975-94 (about 0.5% per year), there is not a decline in institutional trust, despite some political scandals. This is quite

interesting if compared with Peru, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Corruption scandals have had a strong impact on institutional confidence. One possible explanation is the citizens' perception that those responsible will be punished. While accountability mechanisms in these countries are more problematic, in the United States they are more efficient (see also Weiss et al., 2018).

In fact, this research proved that the scenario in the USA in relation to interpersonal trust is low. But why is the country among the most receptive in the region? It is important to note that although the country is among the most receptive in the region, it does not mean that the scenario is positive. See, for example, figure D.9 (appendix). The figure shows that around 60% don't believe that most people can be trusted. However, in Colombia and Nicaragua, the percentage is around 95%-96%. In other words, although the USA has low interpersonal trust, but due to the fact that the other countries in the region have much lower rates, the country ends up being almost outlier in the region. In the case of institutional confidence, rates vary between indicators.

In the case of both Nordic countries and the USA, some common characteristics can be observed, such as greater accountability, transparency, punishment for corruption scandals, which supports the arguments that this scenario is fertile for social capital. As citizens realize that corrupt people are punished, and that institutions are responsive to their interests, greater trust is observed, and positive attitudes flourish in that environment.

6.5 BUT… WHAT ABOUT THE IMMIGRANTS?

With the exception of the police in Europe and the Americas, and the armed forces and national institutions in the Americas, regressions analysis showed that social capital was positive correlated with all other indicators, and in both regions it seems to positively impact attitudes towards immigrants in most of the analyzed indicators. Contrary to most research, which supports conflict theory (Putnam, 2007), the results were mixed, but with a clear positive predominance.

Although some studies argue that social capital may be declining around the world (van Oorschot et al., 2006; Rodríguez-Sedano et al., 2009; Sarracino and Mikucka, 2016), a radical change in this scenario cannot yet be confirmed. However, it is important to highlight that the analyses presented here provide a consolidated scenario, that is, social capital operating in a consolidated regional perspective. Due to the low confidence found in Eastern European countries, it is tempting to analyze countries individually to see if, in places with low social capital, it has a positive effect on attitudes towards immigrants, or if it has no effect at all. In general, however, the scenario was positive, and even after the inclusion of several control

variables, the significance remained, which suggests a robustness of the model proposed here.

7 CONCLUSION

The aim of this dissertation was to answer the following research question:

Why do some people express more positive attitudes towards immigrants than others?

The question was analyzed from the perspective of social capital, namely interpersonal and institutional trust, and the argument was that the greater these two elements (explanatory variable), the more positive the attitude towards immigrants. The regions studied were Europe and the Americas. To empirically test this relationship, I used two surveys, and created some indicators (dependent variable) that capture people's attitudes on important topics such as culture, race, economy, urban crime, etc. Although the theoretical literature associates social capital with something positive, not all indicators were in this direction. The results suggest that, in most scenarios, social capital had a positive effect, which leads me to conclude that the hypotheses were partially confirmed, but with a clear positive prevalence:

Hypothesis 1: The higher the interpersonal trust, the more positive attitudes towards immigrants.

Hypothesis 2: The higher the institutional trust, the more the positive attitudes towards immigrants.

As a concluding remark, the next three sections briefly discuss issues about the ecological fallacy, limitations and suggestions for future research, and, finally, if we can trust social capital to understand people's attitudes toward immigrants.

7.1 AVOIDING THE ECOLOGICAL FALLACY

In the 19th century in Europe, suicide rates were higher in countries that were mostly Protestant. Thus, the inference was that suicide was strengthened by the social conditions promoted by Protestantism, such as individualism (Durkheim, 1951). In the United States elections of 2000, 2004 and 2008, states with higher per capita income voted for Democrats, and since wealthier states have richer citizens, therefore, what was inferred was that richer citizens vote for Democrats. On the other hand, poorer states voted for Republicans, so poorer citizens vote for Republicans (Gelman et al., 2008).

Both the case of Protestantism in Europe and the vote in the United States are examples of ecological fallacy. According to Monaco (2013): "*Ecological fallacy is improperly inferring an association (or lack of association) at an individual-level based on a group-level relationship*" (pp. 644). In an ecological fallacy, it is inferred that observed results at the aggregate level necessarily work at the individual level: if countries with more Protestants have higher suicide rates, then Protestants are more likely to commit suicide. The desire to simplify reality and infer aiming at generalizations can lead the researcher to get his/her analysis wrong by disregarding individual peculiarities and constant social change.

In the case of this research, it is tempting to state that countries with low levels of corruption have more social capital and express more positive attitudes toward immigrants, i.e., citizens living in countries with low levels of corruption are more positive towards immigrants. However, this would be making the classic ecological fallacy. Although many inferences at the aggregate level are confirmed statistically, their explanatory capacity is reduced, as different results may appear in an individual level analysis (Robinson, 1950).

7.2 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Although the results of this research bring important contributions to the studies on international immigration and social capital, some limitations—natural to any scientific work—can be observed. Although I use individual data, the data is analyzed on a consolidated basis, in two regions, to confirm or not the hypotheses. However, macro analyses can miss details specific to each region or country. If the regression analyses had been separated by country, some indicators might not be significant, that is, social capital would not have had a positive effect, or might even have lower significance. Such variation cannot be observed at the aggregate level.

Regarding suggestions for future research, some insights can be drawn from this dissertation. The first would be the relationship between coercive institutions and immigrants. It is common to use institutions such as the government, national congress, politicians and parties in analyses of institutional confidence, but the inclusion of the armed forces and the police are rare. Research only tends to analyze the degree of confidence that people have in them (Pino, 2001; Robinson, 2003; Macdonald and Stokes, 2006; Choi, 2010; Murphy et al., 2014; Albertson et al., 2015). The results showed that they also matter and can be included in future analyses.

Second, with increasing barriers in Europe and the United States, immigrants have been looking for alternatives. Latin American countries that, until recently, received few immigrants

(such as Brazil, Argentina and Colombia) are receiving more and more. The inclusion of these and other countries in other regions, such as Asia and Oceania, should become more common in future studies.

Finally, it has become increasingly common to study the relationship between corruption and inequality with social capital. The results, and possible explanations in the literature, suggest that these elements have a strong impact on social trust. This dissertation, however, did not deepen this analysis. Future research can use these elements to verify the explanatory capacity of phenomena such as corruption on the confidence of citizens, and if it impacts attitudes towards immigrants.

7.5 IN SOCIAL CAPITAL WE TRUST?

Although the results of this study are encouraging for advocates of "the more the social capital the better", they are not a majority. As already noted, most research tends to find the opposite effect between social heterogeneity, brought about by immigration, and interpersonal and institutional trust. In addition, the empirical portion of the study showed not all results went in the positive direction, which suggests that social capital does not always operate positively. However, even considering this fact, the results were robust, and significance remained even after the inclusion of several control variables. This suggests a positive effect on attitudes towards immigrants in most scenarios. Thus, this research supports the literature that has found similar results.

SUPPLEMENTARY DATA

The data was analyzed using Stata 16, and all supplementary data for analysis and replication of this study, including raw data and computational scripts, can be found on Open Science Framework (OSF) at: osf.io/ydp3j.

European Social Survey data were collected on 4 July 2020.

World Values Survey data were collected on 7 August 2020.

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APPENDIX A: SUPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 2

Table A.1. How Satisfied with Life as a Whole

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Valid	Extremely dissatisfied	489	1,3	1,3	1,3
	1	307	0,8	0,8	2,1
	2	773	2,1	2,1	4,2
	3	1327	3,5	3,5	7,7
	4	1542	4,1	4,1	11,8
	5	3973	10,6	10,6	22,4
	6	3199	8,5	8,5	30,9
	7	6522	17,3	17,4	48,3
	8	9794	26,0	26,1	74,4
	9	5607	14,9	14,9	89,4
	Extremely satisfied	3984	10,6	10,6	100,0
	Total	37517	99,7	100,0	
Missing	Refusal	16	0,0		
	Don't know	84	0,2		
	No answer	6	0,0		
	Total	106	0,3		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table A.2. How Satisfied with Present State of Economy in Country

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Valid	Extremely dissatisfied	2330	6,2	6,3	6,3
	1	1457	3,9	3,9	10,2
	2	3242	8,6	8,8	19,0
	3	4512	12,0	12,2	31,2
	4	4582	12,2	12,4	43,6
	5	6017	16,0	16,3	59,8
	6	4836	12,9	13,1	72,9
	7	4795	12,7	13,0	85,9
	8	3468	9,2	9,4	95,2
	9	1107	2,9	3,0	98,2
	Extremely satisfied	659	1,8	1,8	100,0
	Total	37005	98,4	100,0	
Missing	Refusal	15	0,0		
	Don't know	593	1,6		
	No answer	10	0,0		
	Total	618	1,6		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3

Table B.1. Allow many/few Immigrants from Poorer Countries in Europe

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Allow none	4307	11,4	12,5	12,5
	Allow a few	10831	28,8	31,4	43,8
	Allow some	14397	38,3	41,7	85,5
	Allow many to come and live here	4998	13,3	14,5	100,0
Total		34533	91,8	100,0	
Missing		3090	8,2		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.2. Government Should be Generous Judging Applications for Refugee Status

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Disagree strongly	2782	7,4	7,6	7,6
	Disagree	7648	20,3	21,0	28,6
	Neither agree nor disagree	10343	27,5	28,4	57,0
	Agree	12077	32,1	33,1	90,1
	Agree strongly	3622	9,6	9,9	100,0
	Total	36472	96,9	100,0	
Missing		1151	3,1		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.3. Qualification for Immigration: Speak Country's Official Language

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Extremely important	7268	19,3	19,5	19,5
	1	4067	10,8	10,9	30,4
	2	6680	17,8	17,9	48,3
	3	4779	12,7	12,8	61,1
	4	3135	8,3	8,4	69,5
	5	3869	10,3	10,4	79,9
	6	1656	4,4	4,4	84,3
	7	1728	4,6	4,6	88,9
	8	1443	3,8	3,9	92,8
	9	748	2,0	2,0	94,8
	Extremely unimportant	1935	5,1	5,2	100,0
	Total	37308	99,2	100,0	
Missing		315	0,8		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.4. Qualification for Immigration: Committed to Way of Life in Country

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Extremely important	9207	24,5	24,8	24,8
	1	4932	13,1	13,3	38,0
	2	7252	19,3	19,5	57,5
	3	4988	13,3	13,4	70,9
	4	2925	7,8	7,9	78,8
	5	3706	9,9	10,0	88,8
	6	1129	3,0	3,0	91,8
	7	1034	2,7	2,8	94,6
	8	746	2,0	2,0	96,6
	9	380	1,0	1,0	97,6
	Extremely unimportant	894	2,4	2,4	100,0
	Total	37193	98,9	100,0	
Missing		430	1,1		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.5. Qualification for Immigration: Work Skills Needed in Country

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid. Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Extremely important	5707	15,2	15,3	15,3
	1	3703	9,8	10,0	25,3
	2	7143	19,0	19,2	44,5
	3	5729	15,2	15,4	59,9
	4	3638	9,7	9,8	69,7
	5	4507	12,0	12,1	81,8
	6	1484	3,9	4,0	85,8
	7	1426	3,8	3,8	89,6
	8	1178	3,1	3,2	92,8
	9	635	1,7	1,7	94,5
	Extremely unimportant	2045	5,4	5,5	100,0
	Total	37195	98,9	100,0	
Missing		428	1,1		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.6. Qualification for Immigration: Be White

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Extremely important	1201	3,2	3,2	3,2
	1	617	1,6	1,7	4,9
	2	1275	3,4	3,4	8,3
	3	1399	3,7	3,8	12,1
	4	1407	3,7	3,8	15,9
	5	3842	10,2	10,4	26,3
	6	1623	4,3	4,4	30,7
	7	2332	6,2	6,3	36,9
	8	3020	8,0	8,1	45,1
	9	2878	7,6	7,8	52,9
	Extremely unimportant	17476	46,5	47,1	100,0
	Total	37070	98,5	100,0	
Missing		553	1,5		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.7. Immigrants Take Jobs Away in Country or Create New Jobs

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Take jobs away	2359	6,3	6,5	6,5
	1	1291	3,4	3,6	10,0
	2	2386	6,3	6,6	16,6
	3	3377	9,0	9,3	25,9
	4	3271	8,7	9,0	34,9
	5	11376	30,2	31,3	66,2
	6	3964	10,5	10,9	77,1
	7	4050	10,8	11,1	88,2
	8	2684	7,1	7,4	95,6
	9	766	2,0	2,1	97,7
	Create new jobs	824	2,2	2,3	100,0
	Total	36348	96,6	100,0	
Missing		1275	3,4		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.8. Taxes and Services: Immigrants Take out More than They Put in or Less

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Generally take out more	2094	5,6	5,9	5,9
	1	1432	3,8	4,0	9,9
	2	3082	8,2	8,7	18,6
	3	4389	11,7	12,3	30,9
	4	4074	10,8	11,4	42,3
	5	11453	30,4	32,2	74,5
	6	3104	8,3	8,7	83,2
	7	3022	8,0	8,5	91,7
	8	1900	5,1	5,3	97,0
	9	494	1,3	1,4	98,4
	Generally put in more	564	1,5	1,6	100,0
	Total	35608	94,6	100,0	
Missing		2015	5,4		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.9. Immigration Bad or Good for Country's Economy

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Bad for the economy	2166	5,8	6,0	6,0
	1	1332	3,5	3,7	9,6
	2	2685	7,1	7,4	17,0
	3	3630	9,6	10,0	27,0
	4	3502	9,3	9,6	36,6
	5	8804	23,4	24,2	60,8
	6	4112	10,9	11,3	72,1
	7	4734	12,6	13,0	85,1
	8	3440	9,1	9,5	94,6
	9	945	2,5	2,6	97,2
	Good for the economy	1020	2,7	2,8	100,0
	Total	36370	96,7	100,0	
Missing		1253	3,3		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.10. Immigrants Make Country's Crime Problems Worse or Better

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Crime problems made worse	3065	8,1	8,6	8,6
	1	2130	5,7	6,0	14,6
	2	4411	11,7	12,4	26,9
	3	6093	16,2	17,1	44,0
	4	5194	13,8	14,6	58,6
	5	10593	28,2	29,7	88,3
	6	1668	4,4	4,7	93,0
	7	1317	3,5	3,7	96,7
	8	767	2,0	2,2	98,8
	9	243	0,6	0,7	99,5
	Crime problems made better	180	0,5	0,5	100,0
	Total	35661	94,8	100,0	
Missing		1962	5,2		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.11. Religious Beliefs and Practices Undermined or Enriched by Immigrants

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Religious beliefs and practices undermined	1413	3,8	4,0	4,0
	1	835	2,2	2,4	6,4
	2	2227	5,9	6,3	12,7
	3	3494	9,3	9,9	22,7
	4	3352	8,9	9,5	32,2
	5	12604	33,5	35,9	68,1
	6	3441	9,1	9,8	77,9
	7	3592	9,5	10,2	88,2
	8	2512	6,7	7,2	95,3
	9	742	2,0	2,1	97,4
	Religious beliefs and practices enriched	904	2,4	2,6	100,0
	Total	35116	93,3	100,0	
Missing		2507	6,7		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.12. Allow many/few Immigrants of a Different race/ethnic Group as Majority

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Allow none	4345	11,5	11,9	11,9
	Allow a few	11547	30,7	31,5	43,4
	Allow some	15515	41,2	42,3	85,7
	Allow many	5242	13,9	14,3	100,0
	Total	36649	97,4	100,0	
Missing		974	2,6		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.13. Country's Cultural Life Undermined or Enriched by Immigrants

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Cultural life undermined	1432	3,8	3,9	3,9
	1	954	2,5	2,6	6,5
	2	2000	5,3	5,5	12,0
	3	2951	7,8	8,1	20,1
	4	3026	8,0	8,3	28,4
	5	7401	19,7	20,3	48,7
	6	4100	10,9	11,2	59,9
	7	5592	14,9	15,3	75,3
	8	4912	13,1	13,5	88,7
	9	1947	5,2	5,3	94,1
	Cultural life enriched	2168	5,8	5,9	100,0
	Total	36483	97,0	100,0	
Missing		1140	3,0		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Figure B.1. Scree Test for "Qualifications" Components



Table B.14. Correlation Matrix of "Qualifications" Components

	Language	Be White	Work Skills	Way of Life
Language	1.000			
Be White	0.2351	1.000		
Work Skills	0.5248	0.3437	1.000	

Way of Life	0.3916	0.2433	0.4803	1.000

Table B.15. Kaiser-Meyer-Olklin Test for "Qualifications" Components

Variable	KMO
Language	0.716
Be White	0.794
Work Skills	0.668
Way of Life	0.755
Overall	0.716

Figure B.2. Scree Test for "Economy" Components



Table B.16. Correlation Matrix of "Economy" Components

	Jobs	Taxes	Economy
Jobs	1		
Taxes	0.538	1	
Economy	0.535	0.482	1

Table B.17. Kaiser-Meyer-Olklin Test for "Economy" Components

Variable	KMO
Jobs	0.670
Taxes	0.707
Economy	0.708
Overall	0.694

Table B.18. Most People Can be Trusted or You Can't be Too Careful

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid	Cum. Percent.
Valid	You can't be too careful	1854	4,9	4,9	4,9
	1	1041	2,8	2,8	7,7
	2	2371	6,3	6,3	14,0
	3	3645	9,7	9,7	23,7
	4	3569	9,5	9,5	33,2
	5	7677	20,4	20,4	53,7
	6	4401	11,7	11,7	65,4
	7	6388	17,0	17,0	82,4
	8	4805	12,8	12,8	95,2
	9	1172	3,1	3,1	98,3
	Most people can be trusted	638	1,7	1,7	100,0
	Total	37561	99,8	100,0	
Missing		62	0,2		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.19. Trust in Country's Parliament

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	No trust at all	3774	10,0	10,2	10,2
	1	1961	5,2	5,3	15,6
	2	3274	8,7	8,9	24,4
	3	4177	11,1	11,3	35,8
	4	3828	10,2	10,4	46,1
	5	6158	16,4	16,7	62,9
	6	4231	11,2	11,5	74,3

	7	4498	12,0	12,2	86,5
	8	3231	8,6	8,8	95,3
	9	1007	2,7	2,7	98,0
	Complete trust	729	1,9	2,0	100,0
	Total	36868	98,0	100,0	
Missing	Sistema	755	2,0		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.20. Trust in Politicians

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	No trust at all	5662	15,0	15,2	15,2
	1	3041	8,1	8,2	23,4
	2	4423	11,8	11,9	35,3
	3	4821	12,8	13,0	48,3
	4	4429	11,8	11,9	60,2
	5	6068	16,1	16,3	76,6
	6	3887	10,3	10,5	87,0
	7	3043	8,1	8,2	95,2
	8	1292	3,4	3,5	98,7
	9	271	0,7	0,7	99,4
	Complete trust	218	0,6	0,6	100,0
	Total	37155	98,8	100,0	
Missing		468	1,2		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.21. Trust in Political Parties

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	No trust at all	5389	14,3	14,6	14,6
	1	2995	8,0	8,1	22,7
	2	4575	12,2	12,4	35,1
	3	4957	13,2	13,4	48,5
	4	4455	11,8	12,1	60,5
	5	6172	16,4	16,7	77,2
	6	3840	10,2	10,4	87,6
	7	2853	7,6	7,7	95,3
	8	1272	3,4	3,4	98,8
	9	263	0,7	0,7	99,5

	Complete trust	194	0,5	0,5	100,0
	Total	36965	98,3	100,0	
Missing		658	1,7		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.22. Trust in the European Parliament

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	No trust at all	4032	10,7	11,4	11,4
	1	2071	5,5	5,9	17,3
	2	3248	8,6	9,2	26,5
	3	3874	10,3	11,0	37,5
	4	3970	10,6	11,3	48,8
	5	6956	18,5	19,7	68,6
	6	4138	11,0	11,7	80,3
	7	3577	9,5	10,2	90,5
	8	2266	6,0	6,4	96,9
	9	655	1,7	1,9	98,8
	Complete trust	435	1,2	1,2	100,0
	Total	35222	93,6	100,0	
Missing		2401	6,4		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.23. Trust in the United Nations

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	No trust at all	2328	6,2	6,7	6,7
	1	1226	3,3	3,5	10,2
	2	2030	5,4	5,8	16,0
	3	2806	7,5	8,1	24,1
	4	3194	8,5	9,2	33,3
	5	6680	17,8	19,2	52,5
	6	4536	12,1	13,0	65,5
	7	5222	13,9	15,0	80,5
	8	4171	11,1	12,0	92,5
	9	1627	4,3	4,7	97,2
	Complete trust	973	2,6	2,8	100,0
	Total	34793	92,5	100,0	

Missing		2830	7,5		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.24. Trust in the Legal System

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	No trust at all	2406	6,4	6,5	6,5
	1	1341	3,6	3,6	10,1
	2	2376	6,3	6,4	16,6
	3	3295	8,8	8,9	25,5
	4	3315	8,8	9,0	34,5
	5	5617	14,9	15,2	49,7
	6	4315	11,5	11,7	61,4
	7	5329	14,2	14,4	75,8
	8	5360	14,2	14,5	90,3
	9	2372	6,3	6,4	96,7
	Complete trust	1216	3,2	3,3	100,0
	Total	36942	98,2	100,0	
Missing		681	1,8		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.25. Trust in the Police

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	No trust at all	1164	3,1	3,1	3,1
	1	660	1,8	1,8	4,9
	2	1230	3,3	3,3	8,2
	3	1868	5,0	5,0	13,2
	4	2365	6,3	6,3	19,5
	5	5108	13,6	13,7	33,2
	6	4324	11,5	11,6	44,7
	7	6639	17,6	17,8	62,5
	8	7619	20,3	20,4	82,9
	9	3959	10,5	10,6	93,5
	Complete trust	2445	6,5	6,5	100,0
	Total	37381	99,4	100,0	
Missing		242	0,6		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.26. Correlation Matrix of "National Institutions" Components

	Parliament	Politicians	Pol. Parties
Parliament	1		
Politicians	0.747	1	
Pol. Parties	0.714	0.867	1

Figure B.3. Scree Test for "National Institutions" Components



Table B.27. Kaiser-Meyer-Olklin Test for "National Institutions" Components

Variable	KMO
Parliament	0.859
Politicians	0.668
Pol. Parties	0.695
Overall	0.725

Table B.28. Age of Respondent

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	14	2	0,0	0,0	0,0
	15	206	0,5	0,5	0,6
	16	455	1,2	1,2	1,8
	17	489	1,3	1,3	3,1
	18	466	1,2	1,2	4,3
	19	438	1,2	1,2	5,5

20	419	1,1	1,1	6,6
21	465	1,2	1,2	7,8
22	461	1,2	1,2	9,1
23	438	1,2	1,2	10,2
24	471	1,3	1,3	11,5
25	501	1,3	1,3	12,8
26	460	1,2	1,2	14,0
27	490	1,3	1,3	15,3
28	467	1,2	1,2	16,6
29	530	1,4	1,4	18,0
30	497	1,3	1,3	19,3
31	508	1,4	1,4	20,7
32	517	1,4	1,4	22,1
33	554	1,5	1,5	23,5
34	604	1,6	1,6	25,1
35	624	1,7	1,7	26,8
36	586	1,6	1,6	28,4
37	608	1,6	1,6	30,0
38	604	1,6	1,6	31,6
39	590	1,6	1,6	33,2
40	625	1,7	1,7	34,8
41	601	1,6	1,6	36,4
42	563	1,5	1,5	37,9
43	605	1,6	1,6	39,5
44	580	1,5	1,5	41,1
45	632	1,7	1,7	42,8
46	644	1,7	1,7	44,5
47	683	1,8	1,8	46,3
48	619	1,6	1,6	47,9
49	647	1,7	1,7	49,7
50	705	1,9	1,9	51,5
51	643	1,7	1,7	53,3
52	647	1,7	1,7	55,0
53	654	1,7	1,7	56,7
54	636	1,7	1,7	58,4
55	710	1,9	1,9	60,3
56	654	1,7	1,7	62,0
57	632	1,7	1,7	63,7
58	665	1,8	1,8	65,5
59	627	1,7	1,7	67,2
60	680	1,8	1,8	69,0
61	575	1,5	1,5	70,5
62	625	1,7	1,7	72,2
63	601	1,6	1,6	73,8

64	682	1,8	1,8	75,6
65	635	1,7	1,7	77,3
66	625	1,7	1,7	79,0
67	641	1,7	1,7	80,7
68	631	1,7	1,7	82,3
69	582	1,5	1,6	83,9
70	525	1,4	1,4	85,3
71	493	1,3	1,3	86,6
72	476	1,3	1,3	87,9
73	495	1,3	1,3	89,2
74	411	1,1	1,1	90,3
75	435	1,2	1,2	91,4
76	367	1,0	1,0	92,4
77	330	0,9	0,9	93,3
78	338	0,9	0,9	94,2
79	276	0,7	0,7	94,9
80	290	0,8	0,8	95,7
81	257	0,7	0,7	96,4
82	232	0,6	0,6	97,0
83	184	0,5	0,5	97,5
84	197	0,5	0,5	98,0
85	162	0,4	0,4	98,5
86	139	0,4	0,4	98,8
87	104	0,3	0,3	99,1
88	83	0,2	0,2	99,3
89	73	0,2	0,2	99,5
90	47	0,1	0,1	99,6
91	42	0,1	0,1	99,8
92	30	0,1	0,1	99,8
93	26	0,1	0,1	99,9
94	13	0,0	0,0	99,9
95	9	0,0	0,0	100,0
96	4	0,0	0,0	100,0
97	2	0,0	0,0	100,0
99	2	0,0	0,0	100,0
100	3	0,0	0,0	100,0
101	1	0,0	0,0	100,0
102	1	0,0	0,0	100,0
104	1	0,0	0,0	100,0
114	1	0,0	0,0	100,0
Total	37548	99,8	100,0	
Missing	75	0,2		
Total	37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.29. Gender

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	1	17707	47,1	47,1	47,1
	2	19894	52,9	52,9	100,0
	Total	37601	99,9	100,0	
Missing		22	0,1		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.30. Unemployed for a Period More than Three Months

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	NO	26751	71,1	71,4	71,4
	YES	10701	28,4	28,6	100,0
	Total	37452	99,5	100,0	
Missing		171	0,5		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.31. Feeling About Household's Income Nowadays

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Living comfortably	1815	4,8	4,9	4,9
	Coping on present income	6043	16,1	16,2	21,1
	Difficult on present income	17309	46,0	46,4	67,5
	Very difficult	12118	32,2	32,5	100,0
	Total	37285	99,1	100,0	
Missing		338	0,9		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.32. Born in Country

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	NO	3712	9,9	9,9	9,9
	YES	33900	90,1	90,1	100,0

	Total	37612	100,0	100,0
Missing		11	0,0	
Total		37623	100,0	

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.33. Father Born in Country

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	NO	5353	14,2	14,3	14,3
	YES	32028	85,1	85,7	100,0
	Total	37381	99,4	100,0	
Missing		242	0,6		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.34. Mother Born in Country

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	NO	5108	13,6	13,6	13,6
	YES	32429	86,2	86,4	100,0
	Total	37537	99,8	100,0	
Missing		86	0,2		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.35. Friends of a Different Race

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Yes, several	19219	51,1	51,3	51,3
	Yes, a few	12963	34,5	34,6	85,9
	No, none at all	5292	14,1	14,1	100,0
	Total	37474	99,6	100,0	
Missing		149	0,4		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.36. How Satisfied with Present State of Economy in Country

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Valid	Extremely dissatisfied	2330	6,2	6,3	6,3
	1	1457	3,9	3,9	10,2
	2	3242	8,6	8,8	19,0
	3	4512	12,0	12,2	31,2
	4	4582	12,2	12,4	43,6
	5	6017	16,0	16,3	59,8
	6	4836	12,9	13,1	72,9
	7	4795	12,7	13,0	85,9
	8	3468	9,2	9,4	95,2
	9	1107	2,9	3,0	98,2
	Extremely satisfied	659	1,8	1,8	100,0
	Total	37005	98,4	100,0	
Missing	Refusal	15	0,0		
	Don't know	593	1,6		
	No answer	10	0,0		
	Total	618	1,6		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.37. Satisfaction with Democracy

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Extremely dissatisfied	2003	5,3	5,5	5,5
	1	1298	3,5	3,6	9,0
	2	2474	6,6	6,8	15,8
	3	3514	9,3	9,6	25,4
	4	3653	9,7	10,0	35,4
	5	5968	15,9	16,3	51,8
	6	4302	11,4	11,8	63,6
	7	5430	14,4	14,9	78,4
	8	4811	12,8	13,2	91,6
	9	1922	5,1	5,3	96,9
	Extremely satisfied	1150	3,1	3,1	100,0
	Total	36525	97,1	100,0	
Missing		1098	2,9		
Total		37623	100,0		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.38. Level of Education

		Frequency	Percentage	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Not completed ISCED level 1	504	1.34	1.34
	ISCED 1, completed primary education	3299	8.77	10.11
	Vocational ISCED 2C < 2 years, no access ISCED 3	21	0.06	10.16
	General/pre-vocational ISCED 2A/2B, access ISCED 3 vocational	831	2.21	12.37
	General ISCED 2A, access ISCED 3A general/all 3	4419	11.75	24.12
	Vocational ISCED 2C >= 2 years, no access ISCED 3	30	0.08	24.20
	Vocational ISCED 2A/2B, access ISCED 3 vocational	368	0.98	25.18
	Vocational ISCED 2, access ISCED 3 general/all	78	0.21	25.38
	Vocational ISCED 3C < 2 years, no access ISCED 5	869	2.31	27.69
	General ISCED 3 >=2 years, no access ISCED 5	144	0.38	28.08
	General ISCED 3A/3B, access ISCED 5B/lower tier 5A	185	0.49	28.57
	General ISCED 3A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5	3444	9.15	37.72
	Vocational ISCED 3C >= 2 years, no access ISCED 5	3611	9.60	47.32
	Vocational ISCED 3A, access ISCED 5B/ lower tier 5A	3022	8.03	55.35
	Vocational ISCED 3A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5	2956	7.86	63.21
	General ISCED 4A/4B, access ISCED 5B/lower tier 5A	34	0.09	63.30
	General ISCED 4A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5	99	0.26	63.56
	ISCED 4 programmes without access ISCED 5	554	1.47	65.03
	Vocational ISCED 4A/4B, access ISCED 5B/lower tier 5A	241	0.64	65.68
	Vocational ISCED 4A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5	1534	4.08	69.75
	ISCED 5A short, intermediate/academic/general tertiary below bachelor	374	0.99	70.75
	ISCED 5B short, advanced vocational qualifications	2408	6.40	77.15
	ISCED 5A medium, bachelor/equivalent from lower tier tertiary	2066	5.49	82.64
	ISCED 5A medium, bachelor/equivalent from upper/single tier tertiary	1854	4.93	87.57
	ISCED 5A long, master/equivalent from lower tier tertiary	807	2.14	89.71
	ISCED 5A long, master/equivalent from upper/single tier tertiary	3298	8.77	98.48
	ISCED 6, doctoral degree	335	0.89	99.37
	Total	37385		

	Other	108	0.29	99.65
	Refusal	43	0.11	99.77
	Don't know	74	0.20	99.97
	No answer	13	0.03	100.00
Total		37623		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.39. Placement on Left Right Scale

		Frequency	Percentage	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Left	1190	3.16	3.16
	1	770	2.05	5.21
	2	1927	5.12	10.33
	3	3625	9.64	19.97
	4	3425	9.10	29.07
	5	11079	29.45	58.52
	6	3426	9.11	67.62
	7	3571	9.49	77.12
	8	2639	7.01	84.13
	9	771	2.05	86.18
	Right	1033	2.75	88.93
	Total	33456		
	Refusal	455	1.21	90.14
	Don't know	3703	9.84	99.98
	No answer	9	0.02	100.00
Total		37623		

Note. Based on ESS, round 7.

Table B.40. Neighbors: People of a different race

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Mentioned	1499	8,4	8,6	8,6
	Not mentioned	16031	90,0	91,4	100,0
	Total	17530	98,4	100,0	
Missing		287	1,6		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.41. Neighbors: Immigrants/Foreign Workers

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Mentioned	2120	11,9	12,1	12,1
	Not mentioned	15411	86,5	87,9	100,0
	Total	17531	98,4	100,0	
Missing		286	1,6		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.42. Neighbors: People who Speak a Different Language

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Mentioned	1947	10,9	11,1	11,1
	Not mentioned	15590	87,5	88,9	100,0
	Total	17537	98,4	100,0	
Missing		280	1,6		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.43. Immigration Policy Preference

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Prohibit people coming here from other countries	2054	11,5	11,8	11,8
	Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here	7124	40,0	40,8	52,6
	Let people come as long as there are jobs available	5889	33,1	33,8	86,4
	Let anyone come who wants to	2378	13,3	13,6	100,0
	Total	17445	97,9	100,0	
Missing		372	2,1		
Total		17817	100,0		

Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.44. Impact of Immigrants on the Development of the Country

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Rather bad	1460	8,2	8,4	8,4
	Quite bad	3045	17,1	17,5	25,9
	Neither good, nor bad	8256	46,3	47,4	73,3

	Quite good	3418	19,2	19,6	92,9
	Very good	1242	7,0	7,1	100,0
	Total	17421	97,8	100,0	
Missing		396	2,2		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.45. Immigration in Your Country: Strengthens Cultural Diversity

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Disagree	4535	25,5	26,4	26,4
	Hard to Say	3814	21,4	22,2	48,7
	Agree	8803	49,4	51,3	100,0
	Total	17152	96,3	100,0	
Missing		665	3,7		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.46. Immigration in Your Country: Increases the Crime Rate

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Agree	8266	46,4	47,8	47,8
	Hard to Say	4304	24,2	24,9	72,7
	Disagree	4724	26,5	27,3	100,0
	Total	17294	97,1	100,0	
Missing		523	2,9		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.47. Immigration in Your Country: Increases Unemployment

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Agree	9535	53,5	54,7	54,7
	Hard to Say	3595	20,2	20,6	75,4
	Disagree	4289	24,1	24,6	100,0
	Total	17419	97,8	100,0	
Missing		398	2,2		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.48. Correlation Matrix for the "Acceptance" Indicator

	Race	Foreign workers	Language
Race	1		
Foreign workers	0.505	1	
Language	0.487	0.426	1

Figure B.4. Scree Test for "Acceptance" Components



Table B.49. Kaiser-Meyer-Olklin Test for "Acceptance" Components

Variable	KMO
Race	0.651
Foreign Workers	0.687
Language	0.701
Overall	0.678

Table B.50. Most People Can be Trusted

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Need to be very careful	15125	84,9	85,8	85,8
	Mos people can be trusted	2512	14,1	14,2	100,0
	Total	17637	99,0	100,0	
Missing		180	1,0		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.51. Confidence: The Government

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	None at all	6861	38,5	39,0	39,0
	Not very much	6770	38,0	38,4	77,4
	Quite a lot	2933	16,5	16,7	94,1
	A great deal	1045	5,9	5,9	100,0
	Total	17609	98,8	100,0	
Missing	Sistema	208	1,2		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.52. Confidence: The Political Parties

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	None at all	8780	49,3	49,9	49,9
	Not very much	7031	39,5	39,9	89,8
	Quite a lot	1451	8,1	8,2	98,1
	A great deal	343	1,9	1,9	100,0
	Total	17605	98,8	100,0	
Missing	Sistema	212	1,2		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.53. Confidence: Parliament

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.

Valid	None at all	7930	44,5	45,5	45,5
	Not very much	7138	40,1	40,9	86,4
	Quite a lot	1919	10,8	11,0	97,4
	A great deal	449	2,5	2,6	100,0
	Total	17436	97,9	100,0	
Missing	Sistema	381	2,1		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.54. Confidence: Armed Forces

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	None at all	3197	17,9	18,2	18,2
	Not very much	6011	33,7	34,3	52,5
	Quite a lot	5162	29,0	29,5	82,0
	A great deal	3154	17,7	18,0	100,0
	Total	17524	98,4	100,0	
Missing		293	1,6		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.55. Confidence: The Police

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	None at all	4422	24,8	25,0	25,0
	Not very much	6715	37,7	38,0	63,0
	Quite a lot	4697	26,4	26,6	89,5
	A great deal	1853	10,4	10,5	100,0
	Total	17687	99,3	100,0	
Missing		130	0,7		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.56. Confidence: Justice System/Courts

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	None at all	5301	29,8	30,3	30,3
	Not very much	6995	39,3	40,0	70,3
	Quite a lot	3949	22,2	22,6	92,8
	A great deal	1254	7,0	7,2	100,0

	Total	17499	98,2	100,0
Missing		318	1,8	
Total		17817	100,0	

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.57. Confidence: The United Nations (UN)

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	None at all	3883	21,8	24,5	24,5
	Not very much	6067	34,1	38,3	62,8
	Quite a lot	4188	23,5	26,4	89,2
	A great deal	1708	9,6	10,8	100,0
	Total	15846	88,9	100,0	
Missing		1971	11,1		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.58. Correlation Matrix for the "National Institutions" Components

	Government	Pol. Parties	Parliament
Government	1		
Pol. Parties	0.555	1	
Parliament	0.585	0.684	1

Figure B.5. Scree Test for "National Institutions" Components



Table B.59. Kaiser-Meyer-Olklin Test for "National Institutions" Components

Variable	KMO
Government	0.780
Pol. Parties	0.688
Parliament	0.670
Overall	0.705

Table B.60. Age of the Correspondent

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	16	28	0,2	0,2	0,2
	17	99	0,6	0,6	0,7
	18	558	3,1	3,1	3,8
	19	535	3,0	3,0	6,8
	20	479	2,7	2,7	9,5
	21	454	2,5	2,5	12,1
	22	436	2,4	2,4	14,5
	23	412	2,3	2,3	16,8
	24	445	2,5	2,5	19,3
	25	429	2,4	2,4	21,8
	26	365	2,0	2,0	23,8
	27	405	2,3	2,3	26,1
	28	417	2,3	2,3	28,4
	29	403	2,3	2,3	30,7
	30	502	2,8	2,8	33,5
	31	368	2,1	2,1	35,6
	32	396	2,2	2,2	37,8
	33	375	2,1	2,1	39,9
	34	378	2,1	2,1	42,0
	35	379	2,1	2,1	44,1
	36	318	1,8	1,8	45,9
	37	336	1,9	1,9	47,8
	38	348	2,0	2,0	49,8
	39	308	1,7	1,7	51,5
	40	376	2,1	2,1	53,6
	41	271	1,5	1,5	55,1
	42	333	1,9	1,9	57,0
	43	305	1,7	1,7	58,7
	44	296	1,7	1,7	60,4

45	341	1,9	1,9	62,3
46	279	1,6	1,6	63,9
47	295	1,7	1,7	65,5
48	293	1,6	1,6	67,2
49	297	1,7	1,7	68,8
50	297	1,7	1,7	70,5
51	199	1,1	1,1	71,6
52	257	1,4	1,4	73,1
53	282	1,6	1,6	74,6
54	242	1,4	1,4	76,0
55	277	1,6	1,6	77,5
56	262	1,5	1,5	79,0
57	245	1,4	1,4	80,4
58	251	1,4	1,4	81,8
59	193	1,1	1,1	82,9
60	295	1,7	1,7	84,5
61	175	1,0	1,0	85,5
62	225	1,3	1,3	86,8
63	198	1,1	1,1	87,9
64	192	1,1	1,1	89,0
65	252	1,4	1,4	90,4
66	169	0,9	0,9	91,3
67	192	1,1	1,1	92,4
68	162	0,9	0,9	93,3
69	127	0,7	0,7	94,0
70	162	0,9	0,9	95,0
71	109	0,6	0,6	95,6
72	98	0,6	0,6	96,1
73	94	0,5	0,5	96,6
74	72	0,4	0,4	97,0
75	76	0,4	0,4	97,5
76	61	0,3	0,3	97,8
77	59	0,3	0,3	98,1
78	65	0,4	0,4	98,5
79	51	0,3	0,3	98,8
80	55	0,3	0,3	99,1
81	29	0,2	0,2	99,3
82	29	0,2	0,2	99,4
83	17	0,1	0,1	99,5
84	22	0,1	0,1	99,7
85	14	0,1	0,1	99,7
86	7	0,0	0,0	99,8
87	12	0,1	0,1	99,8
88	6	0,0	0,0	99,9
89	8	0,0	0,0	99,9
90	3	0,0	0,0	99,9

	91	5	0,0	0,0	100,0
	92	3	0,0	0,0	100,0
	93	2	0,0	0,0	100,0
	94	2	0,0	0,0	100,0
	Total	17812	100,0	100,0	
Missing		5	0,0		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.61. Gender of the Correspondent

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Male	8677	48,7	48,7	48,7
	Female	9138	51,3	51,3	100,0
	Total	17815	100,0	100,0	
Missing		2	0,0		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.62. Employment status

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Full time (30 hours a week or more)	5382	30,2	30,5	30,5
	Part time (less than 30 hours a week)	1741	9,8	9,9	40,4
	Self employed	3176	17,8	18,0	58,4
	Retired/pensioned	1612	9,0	9,1	67,6
	Housewife not otherwise employed	2599	14,6	14,7	82,3
	Student	1090	6,1	6,2	88,5
	Unemployed	1608	9,0	9,1	97,7
	Other	414	2,3	2,3	100,0
	Total	17622	98,9	100,0	
Missing		195	1,1		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.63. Respondent immigrant

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	NO	17267	96,9	97,4	97,4
	YES	465	2,6	2,6	100,0

	Total	17732	99,5	100,0
Missing		85	0,5	
Total		17817	100,0	

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.64. Mother Immigrant or Not

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	NO	16581	93,1	94,4	94,4
	YES	980	5,5	5,6	100,0
	Total	17561	98,6	100,0	
Missing		256	1,4		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.65. Father Immigrant or Not

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	NO	16585	93,1	94,8	94,8
	YES	914	5,1	5,2	100,0
	Total	17499	98,2	100,0	
Missing		318	1,8		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.66. Highest educational level: Respondent [ISCED 2011]

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Early childhood education (ISCED 0) / n	556	3,1	3,4	3,4
	Primary education (ISCED 1)	2343	13,2	14,5	18,0
	Lower secondary education (ISCED 2)	1795	10,1	11,1	29,1
	Upper secondary education (ISCED 3)	5127	28,8	31,8	60,9
	Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4)	1429	8,0	8,9	69,8
	Short-cycle tertiary education (ISCED 5)	1338	7,5	8,3	78,1
	Bachelor or equivalent (ISCED 6)	2739	15,4	17,0	95,0
	Master or equivalent (ISCED 7)	627	3,5	3,9	98,9
	Doctoral or equivalent (ISCED 8)	173	1,0	1,1	100,0

	Total	16127	90,5	100,0
Missing		1690	9,5	
Total		17817	100,0	

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.67. Scale of Incomes

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Lowest group	1820	10,2	10,5	10,5
	2	1067	6,0	6,1	16,6
	3	1803	10,1	10,4	26,9
	4	2309	13,0	13,3	40,2
	5	4182	23,5	24,0	64,2
	6	2439	13,7	14,0	78,2
	7	1962	11,0	11,3	89,5
	8	1159	6,5	6,7	96,1
	9	271	1,5	1,6	97,7
	Highest group	403	2,3	2,3	100,0
	Total	17415	97,7	100,0	
Missing		402	2,3		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

Table B.68. Left-Right Political Scale

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percent.	Cum. Percent.
Valid	Left	1699	9,5	11,0	11,0
	2	500	2,8	3,2	14,2
	3	885	5,0	5,7	19,9
	4	920	5,2	5,9	25,8
	5	4998	28,1	32,2	58,1
	6	1577	8,9	10,2	68,2
	7	1082	6,1	7,0	75,2
	8	1154	6,5	7,4	82,6
	9	566	3,2	3,6	86,3
	Right	2126	11,9	13,7	100,0
	Total	15507	87,0	100,0	
Missing		2310	13,0		
Total		17817	100,0		

Note. Based on WVS, round 7.

APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 4

Figure C.1. Social Acceptance in European Countries



Figure C.2. Speak Country's Official Language



Figure C.3. Committed to Way of Life



Figure C.4. Work Skills Needed in Country



Figure C.5. Be white



Figure C.6. Take Out/Create New Jobs

Figure C.7. Take Out More Than They Put



Figure C.8. Bad or Good for Economy



Figure C.9. Crime Made Worse or Better



Figure C.10. Religious Beliefs Undermined or Enriched



Figure C.11. Allow None/Many Immigrants of Different Race/Ethnic Group



Figure C.12. Cultural Life Undermined or Enriched



Figure C.13. Government Should be Generous Judging Applications for Refugee Status



Figure C.14. Interpersonal Trust in European Countries



Figure C.15. Trust in Country's Parliament



Figure C.16. Trust in Politicians



Figure C.17. Trust in Political Parties



Figure C.18. Trust in the Legal System



Figure C.19. Trust in European Parliament

Figure C.20. Trust in the Police



Figure C.21. Trust in the United Nations



APPENDIX D: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 5

Figure D.1. Neighbors: People of a Different Race



Figure D.2. Neighbors: Immigrants/Foreign Workers

Figure D.3. Neighbors: People who Speak a Different Language

Figure D.4. Impact of Immigrants on the Development of the Country



Figure D.5. Immigration Strengthens Cultural Diversity



Figure D.6. Immigration Increases the Crime Rate



Figure D.7. Immigration Increases Unemployment



Figure D.8. Immigration Policy Preferences



Figure D.9. Interpersonal Trust in American Countries



Figure D.10. Trust in the Government



Figure D.11. Trust in the Political Parties



Figure D.12. Trust in the Parliament



Figure D.13. Trust in the Armed Forces



Figure D.14. Trust in the Police



Figure D.15. Trust in the Supreme Court



Figure D.16. Trust in the United Nations



APPENDIX E: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 6

Figure E.1. Border Fence in Hungary

A police officer with a dog patrols along the border fence on the Hungarian-Serbian border on April 28, 2017.
Source. LINK

Figure E.2. Syrian Migrants Crossing the Hungary's Border

Syrian migrants cross under a fence into Hungary at the border with Serbia, near Roszke, Aug. 27, 2015.
Source. LINK

Figure E.3. Hungarian Journalist Filmed Kicking Migrants

An employee of a private television channel associated with Hungary's far-right Jobbik party was filmed kicking migrants.
Source. LINK